The characteristics of Australian policymaking in national security crises (with special reference to East Timor, 1999) by Connery, David
  THESES SIS/LIBRARY        TELEPHONE: +61 2 6125 4631 
R.G. MENZIES LIBRARY BUILDING NO:2      FACSIMILE:  +61 2 6125 4063 
THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY      EMAIL: library.theses@anu.edu.au 











USE OF THESES 
 
 
This copy is supplied for purposes 
of private study and research only. 
Passages from the thesis may not be  
copied or closely paraphrased without the  
written consent of the author. 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre 
Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies 
Australian National University 
The Characteristics of Australian 
Policymaking in National Security 
Crises 
(with special reference to East Timor, 1999) 
A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of 
The Australian National University 
David Keith Connery 
January 2008 
Abstract 
This dissertation identifies the consistent and variable characteristics of crisis 
policymaking in Australia, and identifies the reasons why characteristics may change. 
Importantly, this dissertation is about policymaking processes, not judgments about the 
success, morality or effectiveness of Australian policies. 
The analysis is conducted through three main stages. The first involves identifying 
characteristics for national security policymaking through an examination of the literature 
of foreign and defence policy. The second stage refines these into characteristics of crisis 
policymaking through an examination of three crises for Australian policymakers and a 
study of the emergence of the modern crisis policymaking system. These tentative 
characteristics of crisis policymaking, which are organised using the Australian Policy 
Cycle, are tested through a case study of the East Tim or Crisis of 1999. 
The final stage involves reducing a list of twenty-two characteristics into an essential 
group of five. These five include recognising the centrality of the national security 
executive; the collegial nature of crisis policymaking; the relative importance of external 
over domestic actors; the closed and secretive nature of the process; and the complicated 
and complex nature of implementation. The dissertation also identifies political preference 
and the contingent nature of crises as the main factors driving change in this system. 
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AUSTRALIAN POLICYMAKING IN NATIONAL SECURITY 
CRISES: AN INTRODUCTION 
Examining policymaking in crises 
Depictions of government actions in cnses feature prominently in popular 
entertainment. They make great viewing, offering focused stories with heroes and villains, 
rapid action and razor-sharp tension. The academic community also pays significant 
attention to political crises, adding to the understanding of how governments operate under 
extreme pressure and uncertainty. However, the literature (and many popular 
representations) about crises tends to be dominated by work concerning the United States 
(US) political system1, a focus on the top leadership group and the point of decision, and 
the interplay between competing nation-states. 
Some authors think each crisis is unique or 'context-dependent' 2, with its own 
physical characteristics, specific time and location, and impact upon history. Describing 
this as a 'common misunderstanding' , Brandstrom, Bynander and 't Hart point to some 
underlying features that crises share, such as the recourse to history to make sense of events 
and the challenges policymakers and communities often face when confronted by crises.3 
While these two characteristics may be correct, policymaking-which is defined as the 
process of providing advice to ministers and implementing their decisions4- in crisis has 
additional similarities and differences that can be identified and explored. 
These gaps in the existing literature about crises offer two main opportunities for 
further study. The first is to examine policymaking inside a single government at three 
distinct levels of activity, simultaneously examining policy activity from its inception in 
issue identification through decision to the nominal endpoint of evaluation. This deeper 
study of crisis policymaking allows a detailed and comprehensive consideration of many 
2 
Some excellent work on ahout crises outside the US exists includes the collection of papers in 
U Rosenthal, P 't Hart, and MT Charles (eds), Coping With Crises: The Management of Disasters, Riots 
and Terrorism, Charles C Thomas, Springfield, 1989. See also treatments of specific crises such as 
J Bowen, Six Days: How the 1967 War Shaped the Middle East, Pocket Books, London, 2003; and 
R Gerodimos, 'The UK BSE Crisis as a Failure o f Government', Public Administration, no. 82, no. 4, 
2004. 
AL George, 'A Provisional Theory of Crisis Management', in AL George (ed), Avoiding War: Problems 
of Crisis Managemenr, Westview Press, Boulder, 199 J, pp. 23-4. 
A Brandstrom, F Bynander, and P 't Hart, 'Governing by looking back: Historical analogies and crisis 
management' , Public Administrarion, vol. 82, no. 1, 2004, p. I 91. 
I am grateful to my colleague, Boh Wylie, for his lucid contribution to this definition. 
1 
internal policy actors, so providing a better understanding of what characterises this 
specific type of policymaking. The second opportunity is to look at Australia' s approach to 
managing past crises; this provides a way to think about how future Australian 
governments might approach the task of organising for and managing future crises. 
Objectives of this dissertation 
Aim and contribution 
This dissertation addresses the two opportunities described above by identifying the 
consistent and variable characteristics of policymaking in Australian national security 
crises. It argues that the characteristics of Australian crisis policymaking are basically 
enduring, even though the system itself changes due to the contingent nature of crises and 
political preferences. The evidence to support this proposition is developed in two parts. 
Part I develops characteristics for crisis policymaking by drawing on Australia's 
experience over the last seventy years. This experience includes an examination of the 
literature about national security, historical examples of crises and a study of how the 
modern crisis policymaking system emerged. These characteristics are tested in Part II 
through a case study of Australian policymaking during the East Timor crisis of 1999. This 
examination conducts further analysis of the characteristics of crisis policymaking, and 
offers explanation as to why they changed or remained consistent in this case. 
This dissertation aims to make two major contributions to the knowledge of 
Australia's political system. The first is to the understanding of crisis policymaking in 
Australia. This will be achieved, in part, by analysing the literature on foreign and defence 
policymaking, earlier instances of crisis, and the emergence of the modern crisis (and 
national security) policymaking system. The second contribution will be made by 
understanding how the Australian Government and its agencies operated during 1999's 
East Timor crisis. Such a contribution is especially worthwhile because the policymaking 
aspect of this crisis has yet to receive detailed attention.5 The dissertation also aims to make 
This problem was identified by J Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: intervention and its 
aftermath in Southeast Asia, Routledge, London, 2004, p. 123. This is not to say that the issue of 
Australian policymaking in 1999 has gone totally unnoticed. Authors have paid considerable auentio n to 
the 'Howard Letter' of December 1998 and the creation of the International Force East Timor 
(INTERFET) in September 1999. Examples of the literature include D Greenlees and R Garran, 
Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor's Fight for Freedom, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2002, 
pp. 84-7; A Ryan, Primary responsibilities and primary risks: Australian Defence Force participation in 
2 
a small methodological contribution by combining a policy cycle with interviews and other 
sources in an analytica] process that describes policymaking across multiple domains of 
actjvity. 
Why is East Timor worth examining? 
The 1999 East Tim or crisis is worth cxammmg because it changed Australia's 
relationships with regional nations and Australian policy in the early twenty-first century. 
This crisis brought a geopolitical transformation in Australia's region as independent 
Timor-Leste was born, creating a nation that will need international assistance for some 
time yet.6 The crisis also had negative implications for the AustraJia-Indonesia relationship, 
which still suffers some of the effects of this intervention. 
This crisis is also worthy of study because it represented the beginning of new 
directions in foreign and defence policy under Prime Minister John Howard (1996-2007). 
In terms of foreign policy, the East Timer crisis re-shaped Australia's view of its regional 
role, culminating in assertive stances over terrorism and political instability in the South-
West Pacific. The intervention into East Timer also showed the need to reconsider 
Australia's defence policy after a long period dominated by the Defence of Australia 
concept.7 The strengths and deficiencies of this policy were displayed as an Australian-led 
international miJitary force deployed not to block an invading force but to stabjJise the 
(still-Indonesian) province.8 This force, known as the International Force East Timor 
(INTERFET), involved a significant proportion of Australia' s front-line combat troops in 
6 
the international Force East Timar, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon, 2000; and T Fischer, Seven 
Days in East Timar: Ballots and Bullets, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 2000, Chapter l. The 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) produced a book explaining many aspects of policy 
around the c risis (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timar in Transition 1998-2000: An 
Australian Policy Challenge, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2001 ). William Maley also wrote a 
sharp critique of DFA T's role (W Maley, 'Australia and the East T imor Crisis: Some Critical 
Comments', Australian Journal of international Affairs, vol. 54 , no. 2 , 2000). Some have reported the 
events inaccurately as well- for example, see I McPhedran, The Amazing SAS: The Inside Story of 
Australia 's Special Forces, HarperCollins, Sydney, 2005, pp. 25-7. 
For one analysis that identifies the major areas requiring assistance and reform, see International Crisis 
Group, Resolving Timor-Leste's Crisis, Asia Report N°120, 2006. 
Jn simple terms, the Defence of Austral ia concept stresses defence of the sea-air gap to Australia's north 
and emphasises the importance of maintaining self-reliant forces to protect Australian territory. It 
provides an alternative to a ' forward defence ' posture that involves basing outside Australia (mainly in 
Southeast Asia) and force structure priorities that emphasi se coalition operations. For a discussion, see 
M Evans, Frum Deakin 10 Dibb: The Army and the Making of Australian S1ra1egy in the 20th Cen1ury, 
Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon, 2001, pp. 17-33. 
These strengths and deficiencies are identified in Ryan, Primary responsibilities and Australian National 
Audit Office, Management of Australian Defence Force Deployments to East Timor, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canbe1Ta, 2002. 
3 
an ongoing cornmitment.9 This intervention also highlighted important gaps in Australian 
military force structures and readiness that were eventually addressed by a significant 
increase in defence spending and an extensive program of capital equipment acquisitions. 10 
These points make this dissertation especially worthwhile because Australia's strategic 
environment continues to change in response to broader systemic forces and changes 
created by Australian foreign policy. The likelihood of new crises emerging in Australia' s 
region makes it essential for the Australian Government to learn from its experience. 
This introduction continues by defining the key terms of 'national security' and 
'crisis', and distinguishing between the related concepts of 'crisis management' and 'crisis 
policymaking'. The research methodology is then discussed, before the dissertation's 
remaining chapters are outlined. 
Defining crisis policymaking 
National security and crisis 
Although the term 'national security' is used frequenlly in Australian debate and 
practice, any attempt to define it is open to challenge. For example, past Australian political 
leaders often refened to national security as 'the first responsibility of government' .11 
These same Australian Governments made no attempt to define national security, or to 
discuss the relative merits of defining the referent for security as the amorphous 'Australian 
nation'. Australian Governments generally expect unified effort under the banner of 
national security, and this policy area attracts the 'close interest' of senior politicians. 12 
National security is also used frequently in organisational titles within the Australian 
Government. For example, the term is included in the titles of the modern Australian crisis 
policymaking system's two main structural components-the National Security Committee 
of Cabinet (NSCC) and Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCONS). The 
9 It should be noted thal Lhe original Australian commitment of around 4500 in lalc 1999 (INTERFET) was 
gradually reduced to three staff officers by rnid-2005 (Operation CHlRON). The numbers swelled again 
to over !000 after violence broke out in April 2006 (OperaLion ASTUTE) (DcparLment of Defence, 
' Global Operations and Exercises', available hup://www.defence.gov.au, accessed 28 September 2006). 




For examples, see .J Howard, 'Getting the big things right: goals and responsibiliries in a Fourth Term ', in 
Address to the Enterprise Forum Lunch, Adelaide, 8 July 2004, available http://www.pm.gov.au, 
accessed 12 July 2007; and Dr B Nelson, 'Australian Government Strengthens Defence Legislation ', 
Media Release 13 February 2006, available http://www.defence.gov.au, accessed 12 July 2007). 
P Waters, 'At War with Terror', in N Cater (ed), The Howard Factor: a decade that changed the nation, 
Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2006, p. 165. 
4 
organisation charged with coordinating related policies in the Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C) is called National Security Division. Other departments, 
including Attorney-General's and hnmigration, have organisational units with 'National 
Security' in their titles. While the boundaries of this concept may be indistinct, there is no 
escaping national security in discussions about contemporary Australian politics. 
As a result, this dissertation uses national security in a traditional and instrumental 
way. It is defined as protecting or advancing the nation-state's sovereignty, borders, 
interests and political system from perceived or actual threats, as defined by the 
government of the day. 13 National security policy, therefore, attempts to coordinate and 
deploy the relevant instruments of national power-primarily those relating to diplomacy, 
information, military forces, law enforcement, and economic potential-to achieve the 
political ends desired by the govemment. 14 
National security policy is made in three modes. The first, deliberate policy, aims to 
shape the environment for Australia's security through changes to instruments such as 
military posture, trade relationships, diplomatic initiatives and foreign aid. This mode of 
policy is generally communicated through statements and documents. The second mode 
also unfolds over longer time-frames and involves the acquisition or development of 
capability. This capability mode primarily involves military, intelligence and law-
enforcement equipment purchases, but other ingredients are also important-including 
changes to training programs, doctrine and organisational structures. The third mode, and 
the main focus of this dissertation, is crisis policymaking. 
'Crisis' is another contested and ambiguous concept in political science-even if a 
crisis is readily identified in practice. The main differences between the various definitions 
13 
14 
The traditional view of national security-which contrasts with 'global' and 'human' security-is not 
static. Today, traditional security concerns are broadening from the formerly military-dominant focus to 
include non-military challenges such as pandemics, transnational crime and terrorism (see CA Snyder, 
'Contemporary Security and Strategy', in Snyder (ed), Contemporar_y Security and Strategy, Deakin 
University/MacMillan Press, Hounds mills, 1999; and D Mutimer, 'Beyond Strategy: Critical Thinking 
and New Security Studies', in Snyder, pp. 77-81 ). The conceptualisation of security taken in this 
dissertation also follows B Buzan, People States and Fear: An Agenda for international Security Studies 
in the Post Cold War-Era, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1991. 
Changes in the security environment since the J 1 September 2001 terrorist attacks and broader changes 
created by globalisation and technological advances make it harder to distinguish between national (or 
external) security and domestic (homeland) security. While the relationships between the external and 
domestic are acknowledged, it is still possible to consider the two separately because the policy 
processes, actors and instruments used in these two areas remain different, despite overlaps. The 
distinction is also warranted because it is consistent with practice during the period examined in this 
dissertation. 
5 
of crisis concern its constituent conditions, the linkage between effect and event, and the 
category of issues involved. In one definition, Michael Brecher lists the necessary 
conditions for a crisis as including a threat to basic values, a high probability of military 
hostilities and a finite response time. 15 Others have added the conditions of surprise or 
unexpected events 16, while some attempt to make a definition of crisis applicable to a range 
of calamitous situations by using a formula based on threat, urgency and uncertainty. 17 
While time, threat, surprise and uncertainty are candidates for a definitional list, it 
can be difficult to argue that all are necessary conditions. For example, time has an 
uncertain place in a definition. Some crises may indeed arise and dissipate quickly, as in the 
famous thirteen days of October 1962. 18 Others may build over time, and last for a 
significant period, such as the twenty-year crisis described by Carr. 19 Other crises might 
last for a long time, but have periods of greater and lesser intensity. In the case of East 
Timar, the crisis lasted for eleven months (from the Australian policymaking perspective) 
and contained a six-week period of acute crisis.20 
A further problem arises from the way 'crisis' can be applied to almost any 
relationship. As a result, situations as diverse as political contests21 , the economy, public 
relations22, and social relationships have all received attention under the banner of crisis. 
While crisis is indeed a useful aid to understanding in many such instances, this broad 
usage threatens to make the concept highly subjective. 
The possibility that a crisis might not actually involve military conflict should be 
considered, particularly where strained relations occur between parties without military 
forces or in situations where force is specifically excluded from one party's options. 
15 B M recher, 'State Behaviour in International Crisis', Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 23, no. 3, 1979, 
p. 447. See a lso GH Snyder and P Dicsling, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision Making and 
System Structure in International Crises, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1977, p. 6. 
16 P.J Haney, Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisers and the Management of Decision 
Making, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1997, p. 2; and CF Hermann, Crises in Foreign 
Policy: A Simulation Analysis, Bobbs-Merri ll , Indianapolis, 1969, p. 414. Surprise may not always be a 
necessary condition. For example, see Brecher, 'State Behaviour in International Crisis', p. 448. 
17 Rosenthal , 't Hart and Charles, p. 439. 
18 This event has exerted a strong influence of the understanding of crisis, mainly through 
GT Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1st edn, Harper Collins, 197 1. 
19 lt should be noted this characterisation was applied after the event. See EH Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 
1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations, 2nd edn, MacMillan, London, 1948. 
20 The Australian perspective is discussed in more detai l in Chapter 4. 
21 For example, CJ Morgan, The first minister in Australia: studies of the office in crisis situations, 1920-
1941, unpublished PhD thesis, Australian National University, 1968. 
22 Such as G Howell, Description of the Relationship Between the Crisis Life Cycle and Mass Media 
Content, unpublished thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2003. 
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Indeed, military conflict may be averted precisely because of the actions of the parties in 
crisis. To this end, Coral Bell directs our understanding towards the repercussions of the 
crisis by introducing the idea of ' transformation' to the definition. She argues that the 
'essence of true crisis in any given relationship is that the conflicts within it rise to a level 
which threatens to transform the nature of the relationship' .23 This focus on relationships 
and change is important because it promotes consideration of the long-term implications of 
crisis, and includes crises that do not necessarily involve armed conflict.24 These main 
features-threats to values or goals, uncertainty, possibility that violence may be used, 
compressed timelines for decision and transformati ve potential-provide the specific 
context that makes crisis important and distinguishable from other political events. 
Given the way crisis can interfere in many relationships, this dissertation limits its 
examination to national security crises. In this context, a national security crisis is a 
situation, as defined by a government, where sovereignty, international relationships or 
national interests are jeopardised by real or perceived threats from other actors. fu response 
to a threat, governments invoke their responsibility to secure the nation' s interests to 
neutralise, remove or ameliorate that threat. 
In the national security context, crisis creates a policy dilemma when neither side 
will concede and risk damage to its interests. This dilemma forms around decisions about 
the means employed and options that may or may not be pursed. The dilemma also appears 
when decision-makers must choose between actions that restrain conflict but do not bring 
success, and actions that lead to a favourable resolution but risk costs that exceed the value 
of winning.25 After all, raw emotion can lead to inadvertent escalation and a fight over 
goals or values that are not crucial to one or both sides.26 This potential for unwanted 





C Bell , The Conventions of Crisis: A Study in Diplomatic Management, Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, London, 1971, p . 9. 
Karl Deutsch uses the idea of 'turning points ' in a similar way. See K Deutsch, 'Crisis Decision-Making: 
The Information Approach', in D Fre i (ed), Managing International Crises, Sage Publications, Beverly 
Hills, 1982, p. 15. 
George, p. 23. 
26 Clausewitz wrote of the spiral of emotion as having the propensi ty to push confl ict to extremes of 
violence. See C von Clausewitz, On War, trans. M Howard and P Paret, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 1976 , p. 77. 
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The now-famous statement by Robert McNamara, then-US Defense Secretary, that 
'there is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis management' heJped to increase 
the visibility of crisis as a means of understanding politics.27 While this statement is catchy 
and certainly relevant, 'crisis management' is not the best way to discuss the totality of how 
governments act in times of crisis. This is because crisis management, in general usage, 
refers to the process of managing potential conflict between states.28 As a result, most 
literature about crisis management deals with how two states (one often being the United 
States) worked though difficult, often potentially violent, situations. There is also a 
significant focus on how crises move into armed conflict and the relationship between 
military forces, diplomacy and political objectives.29 Others focus on crisis decision-
making, effectively conflating the entire process with the actions of political leaders.30 
Some have tried to use crisis management as a blanket term for the process of dealing with 
a crisis31 , but the term's preponderant meaning has settled towards relationships between 
governments, signals sent and missed, and the actions and counteractions that constitute the 
crisis. 
Applying the established concept of crisis management therefore risks overlooking 
intra-governmental activity, which is the main subject of this dissertation. An examination 
of this activity requires a broader focus that includes important sub-processes within 
governments such as issue identification, policy analysis, consultation and implementation. 
As a consequence, this dissertation uses 'policymaking' to provide a conceptual basis for a 






Quoted in C Bell , Crises and Policy-makers, Canberra Studies in World Affairs no. 10, Department of 
International Relations, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982, p. 29. 
For example, see Deutsch, 'Crisis Decision-Making'; CF Hermann, 'Types of crises and conclusions for 
crisis management', in D Frei (ed), International crises and crisis management, Saxon House, 
Westmead, 1978; and the essays in GR Winham (ed), New issues in international crisis management, 
Westview Press, Boulder 1988. Richardson notes other problems associated with linking the terms crisis 
and management, for this implies an element of control on the part of the parties (JL Richardson, 'Crisis 
Management: A Critical Appraisal', in Winham, p. 14-15). 
Much of this work followed Allison, Essence of Decision (1st cdn). George codified the relationship been 
these agents (George, p. 25). Richardson also noted the pervasive influence of the Cuban case of 
subsequent crisis scholarship (see Richardson, p. 14). 
For example, Y Dror, Policymaking Under Adversity, Transaction Books, New Brunswick, 1986, 
p. 181 ; IL Janis, Groupthink: psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes, 2nd edn, Houg hton 
Mifflin, Boston, 1982; IL Janis, Crucial Decisions: Leadership in Policymaking and Crisis Management, 
The Free Press, New York, 1989; and Haney, p. 19. 
An exception is Rosenthal and Pijnenberg, who discuss the internal workings of governments in their 
study of crisis management. See U Rosenthal and B Pijnenburg, 'Simulation-orientatio n scenarios: An 
alternative approach to crisis decision-making and emergency management', in U Rosenthal and 
B Pijnenburg (eds), Crisis Management and Decision Making: Simulation Oriented Scenarios, Kluwer 
Academic Publishers, Dortrecht, 199 1, pp. 1-3. 
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Policymaking 
Policymaking, as defined earlier, describes the structures and processes of a state that 
link advice and actions of appointed officials (in Australia's case, public servants) with 
their elected ministers. Thus the policymaking process is not concerned with the content or 
assessment of decisions per se. It is concerned with how advice supported decisions, how 
decision processes worked, and how decisions were translated into activities aimed to 
satisfy policy objectives. 
It would be misleading to portray policymaking as an activity that is conducted in the 
same way, every time. Policymaking is a complex process that must account for the 
presence of competing and changing forces within a political system. This system is 
bounded by elements such as constitutions, party systems and bureaucratic institutions that 
remain relatively constant, or change only very slowly. Furthermore, policymaking 
processes can change between iterations, within these boundaries. 
Different explanations have been offered to account for system change. Walcott and 
Hult, in their study of changes in governance structures by US presidents, identify three 
major groups of influences: environmental, presidential choice and organisational. These 
three represent a very broad range of factors. For instance, the environmental grouping 
incorporates changing technology and different roles for domestic, internal and foreign 
actors. Presidential choice brings presidential objectives and presidential strategy together, 
which subsume possible influences such as personal style. Organisational influences 
include factors such as previous structures, learning and 'turf' - that is, the different 
responsibilities and interests of different parts of the government. 
This complexity makes a number of qualifications necessary before a policy cycle 
framework is used to organise analysis. Meredith Edwards summarised these qualifications 
well: 
• Policy processes are non-linear, in that they can move backwards as well as 
forwards and stages might be executed in a different order from the model. 
• Organisational structures are important to policy development and will 
influence the process. 
• Players and networks operating in the process will influence policy outcomes. 
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• Political considerations are all pervading: 'Good policy processes can tame, 
but only to a degree, the political process'.32 
With these caveats in mind, a policy cycle breaks the complex process of 
policymaking into separate, linked steps. These steps usually identify issues and gather 
information so insider experts can present policy options to leaders who, in tum, may make 
decisions. Once made, decisions are implemented-often by officials and sometimes by 
society at large. Other rational models include an evaluation stage, which allows for a 
return to the start of the cycle or process.33 The strength of these models lies in their 
representation of sequential tasks that are conducted as policy is developed, decided and 
then implemented. Their cyclic design also highlights the process nature of government, 
describes how knowledge is synthesised, and provides a way to examine actual policy.34 
The examination of policymaking conducted in this dissertation will use the 
Australian Policy Cycle as an organising heuristic. As such, the policy cycle is used to 
structure the analysis and allow comparison, by phase, between different instances of 
policymaking. The Australian Policy Cycle presents these phases as issue identification, 
policy analysis, policy instruments, consultation, coordination, decision, implementation, 
and evaluation which- since this is a cycle- returns to the issue identification phase. This 
cycle is depicted in Figure 1, while the characteristics of each phase are outlined in 
Chapter 1. 35 




Social Sciences in Australia Policy Paper #2, Canberra, 2004, pp. 6-7. 
For an example of a ra tional comprehensive approach to policy see Y Dror, Public Policymaking 
Reexamined, Chandler Publishing Company, Scranton, 1968. 
P Bridgman and G Davi s, The Australian Policy Handbook, 3rd edn, Allen and U nwin, Sydney, 2004, 
p. 22- 3. Another example of a po licy cycle can be found in B Jenkins, 'Policy analysis: Models and 
approaches ' , in M Hill (cd), The Policy Process: A Reader, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Heme] Hampstead, 
1993, pp. 34-9. 
This dissertation groups the early phases of the policy cycle from identifying issues to policy instruments 
under the heading 'Developing policy advice', the middle stages of coordination and consultation as 
'Bringing advice together' , and the later phases of decision, implementation and evalua tio n as 'Decision 
and beyond'. These groupings have been created to allow the di scussion to be presented logically and 
concisely in Part II. 
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The Australian Policy Cycle is simplistic because it depicts a complex process 
containing equally complex sub-processes flowing from one starting point to the next. For 
instance, the singular policy analysis phase conceals competing sources of policy analysis 
and the range of possible methods, such as cost-benefit analysis and opportunity cost 
analysis. It is also difficult to capture the iterative nature of some policy events or show 
how feedback occurs at many points in the cycle. Furthermore, it would not be correct to 
assume that resources are distributed evenly within the policy cycle, for some areas to be 
given only limited attention when constraints-such as stated political preferences and 
deadlines-dictate. 37 
It is also important to acknowledge other limitations of the policy cycle. The first and 
major limitation is that policy cycles do not provide causal explanations of how policy 
moves from one stage to another. Secondly, policy cycles have inherent limitations because 
they impose rationalism on an endeavour often described by non-rational terms such as 
36 
37 
Bridgman and Davis, p. 26. 
S Everett, The Policy Cycle: Democratic Proce s or Rational Paradigm Revisi ted?' , Australian Journal 
of Public Administration vol. 62, no. 2, 2003, p. 70. 
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'incrementalism', 'satisficing' and 'muddling through' .38 The third limitation is that policy 
cycles do not always fit examples of policymaking from real life, and ignore the multiple 
levels of government and interacting cycles. 39 They do not help us to understand who plays 
in the cycle or the relationships between these actors. As a result, the policy cycle alone is 
unable to help determine which explanations for policymaking behaviour are the most 
powerful.40 These reasons make it important not to claim too much for the explanatory 
power of this model. 
On the other hand, the simplicity and completeness of the Australian Policy Cycle 
makes it a good tool for teaching people about policymaking.4 1 The model is also very 
useful for comparing similar phenomena, including different instances of crisis 
policymaking and their related structures and processes. 
Crisis policymaking, as used in this dissertation, is the mode of national security 
policymaking used when challenges (possibly unexpected and potentially very damaging) 
emerge to threaten to transfonn one nation-state's relationship with others, thereby creating 
a threat to existing goals or values.42 Crisis policymaking may involve efforts to 'prevent 
crises from occurring, to prepare for a better protection against the impact of a crisis agent, 
to make for an effective response to an actual crisis (including decision making), or to 
provide plans and resources for recovery and rehabilitation in the aftermath of a crisis' .43 
Crisis policymaking is concerned with decision processes rather than the substance of those 
decisions, and with the policymaking system rather than analysis of 'good or bad' policy. 
38 Ibid., pp. 66-7. 
39 Criticisms of policy cycles have been made in W Parsons, 'Not Just Steering but Weaving: Relevant 
Knowledge and the Craft of Building Policy Capacity and Coherence', Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, vol. 63, no. 1, 2004, pp. 79- 80. Specific criticisms of Bridgman and Davis' model arc 
contained in C Howard, 'The Policy Cycle: A Model of Post Machiavellian Policy Making?', Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, vol. 63, no. 3, 2005; and Everett, pp. 67- 68. 




Making Models, Budgets and International Organizations', Journal of Politics, vol. 43, 
no. 3, 1979; and MJ Smith, The Core Executive in Britain, MacMillan Press, Basingstoke, 1999. 
This claim i~ disputed by Howard ('Policy Cycle'). While he makes valid criticisms of the Australian 
Policy Cycle, he does not provide an a lternative in this paper. 
Crisis policymaking differs from Dror's 'policymaking under adversity', although crisis is one type of 
adverse condition. For Dror, crisis is differentiated from everyday adversity by the time available, 
suddenness of imposing events and need for rapid decision-making (see Dror, Policymaking Under 
Adversity, p. 181). 




The methodology employed in this dissertation is based on three related analytical 
processes: 
• The first process, conducted in Part I, develops characteristics for Australian 
policymaking in national security crises. This process requires four steps: the 
first identifies general characteristics of Australian policymaking across all 
policy areas, the second identifies characteristics of national security policy, 
the third narrows the focus to the crisis mode of national security 
policymaking, and the last describes the crisis policymaking system. This first 
analytical process is described below in the discussion of characteristics. 
• The second process, which is conducted in Part II, tests these characteristics 
through a case study of 1999's East Timor crisis. 
• The final process refines the characteristics of crisis policymaking into an 
essential group, and identifies a range of implications for the future of 
Australia' s crisis policymaking system. 
This methodology is supported by written sources and interviews. Where these sources 
have potential weaknesses, specific treatments-specifically those described below-are 
applied throughout the dissertation to promote confidence in the conclusions. The next 
section begins by explaining the analytical process before describing the main sources and 
their use in this work. 
PROCESS 1: DEVELOPING CHARACTERISTICS 
Characteristics are defined as features or attributes that typify a certain class of 
phenomena. Characteristics can identify, classify and compare events, and suggest 
relationships among different elements. At present, there are no models available to identify 
or examine the characteristics of crisis policymaking in an Australian setting, although 
others have produced models that describe the relationship between different stages of such 
a system or identified principles of crisis management.44 The first process for developing 
44 For an example of a model describing crises in general, see the 'Unified Model of Crisis' in M Brecher 
and J Wilkenfield, A Study of Crisis, Uni versity of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1997, 
pp. J0- 17. For an example of principles of crisis management, see Richardson, pp. 17- 23. 
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the characteristics of crisis policymaking is undertaken in Chapters l , 2 and 3 through four 
linked steps (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2: Processes 1and2 for Developing the Characteristics of Policymaking in 
National Security Crises 
East Timor 
(1999) 
Step 1.1 Australian policymaking in general 
(using the Australian Policy Cycle - see Chapter 1) 
----...__, 
Step 1.2 ·-..., 
..... 
National Security • "'-
Policymaking \ 









The Modern Crisis Policymaking System 
(See Chapter 3) 
Policy ,---, 
(/' Instruments L.__J Consultation <0 
Policy Analysis Coordination 
D D 
Issue Identification Decision 
<0 EvaluationCJlmplementation (/' 
Step 1.1 of Process 1 (conducted in Chapter 1) involves summarising Bridgman and 
Davis's descriptions of the policy cycle. This is an important step because their description 
of the Australian Policy Cycle is too detailed to provide an analytical framework for a case 
study.45 This is also a contestable step because, as discussed earlier, it is misleading to 
insist that all policies are made in exactly the same way. For every policymaking example 
that draws on empirical evidence, counter-examples will exist. Two approaches are taken to 
resolving this problem. The first is to acknowledge that every instance of policymaking has 
its own idiosyncrasies, and follow the weight of evidence. The second is to leave a 
characteristic open and explore it when instances of crisis are discussed. 
Step 1.2 involves bringing foreign and defence policymaking together to describe 
national security policymaking.46 These policy areas were selected because national 
45 
46 
Meredith Edwards goes through a similar process when using Bridgman and Davis's model as an 
analytical framework for social policy case studies. See M Edwards, Social Policy, Public Policy: From 
Problem to Practice, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2001, pp. 4-6. 
This is a different task to that tackled by authors such as TB Millar and Michael Evans, who analysed 
higher-order concepts that link foreign and defence policy in Australia. See TB Millar, Australia 's 
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security policy is often defined as a combination of foreign policy and defence policy. For 
example, Ross Babbage uses 'security policy' in favour of 'defence policy' because the 
former defines ' a wide range of diplomatic, political, economic, military, social, and other 
pressures and threats to which nation states are potentially susceptible'-thus stating the 
ways in which security is an inherently broader concept than defence.47 Further, the actors, 
processes and instruments involved in foreign and defence policymaking are often the same 
as those (but not the total sum of the available actors and instruments) for national security 
policymaking. Chapter l applies this approach by bringing together the literature on foreign 
and defence policymaking to modify Bridgman and Davis's general characteristics into 
tentative characteristics of national security policymaking. 
The tentative characteristics of national security policymaking are then examined in 
crisis mode in Step 1.3 (see Chapter 2) through three vignettes of past national security 
crises. The purpose of this step is to place crisis policymaking in its historical context and 
provide empirical evidence that shows why the crisis mode differs from national security 
policymaking in general. The vignettes for Chapter 2 were selected because: 
47 
• they occurred across a significant span of Australia's modern history (from 
1941 to 1964); 
• a range of means were used to resolve the crises (two instances involved the 
use of military forces and one did not); 
• the crises varied in duration from a few months to years; 
• each involved different degrees of threat to Australia (one immediate, one 
proximate and one indirect); and 
• crisis policy was made using different structures on each occasion. 
Defence, Melbourne U niversity Press, Carlton, 1965, Chapter 2 and 3; and M Evans, The Tyranny of 
Dissonance: Australia 's Strategic Culture and Way of Wa r 2001-2005, Land Warfare Studies Centre, 
Duntroon, 2005, especially pp. 43- 5 1. 
R Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence, Queensland University Press, St Lucia, 1980, p. xxi, 
note I . Brown also includes relevant aspects of trade, science industrial development and general 
economic policy as part of 'national security policy' (G Brown, Australia's Security: Issues for the New 
Century, Australian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 1994, p. 162). The difficulty of separating foreign 
and defence policy was highlighted by Prime Minister Bob Hawke, 'The Way Ahead', John Currin 
Memorial Lecture, 1983, avai lable hltp://john.curtin.cdu.au, accessed 8 February 2007. See also P 
Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901- 1949, Oxford 
University Press, Melbourne, 1983, p. 136 
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Together, these vignettes arguably represent a broad cross-section of crises and infonn our 
ability to generalise to other national security crises involving Australia. 
The final step (Step 1.4) continues the task of identifying characteristics by 
describing the system for national security policymaking in Australia between 
1963 and 1999. This step employs historical analysis and interviews to examine how 
structures and processes at three separate levels-the political, the policy and the 
administrative-changed over the period until it became the 'modern' crisis policymaking 
system. 
Since an understanding of how and why the crisis policymaking system evolved over 
time is very important to the pmpose of this dissertation, two questions will be asked of 
each characteristic. The first is 'has this characteristic changed over time?' The answer to 
this question will be determined by examining the literature that contributed to the 
formation of that characteristic, and by studying whether relationships, structures or norms 
surrounding that characteristic changed over the last sixty years. That answer will be 
provided in a yes-no-uncertain form. The second question, which is more subjective, asks 
'is there potential for future change' ? This judgement will be based on the history of the 
issue, and whether change in other areas, such as information technology and political 
leadership, could induce further change in that characteristic using the following categories: 
• Possible (noticeable)-the characteristic could change noticeably in the future. 
• Possible (limited)- limited change (between different models, for example) 
could occur. 
• Unlikely-the characteristic is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. 
• Uncertain-no judgement can be made. 
The final stage of the process brings the newly revised group characteristics together 
to produce a description of the crisis poJicymaking system and an understanding of why it 
changed over time. The product Process l ' s four steps is a list of proposed characteristics 
for crisis policymaking. This list is subsequently tested using the insights gained from the 
East Timor case in Process 2. 
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PROCESS 2: TESTING THE CHARACTERISTICS 
The second process adopts a case-study method to test the characteristics using a 
detailed study of a major Australian crisis. The reasons for selecting the East Timor case 
were outlined above, with the recency and importance for Australia's relationships of this 
case being key factors in determining the value of this case to the dissertation's objective. 
The case study was developed by concurrently interviewing a smaJl number of key 
people with a broad knowledge of the East Timer case, and a review of the literature, 
official record and media reporting about the crisis (see below). This method of data 
collection allowed a detailed understanding of the events to be developed, before further 
interviewees were approached to provide their views of policymaking at the time. The 
actual case was then assembled by comparing the characteristics developed in the first 
analytical process against the evidence collected through the case research. 
PROCESS 3: REFINING THE CHARACTERISTICS 
The final process involves comparing the data collected for each characteristic in 
Processes 1 and 2, and assembling that information in a table. This table contains a 
description and a judgement about whether the characteristic is likely to vary or remain 
consistent. Next, the characteristics are refined into a smaller, essential group so these can 
be used under conditions where reference to the full group may be impractical. These 
essential characteristics were selected by looking for overlap, and where the weight of 
evidence from the research showed these to be the most critical for determining how the 
crisis policymaking system works in Australia. This process is conducted in the concluding 
chapter. 
The three analytical processes are important for two reasons. First, it means that the 
characteristics of crisis policymaking have been extracted from literature concerning 
national security policymaking in general and the field of crisis policymaking in particular. 
Secondly, this process ensures that the selected characteristics have been derived from 
Australian experience. This provides some confidence for claims that any characteristics 
identified as consistent or variable are grounded in a longitudinal study that accounts for 
change in the broader political system. Taken together, the steps of this analytical method 




Two main types of written sources are consulted in this dissertation. The first 
includes official documents such as Cabinet minutes, departmental files and other 
government publications. It was possible to consult Cabinet papers and other archived 
material up to 1976, and this helped develop the crisis vignettes and trace the evolution of 
the modem crisis policymaking system. While the range of official sources about 
policymaking during the East Timor crisis is limited at present, some evidence can still be 
gathered from the public record. For instance, the Australian Government has produced one 
book on the East Timor crisis, which describes the role of the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFA T) in the events of 1998-2000. While this book includes a number 
of important and relevant documents and news releases, it cannot be considered 
authoritative because official Australian documents are not cited among its sources. A 
number of submissions and testimonies to a Senate Enquiry on East Timor and Senate 
Estimates hearings in 1999-2000 also form part of the official record, although they contain 
little about policymaking process.48 
The second group of written sources included media reporting, academic articles, 
and published accounts, including memoirs and theses. As expected, these sources 
represented a wide range of viewpoints and issues, each with a unique focus and bias. 
These sources included books that drew heavily on interviews with key actors49, or were 
written by the actors themselves.50 The vignettes of crisis policymaking also drew upon 
near-contemporary accounts and the later work by historians such as Horner, Edwards, 
Woodard, and Dee.51 
48 
49 
Requests were made to the Chief of the Australian Defence Force (2 May 2005) and DFAT 
(9 February 2006) for access to departmental fi.les on East Timor. Both requests were refused. 
Such as Ryan, Primary responsibilities; and Greenlees and Garran, Deliverance. 
50 s uch as A Alatas, The. Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle for East Timor, Aksara Karunia, 
51 
Jakarta, 2006; J Marker, East Timor: A Memoir of the Negotiations for Independence, McFarland and Co, 
Jefferson, 2003; and Fischer, Seven Days. 
Primarily D Horner, Inside the War Cabinet: Directing Australia's War Effort 1939-45, J\llen and 
Unwin, St Leonards, 1996; P Edwards with G Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and 
Diplomacy of Australia's Involvement in Southeast Asia Conflicts 1948- 1965, Commonwealth of 
Australia and Allen and Un win, North Sydney, 1992; P Edwards, Arthur Tange: Last of the Mandarins, 
Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2006; G Woodard, Asian Alternatives: Australia's Vietnam Decision and 
Lessons on Going to War, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2004; and M Dee, Jn Australia 's Own 
Interests: Australian Foreign Policymaking During Confrontation, 1963- 1966, unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of New England, 2000. 
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INTERVIEWS 
The main source of new data for this dissertation was a series of sixty-six interviews 
conducted by the author with those involved in national security policymaking before and 
during the East Timor crisis. These interviewees represented a broad cross-section of the 
bureaucracy-including DPM&C, DFAT, the Department of Defence (Defence), 
Australian Federal Police (AFP), Australian Agency for International Development 
(AusAID), and the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC)-and included officials who 
worked at different levels within these organisations. Interviews were also conducted with 
three ministers (all were members of the NSCC in 1999)52, other political figures, 
ministerial staff and two officials formerly of US Pacific Conunand.53 Two interviewees 
provided work diaries used during this crisis, which contained valuable information about 
events and meeting agendas (including notes from 1999 meetings of the NSCC, the 
Strategic Policy Coordination Group, and Defence working groups). 
These interviews represent an important source of information that future researchers 
may not be able to reproduce; people speaking even five or six years after the event often 
explained it was becoming harder to recall details. Sadly, it is also inevitable that some 
participants will pass away before the thirty-year rule for the release of documents is 
complete.54 As a result, these interviews represent a unique source of information about this 
subject. 
Since the interviews needed to concentrate on processes and events, and were 
narrowly focused in terms of time-span, an investigative style of interview was adopted. 
This style made the interviewees' stories and ideas the basis of data collection, although the 
interviewer interjected from time-to-time to maintain the focus on relevant matters. While 





While often called 'NSC' in Australia, this dissertation retains NSCC to differentiate it from the US NSC. 
While many interviewees agreed to be identified, some were reluctant because the East Timor crisis is 
still sensitive in Australia, particularly for those who are currently serving as government officials. These 
interviewees are only identified by an interview number in this dissertation. 
Under the Archives Act 1983, most Australian Government documents (including Cabinet papers) are 
released thirty years after the end of the year in which the papers were written (see NAA, Fact Sheet JO: 
Access to records under the Archives Act, 2006, available http://www.naa.gov.au, accessed 
17 January 2007). Some documents relating to national security are withheld because they remain 
sensitive. Cabinet notebooks are among those documents excluded from the ' thirty year rule', and they 
remain closed for fifty years (see NAA, Fact Sheet 34 Cabinet Records and Fact Sheet 128 Cabinet 
Notebooks, 2006, available http://www.naa.gov.au, accessed 2 October 2006). 
HJ Rubin and IS Rubin, Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data, 2nd edn, Sage, Thousand 
Oaks, 2005, pp. 6- 7. 
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investigative techniques are more suited to this study because they obtain explanations of a 
person's recollections of an issue and allow the interviewer to seek clarification and further 
detail. 
Open-ended questions and informal probing were used ' to facilitate a discussion of 
issues in a semi structured manner' . 56 It was important to have a flexible interview guide 
because each interviewee saw a very different part of the policymaking process, and none 
saw the entire process. Therefore the early part of the interview usually identified which 
part of the crisis and which aspects of policymaking that the interviewee could and would 
talk about. There were times when questions could be more focused, however, especially 
where interviewees were already on the public record or where they could be used to verify 
comments by earlier interviewees. The interview guide (Annex A) was cleared by the 
Australian National University's Ethics Committee.57 
Overcoming challenges within the methodology 
Despite this range of sources, there are still challenges with the methodology that 
warrant specific treatments to ensure confidence in the findings. Clearly, the full story of 
Australian policymaking during the East Timor crisis will be incomplete until the Cabinet 
papers from 1998-99 are declassified and released under the thirty-year rule and after the 
Cabinet notebooks are made public around 2049.58 But while these sources are undoubtedly 
important, they may not provide a complete account because many relevant documents of 
the time (such as NSCC minutes) were reportedly very brief and often only contained 
statements of the decisions made.59 
Other documents will help complete the picture of the East Timor crisis when (and 
if) they are released. For instance, the numerous submissions made to Cabinet about East 
Timor during 1999 will be crucial to understanding how policy and decisions emerged 





F Devine, 'Qualitative Analysis', in D Marsh and G Stoker (eds), Theory and Methods in Political 
Science, MacMillan, Basingstoke, 1995, p. l 38. 
Australian National University Ethics Committee 2005/124, dated 8 June 2005. 
Cabinet notebooks are not transcripts of meetings, but they do contain valuable information about the 
way debates unfolded and the posi tions taken by members of Cabinet (I Hamilton, ' Interview with Sir 
John Bunting', National Library of Australia - Oral History Section, Canberra, 1983, p. 1/3/35). Sir John 
Bunting was Secretary to Cabinet from 1959 to 1975. 
fnterview with Hugh White, Canberra, 14 April 2005. Professor White was an advisor to Prime Minister 
Hawke and Defence Minister Kim Beazley from 1985- 9 1, and Deputy Secretary Strategy in Defence 
from 1995- 2000. He acted as Secretary of the Defence Department during August- October 1999. 
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context of decisions and the options considered. However, many submissions to NSCC 
during the acute phase of the crisis in September 1999 were made verbally. This suggests 
detailed written Cabinet submissions might not be available, and make the Cabinet 
notebooks an essential reference. The public record may never be complete in any case, 
because some documents are unlikely to be declassified due to their significance to 
Australia's relationships with Indonesia and the United States-two states that Australia is 
unlikely to want to offend in the near or even distant future. As a result of the lack of access 
to Cabinet records, the analysis of policymakjng in lhis dissertation is valuable but must be 
considered tentative at this time. 
Naturalistic forms of data collection such as interviews can create other problems 
because interviewees can be unreliable: people's memories dim, they confuse important 
details including the sequence of events, individuals might naturally inflate the significance 
of aspects with which they were directly involved, and analysis conducted after the fact can 
result in misleading interpretations of the issues of the day. Some interviewees may want to 
obscure the record for their own reasons, particularly if the release of certain information 
might diminish their reputation or worse. Furthermore, interview data can be hard to apply 
with consistency, and may contain bad analytical seeds that lead to bias and inaccurate 
conclusions.60 
There are other considerations for interviewing high-profile or senior people, what 
Heclo and Wildavsky described as 'elite interviewing'. These include the need for the 
researcher to reassure ministers and officials 'that they are talkjng to fellow insiders who 
will understand what is being said' and establishing mutual trust-whkh they described as 
the ' leitmo6f of all workjng relationships'-early in interviews.61 This trust was pursued by 
paying careful attention to gaining agreement about how the information would be used, 
offering options to go 'off the record' at certain point<; in the discussion, and asking 
interviewees to review their transcripts. 
Despite these shortcomings, participant interviews have considerable advantages 
over structured or survey-type interviews because the experience of each individual is very 
different. To draw a basic distinction, the Chief of Defence Force's perspective on a crisis 
60 CM Judd, ER Smith, and LH Kidder, Research Methods in Social Relations, 6th edn, Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich, Fort Worth , 1991, Chapter 11. 
61 H Heclo and A Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money: Community and Policy inside 
British Politics, MacMillan, London, 1974, p. xviii. 
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will be very different to that of a junior member of DF AT staff, but both have something 
worthwhile to say about policymaking. Since potential gaps remain, this research into the 
East Timor crisis needs to be reviewed when more of the official record becomes public, 
and other participants speak about their experiences. 
While these challenges should not be overstated, this disse1tation employs three 
techniques to minimise their effect and promote confidence in the validity of the 
conclusions. The first method used is triangulation, where multiple (preferably three) 
sources of information are used to support findings. These sources are usually written 
works or interviews with people who were present at the events or very closely connected. 
This leads into the second technique, which relies on interviews with people who played 
key roles in the Australian Government's response to the East Timor crisis. Interviewing 
these people now is certain to provide those who examine the official record with additional 
information on what the participants thought about their role in the crisis. These people's 
views provide this study with an overall strength that may be difficult to capture in the 
future. The last technique involved asking some of the interviewees, representing different 
backgrounds, to review chapter drafts. This technique added detail to the research and 
helped to ensure that positions or events were not misrepresented. 
Structure of the dissertation 
This dissertation is divided into two main parts. Part I, which develops characteristics 
of crisis policymaking in Australia, contains three chapters and a summary. Chapter 1 
examines the literature on Australian defence and foreign policy to identify the 
characteristics of the broad area of national security policymaking. Next, Chapter 2 starts 
the task of focusing these characteristics into context by examining three Australian crises. 
The analysis continues in Chapter 3, which traces the emergence of modern crisis 
policymaking from the 1960s through to 1999 under successive Coalition and Labor 
governments. Part I concludes by identifying and explaining a proposed group of 
characteristics. 
Part II tests these characteristics using the East Timor crisis of 1999. Chapter 4 
begins the case study with a description of the crisis from Canberra's viewpoint in four 
phases: 
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• From the NSCC meeting of 1 December 1998 through to Indonesia's 
27 January 1999 announcement of the ballot; 
• From the Australian Government's early responses to that announcement in 
February through to the Bali summit of 26 April; 
• From the May 5 Agreement to deploy United Nations Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET) through to the completion of the ballot on 5 September; and 
• The acute crisis phase from the declaration of the ballot results on 
5 September 1999 until the deployment of INTERFET later that month. 
The case is analysed in Chapters 5, 6 and 7 using the Australian Policy Cycle. The 
first phases, where the policy process is initiated, are analysed in Chapter 5. Next, 
Chapter 6 examines how policy is brought together through consultation and coordination, 
before decision-making and the subsequent phases of implementation and evaluation are 
analysed in Chapter 7. The analysis of each phase finishes with a summary, in lieu of a 
conclusion to the individual chapters. 
The Conclusion identifies the characteristics of crisis policymaking in Australia, and 
highlights the reasons for change and continuity in this system. It also applies these 
characteristics to discuss implications for Australia's future crisis policymaking system. 
Conclusion 
This introductory chapter has identified the aim of this dissertation, defined the 
concept of crisis policymaking and its relationship to national security policymaking, and 
described the methodology used herein. This methodology is essential because there is no 
organised body of knowledge about the detailed conduct of national security policymaking 
in Australia, and the existing theory about crises is mainly concerned with the relationships 
between the protagonists, rather than the operation of a protagonist's policymaking system. 
The next chapter seeks to build the basis for the later discussion of crisis by characterising 
policymaking in its superior field, national security. 
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PART I: DEVELOPING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF 
CRISIS POLICYMAKING 
Part I of this dissertation develops the characteristics of crisis policymaking in 
Australia. This is achieved by firstly identifying characteristics for the broader field of 
national security policymaking in Chapter 1. These tentative characteristics are then 
reviewed in the context of Australia's experience of crisis (Chapter 2) and through the 
emergence of Australia's modern crisis policymaking system Chapter 3). 
The product of this analysis is a group of proposed characteristics for crisis 
policymaking. This group is reviewed in a summary section to this Part. 
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1 
TOWARDS CHARACTERISTICS OF AUSTRALIAN 
NATIONAL SECURITY POLICYMAKING 
Despite the extensive literature on Australian defence and foreign policy-some of 
which is surveyed below-no single body of literature identifies the characteristics of either 
Australian national security policymaking, or its crisis mode. This chapter uses proximate 
sources to propose characteristics of national security policymaking, providing a starting 
point for the subsequent analysis of crisis policymaking. 
Chapter I begins by identifying the characteristics of Australian policymaking using 
the Australian Policy Cycle. Next, literature about foreign and defence policy is examined 
to generate proposals for characteristics to represent national security policymaking. The 
questions of change and continuity are addressed by concurrently examining whether these 
characteristics change over time, and whether future change is possible. The product of this 
chapter is carried forward into Chapters 2 and 3, where actual crises and changes in the 
Australian system over time are used to develop characteristics for Australia's crisis 
policymaking system. 
Characterising a practical art 
Of the many descriptions of policymaking in Australia 1, the Australian Policy Cycle 
is the most comprehensive.2 Although Bridgman and Davis did not identify any general 
characteristics themselves, it is possible to derive some from their descriptions for each 
phase of the policy cycle (see Table 1 ). These characteristics of policymaking are intended 
to act as a base-line for intermediate analytical steps taken in this chapter. 
The Australian policymaking system is often described in generalist political science texts, such as 
M Laffin, 'Public policy making', in R Smith and L Watson (eds), Politics in Australia, Allen and 
Unwin, Sydney, 1989. 
P Bridgman and G Davis, The Australian Policy Handbook, 3rd edn, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 2004. 
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Table 1: Characteristics of Australian Policyrnaking3 
Policy Cycle Characteristics 
Phase (page ref) 
Identify Issues • Issues come to political attention through competitive agitation from domestic 
(pp. 34- 9) sources such as political parties, interest groups, Parliament and the media. 
• Issues might be identified to the administrative level by other domestic 
agents, such as government specialists or the courts. 
• External sources, such as economic change, foreign state or non-state ac tors, 
technology, demographic shifts, or legal change can a lso identify issues. 
• Issues enter the political agenda once there is sufficient mass appeal to 
demand political attention. 
Policy Analysis • A rational comprehensive analytical method is sought, but it may be 
(pp. 47- 57) accompanied by the extra-rational factors of experience and intuition. 
• While internal policy experts ( including bureaucra ts and ministerial staff) 
may still dominate, ministers increasingly use non-government sources for 
analysis. 
• The process is iterative because information is incomplete, people disagree 
over objectives and parameters shift. 
• Policy is analysed according to the dominant framework of the policy area . 
Policy Instruments • The instruments most used in Australia include financial, legal, advocacy and 
(pp.70- 7) government action. 
• There are limi ta ti ons on what the government can do wi th its policy 
instruments. 
Consultation • Citizens demand a say in policy between e lections, and sometimes, 
(p. 78 and pp. 80- 2) consultation is mandatory. 
• Consultation occurs across a continuum from information to control. 
Coordination • Governments attempt to achieve tolerable compatibility, or al least minimise 
(p. 104) harmful inconsistencies, across government activities. 
• Governments seek consistency through structures and routines . 
Decision • Cabinet is dominant. 
(pp. 106- 9) 
• Officials, when invited, answer questions of a technical nature and leave the 
room before decisions arc taken. 
• Cabine t conventions are based on collective responsibility, secrecy, and 
recorded decisions. 
Implementation • Implementation is considered throughout the policy cycle . 
(pp.119- 21) 
• The more agencies involved, the more difficult implementation becomes . 
Evaluation • E valuation typically occurs after the policy has been implemented . 
(pp. 131-3) 
• Policy advice is not systemically evaluated . 
A number of these general characteristics of Australian policymaking are intuitively 
transferable to national security. For example, the use of policy experts and the difficulty of 
implementation are reasonably likely to characterise both the general and specific fi elds. 
However, a number of others are not immediately transferable. For example, while testing 
Ibid. 
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ideas or allowing the community to comment on policy between elections might be 
applicable for areas such as social security or education, there are limits on national 
security consultation when decisions are time-critical and based on highly protected 
information.4 Even the seemingly straight-forward characteristic of Cabinet domJnance 
over decision making is questionable as Cabinet sub-committees and even informal 
groupings of ministers and officials play major roles in decisions. It is therefore worth 
reviewing these general characteristics to see how they apply to the specific policy area of 
national security. 
National security policymaking 
Defining defence and foreign policymaking 
Any consideration of national security as a separate policy area must begin with 
discussions of defence and foreign policy. This is because the broad concept of national 
security includes matters such as protection against threats, the promotion of selected 
values, and participation in agreements and alliances-issues which are generally managed 
by the structures, approaches and instruments of defence and foreign policy. 
While foreign and defence policy overlap, they remain distinct policy areas. Defence 
policy pertains to the military measures taken to protect national sovereignty and achieve 
national objectives. The literature on defence policy in Australia is significant, but it tends 
to focus on internal issues such as defence organisation and equipment acquisition. 5 
However, defence policy has other aspects that attract attention, including threat 
assessment, national strategy, resource allocation, alliances, overseas basing and the 
5 
Ibid., p. 78. A similar point was made by Jenkins when he separated policy content from policy process 
in relation to welfare and national defence-see B Jenkins, 'Policy analysis: Models and approaches', in 
M Hill (ed), The Policy Process: A Reader, Harvester Wheatsheaf, Heme! Hampstead, 1993, p. 35. 
Exceptions may arise from time-to-time, as the later d iscussion of the Australian Government's 
'community consultation' for the 2000 Defence White Paper shows. 
For examples see G Cheeseman and DJ Ball, 'Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and 
Processes,' in DJ Ball and C Downes (eds), Securiry and Defence: Pacific and Global Perspectives, 
Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1990; and DE Kennedy, 'The Administration of Defence', in HG Gelber (ed), 
Problems of A ustralian Defence, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1970. Some exceptions, which 
consider broader aspects of strategy and planning, include A Dupont, Transformation or Stagnation? 
Rethinking Australia's Defence, Working Paper No. 374, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canberra, 2003; and R Babbage, Rethinking Australia 's Defence, Queensland University Press, St Lucia, 
1980. 
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employment of military forces.6 The overlap between defence and foreign policy is clearest 
here. 
So what is foreign policymaking? Gyngell and Wesley, after noting that many 
authors choose not to define this field, characterise foreign policymaking as action taken by 
officials and politicians on behalf of their state on matters 'directed in whole or in part 
outside the boundaries of the state'. 7 In the early stage of the Department of External 
Affairs (DEA), these actions were mainly concerned with political and security matters, 
particularly as the world engaged in, and emerged from, the Second World War.8 The 
concerns of foreign policy have broadened since then to encompass a range of 
interdependent issues including trade, foreign aid, education, international image, 
quarantine, traveler safety, and defence assistance and operations-where those issues have 
an external dimension. 
Despite its malleable definition, it is possible to identify some main characteristics of 
foreign policymaking. Gyngell and Wesley, for example, identify four characteristics: 
congeniality, strong executive influence, less political consensus and professionalism.9 
Hugh Smith would probably agree with this list while adding secrecy, interrelated issues 
and the need for immediate reaction. 10 Nancy Viviani offers enduring features of the 
foreign policymaking environment, where the annual budget, major policy reviews and the 
management of crises are arenas for competition. Some might say short-term thinking is 






For example, TB Millar, Australia 's Def ence, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1965, focuses on 
these issues. 
A Gyngell and M Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
2003, p. 21. 
Department of Foreign Affairs, Submission to the Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration , Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 1974, p. 2. 
Gyngell and Wesley, pp. 253- 54. 
H Smith, 'Foreign Policy and the Political Process', in FA Mediansky and AC Palfreeman (eds), 
In pursuit of national interests: Australian Foreign Policy in the 1990s, Pergamon Press, Sydney, 1988, 
pp. 20- 2. 
The problem of 'short termism' has been mentioned as a c ritical prohlcm for Australian policymaking in 
general (See D Beveridge, 'Australia's Future Threat Space: Strategic Risks and Vulnerabi lities', 
Security Challenges, vol. 2, no. 2, 2006, pp. 54-5). This view draws some support from one senior DFAT 
officia l, who was quoted as saying 'Defence looks very much to the long term, looks to contingencies 
that arc not inunediately obvious. The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade tends to offer advice 
about more immediate e vents'. (Mr J Dauth in Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Legislation 
Committee, Consideration of Estimates (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), 11 February 1997, 
p. 256). This statement is supported by the very limited reference to any time-frame beyond 2005 in 
DFAT's recent White Paper (see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Advancing the National 
Interest, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2003 , Chapters 10, 11 and 12). 
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a broad explanation of policymaking. In some cases, they tend to neglect important sub-
processes such as implementation, evaluation and issue identification. 
One way to build on this work is to analyse the characteristics of defence and foreign 
policymaking, using the policy cycle to organise the discussion. This analysis will develop 
tentative characteristics to represent national security policymaking as a specific public 
policy field. 
Identify Issues 
The Identify Issues phase is the nominal start of the Australian Policy Cycle. In this 
phase, ' issues are selected for attention from the myriad of matters pressed on 
government' .12 These issues could be fresh, they could have some sort of track record, or 
they could arise from the Evaluation stage of the policy cycle. Bridgman and Davis identify 
four characteristics of this phase: 
• Issues come to political attention based on competitive agitation from 
domestic sources, such as political parties, donors, interest groups, Parliament 
and the media. 
• Issues might be identified to the administrative level by other domestic agents, 
such as government policy specialists or the courts. 
• Issues can be created by the influence of external sources, such as economic 
change, foreign state or non-state actors, technology, demographic shifts, or 
legal change. 
• Issues enter the political agenda once there is sufficient mass appeal to 
demand political attention. 13 
This phase is about determining which issues attract government attention, and how 
responses are framed in the latter phases of the policymaking process. 
COMPETITIVE AGITATION AND DOMESTIC ACTORS 
In Australia, foreign policy issues may be identified by a range of domestic actors, 
but the importance of each differs from the order implied by Bridgman and Davis. 
Similarly, the idea of competitive agitation is more difficult to apply because defence and 
12 Bridgman and Davis, p. 34. 
13 Ibid., pp. 34- 9. 
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foreign policymaking are not straight-forward examples of pluralist models, as neither 
DFAT nor Defence's influence is equal outside their formal spheres of responsibility. Nor 
does defence and foreign policy follow strictly corporatist models because interest groups 
do not play dominant roles in either. 14 Instead, actors at Lhe centre in the national security 
executive (the prime minister, his national security ministers and their bureaucracy) and 
foreign governments have the major bearing on the shape of this and subsequent phases of 
policymaking. 15 
Prime ministers use their authority, access to information and bureaucracy to exert a 
strong influence over the foreign and defence policy agenda. 16 The major factors that help 
prime ministers establish this influence-which can result in dominance on occasions-is 
their leadership of the government, control of the Cabinet agenda and their participation in 
aJJ major policy decisions. Examples of how dominance is used (within the constraints of 
electoral acceptability and personal energy) to pursue personal causes and interests include 
Billy Hughes' deep interest in trade issues and reparations after the First World War; Sir 
Robert Menzies' interest in Defence organisation; Malcolm Fraser's interest in dismantling 
apartheid; Bob Hawke's interest in Israel; and Paul Keating's interest in economic 
engagement with Asia.17 Given the persistence of the prime minister's position, which is 
theme that will be returned to throughout this dissertation, it is reasonable to assume this 





See Laffin (pp. 38-41) for a discussion of these approaches to policymaking. 
Greenwood describes this as the 'executive bureaucratic system' consisting of the prime minister, foreign 
minister and senior officials. See G Greenwood, 'Australian Foreign Policy in Action', in 
Greenwood and N Harper (eds), Australia in World Affairs 1961-1965, FW Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968, 
p. 23. The idea of a 'core executive' is also similar-see RAW Rhodes and P Dunleavy, Prime minister, 
cabinet, and core executive, St. Martin's Press, New York, 1995; and MJ Smith, The Core Executive in 
Britain , MacMillan Press, Basingstoke, 1999. 
J Beaumont, 'Making Australian Foreign Policy, 1941-69', in Beaumont, ct al. (eds), Ministers, 
Mandarins and Diplomats: Australian Foreign Policy Making 1941- 1969, Melbourne University Press, 
Carlton, 2003, p. l l; P Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign 
Policy 1901- 1949, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1983, pp. 6-12; Millar, Australia's Defence, 
pp. 93-5; G Evans and B Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations in the World of the 1990s, Melbourne 
Uni versity Press, Carl ton, 1991, p. 47; G Smith, D Cox and S Burchill , Australia in the world: an 
introduction to Australian foreign policy, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 
pp. 43-4. Further support for prime ministerial dominance comes from A Renouf, The Frightened 
Country, MacMillan, South Melbourne, 1979, p. 25. There are exceptions to this pattern. Edwards notes 
how Prime Minister Joseph Lyons delegated authori ty to his external affairs minister (Edwards, Prime 
Ministers, p. 137); while Smith makes a similar observation about the early years of Prime Minister 
Hawke's tenure (Smith, 'Foreign Policy', p. 25). 
See Smith, 'Foreign Policy', pp. 25- 6; and G Megalogenis, The Longest Decade, Scribe, Melbourne, 
2006, Chapter 7. Other factors that promote the prime minister 's dominance will be discussed in the 
Decision phase. 
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The main national security ministers, especially the foreign minister and defence 
minister, also have significant assets that make them highly influential in issue 
identification. This influence starts with their political 'responsibilities' to reflect public 
concerns, and extends to their ability to act on the specialised advice from their 
bureaucracies. Ministers too may champion issues where they have a strong personal 
interest, in much the same way as the prime minister might. 18 A minister's significant 
responsibilities for routine decision-making, role in day-to-day policy activity, and 
discretion over some senior appointments also contribute (sometimes indirectly) to their 
ability to identify issues. 
The national security bureaucracy is important to issue identification today, but this 
was not always the case. 19 Sir Arthur Tange observed that, in the 1950s, Australian 
ministers tended to take more notice of British and American leaders and official sources 
than their own bureaucrats. According to him, thi s changed in the 1970s as Australia 
improved its intelligence and analytical capacity.20 This allowed the bureaucracy to assert 
its advantages of subject expertise, access to information and proximity to political leaders 
to influence policymaking. Now this position has been achieved, it is unlikely to change 
without some major crisis of confidence between political leaders and their officials. 
Other actors tend to have a more haphazard and less direct influence on issue 
identification for defence and foreign policy. 21 Parliament's role could be discussed at 
many points in the policy cycle-in theory. In reality, its influence is constrained by four 
factors: the paucity of information provided to it, party discipline that allows the 
government to conduct most of its foreign policy business with some assurance of its 
I 8 
19 
The effect may nol always be posilive. One 195 l cable from the Bri tish High Commission in Canberra 
noted how 'Australian foreign policy, since it became a naLive producl, has been largely governed by the 
personal predileclions of the Minister for External Affairs ... This accounts for the inconsistencies in 
Australian foreign policy' (quoted in Beaumont, 'Making Australian foreign Policy' , p. 14). 
The main national securily policy departments are Department o f External Affairs (DEA)/Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Department of Defence, Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (DPM&C)/Prime Minister 's Department (PMD) and the Attorney General' s Department. DEA 
was renamed Depar tment of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in J 97 1, and renamed again when it was merged with 
the Department of Trade and the Australian Information Service to become DFAT in 1987. Similarly, 
DPM&C was known as the PMD until 197 1. The titles DFAT and DPM&C will be used in this 
dissertation unless DENDFA or PMD is required for clarity. 
20 Tange had earlier described the information flow where Australia ' s external re lations were conducted 
between the prime minister and British leaders, while the bureaucratic link was maintained between PMD 
and Commonwealth Office. According to him, this linkage impeded the fl ow of information to DEA. See 
JDB Miller, 'Transcript of Interview with Sir Arthur Tange, AC, CBE' , National Library of Austra lia -
21 
Oral History Unit, Canberra, 198 I , p. 91 and pp. 112- 3. 
Cheeseman and Ball , p. 253. 
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position rn the lower house, the ability to manage many foreign policy issues without 
legislation, and the need to concede to the executive the right to make rapid decisions on 
day-to-day issues.22 Of course, it is possible for parliamentary committees and individual 
members to identify issues and conduct the analysis needed to develop policy options, but 
such activity has little influence.23 Instead of looking at Parliament's role in this and the 
early phases, it is (only slightly) more profitable to look at Parliament in the last policy 
cycle phase, evaluation. 
While the media, academia and interests groups- including business, producers, 
single-issue groups and those interested in particular overseas countries- have a better 
chance of influencing the defence and foreign policy agenda than the public, their influence 
remains constrained.24 The most noticeable of this grouping, the media, plays a reflective 
role where outlets communicate the debate and ultimately select the issues presented to the 
public, and an input role where they ignite issues though criticism.25 While the media's part 
in issue identification may be changing as other forms of media (such as biogs and on-line 
journals) become cheaper and easier to use, these two roles are likely to endure for some 
time yet. Business and producer lobbies also have an enduring role but they generally tend 
to bypass public debate and take their concerns directly to the executive and 
parliamentarians.26 Academics and some issue groups tend to have a foot in both camps; 
they can seek influence through the media or publish papers directly in the hope of gaining 
ministerial interest. However, these actors' influence is largely determined by their means 
of communication with their target audience. The advantage of a mass market gives the 
media a significant edge, while academics and issues groups must find ways to have their 
work noticed by policymakers or even the public. 
Of course, decision-makers also use these avenues to promote their policy views and 
create the constituency needed to initiate policy proposals. For instance, then-Minister for 






See A Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press, London, 1967, 
p. 31 ; and Ed ware.ls, Prime Ministers, p. 24 . Evans and Grant have a slightly different view, and they 
focus on Parliament's strengths in probing and infrequent debate (p. 49). 
Gyngell and Wesley, pp. 173-178. 
Watt, p. 298 and pp. 314- J 5. Edwards also shows ho w the institutes a llowed interested people to meet 
and sometimes to allow officials to air competing views (Edwards, Prime Ministers , pp. 93-7). Bergin 
credits interests groups with little influence (A Bergin, 'Pressure Groups and Australian Fore ign Policy', 
Dyason House Papers, vol. 9, no. 3, I 983, p. 14). 
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Gyngel l and Wesley, pp. 182-9 1; Evans and Grant, p. 50; and Smith, Cox and Burchill , p. 46. 
32 
purchase of F-111 aircraft in 1967 .27 Other ministers think national security is basically 
different in this regard. One noted: 
... you did not have to create a series of political circumstances to get people to sit up, which 
you do have to in the other portfolios ... With national security, you can generally go in there 
and say, 'OK we need to have a second brigade bought up to readiness' - which happened 
in Timor. You did not have to go out and jazz up the press, and jazz up the others ... 28 
Despite their relative strengths and weaknesses, all of these additional domestic actors are 
likely to remain important in national security policy, but their influence will be sporadic 
and difficult to measure.29 
EXTERNAL ACTORS 
Foreign governments, and the external environment more generally, tend to be 
dominant actors in issue identification. 30 This was especially so prior to 1942, when 
Britain had a central- but sometimes contested-role in identifying Australian foreign and 
defence policy issues.31 British dominance was also reinforced by the importance of its 
official and media sources to the Australian Government and people.32 As a result, 
Australia tended to see the world through British eyes, especially at a number of crucial 
times.33 Six years after the war, the new alliance with the United States became central to 
Australian thinking. Cheeseman and Ball think this dependence saw Australian national 
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significant evidence to show that the Australian Government was attempting to build a 
more independent policy line, even if alliance considerations were paramount.35 
While many issues are shaped by the actions of other governments, non-state actors 
(such as terrorist groups and transnational companies) and even more amorphous forces 
(such as globalisation and climate change) also have the ability to create issues. In the 
1950s, for instance, the threat of communism was a strong influence on Australia 's 
domestic and international security agenda. Illegal irrunigration, pandemics and regional 
terrorist groups have significant effects today, and into the immediate future. 
MASS APPEAL 
Many authors think the Australian public generalJy pays little attention to defence 
and foreign policy outside war and elections.36 As a resul t, the public generally plays a 
minor role in issue identification, primarily by supporting issues raised by the media and 
interest groups, and by identifying the implications of issues and defining the electoral 
acceptability of policy.37 Another view is that it is the government's responsibility to 
identify national security issues: 
In m y time, and I think in M enzies' time, we belie ved it w as the government' s duty 
to w ork out what the issues were a nd persuade the public to support us. And I think 
that's what w as done.38 
Neither view says that political leaders do not consider domestic issues as they develop 
foreign policy; nor does it mean that the Australian public is totally uninterested. Both 
highlight the responsibilities of leadership, based on the advantage that political leaders 





Edwards provides a balanced description of Australian Government attempts to steer a defence and 
foreign policy course between the competing positions of two major allies, and a growing recognition of 
the need to base policy on national interests. Sec P Edwards (wi th G Pemberton). Crisps and 
Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's lnvolvemel!t in Southeast Asia Conflicts 
1948-1965, Commo nwealth of Australia/Allen and Unwin, North Sydney, 1992. 
ANOP Research Services, ' Puhlic Attitudes to Defence: Report of the 1987 Nationa l Study on 
Community Atti tudes', Crows Nest, 1987, p. 5. O thers who c ite opinion po lls and other authors to 
support this view include H Smith, 'Foreign Policy and the Political Process', pp. 34-66; and Gyngel l 
and Wesley, p. 19 1. Smith. Cox and Burchill note tha t foreign policy issues were important in e lections 
during the period 1945- 72. hut not for the period l 972- 96 (p. 35). McAllister thinks public views are less 
well -formed because ' the issues themselves aren' t regulurly and public ly debated hy political eli tes.' 
(I McAllister, At1itude Mat1ers: Public opinion in Australia towards defence and security, Australian 
Strateg ic Policy Institute, Canberra, 2004, p. I 0). 
N Vivia ni , 'The Official Formulation of Fore ign Policy', in Mediansky and Palfrecman, p. 47. Gyngell 
and Wesley identify three types of public whom pay some degree of attention to the issues, while not 
being a part of the issue identification process itself (pp. 196- 202) . 
Interview with the Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser, Melbourne, 2 July 2007. Mr Fraser \Vas Australia's Prime 
Minister from 1975--83. 
34 
But the consequence is that 'governments are much less constrained by voters' opinions 
about them when it comes to national security issues'. 39 
However, it is important to note that information is becoming more pervasive in the 
community, and this may erode one mode of operation for future govemments.40 Even 
without the benefit of new technology, public opinion had influence from time-to-time by 
creating pressure for change on issues such as immigration, defence preparedness and 
overseas aid.41 Recent concern over illegal immigration has also generated significant 
public pressure, generally in support of the government.42 Despite these instances, the cause 
and effect relationship is not entirely clear, for the sway of public opinion often coincides 
with the government's preferences. It is also reasonable to point out that public opinion is 
often presented in other ways, which empowers groups such as the media and lobbies to 
claim a representative mandate. It is possible to see a challenge to this as political polling 
becomes a more direct influence on policy positions. 
PROPOSED CHARACTERISTICS 
Bridgman and Davis's characteristics of issue identification seem broadly applicable 
to defence and foreign policy. However, there are differences between their pluralist view 
of issue identification and the more closed influences on national security policy; and 
questions about the ability of mass appeal to influence government perspectives and 
agendas. These characteristics have been broadly consistent in the literature, although there 
are questions about the way new sources of infonnation wi11 change the interaction between 
society and its government. The proposed characteristics of issue identification for national 
security policymaking are: 
• The prime minister, the national security ministers and their bureaucracy tend 
to be the dominant internal actors in issue identification and, by extension, 
problem definition. 
• Foreign governments have the ability to place issues on the national security 
policy agenda when they intend to harm Australian interests, when the 
39 See McAllister, p. I 0. 
40 F or a discussion of this trend and its implications, see I Marsh, 'Governance in Austra lia: Emerging 
Issues and Choices', Australian Journal of Public Administration, vol. 61, no. 2, 2002, p. 4. 
Watt, p. 299. 
42 T he influence of public opinion during the Tampa Crisis of 2001 is discus ed in D Marr and 
41 
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interests of Australia's allies and friends are threatened, and when high levels 
of interdependence mean that threats to others' interests are viewed as threats 
to Australia. 
• Other domestic actors can identify issues for national security policy, but their 
ability to do so is uneven and constrained by the position and information of 
the dominant actors. 
• Mass appeal plays an uncertain role in issue identification for national security 
policy. 
The first two characteristics have not changed much over the last hundred-or-so 
years, and without major changes in Australia's political system the national security 
executive is likely to retain its advantage in issue identification for national security policy. 
The role of foreign governments has been, and is likely to, remain consistent. This reflects 
the ability of overseas actors to initiate national security problems and define the 
subsequent 'problem space'. One emerging change is the increasing importance of non-
state or transnational actors, such as teITorist groups, for issue identification. The role of 
other domestic actors could change over time too, especially if they find the means and will 
to shape the national security agenda. Similarly, the ability of mass appeal remains 
uncertain, but once mobilised would unquestionably play a role in shaping the agenda and 
options for political leaders. At this stage, however, it is best to leave open the judgement 
about whether this characteristic will change. 
Policy Analysis 
The second phase of the cycle involves analysis of the policy issue, which is defined 
by Bridgman and Davis as 'using research and logic to develop options for decision 
makers'. The Policy Analysis phase has five main characteristics: 
• A rational comprehensive analytical method 1s sought, but it may be 
accompanied by the extra-rational factors of judgement, experience and 
intuition. 
• The process is iterative because infomiation is incomplete, people disagree 
over objectives and parameters shift. 
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• While internal policy experts (including bureaucrats and ministerial staff) may 
still dominate, ministers increasingly use a range of non-government sources 
for analysis. 
• Policy is analysed according to the dominant framework of the policy area.43 
This phase is therefore about the way policymakers define, evaluate and then present 
alternative courses of action for refinement in the next phases of the policy cycle. 
RATIONAL AND COMPREHENSIVE? 
Both foreign and defence policy can be characterised as rational, iterative processes 
influenced by extra-rational factors. At least in theory, Defence uses a structured 
policymaking process that struts from top-level policy documents such as white papers, and 
ends with decisions to buy equipment, develop different kinds of combat units or execute 
military operations.44 While this is a neat view, it is highly misleading. 
There are concurrent influences working within the formal process, including inter-
service rivalry, competition between civilians and uniformed staff and different views about 
the way to achieve strategic objectives.45 Cheeseman and Ball describe the different groups 
working within the processes as interest groups that conduct analysis through adversarial 
contest rather than reasoned argument.46 These adversaries find it easier to block policy 
than to create effective policy, which Paul Dibb described as 'institutional intransigence' .47 
Changes within Defence over the last fifty years have been designed to minimise the impact 
of internal competition, increase the range of considerations that guide defence policy, 
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success in achieving this is best illustrated by the frequent changes to the structures and 
processes for providing capability advice within Defence.48 
Despite being a smaller department, analysis in DFAT is also hierarchical and 
defined by institutional roles that determine authority and responsibility.49 Others have a 
different view, emphasizing how a small and agile department brings key people together 
(often with the minister) to analyse policy.50 It is also worth noting the importance of 
individuals, particularly the ministers and secretaries who will use various means, including 
ideological precepts, to filter and analyse issues.51 
ITERATIVE AND CLOSED 
The iterative nature of defence policy can be inferred from Defence's committee 
structure. In highly ordered processes, individual submissions are drafted and modified as 
the proposal moves up the decision-tree. Ball claims this process leads to major policy 
documents, which are supposed to provide the underlying rationale for policy choices, 
being politically motivated or influenced. This results in alterations between iterations that 
can be explained in terms of the 'changing power/political relations between many of the 
senior defence planners and decision-makers' .52 
The flow of work also contributes to the iterative nature of policy analysis, 
particularly where new issues emerge and influence an existing problem.53 This can be seen 
in the way senior officials frequently work on more than one policy issue at a time, and in 
the way developments in related areas force re-assessments to other issues. For example, 
changes in the internal or domestic environment can make yesterday's good idea look 
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the potential for conflict between different groups, the iterative nature of policymaldng is 
likely to persist. 54 
Analysis within defence policy has been closed and a domain of insiders srnce 
Federation55, but there has been room for three types of outside experts: ministerial 
consultants (such as Sue Hamilton, Paul Dibb, and Malcolm Mclntosh)56, consultants from 
the private sector57, and ministerial staff. This last group is becoming especially important 
as they adopt broader roles.58 At other times, external advice might be needed to break 
internal deadlocks on policy, provide fresh ideas (or perhaps just ideas acceptable to 
ministers), and offer ministers independent sources of advice.59 The reliance on expert 
advice is an increasing trend within national security policymaking,60 with one recent 
review explicitly calling for improving the availability of external advice for the 
intelligence community.61 Given the history and likelihood that ministers will desire 
flexibility in their sources of advice, there is some room (but not much) for the national 
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DOMINANT FRAMEWORKS 
It is difficult to determine whether a dominant framework or an 'official mind' exists 
in either defence or foreign policymaking. Beaumont argues against the existence of one in 
foreign policy, but nevertheless describes a transition from the 'cold war liberalism ' of the 
1950s to the 'cold war mentality' of the 1960s.62 Gyngell and Wesley note how the world 
view of DFA T officers strongly follows the logic of realism, but many officers hold liberal 
conceptions about international cooperation and the role of values.63 The realist view also 
dominates Defence, but this does not represent a shared official mind with foreign 
policymakers. Significant differences on substantive issues and a marked difference in self-
image between the departments prevent such a convergence.64 According to Tange, one 
reason was Defence's inability to acknowledge defence as an aspect of foreign poJicy.65 
Clear, and different, concepts also guide thinking in defence and foreign policy. 
Brabin-Smith describes a group of major concepts that played a dominant role in defence 
thought. This 'heartland' was based on the concepts of self-reliance, levels of conflict and 
warning time, the limitation of Australia's military resources, and a regional focus for 
operations. These were supported by the US alliance, the importance of Indonesia, and the 
relationship with New Zealand. 66 While DFA T officers display some coherence in their 
world views67, Wesley and Warren identify at least three currents of foreign policy thought 
in traditionalism, seclusionism and internationalism. They argue such currents inhibit a 
unified view of Australian foreign policy.68 Indeed, these differences cause some friction 
between the two departments, particularly in the way Defence members tend to view 
62 Beaumont, 'Making Australian Foreign Policy', p. 9. Tange supports this view when he notes that DEA 
officials 'were by no means cold warriors' and held positions such as support (or sympathy) for the Non-
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themselves as 'warriors' and see DFAT officers as 'wimps'.69 Tange also notes how 
Defence officials often think foreign affairs advisers are 'sometimes distracted from 
international action best suiting Australia's enduring security interests by more ephemeral 
issues' .70 These differences seem to ensure attitudes that divide defence and foreign policy 
will be stronger than those that unite.7 1 
There are strongly held opinions that ministerial views-and not departmental-
dominate the analytical framework in the Westminster system.72 For instance, Porter notes 
how assumptions shared by ministers about Chinese communism and alliance relationships 
shaped Australia's path to Vietnam. These assumptions made further analysis into the 
causes of the Vietnamese conflict unnecessary, which made bureaucratic opinions less 
influential in policy.73 
Bipartisan agreement may contribute to a dominant framework, but even this 
assumption of recent Australian political discourse is challenged today. Of course, there 
have been significant political disagreements over security issues across time, including 
those favouring imperialist over nationalist preferences74, multilateral approaches to 
security issues75, over whether Britain or the United States should be Australia's principal 
ally, and eventual disagreement over the conflict in Vietnam. Differences have also 
emerged more recently, particularly over the ongoing Iraq War.76 But these differences 
have been ameliorated since the 1970s by the dominance of the Liberal and 
National/Country Party Coalition and the Australian Labor Party (ALP). This has seen 
69 Gyngell and Wesley, p. 80. 
10 Sir Arthur Tange, Defence Policy Administration and Organisation: Selected Lectures 1971- 1986, 
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Australian positions on national security remain relatively stable, with the continuity being 
underwritten by an agreed set of assumptions about Australia's regional security 
environment77, a creed that holds national security above politics, and a tendency for the 
major parties to seek the middle ground.78 Bipartisanship may reduce the room for debate, 
but it is also cJear that consensus is perishable. 
PROPOSED CHARACTERISTICS 
The characteristics of the Policy Analysis phase of the Australian Policy Cycle look 
robust when viewed through the lens of national security policymaking, although slight 
modifications are needed: 
• Departments are structured to adopt rational comprehensive approaches to 
analysis, but this is modified in practice by extra-rational influences such as 
group loyalty and identity, power relations, competition, and appeals to 
professional judgement. 
• Policy issues are rarely analysed as individual, discrete problems, and the 
nature of competition between issues and interests, and the consequent 
influence on the issue at hand, makes analysis iterative. 
• Internal policy experts (insiders) dominate, but external sources of analysis are 
available. Where external sources are used, these tend to be former insiders or 
consultants sympathetic to the government of the day. 
• The existence of a dominant framework is contestable and its influence can be 
difficult to identify. No dominant framework links defence and foreign policy. 
The majority of these characteristics have been consistent over time, particularly the 
approaches to analysis and its iterative nature. However, change has been experienced in 
the dominant framework- but just what constitutes the framework remains an open 
question. Perhaps the direction of change could be from separate foreign and defence 
frameworks to an inclusive national security one. The broader range of internal policy 
experts, which now includes ministerial advisers and consultants, has also occurred and 
further change is conceivable. 
77 G Fry, 'Australia's Regional Security Doctrine: Old Assumptions, New Challenges', in G Fry (ed), 
Australia's Regional Security, Allen and Un win, North Sydney, 1991, pp. 9- 10. 
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Policy Instruments 
The third phase involves developing and assigning means, called policy instruments, 
to achieve the government's ends. The characteristics of this phase are: 
• The instruments most used in Australia include financial, legal, advocacy, and 
government action; and 
• There are limitations upon what the government can do with its policy 
instruments.79 
This phase is about identifying what means a government may apply to advance a given 
policy objective, and how those means may be used. 
MAIN INSTRUMENTS 
While diplomacy and military force have been considered the main instruments of 
Australia's national security policy, other instruments-such as international law, foreign 
aid, information, and social and economic levers-have also become important. Together, 
these represent a close match with those identified by Bridgman and Davis, and reflect a 
standard inventory of instruments available to most governments. 
As a policy instrument, diplomats advise and implement policy as they convince 
others to accept the government's position. This includes traditional state-to-state 
diplomacy and public diplomacy to influence domestic opinion in the target population.80 
Diplomacy may involve preferences for bilateral engagement at times, or it may involve 
strategies of coalition-building and multilateral action.81 Regardless of the means, a high 
degree of individual competence is expected among diplomats, who continue to develop 
their influence through professionalism and the value ascribed to their mission.82 However, 
as Sir Garfield Barwick noted, diplomacy does not stand alone: 'If you don' t back up your 
diplomacy with some [mihtary] show, then your diplomacy is always weak'.83 
The primary reason for maintaining military forces is to apply lethal force against the 
state's enemies. But the ways to implement defence policy are more subtle and varied. As 
79 Bridg man and Davis, pp. 70-7. 
80 Evans and Grant, pp. 67-72. 
81 Smith, Cox and Burchill , Chapter 5. 
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the Royal Australian Navy notes, '[naval] forces possess considerable utility in a wide 
range of situations that span not only the spectrum of conflict, but also much peaceful 
human activity' .84 This view sees military force as a flexible instrument that can contribute 
to a range of different operations, including disaster relief, border patrols and combat. 
Gyngell and Wesley also acknowledge the contribution of defence forces to other aspects 
of foreign policy, such as alliances, arms control and capacity building for neighbours.85 
While ultimately flexible, defence forces are not always seen as the best instrument to 
achieve policy outcomes. 
SITUATIONAL UTILITY 
Instruments can be useful at different times. For example, economic instruments 
such as foreign aid were used to introduce post-colonial Asia to Australia through the 
Colombo Plan, while international law and agreements have been used to advance human 
rights.86 Australia has used military instruments under a wide variety of circumstances in 
support of allies and to promote stability in the Southwest Pacific, showing utility on 
humanitarian and peacekeeping missions beyond their destructive or occupying power.87 
However, no instruments have universal utility; what might be suitable for one situation 
can be disadvantageous for others. Military force may be useful in some operations where 
foreign governments have lost control (such as Solomon Islands in 2003), while at other 
times military intervention can increase violence (as was the anticipated result of an 
Australian intervention into Fiji after the 1987 coup). 
Instruments are rarely employed in isolation, and better strategies employ more than 
one at a time. Military force may therefore be used in concert with diplomacy or alliance 
partners as a means of convincing others to accept one's will, while 'soft' instruments such 
as economic inducements, education, and public diplomacy may be sufficient at other 
times. Combining instruments and creating consistent plans has not been an easy task. An 
adventurous Australian attempt to bring non-military elements of national power together 
84 Royal Australian Navy, /\ustralian Maritime Doctrine, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2000, 
p. 55. 
85 Gyngell and Wesley, pp. 80- 1. 
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to fight Asian communism m the 1950s faltered because officials could not imagine 
different ways to combine the available instruments.88 
PROPOSED CHARACTERISTICS 
This view of Australia's policy instruments refines the initial list of characteristics: 
• The instruments most used by the Australian Government in national security 
policy are diplomacy, alliances, international law, military force, foreign aid, 
information, and economic and social levers. 
• The utility of national security policy instruments is highly situational. 
While the first characteristic has been relatively enduring, this could change as the 
conception of national security broadens, and new thinking emerges about the application 
of national power.89 Instruments used rarely or tentatively in the past (such as education 
and information) could become important national security policy tools in the future. If this 
is the case, then the second characteristic is likely to be enduring because the utility of each 
instrument will be even more situational. 
Consultation 
The Consultation phase of the Australian Policy Cycle involves testing policy with a 
wider range of stakeholders. The phase has two charactelistics: 
• Citizens demand a say in policy between elections, and sometimes 
consultation is mandatory; and 
• Consultation occurs across a continuum from information to control. 90 
SECRETIVE CONSULTATION 
The characteristics of consultation in foreign and defence policy are very different to 
those of domestic policy. Instead of reaching out to citizens, consultation in defence and 
foreign policy generally occurs with interlocutors overseas. This consultation is often 
opaque, a condition usually desired by both parties. Camilleri sums up this attitude by 
88 A case made in C Waters, 'A fai lure of imagination: R.G. Casey and Australian plans for counter-
subversion in Asia, 1954-1956', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 3, J 999. 
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observing that foreign policy is highly secretive.91 Millar goes further by arguing that 'no 
Australian Government has taken the view that foreign policy is a subject on which the 
public should be well informed' .92 This does not mean that all politicians avoid informing 
the public about foreign policy, but it became increasingly common in the 1960s for major 
decisions to be announced after a closed policymaking process.93 There is constant pressure 
regarding secrecy and, although breeches occur, this characteristic appears durable.94 
There will be exceptions. Governments may use the media to explore how their 
policies might be received, make 'domestic consumption' statements or have fuller 
discussions about issues at specific times such as elections. Watt, for one, identifies efforts 
by foreign ministers to explain policy and influence public opinion.95 Watt noted, however, 
an increasing trend towards a more secretive approach by Menzies and his later foreign 
ministers, such as Sir Paul Hasluck. 
A CONSULTATION CONTINUUM 
Bridgman and Davis present a continuum of government consultation spanning 
information (the minimum where people are simply told of decisions), through increasing 
interaction between government and stakeholders, to control where governments allow 
citizens to make decisions through referenda.96 While defence and foreign policymaking 
clearly differs from this model, it is possible to identify a range of consultative activities 
91 JA Camilleri, An Introduction to Australian Foreign Policy, Jackaranda Press, Milton, 1973, p. v. 
92 TB Millar, Australia in Peace and War: External Relations Since 1788, Australian National University 
Press, Botany, 1991, p. 2. 
93 
94 
Watt (p. 299) noted an absence of consultation as the government committed troops to Borneo and 
Vietnam in the mid-1960s, even as the power of the media and popular opinion was increasing. The 
description of a closed process is supported by Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence, p. xvii; 
Cheeseman and Ball , p. 250; Ball, Politics of Australian Defence Decision Making, p. 6; and 
G Pemberton, 'An Imperial Imagination: Explaining the Post-1945 Foreign Pol icy of Robert Gordon 
Menzies', in F Cain (ed ), Menzies in Peace and War, Allen and Unwin/Austra lian Defence SLUdies 
Centre, St Leonards, 1997, p. 168-70. 
Gyngell and Wesley (p. 256) observed how DFAT were obliged to explain how travel warnings arc 
developed after the second Bali Bombing in 2003. See also Cheeseman and Ball, pp. 253-4. For a case-
study of the problems or secrecy, see R Pitty, 'Way Behind in Following the USA over China: The Lack 
of any Liberal Tradition in Australian Foreign Policy, I 970- 72', Australian Journal of Politics and 
History, vol. 51 , no. 3, 2005. 
95 Watt, pp. 300-2. 
96 Bridgman and Davis, pp. 80-2. 
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that governments undertake when making national security policy.97 The original model, 
and the refinement for national security policymaking, is shown in Figure 3 beJow. 
Figure 3: The Consultation Continuum98 
The General Policy Context 
A one-way flow Government The Community Responsibility Rarely, the 
of information solicits and is drawn into for policy is decision is 
about responds to decision-making shifted to a body turned over to a 
Government views about or process referendum for 
Policy policy proposals outside political decision 
control 
INFORMATION CONSULTATION PARTNERSHIP DELEGATION CONTROL 
-
I lncreasina involvement bv oarties outside aovernment --.,,. 
Government Discussions Joint Policy Ability to make 
announcement about policy consultation consultation a decision is 
s about policy options with about policy shifted to an limited by an 
(a one-way flow parties (not in a (e.g. in an outside body or external party 
of information) formal alliance/ alliance council) process (e.g. to 
agreement) the UN) 
INFORMATION CONSULTATION PARTNERSHIP DELEGATION CONTROL 
-
I Decreasina freedom for unilateral action 
The National Security Policy Context 
The information mode is most commonly used in Australia for defence and foreign 
policy. As the ea.rJier section on issue identification notes, governments often announce 
defence or foreign poJicy decisions after the fact, and sometimes after the event has 
occurred.99 The second phase of the continuum, consultation with the domestic audience, is 
also not unknown. As mentioned above, it was used during the process to develop the 2000 
Defence white paper. 100 Despite the community involvement, Cheeseman and Smith 
thought 'there is Jittle evidence that the consultation process will have anything other than a 
marginal effect ... what the [consultation] did was to garner public support for policies 
97 
98 
For example, Defence used a public consultation during the 2000 Defence White Paper process 
(A Peacock (Chairman), Australian Perspectives on Defence: Report of the Community Consultation 
Team September 2000, Department of Defence, Canberra, 2000). 
Adapted from Bridgman and Davis, pp. 82-7. 
99 For a recent example, see the discussion about the 1995 security agreement with Indonesia in R Piny, 
'Strategic Engagement', in P Edwards and D Goldsworthy (eds), Facing North: A Century of Australian 
Engagement with Asia, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, 2003, pp. 7 4-6. 
100 G Cheeseman and H Smith, 'Public consultation or political choreography? The Howard Government's 
quest for community views on defence policy', Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 55, 
no. l , 200 I, p. 85 and p. 97. 
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already in train' .101 While that may represent the end of domestic national security 
consultation, it is possible to see another line of consultation occurring internationally. 
Australia consistently consults with close allies, and other relevant parties, before 
committing to a policy position. For example, the Cambodian peace negotiations102 and 
External Affairs Minister Sir Percy Spender's efforts to create a security framework for 
Australia in the early 1950s demonstrated these efforts.103 Mandatory consultation with 
other governments has also been written into two of Australia's security treaties.104 
Partnership is another option for consultation with close allies. Australia's agreement 
with Britain and New Zealand in 1949 to create the Australia, New Zealand and Malayan 
Area (ANZAM), for example, included close partnership arrangements for joint 
intelligence assessments and military plans.105 Evidence of paitnership can also be found in 
the arrangements for managing the Australia-US Joint Defence Facilities in Australia. 106 
However, partnership cannot be taken too far as not all partners are equal and decision-
making remains, in most cases, a sovereign prerogative. 
Delegation can be seen when Australia consults others thrnugh multinational fora 
such as the United Nations. Multilateralism has a strong history in Australia, to the point 
where some place multilateral forums at the centre of Australia's approach to diplomacy. 107 
The last option, control, can also be seen in Australia' s historical experience. Australia's 
decision to go to war in 1914 was not made suddenly; earlier Imperial Defence Conferences 
determined the Australian Government's actions when the Empire was threatened. 108 Later 
problems throughout the war, such as manpower issues and the British decision to evacuate 
JOI Ibid. , p. 98. 
102 See Evans and Grant, pp. 214-18 and Gyngell and Wesley, pp. 90- 1. 
100 p s D Lowe, ' ercy pender, Minister and Ambassador' , in Beaumont, p. 91. 
104 For examples, see Department of External Affairs, 'Security Treaty between Australia, New Zealand and 
the United States of America (ANZUS) ', Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1951 , 
Article III; and (the now abrogated) Department o f Foreign Affairs and Trade, ' Agreement with 
Indonesia on Maintaining Security', Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1995, Article 2. 
1m 6 This agreement was not made public at the time- sec Edwards (with Pemberton), pp. 61- 2 and p. I 4. 
106 See Commonwealth of Australia, 'Exchange of Notes, done at Canberra on 4 June 1998, constituting an 
Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the United States of America to 
further extend in force the Agreement relating to the Establishment of a Joint Defence Facility at Pine 
Gap of 9 December 1966, as amended', (available http://www.austlii .edu.au, accessed 
20 December 2006). Working arrangements and modes for setting agreed priories are discussed in 
Desmond Ball 's evidence to Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 'Pine Gap', Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 9 August 1999, pp. 3-4. 
107 See Evans and Grant, pp. 61- 4; and Smith, Cox, and Burchi ll, p. I I 0. 
'
08 EM Andrews, The Anzac illusion: Anglo-Australian relations during World War 1, Cambridge 
Universi ty Press, Melbo urne, 1993, pp. 24-30. 
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Gallipoli, were also marked by limited consultation with the British Government. This level 
of control remained until the Imperial War Cabinet was established in March 1917, which 
slightly increased Australia's involvement in decision-making about the war. 109 Another 
example of control can be seen in the recognition of China, when the Australian 
Government was surprised by US actions in 1972.110 
PROPOSED CHARACTERISTICS 
The Consultation phase for national secmity policy contains some major differences 
from that described by Bridgman and Davis. The proposed characteristics are: 
• A one-way passage of information from government to the public is the option 
generally used with domestic audiences. Consultation may be used on rare 
occas10ns. 
• All options are used with overseas interlocutors, primarily other governments 
and major international organisations, with information, consultation, 
partnership and delegation being common. 
• Much consultation occurs in secret. 
These characteristics have been consistent within national security policy. It is quite 
conceivable that a future Australian Government would conduct another consultation 
process around a security-related white paper, but the prospects for sudden and increased 
levels of consultation are limited. One possibility is that increased transparency may be 
forced on governments by the ever-increasing flow of information in the public domain. 
However, major change would probably require greater political openness, a shift in 
attitudes about the classification of national security information, or dramatic alterations to 
the freedom of information laws. 111 Foreign governments, and indeed the Australian 
Government, will continue to value discretion and opacity in their dealings with others on 
national security issues. 
109 Prime Minis ter Hughes' attendance at the British Cabinet and Imperial War Cabinet provided one way 
for Australia to influence British decision-making. See Ence!, pp. 327-28; and Edwards, Prime Ministers, 
p. 35 and pp. 42-6. 
110 See Pitty, 'Way Behind ', especially pp. 441- 2 and p. 449. 
111 At present, the Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Commonwealth), s33 allows the Australian 
Government to withhold documents that would 'affect national security, defence or internationa l 
re lations' (Commonwealth of Australia, Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Commonwealth), available 
http://www.comlaw.gov.au, accessed 12 Apri l 2007). 
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Coordination 
The Policy Analysis phase identified instances where different proposals created 
competitive tensions among policy actors. But not aJJ competition among actors is harmful. 
Indeed, debate between competing ideas during the Policy Analysis phase can lead to better 
policy and a higher degree of acceptance among stakeholders. Yet once preferred options 
are identified (and, ultimately, decisions are made), harmful competition undermines 
policy. As a result, a coordination phase is included in the Australian Policy Cycle. This 
phase is generally characterised by: 
• Governments attempt to achieve tolerable compatibility, or at least minimise 
harmful inconsistencies, across government activities. 
• Governments search for consistency through structures and routines. 112 
ACHIEVING TOLERABLE COMPATIBILITY 
There are two schools of thought about how tolerable compatibility is achieved in 
foreign and defence policy, with the use of power being the main point of difference. The 
first considers foreign policymaking as an arena of bureaucratic politics where interested 
departments compete over resources, influence and jurisdiction. 113 Descriptions of 
bureaucratic politics call upon an extensive body of thought, primarily based on literature 
about US politics, which relies on structural determinism and an indivisible view of power 
to define relationships and decision-making. Policy made under competitive conditions is 
likely to be influenced by compromise as the main participants bargain to get the best deal 
for their organisation. 114 It also sees salvation from this competition in structural terms, 
11 2 B D ridgman and avis, pp. 93- 7. See also G Davis, A Government of Routines: Executive Coordination in 
an Australian State, Centre for Australian Public Sector Management/MacMillan, South Melbourne, 
1995. 
113 Proponents of the bureaucratic politics view in Australian defence and foreign policymaking include 
Trood, 'Bureaucratic politics'; Viviani, 'Official Formulation ' ; Waters, 'The Great Debates', pp. 54-8; 
G Hawker, RFI Smith, and P Weller, Politics and Policy in Australia, Queensland University Press, 
St Lucia, 1979, Chapter 7 ; Smith, Cox, and Burchill, p. 45; and Ball, Politics of Australian Defence 
Decision Making, p. 46. 
114 DA Welch, 'The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: Retrospect and Prospect', 
International Security, vol. 17, no. 2, 1992, p. 128. The literature on bureaucratic politics is extensive. 
f or examples, see GT Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1st cdn, Harper 
Collins, 1971 ; MH Halperin, Bureaucratic politics and foreign policy, The Brookings Institution, 
Washington, 1974; and U Rosenthal , P 't Harl, and A Kouzmin, 'The Bureau-Politics of Crisis 
Management ', Public Administration, vol. 69, no. 2, 199 l. For an early challenge to bureaucratic politics, 
see DJ Ball, 'The Blind Men and the Elephant: A Critique of Bureaucratic Politics Theory', Australian 
Outlook, vol. 28, no. 1, 1974. 
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whereby new coordinating committees or bodies are established to bring different areas 
together and ameliorate conflict. 115 
Coordination under conditions of bureaucratic politics is therefore about dominating 
other departments and having one's view prevail. 116 In this view, DFAT's role has been 
constantly challenged by Defence, DPM&C, Trade, and sometimes Immigration. 117 Within 
Defence, bureaucratic politics results from three rivalries: among the uniformed services, 
among uniformed officers and civilians, and among Defence and other departments, 
particularly DFAT. 118 Despite this, efforts to improve interdepartmental coordination 
included the creation of a Defence Liaison Branch within DEA. 119 Attempts to improve 
interdepartmental coordination through committees were also tried, but these proved 
unsatisfactory if agencies adopted institutional positions or sought consensus. 120 
The second school describes Australian foreign policymaking as highly collegial. In 
this view, Australian policymaking is consensual rather than conflictual and actors play 
complementary roles, with most policy work involving ongoing issues rather than new 
decisions or initiatives. Actors therefore exercise influence within overlapping policy 
processes, rather than seeking to dominate one particular argument at a time. It also 
recognises the authority of expertise, and each area's functional responsibilities. 121 
115 An example of this thinking is seen in a memo explaining how the Joint Staff within Defence and DEA's 
Defence Liaison Branch were 'the key(s) to cooperation' within Defence and between departments (see 
NAA Al 945, CS 13417/1/ Part 1, J King Minute to Mr Campbell, 'Coordination of Military and Civil 
Branches of Government', c. May 1966). 
116 This is often described as 'defending the departmental line,' ensuring that agreed policy preferences or 
responsibilities are protected. Sec M Painter and B Carey, Politics Between Departments: The 
fragmentation of executive control in Australian government, University of Queensland Press, Brisbane 
1979, p.103. 
117 Edwards emphasises this point as he charts the emergence of the specialised foreign policy bureaucracy 
(see Edwards, Prime Ministers, p. 188 and p. 191). See also Waters, pp. 55- 6; and Pemberton, 'An 
Imperial Imagination', p. 161. DJ Ball and D Horner, Breaking the Codes: Australia's KGB Network, 
Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1998, pp. 153-5; and Horner, Defence Supremo, p. 193-4, reminds us 
thal the original challenge to leadership in foreign policy came from DEA to Defence. Conversely, 
Gyngell and Wesley think Defence has relatively little influence over foreign policy (p. 80). 
118 s h ec Babbage, Rethinking Australia's Defence, pp. 125-37; Defence Review Committee, The Hig er 
Defence Organisation in Australia (the Utz Review), Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1982, pp. 42--6; and Cheeseman and Ball, p. 265 for views on bureaucratic politics and connict 
within Defence. The lack of trust between DEA and Defence was virulent when DEA officers came 
under suspicion for leaking classified information to the Soviets in 1944 and were considered as ' left-
wing' (Tange, ' Personal Narrative', p. 25). Edwards, Prime Ministers, p. I 08, also notes the lack of 
coordination between EA and PMD at the same time. 
i19 D epartmenl of Foreign Affairs, Submission to the Royal Commission on Australian Government 
Administration, Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, 1974, p. 20. 
120 Department of Foreign Affairs, Submission, p. 16. 
121 Gyngell and Wesley, pp. 40-2 and p. 253. 
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Consensual coordination is assisted by the institutional structure of rules, norms, 
communication patterns and procedures. 122 Hierarchy and responsibility then determines 
who can act (either in institutional or individual terms), who issues direction, and ultimately 
who is accountable. Coordination then proceeds through established modes of 
communication. These modes serve to guide action (by providing shorthand descriptions of 
the preferred action or outcome), by determining who is and who is not involved, and who 
has influence over the process. 123 
This explanation can be used to account for collaboration between officials and 
political leaders, such as that between Dr HV Evatt and his diplomats, and between the 
'official family' of senior bureaucrats who worked closely during the Second World War 
and after. 124 There is also a significant amount of coordination among ministerial staff, 
between ministers, and between the prime minister and his senior ministers. 125 
Other explanations also support the view of a consensual policymaking process in 
Australia. The first is the influence of political control over the contemporary bureaucracy, 
which in the case of the Howard Government was facilitated by its long tenure, discipline, 
'network of loyalists' and centralisation of bureaucratic control. 126 This trend towards what 
Paul Kelly describes as 'prime ministerial government' limited debate and promoted 
support for the government's policy preferences. 127 When linked to an increasing range of 
successful cooperative ventures128, changed attitudes and other initiatives such as the 
122 M anagement Advisory Committee, Connecting Government: Whole of Government Responses to 
Australia's Priority Challenges, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2004, pp. 11- 16 and Figure 11 , 
describe the components of a best practice for coordination and the 'whole-of-government' approach. 
123 Gyngell and Wesley, pp. 50- 5. 
124 Edwards, Prime Ministers, p. 187; and Painter and Carey, pp. 99- 100. 
125 Evans and Grant, pp. 46-7. 
126 
.I Cotton and J Ravenhill , 'Radical Conservative', Diplomat, vol. 5, no. 5, 2007, p. 42. 
127 P Kelly, ' Re-thinking Australian Governance: The Howard Legacy', Australian Journal of Public 
Administration, vol. 65, no. l, 2006, pp. 7-8. The innuence of the 'ministerial view' and 'bipartisanship ', 
as discussed in the earlier section on Policy Analysis, is also active here. 
128 Some examples of close cooperation between Defence and Foreign Affairs were cited in Department of 
Foreign Affairs, Submission, p. 20. Tony Ayers, a former Secretary of the Department of Defence, also 
identified reduced competition and more partnerships with DFAT during his tenure (1988-98) in 
J Farquarson, 'Transcript of Interview with Tony Ayres, AC', National Library of Australia - Oral 
History Section, Canberra, 1998, p. 47. 
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whole-of-government approach129, there is less space for bureaucracies to fight over turf 
and incentive to settle disagreements before reaching Cabinet. 130 
STRUCTURES AND ROUTINES 
Australian Governments have used different structures and routines to manage 
national security policy. Comntittees are the most common form at the interdepartmental 
level, with more recent innovations including multi-agency task forces on specific issues. 131 
These committees are supported by routines that describe how work is done and who is 
involved. While routines vary over time (and in earlier times, these were ad hoc at best), 
most governments define procedures, provide formats for submissions, and issue agendas 
for Cabinet. Examples of declared processes include the minutes of Prime Minster Holt's 
first Cabinet meeting in 1966, the Department of Foreign Affairs Administrative Circular of 
1971, and recent editions of the Cabinet Handbook. 132 Taken together, these documents 
show a trend towards increased formality in policymaking processes. 
It is possible to identify why Australian structures and routines, or processes, change. 
For one, there is the nature of the task at hand. Thus, the design dictum of 'form follows 
function' can apply to policymaking, and it is supportable when the influence of 
information-especially classified information-determines who participates in national 
security policymaking. Leaders also demand structure and processes to suit their 
preferences. This is seen in the composition of committees, as well as rules set for what 
might go into submissions. Actors from outside the executive might also influence 
structures and routines. For example, the ALP's National Conference and the special 
position of Caucus explain why Labor Governments adopt different structures to their 
conservative counterparts. Decisions to use multilateral forums, such as the United Nations, 
to achieve particular policy outcomes also change the system's participants. 
129 See Management Advisory Committee, pp. 3-6. 
130 Sir Geoffrey Yeend said bureaucratic politics was much worse in the 1950s than the 1970s (R Hislop, 
'Record of Interview with Sir Geoffrey Yeend, AC, CBE', National Library of Australia - Oral History 
Section, Canberra, J 990, p. 5). 
131 For example, DFAT established a multi -agency 'Iraq Task Force' in September 2002 to coordinate 
national po licy on the impending conflict. See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 
2002-2003, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2003, p. 54. 
132 Sec NAA, A5839 Vol. I , First Holt Ministry Cabinet Decisions. Cabinet Decision No. 1, 'Without 
Memorandum - Cabinet Procedure', 26 January 1966; also NAA, Al 838, CS 661/2/2/1, Department of 
Foreign Affairs, 'Administrative Circular No. Al 7617 I - Cabinet Submissions and Decisions', 
30 April I 971 , which out Ii ned a number of requirements that departmental officers were to observe when 
preparing Cabinet submissions; and Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Cabinet Handbook, 
5th edn, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2004. 
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TENTATIVE CHARACTERISTICS 
At this stage, the characteristics of the Coordination phase are especially tentative 
because it is difficult to identify whether the bureaucratic politics or collegial position 
prevails. As a result, the 01iginal characteristics have been modified as follows: 
• Coordination is basically competitive, but it shows some propensity for 
greater collegiality. 
• Governments describe structures and routines that suit their preferences, the 
best thinking of the time, the task at hand and external factors. 
Both the 'bureaucratic politics' and 'collegiality' views of coordination have some 
strong proponents. It is possible that Gyngell and Wesley have overturned a considerable 
weight of opinion and correctly identified consensual policymaking as a new norm in 
foreign policymaking. However, it is also plausible that the Australian fonn of bureaucratic 
politics is less severe than the American and so harder to identify on every occasion. This 
characteristic will be left open for now, and considered again in subsequent chapters. 
The existence of structures and processes in national security policymaking are 
somewhat clearer, with elements of both becoming more formal over time. Further change 
is likely, particularly to the actual structures and nature of the processes, although the 
direction of change is not necessarily towards increased formality. 
Decision 
The Decision phase is the point of the cycle where the officials' work is formally 
considered by Cabinet. The main characteristics of this phase are: 
• Cabinet is dominant. 
• Cabinet conventions are based on collective responsibility, secrecy and 
recorded decisions. 
• Officials, when invited, answer questions of a technical nature and leave the 
room before decisions are taken. 133 
133 Bridgman and Davis, pp. I 06-9. 
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DOMINANT PRIME MINISTER 
Aside from its external orientation, the most significant characteristic attributed to 
foreign and defence decision-making is the dominance of the executive arm of government, 
but not necessarily the Cabinet, in the process. 134 The change to this norm is founded in 
institutional power and the nature of foreign and defence (and thus, national security) 
policy as a distinct field. 
Of those wielding institutional power in decision-making, the defence and foreign 
ministers have natural advantages. Both control substantial bureaucracies that provide 
specialist advice and information that others Jack. Both ministers have statutory 
responsibilities for day-to-day decisions, while legislation and accepted practice gives them 
considerable latitude over policy execution. 135 fa addition, few foreign or defence policy 
issues are decided in the full Cabinet and most cabinets generally (but not always) have a 
formal or informal subcommittee to consider relevant questions.136 These advantages 
usually make the defence and foreign ministers very influential. 
While these advantages provide both ministers with significant decision-making 
power, other forces balance their dominance. For one, both are likely to be highly reliant 
upon advice, and their lack of specialised knowledge leaves room for decisions to be 
shaped by the options presented to Cabinet. On the defence side, another factor relates to 
the size of the portfolio, which is large by Australian standards and has an unusual degree 
of inherent complexity. 
However, the main institutional check on these ministers' influence is the pnme 
minister. The prime minister's dominance is neither new nor unique. Nearly every 
incumbent since Sir Edmund Barton has taken an active role in foreign and defence policy 
and a number held a relevant ministerial portfolio. 137 Intra-party fights are also unlikely to 
diminish that position. As one political leader put it: 
134 Cabinet, the prime minister or even the defence minister were not always dominant in the early days of 
the Australian Government because strong Naval and Military Boards provided a lternate loci for 
authority over Defence policy until the 1926, when the De fence Committee was established (see Ence!, 
pp. 330- 1 ). 
135 Interview with John Moore. 
136 Smith, 'Politics of foreign policy', p. 17. This issue is explored further in Chapter 3. 1n .. A number of prime ministers have been external affairs/foreign minister or defence m1ms1er at some 
stage of their terms of office (including many early leader inc luding Barton, Deakin, Reid, Hughes, 
Bruce, Scullin, Lyons, Menzies, Curtin, and later, Whitlam). On the prime minister' s dominance of 
forei gn policy see Edwards, Prime Ministers; D Lee, 'The Origins of the Menzies Government's Policy 
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. . . the prime m1mster is always strong in national security. Both Hawke and 
Keating were, even when they were fighting with each other. You tended to find in 
the area of defence policy and national security policy that the sources of party 
brawls or intra-government policy fights were not there. Consensus would be 
reached quickly. The prime minister would basically watch what the defence and 
foreign ministers were doing and engage himself ... 138 
The prime minister's role is enabled by responsibility for setting the strategic 
direction for government, for articulating a vision, and for interpreting the nation's interests 
and values in a way much broader than ministers. 139 The prime minister also sets 
expenditure, influences relationships and can reject calls for policy reviews. The prime 
minister can also act unilaterally.140 These factors are significant advantages and can make 
it difficult for either the defence or foreign minister (or indeed, any minister) to oppose the 
prime minister' s preferences.141 
The executive's dominance over national security decisions is further assisted by the 
Constitution, as only the Corrunonwealth Government has the power to make laws relating 
to external relations and has the sole responsibility for defence. The party room also gives 
the executive some freedom, although Labor's Caucus and National Conference have a 
bearing on policy positions when in government. 142 Other factors contributing to this 
latitude include the domestic focus of parliamentary parties, while the need for fast 
on Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia', in Cain (ed), Menzies in Peace and War; Watt, p. 303- 10; 
D Lowe, Menzies and the 'Great World Struggle': Australia's Cold War 1948-1954, UNSW Press, 
Sydney, 1999; and Gyngell and Wesley, pp. 97- 100. 
138 Interview with the Hon Kim C Beazley, MP Canberra, 10 October 2006. Mr Beazley was Defence 
Minister from 1984 until 1990, and Opposition Leader in 1999. 
139 Pemberton, 'l\n Imperial Imagination', pp. 165-8. 
140 F or examples, see Pemberton, 'An Imperial Imagination', p. 166, on Menzies and atomic testing; 
HS Albinski , Australian. External Policy Under Labour, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1977, 
p. 150, on Whitlam; G Greenwood, 'The Political Debate in Austra lia', in Greenwood and 
N Harper (eds), Australia in World Affairs 1966- 1970, FW Cheshire, Melbourne, 1974, p. 62, and 
Sir Alexander Downer, Six Prime Ministers, Hill of Content, Melbourne, 1982, p. 114, on Gorton's 
unilateral decision-making. 
14 1 In recent times, Prime Minister Howard is thought to have over-ruled Defence Minister Robert Hill 's 
less-traditional views on Australian defence policy (G Barker and L Tingle, 'Canberra toughens pro-war 
stance despite protests', Australian Financial Review, 18 February 2003 (Factiva version); A Dupont, 
' We have to bring out the big guns', Australian, 29 November 2005, p. 12; and A Hawke, 'Speech at the 
book launch of Essays on Australian Defence', Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 2005, p. 
3, available http://rspas.anu.edu.au, accessed 12 July 2007. For another example of prime ministerial 
dominance over his ministers sec Gyngell and Wesley, p. I 00. 
142 Smith, 'Foreign Policy', pp. 27- 8; Albinski, Australian External Policy, p. 314; and Edwards, Prime 
Ministers, especially p. 26. 
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decisions and the executive's information advantage also contribute. 143 The nature of the 
bureaucracy also helped extend that autonomy: 
A smaller number of people, a smaller number of decision-makers, a general 
acceptance that national security was important; after all, historically there were 
only three portfolios that counted: Treasury, Defence and Foreign Affairs ... and 
that still really applies ... 144 
CONVENTIONS 
For the most part, Cabinet conventions concernmg collective responsibility and 
secrecy are accepted as essential to the functioning of Cabinet government. While these 
conventions are breached from time to time, they are unlikely to be formally abandoned 
because they provide Cabinet, and individual ministers, with the confidence to accept 
collective responsibility. 145 Some conventions have changed. One, which occurred largely 
in response to the needs of national security, was Cabinet's move from informally produced 
minutes to recorded decisions. 146 Another was the change in patterns of attendance by 
officials at Cabinet. While it was considered improper for officials to attend early Cabinets, 
this attitude changed during the Second World War. 147 During thi s time it was common for 
both Cabinet and the War Cabinet to invite high-ranking public servants, distinguished 
visitors, representatives of foreign governments and other experts to consult with them. 148 
This practice continued after the war and was frequently used by Menzies. 149 
143 Edwards notes the freedom given to prime ministers at early imperial conferences, and the freedom of 
action accorded to successive leaders in their dealings overseas. See Smith, 'Foreign Policy', p. 30 and 
pp. 42- 52, on Hughes at the Versailles Treaty negotiations. Smith notes how backbenchers sometimes 
influence the executive by banding together, bul these efforts are often mounted after decisions have been 
made (Evans and Grant, pp. 45-6). On the issue of time and decisions, sec Ence!, pp. 285-93. 
144 Interview with John Moore. 
145 HY Erny, The Politics of Australian Democracy: Fundamentals in Dispute, 2nd cdn, MacMillan, South 
Melbourne, 1978, pp. 259- 60 and pp. 3 12-5; G Singleton, D Ai tken, B Jinks and J Warhurst, Australian 
Political Institutions, 6th edn, Longman Australia, South Melbourne, 2000, pp. 157-61; and 
P Hasluck, The Government and the People: 1939-41, Australian War Memorial, Canherra, 1952, 
p. 422 (cited as Hasluck, 1939-41 below). 
146 The move from the informal to formal systems for recording decisions is noted in Encel, p. 256 and 
p. 332; and Horner, Defence Supremo, pp. 74- 5. 
147 Encel, p. 337; and Hasluck, 1939-41, pp. 422-3. 
148 The Australian Cabinet held frequent meetings with senior US officials in the 1960s. For examples, see 
the references Lo the discussions between Cabinet and Averell Harriman of the US S tate Department on 
7 June I 963 in Edwards (with Pemberton), p. 265; and the meeting between Cabinet members and the 
senior US officials, General Maxwell Taylor and Mr Clark Clifford in I 967 (NAA, A5840, Second Holt 
Ministry Cabinet Decisions Volume 2, 'Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee', 28 July 1967. One 
exception to this convention, which occurred during the crisis of I 942, will be discussed in Chapter 2. 
149 On Menzies' attitude to inviting national security officials to Cabinet, see D Horner, Strategic Command: 




The Decision phase for national security is strongly consistent with other policy 
areas, but some adjustment needs to be made for the actual locus of decision. As a result, 
the tentative characteristics are: 
• The prime minister is dominant. 
• Cabinet conventions are based on collective responsibility, secrecy and 
recorded decisions. 
• Officials, when invited, answer questions of a technical nature and leave the 
Cabinet room before decisions are taken. 
These characteristics have remained largely consistent, with the mam period of 
change coming during the Second World War. However, future change is possible in all of 
these. For one, the place of decision can move between Cabinet, a committee of Cabinet 
and less formal groupings. While each of these will be centered on the prime minister, at 
least a few other ministers and (under some circumstances) one or a few senior officials 
may be included. The characteristics of Cabinet conventions and official participation have 
also changed, and further change could be dictated by shifts in political preference or 
exceptional circumstances, such as crises. 
Implementation 
Implementation is the penultimate phase of the policy cycle, where ' the machinery of 
government smoothly implements the Cabinet's wish-in theory'. 1 so The two main 
characteristics of implementation can be described as: 
• Implementation is considered throughout the policy cycle. 
• The more agencies involved, the more difficult implementation becomes. 151 
CONSIDERED THROUGHOUT 
While defence policy tends to be implemented after decision and foreign policy 
implementation tends to occur constantly, both consider implementation throughout the 
cycle. Defence policy implementation requires attention to practical issues such as force 
150 Bridgman and Davis, p. 119. 
15 1 9 Ibid., pp. 11 - 2 1. 
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readiness, logistics and international agreements. 152 For the most part, this means defence 
policy implementation is considered early in the policy cycle when the availability of forces 
and their utility are weighed up in the policy instruments phase. Furthermore, Cabinet must 
give permission to use these assets, which is often followed by a formal announcement. 
More time usua1ly lapses as forces prepare and then deploy to the area of operations. For 
example, the deci sion to commit forces to the First World War occurred in early August 
1914. From there, it took six weeks to embark the first Australian Imperial Force and 
another six months before the force saw combat at Gallipoli in April 1915. In the 1990-1 
Gulf War, there were two days between Cabinet's decision and the departure of the first 
ships for operational service. 153 This need for planning, decision and preparation means 
defence policy usually follows the prescribed linear path of the policy cycle. 
The nature of diplomacy lends itself to being applied in fast and flexible ways. While 
a linear progression from phase-to-phase may be followed at times, there is room for 
greater variety because foreign policy can be made by a statement, without a Cabinet 
d . . l . l . 154 ec1s10n or a eg1s ative process. Authoritative-or at least consequential-
announcements can be made by ministers or senior officials without consultation and 
before Cabinet considers its preferred response. The clearest example of this is the way 
Prime Minister Whitlam took most foreign policy decisions and then 'ratified' them in 
Cabinet. 155 Thus implementation can occur in a variety of ways, including using signals to 
influence debates and attitudes and, on occasions, acting before decisions are made. 156 
Coordination mechanisms, the involvement of other departments in policy analysis 
and the maintenance of collegial relations are useful for promoting consistency in advice 
and implementation. 157 Earlier examples of such mechanisms included interdepartmental 
committees and standing committees that have permanent representation from other 
152 Accounts o f planning for ADF deployments can be found in B Breen, Mission Accomplished-East Timor, 
Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2000; and D Horner, The Gulf Commitment: The Australian Def ence 
Force's First War, Melbourne University Press, Carlto n, 1992, p. 27. 
153 Horner, The Gulf Commitment, p. 28. The government may conceivably deploy forces on covert 
orerations without an announcement, but th is too would usually be preceded by planning activity. 
154 Smith, 'Foreign Policy', pp. 16-17. Evans and Grant, Australia's Foreign Relations, p. 45- 7. 
155 Smith, 'Fore ign Policy', p. 24. Whitlam would refute this, as he says all major policy decisions taken in 
1972-73 were long-standing ALP policy (EG Whitlam, The Whitlam Government 1972-1975 , Viking, 
Ringwood, 1985, pp. 25- 6). Trood notes other examples, including situations where conflict occun-ed 
between ministers over policy positions (R Trood, 'Prime Mini sters and Foreign Policy', in P Weller 
(ed), Menzies to Keating: The Development of Australian Prime Minister.ship, Melbourne University 
Press, Carlton:, 1992, p. 163). 
156 Smith, 'Fore ign Policy', p. 24; Renouf, p. 504; and Gyngell and Wesley, p. 33. 
157 Bridgman and Davis, pp. 95- 97. 
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departments. 158 In more recent times, task forces have been used to guide both 
implementation and, as a consequence of the dynamic nature of events, further policy 
development. 159 
COMPLICATED AND COMPLEX 
Difficulties are created when more than one department is involved in implementing 
either foreign or defence policy. This case was clearly stated by the Department Foreign 
Affairs (DFA) in their 1974 submission to the Coombs Royal Commission: 'Unless there is 
one m.inistry ... given responsibility for coordinating and controlling the country's foreign 
relations, there will be wasteful duplication of effort, conflict or inconsistency in aims, and 
confusion and uncertainty about government policy-all detrimental to the national 
interest' . 160 This also makes it possible for the work done by diplomats to be spoilt by 
others with a 'clumsy or insensitive utterance' by one min.istry to another. 161 
The involvement of other departments in dealings with foreign countries has only 
increased since then. Gyngell and Wesley note that 'Almost all Australian Federal 
Government departments acknowledge the importance of the international dimension in 
their work', but their involvement is 'sporadic and rarely profound' .162 Now it is common 
for other departments to contribute to capacity-building missions in the region, as many 
have done in the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) and the 
Enhanced Cooperation Program (ECP) in Papua New Guinea.163 The increasingly broad 
range of participants in implementation also needs to be mirrored by their participation in 
other phases of the policy cycle, particularly in the Policy Development, Policy Instruments 
and Coordination phases. 
158 For a discussion of interdepartmental committees, sec Painter and Carey. Example of standing 
commit.tees with interdepartmental representation such as the Joint Planning Committee (JPC) are 
discussed in Chapter 3. 
159 For examples, note the Gulf Task Force of 1990 (Horner, Gulf Commitment, p. 24); the multi-agency 
Emergency Response Team established to manage the Douglas Wood kidnapping in 2005 (AAP, 
'Kidnapped Aussie's plea to PM', Sydney Morning Herald, 2 May 2005); and the Bougainville Watch 
Group, an interagcncy forum that monitored the Australian contribution to the Peace Monitoring Group 
mission from 1998- 2002. 
160 Department o f Foreign Affairs, Submission, p. 4. 
161 Tange, 'Personal Narrative', p. 37. 
162 Gyngell and Wesley, pp. 78- 9. 
163 S M ce Fullilove, The testament of Solomons: RAMS/ and international stare-building, The Lowy 
Institute, Sydney, 2006; and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Enhanced Cooperation Program 
(ECP),' 2005, available http://www.dfat.gov.au, accessed 18 December 2006. 
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Defence generally does its best to exclude agencies from implementation, especially 
during military operations, by delineating between strategic, operational and tactical 
matters through different layers of command. 164 This does not always work, and close 
political guidance of operations should be expected.165 The military is also adjusting to the 
presence of other departments on operations, especially where nation building is required. 
According to one Australian officer, cultural distinctions between the police and military, 
difficulties with information exchange, different work practices and even social attitudes all 
hinder close cooperation. 166 While there are suggestions for overcoming these differences, 
including more exchanges and common operating procedures, the pervasiveness of this 
problem suggests that implementation is unlikely to become less complex in the future. 
TENTATIVE CHARACTERISTICS 
The literature on defence and foreign policy tends to support the two characteristics 
of implementation presented above. The first, where implementation is considered 
throughout the policy cycle, looks to be entrenched and unlikely to change. The effect of 
organising a multi-agency conunitment, where different agencies are required to plan and 
conduct implementation, are well known. 167 So while the complexity of multi-agency 
activities is not new, the greatest emphasis on this has come over the past decade with 
Australian-led operations in Bougainville (1998- 2002) and the Solomon Islands 
(2003-ongoing) being cases in point. This characteristic is likely to become more 
pronounced as constitutionally demarcated roles are sometimes blurred, and hierarchical 
organisation and specialisation remain the most likely structure for future national security 
164 Australian Army, The Fundamentals of La.nd Warfare, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2006, 
pp. 32-4. 
165 See the description of the conflict between Generals Blarney and Rowell during the Kokoda Campaign o f 
1942 in D Horner, Crisis of command: Australian generalship and the Japanese threat, 1941- 1943, 
Australian Natio nal University Press, Canberra, 1978. Cohen challenges the 'normal ' view of civil -
military relationships which seeks to keep politicians away from operations (E Cohen, Supreme 
Command: soldiers, statesmen and leadership in wartime, Simon and Schuster, London, 2003, especially 
Appendix A). Modern theorists think advances in information technology will allow political leaders to 
influence tac tical actions from a distance. For a discussion, see Lieutenant Colonel D Schmidtchen, Eyes 
Wide Open: Stability, Change and Network-Enabling Technology, Land Warfare Studies Centre, 
Duntroon, 2006, pp. 22-24. 
166 
.I Hutcheson, ' Helping a Friend: An Australian Mili tary Commander's Perspective on the Regional 
Assistance Missio n to the Solomon Islands', Australian Army Journal, no. 2, 2005. The Australian 
Federal Police Commissioner recognised similar problems: see M Keelty, 'Policing in a f oreign Policy 
Space', Address to the National Press Club, Canberra, I J October 2006. 
167 For one discussion on the problems of implementation in contemporary government, see Management 
Advisory Committee, Chapter 2. 
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policymaking-rather than implementation though a multifaceted national security super-
department that incorporates Defence and DFAT under the same roof. 168 
Evaluation 
The Evaluation phase provides the nominal end of the policy cycle because it 
represents the point when the utility of policy must be questioned and a new cycle 
begins. 169 Two characteristics of evaluation derived from Bridgman and Davis are: 
• Policy advice is not systemically evaluated. 
• Evaluation typicalJy occurs after the policy has been implemented. 170 
The impatience with review, and the desire to avoid the political recriminations that 
may follow, means that policymaking processes and policy outcomes are rarely, if ever, 
directly evaluated by the government. Thus the evaluation phase remains somewhat 
opaque, with dissatisfaction with policy usually being inferred by new policy initiatives or 
changes to the structure of policymaking processes. 
NOT SYSTEMATICALLY EVALUATED 
One slogan from the 1943 election campaign sums up the Australian attitude to 
evaluation: 'No time for bitterness. We're too busy' .171 This displays impatience with going 
over past events and the expectation that any evaluation will be subjectively political rather 
than objective. As Sir Arthur Tange noted: 
There has been enthusiastic acceptance of the idea that, because Cabinet Ministers 
cannot be expected to be on top of all the managerial decisions which occur ... a 
way must be found for Parliament and the media to get at what the administrator is 
doing, how he is doing and why he is doing what he does ... The answer to 'why' 
often lies in the obscurities of party politics ... 172 
The consequent lack of discussion about policy evaluation in the literature reduces the 
available evidence to define this characteristic of defence and foreign policymaking. 
168 A precedent for the amalgamation of numerous departments and agencies exists with the 1987 
reorganisation or DFAT, and more recently in the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In the 
instance or OHS, the size of the organisation and mixing of diffe rent organisational cultures has delivered 
sub-optimal results. For a deta iled discussion o f problems confronting DHS, see TH Stanton (ed), 
Meeting the Challenge of 9111: Blueprints f or More Effective Government, ME Sharpe, Armonk, 2006. 
169 Evaluation is another phase-in addition to coordination and consul tation- that could be undertaken at 
any time during a cycle. 
170 Bridgman and Davis, pp. 131- 3. 
171 P Coorey, 'Poll loss the end for ALP, unions', Sydney Morning Herald, I January 2007. 
172 Sir Arthur Tange, 'Accountability ', in Tange (ed), Defence Policy Administration and Organisation: 
Selected Lectures 1971-1986, Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra 1992, p. 6 1. 
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However, some evaluation does occur and this provides a limited body of work to consider 
questions about policymaking. 
The bodies most likely to conduct evaluation are the Australian National Audit 
Office (ANAO), Parliament, academia and independent reviews appointed by the 
government. While this is a formidable range of potential evaluators, the work of bodies 
and individuals such as these do not amount to a systematic evaluation of national security 
policy. This observation is supported by the way ANAO is excluded from examining the 
political aspects of performance, meaning that most of the seventy ANAO evaluations of 
Defence and fourteen evaluations of DFAT over the last ten years have focused on the 
mechanical or administrative aspects of perfonnance. 173 
Parliament also attempts to evaluate policymaking through its committee system. 
While there is some tradition of examining major crisis events in the United Kingdorn174, 
Parliamentary inquiries into national security generally focus on capability issues and 
foreign policy questions. 175 In addition, there were two enquiries in matters related to 
disaster management, in 1989 and 1994, and one into the 'Lebanon Crisis' of 1976 which 
examined humanitarian issues. 176 However, committees face significant obstacles when 
reviewing policy, such as working in an environment that is more about politics than 
security.177 In this view, the executive does what it can to prevent evaluation (and 
173 Of these eighty-four reports only three relate to policy formulation and advice. These included one about 
the implementation of bilateral relations in DFAT, and reports about the East Timor operation and 
Australian industry for Defence. ANAO also reported on domestic security coordination for DPM&C 
(see Australian National Audit Office, 'Publications', available http://www.anao.gov.au, accessed 
3 1 March 2007). On the scope of the Auditor-General's responsibilities, see Commonwealth of Australia, 
'Auditor-General Act 1997 (Commonwealth)', Part 4, available http://www.comlaw.gov.au, accessed 
I 8 October 2007. 
174 For examples, see Lord Oliver S Franks, Falklands Island Review: Report of a Committee of Privy 
Counsellors, HMSO, London, 1983; and Lord N Philips, The BSE Inquiry: The Report, 2000, Chapter 15, 
available http://www.hseinguiry.gov.uk; accessed 20 December 2006. 
175 The Parliament's various committees on foreign affairs and defence often called for officials to provide 
briefings on topical matters, and sometimes developed policy themselves (such as on the Omega 
navigation system in the 1970s). early iterations included the Government Members Defence Committee 
of the early 1960s (NAA, A 1946/14, CS 70-1701) and the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs of the late 
60s (NAA, Al 838, CS 56 I/112). 
176 Senate of Australia, 'The First 20 Years - Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade', 2007, available 
http://www.aph.gov.au, accessed 16 June 2007. The 1999 senate enquiry into East Timor will be 
examined in Part II. 
177 K Burton, Scrutiny or Secrecy? Committee Oversight of Foreign and National Security Policy in the 
Australian Parliament, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2005, pp. 37-40. Recent examples of 
evaluations include work by the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intell igence and Securi ty on 
intell igence agency powers and the review of decisions to list various groups as terrorist organisations; 
inquiries by the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade in the Asia tsunami 
response and o thers into immigration detention centres. 
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participation m policymaking) by refusing vital information to committees. This can 
involve a range of tactics, such as refusing to appear in person, prohibiting appearances by 
advisors, and privileging information through the public interest immunity clause that 
applies to much national security information. 178 
However, Kate Burton also notes that when evaluation does occur, it is likely to be 
conducted under a form of self-censorship by members of the major parties. These 
members choose not to demand changes to procedure or push too hard on security issues 
because they want to maintain a degree of bipartisanship in the area, exclude minor parties, 
be considered responsible on national security issues, and avoid establishing precedents that 
might cause harm once government changes hands.179 As a result, the actual influence of 
Parliament in evaluation is minimal.180 
Other bodies, such as royal commissions or ministerial inquiries, can also be 
appointed to review foreign and defence policy. There are many reasons for establishing 
inquiries (to use a generic name) including fact-finding, incident investigations, and 
synthesising views on issues. Other types of inquiry may simply attempt to educate, while 
others may be formed to show concern about a problem or provide a forum for grievance. 
The common factor is that all inqui1ies work within strict terms of reference that are 
approved by the government. The most notable of inquiries relating to defence and foreign 
policy have included royal commissions into the intelligence community by Justice Hope in 
1977 and 1985, and an enquiry into intelligence about Iraqi weapons of mass destruction by 
Philip Flood in 2004.181 The Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has also been 
involved in inquiries, including the recent 'Oil for Food' inquiry into the Australian Wheat 
Board. 182 It is difficult to generalise about the influence of such inquiries. To some, the 
terms of reference will skew the inquiry and prevent a fu]] examination of the issues.183 In 
178 Ibid., pp. 26- 37. 
179 Ibid., pp. 37-40. 
180 Gyngell and Wesley, p. 176. 
181 See R Hope, ' intelligence and security, abridged findings and recommendations', Royal Commission 
third report, Australian Government Printing Service, Canberra, 1978; R Hope, Royal Commission on 
Australia's Security and Intelligence Agencies, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 
1985; and Flood, Australian Intelligence Agencies. 
182 The Hon TR Cole, Report of the Inquiry into certain Australian companies in relation to the UN Oil-for-
Food Programme, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2006. 
183 This charge was laid at the Australian Government during the Cole Commission by KC Beazley, MP, or 
the ALP. See M Colvin, 'Truth hidden beyond inquiry's narrow terms o f reference: Opposition', 
PM, ABC Radio (Australia), 13 April 2006, available http://www.abc.net.au, accessed 30 January 2007. 
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other cases, the choice of inquirer will prejudge the results as their bias affects the questions 
asked (and not asked). 184 
This characteristic may be changing as departments conduct internal reviews and 
evaluations on a more regular basis. DFAT has an executive planning and evaluation 
branch that reviews each division's performance on an annual basis. 185 Defence too has a 
management audit branch, and it also employs the Defence Science and Technology 
Organisation and individual departmental officers to conduct reviews of various issues. 186 
While the details are scant, there is some evidence that interdepartmental reviews have been 
conducted into Operations BALI ASSIST in 2002 and TSUNAMI ASSIST in 
2004- 5.187 The latter was based on extensive debriefing of participants, with the results 
collated by Emergency Management Australia. 188 
EVALUATION AFTER IMPLEMENTATION 
Like other areas, foreign and defence policy evaluation (when it is conducted) is 
likely to occur after implementation is complete. In some ways, this is understandable as 
the perspective afforded by time is important to understanding the full scope of events and 
the results of policy. While uncommon, some forms of evaluation can occur during an 
event. A recent evaluation of Australia's relief performance after the 2004 Asian tsunami 
was conducted in the midst of ongoing recovery efforts, although it must be noted that the 
disaster response phase being reviewed had given way to the recovery phase. 189 Other 
opportunities to evaluate policy-in-progress exist, especially when parliamentarians disrupt 
the post facto evaluative norm by asking questions of ministers in Parliament or in the party 
184 For example, some claimed Flood's background influenced his findings on the very controversial issue of 
intelligence agency performance before the Iraq War of 2003 in AAP, 'Flood report diplomatic in its 
criticism', Age, 22 July 2004 (internet edition). Others disagree with this assessment. For example, see 
the compliments paid by Senator R Trood, 'Speech for the Second Reading of the Intelligence Services 
Legislation Amendment Bill (2005)', 5 October 2005, available http://www.senatortrood.com, accessed 
29 January 2007. 
185 Department of Foreign Affai rs and Trade, Annual Report 2005-2006, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, 2006, Chapter 3. 
186 A tactical 'lessons learnt' functi on is also employed at the service and joint levels within the ADF, but 
these e fforts do not consider policy or political level issues (author 's observations). 
187 Operation BAU ASSIST was a multi -agency response supporting Indonesian authorities after tbc 
October 2002 terrorist bombings in Bali. Operation TSUNAMI ASSIST was another multi -agency 
response to the Asian tsunami o f December 2004. 
188 S Gilding, ' Delivery of Government Policy in Times of Crisis - A Specific Reflection', paper presented 
at the Government Policy and Evolution Conference, Canberra, 27 .July 2005. 
189 Ibid. 
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room. These questions can provide useful information to evaluate implementation and hold 
ministers accountable for their actions as events unfold.190 
TENTATIVE CHARACTERISTICS 
The limited literature on the evaluation of Australian foreign and defence policy 
leads to a tentative acceptance of the original characteristics. However, both propositions 
require qualification. Firstly, official evaluation can occur during implementation, but the 
avenues for this are limited to parliamentary questions or ad hoc internal deliberations. 
Secondly, the sources of evaluation also may have some space to expand as new threats 
emerge. For example, health information will be needed to respond to pandemics, while 
law enforcement information is required to respond to terrorism. Pressure for change may 
also come from the media and internet users, and the courts if judicial intervention is 
adopted as a way to hold the government accountable for their response to threats. 
Tentative characteristics for national security policymaking 
There are similarities between foreign and defence policymaking-as the areas used 
to define national security-and the characteristics of policymaking in other areas. Should 
we be surprised? Smith, Cox and Burchill argue that 'foreign policy is not substantially 
different from other policy areas in tenns of the anay of domestic pressures that come to 
bear on its formulation' 191 , but most acknowledge that foreign and defence policy differs 
. . . , 192 Th from other areas to the point of being 'a remote, elite and secret.Ive actIV1ty . e 
differences anse, in the main, from the heightened secrecy that restricts the flow of 
information about national security, and the dominance of the executive and departmental 
experts in this field. These two differences lead to a relatively closed policymaking process 
where potential actors are usually excluded and the flow of information is restricted. 
Additional differences are created by the largely external (international) focus of both 
190 Albinski descrihcs the role and successes of Opposition efforts to unsettle the Whitlam Government in 
1975 (Albinski , Australian External Policy, p. 280). 
191 Smith, Cox and Burchill, p. 49. 
192 Millar emphasised the 'difference' of defence from other areas when he wrote how the Australian 
Government had 'almost convinced the average Australian that he cannot expect to know too much about 
defence' (Millar, Australia's Defence, pp. 2- 3). The notion of difference is formalised in one primer on 
Australian policymaking, where foreign policy is discussed in a second, wholly separate part of the book 
(D Jaensch and M Teichmann, Australian Politics and Foreign Policy: An Introduction, Longman 
Cheshire Melbourne, 1987). The description of the 'elite' process was provided by Gyngell and Wesley, 
p. 122. 
66 
policy areas and the crucial roles played by substantially independent external actors. 193 
These differences make it necessary to modify the characteristics for some phases to 
provide a more accurate reflection of national security policymaking (see Table 2). 
The most noticeable differences between policymaking in general and the specific 
area of national security arise in the early phases of the policy cycle. The national security 
executive and foreign governments tend to be the most dominant actors in the issue 
identification phase. While these actors may weigh domestic considerations when framing 
policy, other domestic agents-such as the courts, lobby groups, the media and the 
public-only have a sporadic influence over national security policy. Rational 
comprehensive methods of policy analysis may be adopted, but this approach often gives 
way to extra-rational 'professional judgement' . Analysis in these policy areas also tends to 
be more closed and reliant on insiders, but this may be changing. The existence of a 
dominant framework is contestable, for both foreign and defence policy tends to operate 
today within politically set boundaries. The importance of external actors also extends to 
the Consultation phase, to the point where some Australian governments have attempted to 
exclude the public from the entire process. 194 
The Coordination phase is an interesting example of where Bridgman and Davis's 
characteristics are modified the most. Coordination in national security policy aims to 
reduce friction, while structures and routines are imposed to assist (as they are in other 
policy fields). But more can be said about the nature of power and the coordination of 
national security policy. Firstly, this characteristic may be changing, with relationships 
between the different agencies of the Australian bureaucracy moving from a competitive to 
a cooperative basis. Secondly, it is possible that the crisis mode of national security 
policymaking may induce behaviour in bureaucratic actors that is different from the 
deliberate or capability modes. At this stage, both the bureaucratic politics and consensual 
explanations will be carried forward to the next phase of analysis. 
193 Albeit many of the issues o f defence policymaking are internally focused and deals with equipment 
procurement and 'interservicc politics'. For examples, see DJ Ball, The Politics of Defence Decision-
Making in Australia: The Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments, Reference Paper 7, 
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 1975. 
194 For example, the 1995 Australia- Indonesia security agreement was negotiated in secret in order to 








Table 2: Tentative Characteristics of National Security Policymaking 
General Characteristic 
• Issues come to political attention based on 
competitive agitation from d omestic sources, such 
as political parties, donors, interest groups, 
Parliament and media; 
• Issues might be ide ntified to the administrative level 
by o ther domestic agents, such as government 
policy specialis ts or the courts; 
• Issues can be created by the influence of external 
sources, suc h as economic cha nge, foreign state or 
non-state actors, technology, demographic shifts, or 
legal change; and 
• Issues enter the political agenda once there is 
su fficie nt mass appeal to demand political ane ntion. 
• A rational comprehe nsive analytical method is 
sought, but i t may be accompanied by the extra-
rational factors of judgement, experience and 
intuition. 
• The process is iterative because information is 
incomplete, people disagree over objectives and 
parame ters shift. 
• While internal policy experts (including bureaucrats 
and ministerial sta ff) may still dominate, ministers 
use an increasing range of non-government sources 
for analysis. 
• Policy is analysed according to the dominant 
framework of the policy area. 
• The ins trume nts most used m Australia include 
financia l, legal, advocacy, and government ac tion. 
• There are limitations upon what the government can 
do with its policy instruments. 
Tentative Characteristics of national security 
policymaking 
1. The prime minister, the national security ministers and 
their bureaucracy tend to be the d ominant internal actors 
rn issue identifica tion and, by extension, proble m 
definition. 
2. Fore ign governments have the ability to place issues on 
the national security policy agenda when they intend to 
harm Australian interests, when the interests of 
Australia' s allies and friends are threatened, and when 
high le ve ls of interdependence mean that threats to 
others' interests are viewed as threats to Australia. 
3. Other domestic actors can identify issues for national 
security policy, but their ability to do so is uneven and 
constrained by the position and information of the 
dominant actors. 
4. Mass appeal plays an uncertain role in issue 
identification for national security crises. 
I. Departments are struc tured to adopt rational 
comprehensive approaches to analysis, but this is 
modified in practice by e xtra-rational influences suc h as 
group loyalty a nd ide ntity, power re lations, competition, 
and appeals to professional judge ment. 
2. Policy issues are rare ly analysed as individual , discrete 
problems, and the nature of competition between issues 
and interests, and the conseque nt influence on the issue 
at hand, makes analysis iterative. 
3. Internal policy experts dominate, but external sources o f 
analysis are available. Where external sources are used, 
these tend to be former insiders or consultants 
sympathetic to the government of the day. 
4. The existence of a dominant framework is contestable 
and its influe nce can be difficult to identify. No 
dominant framework links defence and foreign oolicv. 
1. The instrume nts most used by the Australian 
Government in national security policy are diplomacy, 
alliances, international law, military force, foreign aid, 
information, and economic and social levers. 
2. The utility of national security policy instruments is 


































Phase General Characteristic Tentative Characteristics of national security Has the Is there 
policymaking characteristic potential for 
changed? change? 
Consultation • Citizens demand a say in policy between elections, l. Coordination is basically competitive, but it shows some 1. No 1. Possible 
and sometimes, consultation is mandatory. propensity for greater collegiality. (limited) 
• Consultation occurs across a continuum from 2. Governments describe structures and routines that suit 
information to control. their preferences, the best thinking of the time, the task 2. No 2. Unlikely 
at hand and external factors. 
Coordination • Governments attempt to achieve tolerable I. Coordination is basically competitive, but it shows some 1. Yes I. Uncertain 
compati bi 1 i ty, or at least mmmusc harmful propensity for greater collegiality. 
inconsistencies, across government activities. 2. Governments will describe structures and routines that 2. Yes 2. Possible 
• Governments search for consistency through suit their particular preferences and best thinking for the (noticeable) 
structures and routines. time; the task at hand; and external factors 
Decision • Cabinet is dominant. l. The prime minister is dominant. 1. No I. Possible 
• Cabinet conventions are based on collective 2. Cabinet conventions are based on collective (noticeable) 
responsibility, secrecy and recorded decisions. responsibility, secrecy and recorded decisions. 2. Yes 2. Uncertain 
• Officials, when invited, answer questions of a 3. Officials, when invited, answer questions of a technical 
technical nature and leave the room before decisions nature and leave the Cabinet room before decisions are 3. Yes 3. Uncertain 
are taken. taken. 
Implementation • Implementation is considered throughout the policy 1. Implementation is considered throughout the policy 1. No I. Unlikely 
cycle. cycle. 
• The more agencies involved, the more difficult 2. The more agencies involved, the more difficult 2. Yes 2. Unlikely 
implementation becomes. implementation becomes. 
Evaluation • Policy advice is not systemically evaluated. I. Evaluation typically occurs after the policy has been 1. Yes 1. Possible 
• Evaluation typically occurs after the policy has been implemented. (limited) 
implemented. 2. Policy advice is not systemically evaluated. 2. Yes 2. Possible 
(limited) 
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In the later phases, national security policymaking shares many of the characteristics 
described by Bridgman and Davis. The Decision phase retains most of the same 
conventions, although the prime minister has the ability to dominate this phase. The 
Implementation and Evaluation phases are also very similar, particularly in terms of the 
complexity of implementation and the lack of willingness to evaluate policy advice. 
Yet the policymaking system is not stagnant-it has changed and it will continue to 
do so. Gyngell and Wesley explain the reasons for this in terms of anarchy, but this 
suggests a total absence of control over actors pursuing their own self-interest.256 This 
description is difficult to sustain because armed forces might conduct operations 
independent of government direction in an anarchical system. This is clearly not reality in 
the Australian situation. Instead, change should be expected in the system because it is 
under constant pressure to adapt to existing conditions. This has been a major driver for an 
increasingly independent national policy by Australian governments since 1942, and for the 
creation of suitable structures to facilitate that independence.257 Thus the evolving role, 
function and prestige of External Affairs/DFAT is one expression of deliberate adaptation. 
Change is a constant. However, newly elected governments may not be the major 
reason because they rarely make sweeping foreign or defence policy changes on coming to 
office. While some may act quickly once elected, most tend to implement change that has 
already been discussed and accepted. Thus, and in contrast to New Zealand's Lange 
Government's stand on nuclear ships258, the policy initiatives of the Whitlam Government 
were largely concerned with catching up with changes already accepted in the party and 
society. 259 This view will be tested further, as the evidence presented in this chapter shows 
the importance of political leaders in determining how policymaking is conducted. 
This chapter has used one interpretation of the general characteristics of Australian 
policymaking to derive, through an examination of defence and foreign policymaking, a 
tentative group of characteristics to describe national security policymaking. The next 
chapter takes this analysis further by examining the extent to which the tentative 
characteristics need to be modified for the more specific mode of crisis policymaking. 
256 Gyngcll and Wesley, p. 22. 
257 Edwards, Prime Ministers, p. 189. 
258 David Lange's Labour Government refused permission for the USS Buchanan to enter New Zealand 
ports in I 985 (see R Thakur, 'Creation of the Nuclear-Free New Zealand Myth: Brinkmanship without a 
Brink', Asian Survey XXIX, no. l 0, 1989). 
259 Whitlam, p. 26; and Smith, 'Foreign Policy', p. 26. 
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POLICYMAKING DURING CRISES - AUSTRALIAN 
EXPERIENCES 
2 
This chapter refines the tentative characteristics of Australian national security 
policymaking to describe the specific mode of crisis policymaking. It identifies how crisis 
differs from national security policymaking and continues the process of identifying 
characteristics for testing in Part II. 
Chapter 2 examines three vignettes of crisis involving Australia during the last 
century. Each begins with an outline of the crisis before discussing policymaking (using the 
Australian Policy Cycle to organise that discussion). The chapter's final section summarises 
the similarities and differences between the tentative characteristics identified in Chapter 1 
(see Table 2) and those in the vignettes. These insights will be incorporated into those from 
the next chapter, which examines the emergence of the modern crisis policymaking system. 
The main sources used to construct the vignettes include archival material, official 
histories, and published accounts and memoirs. While these are strong sources, they do not 
always capture the intimacy of crisis policymaking. This makes it difficult to document the 
relationships between actors and the political arena. Therefore, this section illustrates the 
main aspects of crisis policymaking but does not represent a comprehensive account of 
events. 
Crisis vignette 1: Japan's threat, 1941-42 
A new war 
While Australian policymakers faced important challenges during the 1914-18 war, 
the crisis faced after the Japanese invaded Southeast Asia and the Pacific in late-1941 was 
the first (and only) occasion where an invasion of Australia was considered possible. 
There had been sufficient time to prepare the policymaking system. A functioning 
body for directing the war effort, the War Cabinet, had been established in September 1939. 
A second body composed of ministers and senior opposition figures, known as the 
Advisory War Council (A WC), was formed a year later. 1 The main issues at this time 
The A WC was a compromise to ensure unity of decision-making after the Opposition declined the 
invitation to join a 'natio nal government' (see D Day, The Politics of War: Australia at War 1939-45 
7 1 
concerned Australia's contribution to the war in Europe and economic mobilisation, but the 
looming Japanese threat was felt among Australian leaders from October 1940. Both 
Australian and British leaders based their strategy on defending Singapore from Japanese 
attack until reinforcements arrived. 
John Curtin of the Australian Labor Party (ALP) became prime minister on 
3 October 1941. Curtin made minimal changes to the structure of decision-making, and the 
two political groups essentially changed sides in the A WC. This established committee 
structure allowed the government to adapt to 'a new war' after the Japanese attacks on 
Pearl Harbor, Malaya and Philippines on 7- 8 December 1941 , and to agree on the essential 
points of a course of action within two weeks.2 
The situation deteriorated over the next three months as Singapore fell on 
15 February 1942, Darwin was bombed on 19 February, and the Japanese landed in the 
Australian protectorates of Papua and New Guinea in March. The sense of crisis, already 
palpable in the nation's senior decision-making bodies, was reinforced when the Japanese 
advanced to Port Moresby along the Kokoda Track in July 1942.3 
The policy cycle 
ISSUE IDENTIFICATION 
While the Japanese attacks generated the crisis, the Australian Government's 
continued reliance on Britain for information and policy direction shaped issues and 
options. This influence was reinforced by Australia's longstanding connection to Britain, 
and the Australian reliance on British information sources. This ' virtual monopoly on 
information'-using resources including the Dominions Office, the British Broadcasting 
Corporation (BBC) and Australia's representative in London- 'ensured that Australia 
2 
from Churchill to MacArthur, HarperCollins Publishers, Pymble, 2003, p. 86; and D Horner, Inside the 
War Cabin.et: Directing Australia's War Effort 1939-45, Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, 1996, 
pp.20- 1). 
D Horner, Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the Making of Australian Defence Policy, Allen 
and Unwin, St Leonards, 2000, p. 128. 
P Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness: Australian Foreign Affairs 1941-47, Melbourne Uni versity Press, 
Melbourne, 1980, pp. 42-3. 
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looked at the world through British eyes' .4 It was not until the Japanese attacked that all 
opposition to putting the defence of Australia ahead of Imperial commitments ceased.5 
POLICY ANALYSIS 
Defence analysed the war situation through formal, written strategic appreciations. 
These appreciations were characterised by their overwhelmingly military focus, limited 
consultation and significant high-level involvement in their drafting. In one example the 
Chief of the General Staff, Lieutenant General Vernon Sturdee, produced a new assessment 
soon after the fall of Singapore without input from the other service chiefs.6 
Despite these characteristics, strategic assessments (and military appreciations) 
remained an imprecise art. David Horner noted: 
... unlike later campaigns, the government closely scrutinised and at times sought 
to influence the conduct of the lPapuan] campaign ... the main reason for the 
interest was that it soon became obvious that the campaign had been shaped by 
. . 7 inaccurate strategic assessments. 
Even attempts at rigourous analysis can become clouded in a crisis, and considerations 
other than objective fact play an important part in ostensibly professional advice. 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
The main policy instrument considered in this case was military action and most of 
the nation's resources were directed towards supporting the aimed forces. At the time, 
Australia's diplomatic instruments were limited in their size and role, with representation in 
only London, Washington and Ottawa. The main job of these representatives was to 
provide support to the government's desire to obtain more British and US reinforcements to 
defend Australia. The Department of External Affairs (DEA) also sought a closer 
relationship with the Soviet Union, in the hope of increasing the pressure on Japan.8 That 
4 Day, The Politics of War, p. I I. 
See Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, Chapter l 0 (especia lly p. 99) for a discussion of the disagreement 
within the AWC over the recall of 1st Australian Corps to Australia in early 1942. 
Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, p. 99. T he other service chiefs were both seconded British officers. 
D Horner, High Command: Australian and Allied Strategy 1939- 1945, Allen and Unwin Australia, North 
Sydney, 1982, p.215. 
Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, pp. 40- 2. 
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the DEA was also reduced in size by labour regulation in 1942 also shows that Australia's 
priority was on the armed forces and economic mobilisation.9 
CONSULTATION 
Despite the limited consultation during military appreciations, there was still a strong 
norm of consultation within government elsewhere in the policy development process. The 
A WC was the strongest manifestation of this-it brought both sides of Parliament together 
to reduce the chance of direct opposition to government policy over the war. Consultation, 
of sorts, also occurred as different business people were co-opted to official committees in 
support of the war effort. However, engagement with the public was limited to information 
(see Figure 2 earlier), although elections did occur at regular intervals throughout the war. 10 
The government placed a high value on secrecy, to the point of having secret sessions of 
Parliament during the crisis. 11 
The Australian Government tried to improve its ability to consult with its British and 
US allies in a number of ways. This extended from gaining a seat in the British War 
Cabinet, to less-successful initiatives such as the Pacific War Council. 12 Despite these 
efforts, the Australian Government exerted only patchy influence with the British, and was 
unable to shape US policy in any meaningful way. As a result consultation occasionally 
reached the partnership level, but the normal mode was delegation or control as the 
American and British governments decided on the major issues (such as 'beat Hitler 
first' 1\ and on the allocation of resources to theatres.14 
9 The Manpower Directorate was responsible for regulating Australia's Jabour force for the war effort (sec 
Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, Chapter 9; and Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 43 for its effect on the 
DEA). 
10 P Hasluck, The Government and the People: 1942-45, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1970, 
pp. 233-43. 
11 These sessions met on 20 and 2 1 February 1942. Parliament's regular meetings were disrupted during 
February through to June, but it was still able to consider bills to finance the war and debate measures to 
raise money for war (see Hasluck, 1942-45, pp. 307-9). 
12 The Pacific War Council was established in l 942. It members included the United States, Britain, China, 
the Netherlands, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. 
13 
'Beat Hitler First' summarises the agreed British and US grand strategy decided in March 1941 and 
confirmed in December 1941. /\s a result, the priority of US resources generally went towards the 
European theatre at the expense of the Pacific theatre (see Horner, Defence Supremo, p. 125; and 
J Beaumont, Australia's War 1939-45, Allen and Un win, Crows Nest, 1996, pp. 171-2). 
14 Hasluck, 1942-45, pp. 227- 9. Hasluck did not place emphasis on the relationship between Curtin and 
MacArthur. In his opinion, their relationship did not necessarily bring Australia any greater influence in 
Washington, but it 'placed Australia in the role of one who was backing one side in an American debate 
(over military resources) rather than in the role of an ally stating its views as one nation lO another' 
(Hasluck, 1942-45, p. 631). 
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COORDINATION 
The difficulty with coordinating policy advice was exacerbated by aspects of 
structure and interdepartmental relations. On the structural side, war brought a significant 
increase in the number of departments, committees, boards and directorates overseeing the 
national effort. Most of these were responsible for resource planning and implementing 
policy, and all held specialised knowledge. Many structures, especially committees, were 
established on the basis of transitory conditions or to accommodate individual personalities. 
In other cases, the smaller structures became redundant as the war progressed and the 
government became more 'authoritarian' .15 Defence epitomised this phenomenon. By 1941, 
it comprised ten separate ministers and departments that were linked at the very top-on 
matters of higher defence policy- through Sir Frederick Shedden's Department for 
Defence Coordination.16 The physical separation of departments was another factor, with 
the Defence group located in Melbourne, while DEA and the Prime Minister's Department 
(PMD) were based in Canberra. 
Relationships between departments were another factor in coordination. In 1942, 
PMD was not a major policy force, mainly because it lacked the capability to develop 
policy advice and possibly because Prime Minister Curtin was also Defence Minister (just 
as Menzies had been). 17 DEA was also marginalised and weak, especially because the 
crucial relationship with Britain was maintained by PMD and Defence was a major 
influence on external relations.18 As a result, Defence-particularly Shedden-was the 
dominant force in policy advice. It became largely responsible for initiating action on war 
policy issues, examining (and so coordinating) the War Cabinet agenda, and ultimately as 
the authoritative voice of War Cabinet decisions. 19 The lack of coordination was also seen 
in the relationships between the economic and war departments. According to Hasluck, the 
15 P Hasluck, The Government and the People: 1939-41, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1952, 
p. 436-8 (cited as Husluck, 1939-41). 
16 Hasluck, 1939-41, p. 436 and 442-3. The Department' s title reverted back to 1he 'Department of 
Defence' in Apri l J 942. Sir Frederick Shedden was Secretary of the Department of Defence/Department 
of Defe nce Coordination from November 1937 to October 1956. 
17 Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 7. 
18 This weakness was also seen in the way the External Affairs Minister did not si t on the War Cabinet and 
A WC between October I 940-0ctober 194 1. See Hasluck, Diplomatic Witness, p. 43 ; and 
P Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901- 1949, 
Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1983, p. J 54. 
19 Hasluck, 1939-41, pp. 443-4. 
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economic departments did not follow direction and the war departments regarded 'the 
details of economic administration as subordinate matters' .20 
DECISION 
The decision structure at the political level was based on a series of linked 
committees, all of which involved Curtin as the chair and Shedden as secretary.21 The 
Cabinet and War Cabinet were the highest decision-making bodies.22 The War Cabinet was 
formed to allow a small number of selected Cabinet ministers (between seven and eleven) 
to make decisions about strategy and the war effort, with only the most important issues 
referred to full Cabinet.23 Senior military officers and officials were called to attend 
meetings as necessary, and Shedden acted as War Cabinet secretary throughout. Despite 
this central position, the War Cabinet did not retain its primacy and authority soon moved 
to the AWC. 
Curtin promoted the AWC's role after the Japanese attacks in December 1941; he 
felt this body could manage the crisis more effectively than the War Cabinet. To achieve 
this, Curtin expanded the A WC membership by two ministers, decided that A WC decisions 
would be treated as Cabinet decisions, and increased the A WC's authority to include 
international questions, strategy and 'war policy generally' .24 With these changes, the 
government and opposition became jointly responsible during the c1isis of December 1941-
September 194225, but not necessarily in the highest decision-making forum. 
That position was taken, for a time, by the Prime Minister's War Conference 
(PMWC), which exercised decision-making authority for a short time after US General 
Douglas MacArthur aITived in Australia in March 1942. Curtin originally wanted to hold 
meetings between his senior ministers and the senior operational commanders. However, 







Hasluck, 1942-45, p. 245, cited the effect upon 'manpower' allocations during and after the crisis. 
For a discussion of this relationship and Shedden's role, see Horner, Defence Supremo, chapter 7. 
As noted earlier, Parliament met in 1942 but it was not influential in the crisis. See Hasluck, 
1942-45, p. 307-9. 
The full Cabinet was consulted on major policy issues and received updates from the War Cabinet. Day-
to-day direction of the war was delegated to the War Cabinet and A WC. Cabinet's other sub-committee, 
the Production Executive, needed to refer policy decisions to full Cabinet or the War Cabinet. See 
Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, pp. 2-3 and p. 132, and pp. 92-6. 
Ibid., p. 87, quoting a report in the Sydney Morning Herald of 18 December 1941. 
HY Evatt noted that 'in the dark days of 1942 when the threat to Australia was very grave, all the 
important decisions taken were really decisions of the Council' (ibid., p. 196). The AWC continued to 
meet through to the end o f the War, although much of the authority for decisions returned to the War 
Cabine t after August 1943. 
76 
whom the pnme minister might summon. This was accepted and Shedden became a 
participant, rather than just the secretary. This arrangement excluded General Thomas 
Blarney (the senior Australian military officer) from decision-making for a time, and meant 
that MacArthur became the senior military adviser to Curtin. The PMWC met fortnightly in 
May and June 1942, and discussed strategy, priorities and war effort. 
Once the threat receded and MacArthur moved his headquarters to Brisbane in 
July 1942, the PMWC became less important in the policymaking system. The remarkable 
story of this structure, however, was that it existed at all. It was highly irregular, 
particularly when considered against the concept of sovereignty. As Peter Edwards noted, 
'A body comprising a prime minister, a public servant and a foreign general flouts almost 
every constitutional convention' .26 The PMWC did, however, put military considerations at 
the forefront of decision-making in a very close partnership between a civilian leader and 
his principal military and policy advisers.27 
Decision-making in this crisis therefore revolved around a number of key people, 
such as Curtin, Shedden, MacArthur, Blarney and the members of the A WC. That these 
identities, and therefore the relationships among the key people, remained reasonably stable 
throughout the crisis helped to make decision-making smoother. However, these 
relationships were probably more critical than the fmmal structures described above for 
detennining the decision path.28 
A number of Cabinet conventions can be identified in this period. Joint responsibility 
within the A WC was one, and it is certain that all members felt bound by decisions made 




P Edwards, 'Another look at Curtin and MacArthur', paper presented at Remembering 1942, Australian 
War Memorial, 2002, available http://www.awm.gov.au, accessed 29 August 2006. 
See D Horner, Inside the War Cabinet, pp. 121 - 3 for further commentary on that relationship. 
See Horner, High Command, pp. 137- 8; Horner, Defence Supremo, p. 59, p. 150 and p. 234; Hasluck, 
Diplomatic Witness, p. 7; and C Waters, 'The Great Debates: H.V. Evatt and the Department of External 
Affairs', in .I Beaumont, C Waters, D Lowe, G Woodard (eds), Ministers, Mandarins and Diplomats: 
Australian Foreign Policy Making 1941- 1969, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2003, p. 52; and 
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29 See the comments attributed to KA Beasley, an ALP member of the A WC, in Horner, Inside the War 
Cabinet, p. 196. 
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feared that briefing opposition members on operational matters increased the chances of 
leaks and political attacks.30 
Accountability norms were subdued but they were not extinguished. While joint 
responsibility acted to prevent public criticism, the opposition still used the A WC to 
question ministers and officials. Access to good infonnation facilitated this. 31 It also 
remained the convention for all officials (less the secretariat) to retire while decisions were 
made by the War Cabinet and A WC (but not the PMWC), and for significant debate to 
occur in their absence. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The implementation of policy decisions in this crisis fell mainly upon the military, 
particularly those forces in New Guinea. However, there was a significant lack of 
confidence in these forces, especially those conducting the fighting withdrawal along the 
Kokoda Track. This lack of confidence heightened the sense of crisis and drew political 
leaders and generals such as Blarney directly into the campaign's management.32 
Diplomacy played a supporting role in implementation, with its main task being to 
secure more resources from the United States and Britain.33 Diplomats could also 
undermine those efforts, especially when representatives had different opinions. In one 
example, Australia's High Commissioner to London, Stanley (Lord) Bruce, ignored his 
government's direction to request more military resources during discussions with British 
Prime Minister Churchill.34 
Implementation also needed to flow into the civilian economy in this crisis. This was 
attempted through a range of means, including bodies to oversee economic policies, 
legislation and resource allocation.35 The coordination of this effort was complicated by the 
30 
31 
Menzies was concerned abouL leaks during Lhe 1941 Greek campaign. See Horner, High Command, 
p. 84. 
For example, Curtin used information gained in the A WC to criticise government plans and offer 
alternatives for the defence of Australia in Seplember 1941. See Homer, Inside the War Cabinet, 
pp. 72- 3. 
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divergence between departments and by the public's apathy towards the need for a unified 
war effort. 36 
EVALUATION 
There is no evidence of any formal evaluation of the policymaking system during or 
after this crisis. Evaluation did occur elsewhere, such as the review conducted in 1942 into 
the role and performance of the Department of Information. 37 
Analysis against the tentative characteristics 
This crisis provides broad support for the characteristics of national security 
policymaking presented in Table 2. This vignette shows the prime minister's dominance in 
decision-making, particularly in the way Curtin changed decision structures during the 
crisis. On one Jevel, the changes to the AWC's role from December 1941 were logical; they 
streamlined the decision process and increased the chances of political consensus. 
However, the PMWC reflected a preference for reducing the number of people involved in 
decision-making. Furthermore, Shedden' s role was unusual at a time when the norm ran 
against official participation in decision-making, while MacArthur's deep involvement was 
unheard-of. 
It is possible to interpret this as a case of pre-bureaucratic politics where Defence 
triumphed over less-powerful rivals. Indeed, DEA staffing was reduced significantly in 
1942, and PMD played its usual communication role. This lack of competition may be 
explained by the overwhelming focus on the war and Defence's control of the War Cabinet 
agenda and submissions. It also shows the immaturity of DEA (as an institution) at this 
time, and the acceptance of traditional roles in a time of crisis. 
The influence of this crisis was felt for some time in direct tenns, particularly in the 
post-war settlement Australia sought. The influence also continued indirectly, as some 
members of the pre-Curtin Government War Cabinet and A WC during this crisis returned 
to government in 1949. It was these leaders-including Robert Menzies, Harold Holt, 
Percy Spender, John McEwan and Richard Casey-who were charged with guiding 
Australia through a number of security challenges during the 1950s and l 960s. 
36 Hasluck, 1939-41, pp. 235- 8 and pp. 374-86, recounts the difficulty of channeling public concerns to 
create an effective national response to the war before 1942. 
37 Ibid. , pp. 383- 5; and Hasluck, 1942-45, p. 397. 
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Crisis vignette 2: Australia and 'United Action', 1954 
Dominoes and decisions 
Peter Edwards described Australia's post-1945 involvement in Southeast Asian 
conflicts as one of 'crises and commitments'. 38 While some of these crises were ultimate! y 
of minor importance for Australia, others had far-reaching consequences for the region, for 
Australia's place therein, and for the very nature of Australian society. Edwards observes 
that the government handled some crises well, but Australia was left exposed and 
vulnerable at times because solutions to past crises were applied 'as if they were irrefutable 
truisms' .39 
The United Action Crisis of 1954 provides an example where Australian crisis 
policymaking was successful to a degree, although good fortune played a part in avoiding 
significant political or military costs.40 This fortune was notable because Australia's formal 
crisis policymaking system was not always followed. According to Edwards: 
.. . policy on these and other external crises was often decided in meetings in 
Menzies' office in Parliament House, bringing together three ministers-Menzies, 
Casey and McBride-and two departmental secretaries, Allen Brown of the Prime 
Minister's Department and Tange.41 
Edwards also noted how Shedden, still Secretary of the Department of Defence, was 
now 'separated by physical distance and intellectual disengagement' and did not play a 
major role. Instead, Menzies reHed heavily on the experience of the ministers involved in 
this group, while using the full Cabinet as a vehicle to legitimise his actions.42 
The crisis of March-June 1954 developed as the Vietnamese communist (Viet Minh) 
forces closed on the French military operating base of Dien Bien Phu.43 Fearing the worst, 
US Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed 'united action' by European nations, the 
United States and others such as Australia to prevent the (Chinese) communist threat 
38 P Edwards (with G Pemberton), Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia's 
involvement in Southeast Asia Conflicts 1948-1965, Commonwealth of Australia and Allen and Unwin, 
North Sydney, 1992. 
39 Ibid., p. 385. 
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underminjng Southeast Asia. DuJles warned this might 'involve serious risk', but such risks 
were necessary to 'win peace' .44 President Eisenhower also promoted the policy in his 
speech about the 'falling domino principle' .45 Others noted calls for nuclear weapons to be 
used.46 
Australia's response to this crisis did not involve the deployment of forces, as in the 
1941-42 crisis. Instead, this crisis was managed in Cabinet and played out through 
diplomacy by Australia's overseas missions. The two institutions provided, in different 
ways, the locations for the Australian Government to determine its response to the 
conflicting solutions offered by the cautious Great Britain and more bellicose United States. 
This crisis therefore contained a sub-text about reconciling the Australian Government's 
emerging sense of national interests in a rapidly changing world with its long-held and 
new-found commitments to external powers. 
The policy cycle 
ISSUE IDENTIFICATION 
Once again, the dominant issues for the Australian Government were identified 
overseas. While the deteriorating situation around Dien Bien Phu was the immediate 
trigger, contributing issues included the French Government's military and political 
difficulties, the approaching Geneva Conference47, and the US Government's determination 
to act against Chinese aggression. 
Despite improving indigenous diplomatic and intelligence capabilities, British 
sources of information remained important to the Australian Government. Sir Arthur Tange 
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the 1950s.48 Consequently, Australian officials and politicians paid 'some price in objective 
judgement', but they recognised that policy would have been 'bereft of the kind of 
information which was necessary' without British support.49 This reliance made exchanges 
among Britain, New Zealand and Australia important, particularly because these supported 
the cautious approach favoured by Australian leaders.so Indeed, the contrast was stark 
between the American position promoting action and the British preference for a diplomatic 
solution. 
Another complicating factor for issue identification was geography. Prior to this 
crisis, the main focus for Australian security attention was not Asia. Rather than looking at 
the Chinese threat, both the prime minister and Defence envisaged contributions against 
possible Soviet expansionism in Iran and the broader Middle East.s1 Despite this, External 
Affairs Minister Casey and his department, under Tange, were making a case for Australia 
to look more closely at Asia and to make the United States more interested in this region.52 
While the press foHowed this crisis closely, Edwards notes how they did not initially 
have a unanimous position. A sample of capital city daily newspapers supports this view. 
At first, The Sydney Morning Herald expressed 'heartfelt relief' in the determination 
expressed by Mr Dulles, and a warning of its military implications for Australia. Further, 
the edit01ial warned that 'no Australian Government could hang back if it were called to 
help'.53 Conversely, The Melbourne Herald urged caution and diplomacy ahead of action.54 
The press did tend, however, towards a more 'British' line later in the crisis, which clearly 
accorded with the instincts of most Cabinet members.5s There was also strong suppo1t for 
48 JDB Miller, 'Transcript of Interview with Sir Arthur Tange, AC, CBE', National Library of Australia -
Oral History Unit, Canberra, 198 1, p. 111. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Edwards (with Pemberton), pp. 126-8. 
5 1 D Lowe, 'Menzies' Nmional Security State 1950-53', in F Cain (ed), Menzies in Peace and War, Allen 
and Unwin/Australian De fence Studies Centre, St Leonards, 1997, pp. 43-4. 
·
52 Ibid. , p. 43; and Edwards (with Pemberton), pp. 53-6. 
53 Sydney Morning Herald, 'Warning to Red Axis - and to Australia', 31 March 1954, p. 2. 
54 
55 
The Advertiser adopted a similar position ('Safety in the Pacific', I April 1954, p. 2), and extended it by 
declaring that atomic weapons should be used to defeat the communists. 
Melbourne Herald, 'Warning lo China?', 7 April 1954, p. 4. 
Edwards (with Pemherton), p. 128 and p. 133. The Advertiser was somewhat equivocal. One editorial 
supported the desire for a broader security pact in Southeast Asia, but was concerned for its implications 
for J\NZUS ('Mr. Dulles's Defence Plan ', 5 May 1954, p. 2). Later, the editor was more concerned for 
taking positives from the French defeat and US reconsideration of its position, noting how the 'American 
Secretary of State has c learly profited from his recent setback [in Geneva]' hecause events gave a new 
impetus to talks about a security pact in Southeast Asia (Advertiser, 'Mr. Dulles starts again', 
11 May 1954, p. 2). 
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Foreign Minister Casey's speech on 30 April at Geneva and optimism expressed at the 
outcomes of the conference.56 This support worked to the government' s political advantage, 
as it helped prevent United Action from becoming an election issue. 
POLICY ANALYSIS 
The main issues for policy analysis included Australia's aJliance with the United 
States, the potential for war with China, further treaties with Southeast Asian states, the 
impending election, the Geneva conference on Korea and Vietnam, and the influence of 
Chinese and conununist successes on regional stability. The choices for policy analysis also 
came down to following either a 'British' or 'American ' line, as noted above. Each of these 
issues worked together to create high risks, time pressure and transforrnative potential. 
Analysis was conducted within individuaJ departments, and there appears to have 
been only limited links between them. Defence policy analysis was conducted as a 
cooperative task between the Joint Intelligence Committee (JTC) and Joint Planning 
Committee (JPC), and their work was presented as an appreciation for the Defence 
Committee about the military aspects of United Action.57 The advice from DEA stressed 
caution. Jn their submissions to Cabinet, DEA pointed to the dangers of Western military 
intervention, concern for relations with Asian countries, and the potential to provoke a 
Chinese reaction.58 Despite these differences, it is clear that all- including Cabinet-were 
seized of the importance of this issue to Australia's security and the problems it presented 
for Australia's external relationships. 
One complicating factor, aside from the time pressure created by the tacticaJ 
situation at Dien Bien Phu, was the imprecise meaning of the US proposal (even by 
27 May).59 Despite this, asse1t ions of Indochina' s importance by American leaders were 
'broadly in line with agreed Commonwealth appreciations' , with the only point of 
56 AAP and Staff Correspondent, 'Casey Praised at Geneva', Sydney Morning Herald, I May 1954, 
p. 3; and Sydney Morning Herald, 'Some Progress has been made at Geneva', 6 May 1954, p. 2. 
57 Sec NAA, A l 838/269, TS652/3/2 Part 2, Joint Intelligence Committee Minutes, 13 and 14 Apri l 1954. 
The .TIC was tasked to conduct analys is on 18 March 1954, and it met in session with the JPC twice on 
13 and 14 April. Both groups had invited members or observers from other departments including DEA 
and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). The JPC is discussed in more detai l in 
Chapter 3. 
58 Edwards, Arthur Tange, pp. 74-5. 
59 Sydney Morning Herald, 'Casey lo Visit lndo-China and Washington', 8 April 1954, p. J. Also, Edwards 
(with Pemberton), p. 127. 
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departure being the assessment of Indonesia's vulnerability to communist subversion.60 
This shows how governments use external sources of advice- in this case, from allied 
governments- to shape or confirm their own thinking about a particular problem. 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
The Australian Government had a full range of policy instruments available during 
this crisis. While the US Government was keen to explore military options, the Australian 
Government went to some lengths to ensure these were not discussed in Cabinet. Indeed, 
one suggestion to consult with the Chief of the General Staff was explicitly rejected in 
order to prevent any discussion of military action before the election.61 
Part of the government tried to find other, more novel tools to achieve its goals. 
Instruments such as aid, education and information were being considered as important 
tools around this time, but not strictly in relation to the United Action crisis. In early 1955, 
External Affairs Minister Spender was given the task of creating a non-military response to 
communism that would involve aid, education, visits and shaping trade unions. The use of 
info1mation through radio, books and magazines was also being considered to counter 
communist propaganda, and to create an aspiration for democracy and prosperity in 
Southeast Asia. The Australian Government also looked at how it could work with other 
governments towards the same objectives. However, the Overseas Planning Committee, 
which was responsible for planning and coordinating these measures, ceased meeting by 
the end of 1956- perhaps because its role had been subsumed by international groups, 
perhaps because bureaucrats were skeptical of its usefulness, and perhaps because its 
political advocate was loosing his power in Cabinet.62 
CONSULTATION 
Consultation with its allies was essential to establishing Australia's position in this 
crisis. Consultation began with a discussion between US Secretary of State Dulles and 
Casey on 26 March, and continued in various meetings between Casey and British, French, 
60 NAA, A 1945/42, Defence Corrunittee Minutes, 'Indo-China - United States' Proposals for United 
Action', 15 April 1954, p. 1951 and Annex Al953. 
61 Edwards (with Pemberton), p. 126. 
62 For a detailed explanations o f the measures considered and the effect of this initiati ve, see C Waters, ' A 
failure of imaginatio n: R.G. Casey and Australian Plans for counter-subversion in Asia, 1954- 1956', 
Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 3, 1999, pp. 360- 1. 
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New Zealand and American leaders throughout April and May.63 The importance of 
consultation with Australia's allies was emphasised by Menzies in Cabinet64, and the form 
of such consultation eventually included meetings aimed at identifying possible troop 
commitments. These meetings led to detailed military-to-military discussions in June 1954 
and in the margins of the Geneva Conference.65 Consultation efforts also included close 
monitoring of major US-British meetings and representations to other nations by 
Australia's diplomatic staff. 66 
COORDINATION 
The differences m analytical perspectives between departments may have 
contributed to a lack of coordination. This problem was made clear in an exchange between 
the Permanent Secretaries of Defence and DEA from 1 April 1954, in which each 
complained of the other's lack of responsiveness and unwillingness to cooperate. While one 
of the main reasons for this acrimony was the principle that each permanent head was 
responsible for giving independent advice to his minister, the differing personal views of 
Shedden and Tange were probably important.67 A similar lack of coordination was shown 
when the important submission to Cabinet by DEA on 4 June was presented for the first 
time at the actual meeting.68 Coordination was better when departments had pemrnnent 
seats on committees, or sent observers to them.69 
63 
64 
See TB Millar (ed), Australian Foreign Minister: The Diaries of R.C. Casey 195/-60, Collins, London, 
1972, pp. 123-69; and Edwards (with Pemberton), p. 122. 
NAA, A 11099, Cabinet Notebook, Notes of Meetings 12 February 1954 to 27 April 1954, p. 27 /85. 
65 NAA, A1838/346, 661/2/2/I Part 2, Cabinet Submission 360, 'Report of the five Power Military 





Edwards (with Pemberton), pp. 136- 7. Edwards, Arthur Tange, p. 75, highlights the role of diplomatic 
cables in coordinating action. 
Horner discusses these differences, which could be categorised simplistically as a '81itish focus' and 
emphasis on containing the Soviets on Shedden's part, and an 'Asian foc us' on Tange's (Defence 
Supremo, p. 316-19). The Permanent Head of a department (now known as the Secretary) is an appointed 
career official. 
This was the first meeting of Cabinet after the 29 May 1954 election, and the first Cabinet consideration 
of the crisis since 27 April. When discussion turned to Indo-China, Casey read from a DEA submission 
that had not been circulated prior to the meeting. He stated the basic, and continuing, dilemma for 
Australia in these terms: 'We have to steer between letting the US believe we will fight our battles and 
le tting the US uncautiously get into a ground war in Asia' (NAA, A 11099/1 , Cabinet Notebook, Notes of 
Meetings 4 June 1954 to 27 October 1954, pp. 2- 3/164 ). 
For example, ASIO sent a liaison officer to JJC meetings. While the De fence Committee brought officials 
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members in 1954. Sec NAA, 'Defence Records', (avai lable http://www.naa.gov.au, accessed 
14 November 2007). 
85 
DECISION 
Australian Cabinets often form sub-committees to consider specific problems, as 
seen in the vignette described above. Despite this experience and practice, this crisis was 
discussed-and managed-in the full Cabinet. 
Cabinet's dominance was refined in three ways. In the first, Menzies used his 
political skills and credibility to be the central decision-maker and major figure. While 
some dispute whether Menzies established a 'prime ministerial' style or not, his dominance 
over defence and foreign policy issues was not in question.70 In the second refinement, 
Menzies made best use of the existing conditions and institutions to promote his position. 
These included the increasingly influential PMD, the low-levels of currency in foreign 
affairs among most of the Cabinet, and Second World War-era images and analogies 
including references to appeasement, the Spanish Civil War, the need to resist aggression, 
and previous war roles.71 
The third refinement can be seen in the way few firm decisions were made in the full 
Cabinet. Instead, it seems likely that Menzies gave a great deal of latitude to ministers to 
make decisions and then back-brief Cabinet.72 This meant Cabinet was a place for ministers 
to air their views and set parameters for action, rather than a decision-making body. As a 
result, some personalities were allowed to dominate the discussion even though they did 
not have portfolio responsibilities related to the issues. Menzies would often conclude 
meetings with a short summary, without necessarily committing the government to one 
course or another.73 Once done, the real decisions were probably made in the smaller 
70 D Lee, 'Cabinet', in S Prasser, JR Nethercote and J Warhurst (eds), The Menzies Era: A Reappraisal of 
Government, Policy and Politics, Hale and Ironmonger, Sydney, 1995, pp. 125-9. See also R Trood, 
'Prime Ministers and Foreign Policy', in P Weller (ed), Menzies to Keating: The Development of 




Lowe, 'Menzies' National Security State 1950-53', pp. 43- 6. Tange also describes appeasement as one 
of the four 'strong beliefs' guiding coalition policy at this time. See Sir Arthur Tange, 'On leading horses 
co water ', in Tange (ed), Defence Policy Administration and Organisation: Selected Lectures 1971- 1986, 
Australian Defence Force Academy, Canberra, 1992, p. 85. 
I Hamilton, 'Interview with Sir John Bunting', National Library of Australia - Oral History Section, 
Canberra, 1983, p. 1/4/51- 53. 
Jn practice, the Cabinet notebooks show that everyone in Menzies' Cabinet was able to contribute to 
discussion, but some personalities tended to dominate (Cabinet Notebook, 12 February - 27 April 1954). 
Of the 20 ministers, only half of these really participated in discussions about the crisis with Has luck, 
Casey, McMahon, Kent Hughes, Holt, McBride and HL Anthony being the most frequent speakers. A 
few others made one or two remarks, mainly to ask a question or to support another's view. Interestingly, 
Menzies was recorded as saying very little in some meetings (such as the Cabinet meeting of 19 April, 
pp. 58- 59/85), sometimes speaking just to outline the broad policy (27 April 1954, pp. 82-84/85). ln the 
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grouping centered on Menzies, Casey, McBride and their senior officials.74 While Weller 
reported the strong involvement of officials in Cabinet in the early 1950s75, there is no 
record of their attendance during this crisis. If these records are correct, then the absence of 
officials from Cabinet goes against the prevailing norm. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Unlike the previous vignette, the government tried to avoid using military force to 
implement policy in this crisis. Instead, the External Affairs Minister and diplomats were 
left to determine the positions of the other major actors and to communicate Australia's 
views to others. Yet not every minister was confident about such a reliance on diplomacy to 
stabilise the region. Postmaster-General Anthony countered Casey's long presentation on 
the situation on 4 June by stating his lack of confidence in Asian countries to 'stop 
communism' and stressed reliance on the United States. Defence Minister McBride spoke 
of Chinese ambitions over the Red River Delta and the need to get local support for ground 
operations. He warned that ' things will go badly and then the US will be forced to use atom 
bomb'. He thought Australia was the only state that could influence the United States on 
thi s. Minister for the Interior Kent Hughes wanted the prime minister to go to Washington 
and London because 'Nothing is more vital to us than lndo China'. He tried to promote this 
conflict as a 'holy war' against atheism in order to attract Asian support.76 
EVALUATION 
There is no evidence to indicate that the policymaking process was evaluated in this 
crisis. Menzies did institute a number of changes to his Cabinet system soon after, however 
by establishing the Prime Minister's Committee and the General Administrative 
74 
75 
4 June meeting, Menzies did not speak until late and did not commit himself to a course of action 
(recorded in Cabinet Notebook, 4 June-27 October 1954, pp. 2-11/164). 
One instance of the importance of this smaller grouping can be seen in the events of 25 April 1954, when 
a misleading report led Australia to fear that the United States was about to launch a massive air strike to 
support the French. Rather than calling Cabinet together, Menzies, Casey and McBride agreed to convey 
Australia's opposition to any such strike-see Edwards (with Pemberton), p. 132. Lee ('Cabinet', p. 125) 
supports the importance of this small grouping to Menzies, and he notes Hasluck's opinion of Menzies' 
policymaking style. In contrast, Trood does not think Menzies and Casey were close, and he downplays 
the latter's influence (Trood, 'Prime Ministers', p. 167). 
P Weller, Cabinet Government in Australia, 1901-2006, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2007, pp. 100--3. 
76 Cabinet No1ebook 4 June- 27 October 1954, pp. 6- 71164. Sir Wilfrid Kent Hughes was a long-serving 
Australian parliamentarian and minister. He was also Minister for Works in 1954. 
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Committee.77 Even this an·angement failed to satisfy Menzies and he instituted a new 
system of an 'inner' and 'outer' ministry in January 1956.78 
Analysis against the tentative characteristics 
This vignette provides strong evidence to validate many of the tentative 
characteristics of national security policymaking and to support their application to the 
crisis mode. Once again foreign countries were important to issue identification, while 
domestically the prime minister, the external affairs and defence ministers, and the 
bureaucracy were dominant. While the print media covered the crisis and Geneva 
Conference extensively, the genera] line presented by the major outlets studied earlier was 
supportive of the government's preferred position. This does not deny the importance of 
domestic considerations, especial1y since this crisis occurred during an election campaign. 
Nor should this crisis be considered in isolation, because a number of other local and 
international issues-especially the Korean War settlement, the Petrov Affair79, the new US 
alliance, and generally strong anti-communist feelings-were entangled in the issues and 
analysis of the United Action crisis. 
Another feature of the analysis was the lack of considered study of the issues by 
Cabinet ministers. Many with domestic portfolios were vocal in Cabinet, but since the 
major submissions were presented at the actual meeting, most of their opinions were likely 
based on their quick reading and personal experience. This example supports the 
importance of extra-rational factors in policymaking, particularly where the time for 
analysis is relatively short. This vignette also demonstrates the situational utility of policy 
instruments and the way Cabinet attempts to isolate instruments-in this case, the 
military-they do not wish to use. 
Bureaucratic politics is evident rn the conflict between Defence and DEA. This 
caused a lack of coordination and drew Cabinet, especially the Prime Minster, into the 
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of advice.80 The tension between Defence's 'British' and DEA's 'regional' or 
' independent' view also demonstrated the existence of competing dominant frameworks 
within the bureaucracy. 
While Cabinet may have been nominally in charge, it was clearly an ineffective crisis 
manager.81 This assessment would be disputed by the Official Historian, Peter Edwards. He 
thought Cabinet played a canny game by using the May Federal election to conceal its 
preference for a negotiated solution, thus avoiding a strong American rebuke and the 
equally unpalatable need to choose between the US and British positions. 82 Indeed, it must 
be said that the best decision was probably not to make one, especially as any initiative on 
Australia' s part was unlikely to have been decisive. 
But Edwards' assessment is not supported by the meandering discussions recorded in 
the Cabinet Notebooks of April- May 1954, where many ministers contributed to the 
discussion regardless of their portfolio. Some contributions were emotive (such as Kent 
Hughes' desire to wage 'holy war' against the communists), while others contained fanciful 
assumptions (such as McMahon's view that action could bring 'Asian opinion' around).83 
At best, Cabinet provided the parameters for the smaller grouping, based on Menzies, 
Casey, McBride, Tange and Brown, to establish the more detailed policy line. That 
Menzies changed his Cabinet structure soon after this crisis, and again in 1956, hints at a 
level of dissatisfaction with Cabinet as a forum for decision. These structures were tested 
over the next eight years, but they did not last long enough to face Australia's next major 
international crisis. 
Crisis vignette 3: Konfrontasi, 1963-64 
The other crisis 
Australia faced two major national security crises m the 1960s. The one which 
attracted most attention was the commitment to the Vietnam War from 1962-72, which saw 
regular (professional volunteer) and national service (conscript) troops serve in an 
80 Trood, 'Prime Ministers', p. 168. 
81 Tange thought Cabinet (and DEA) would not have the capacity to handle more than one crisis at a time 
(.TDB Miller, 'Transcript o f Interview with Sir Arthur Tangc, AC, CBE', National Library of Australia -
Oral History Unit, Canberra, 1981 , p. IOI). 
82 Edwards (with Pemberton), p. l 38. 
83 Cabine t Notebook, 4 June-27 October 1954, pp. 6-711 64; and Cabinet Notebook, 12 February-27 April 
J 954, pp.82- 4/85. 
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ultimately unpopular defeat.84 This larger war overlapped with a smaller conflict that had 
significant implications for Australia' s relationships with its major allies and its 
neighbours. This final vignette examines the conflict, now known by its Indonesian name 
Konfrontasi, from early 1963 to the initial commitment of Australian military units to 
Borneo in April 1964. 
The events of 1963 developed after a proposal to federate the peninsular Malay 
states, Singapore and the Borneo territories of Sabah and Sarawak as 'Malaysia' by the 
Malayan Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman.85 This proposal was eventually rejected 
by the Indonesian and the Philippines Governments, who shared rival claims to these 
territories with Malaya and a growing distrust of 'Western' intentions in Southeast Asia. 
The mix of issues turned into a heated situation when a small but still significant revolt in 
the Sultanate of Brunei was suppressed by British and Malayan troops and police in 
December 1962. 86 This revolt was followed in January 1963 by provocative statements by 
Indonesian leaders, who described the proposed federation as ' neo-colonial ' and 'neo-
imperialist' .87 
Australia's leaders and officials watched this growing dispute closely, with their 
mam policy objectives being to support Malaysia's right to exist, to obtain a peaceful 
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outcomes were preferred as Australia needed to balance its defence agreement with Malaya 
and support for Britain against relations with its increasingly assertive Indonesian 
neighbours. On 16 January 1963, the British Government asked for consultation with the 
United States, Australia and (eventually) New Zealand to assess 'Indonesia' s expansionist 
intentions' and hostility to Malaysia.89 This invitation was accepted, and led to a series of 
consultations over the next nine months.90 
The crisis became acute as the Malayan Government proclaimed Malaysia Day for 
16 September 1963. This announcement, made by Malayan Prime Minister 
Tunku Abdul Rahman on 29 August 1963, was considered especially provocative as a UN 
consultation process was still underway in the Borneo territories. This announcement 
brought strong condemnation by the Indonesian Government and protest action against 
British interests in Jakarta.9 1 The Australian Government offered immediate political 
support for Malaysia, consulted the United States and Britain, and adopted a 'less 
conciliatory' attitude towards the Indonesian position.92 
Discussions about possible outside military commitments continued, with the British 
Government making formal approaches concerning Australian military aid and troops in 
September and November 1963.93 These requests were rejected by the Australian 
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fonnal request was received from the Malaysian Government.94 Further British requests 
followed in early 1964, which led to small and incremental changes to Australia's 
commitment.95 It was not until intelligence identified regular Indonesian forces in Sabah 
and Sarawak that the Australian Government decided, on 9 April 1964, to commit non-
combat forces (including engineers, helicopters and minesweepers) to assist British and 
Malaysian security forces in Borneo.96 Despite further requests97, Australia did not commit 
combat troops to operations against Indonesian forces m Borneo until 
3 February 1965.98 
The policy cycle 
ISSUE IDENTIFICATION 
The genesis of this crisis can be found in the rise of the concept of Malaysia in 1961, 
and the main challenge for Australia revolved around maintaining Western influence in a 
region undergoing significant political change. These priorities were articulated in 
Australia's defence policy, where the Australian Government was convinced that the best 
way to defend Australia was to cultivate alliances and maintain a ' forward ' presence in 
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St Leonards, 1997, pp. 75-6; and D Horner, 'Security Objectives', in FA Mcdiansky (ed), Australian 
Foreign Policy into the New Millennium, MacMillan Education Australia, South Melbourne, l 997, 
pp. 77-81. 
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change in Southeast Asia became important to Canberra, almost regardless of the 
relationship between Australia and individual states.100 
Intense public interest also helped to identify this issue. 101 According to Edwards, the 
public perceived Australia's relative weakness vis-a-vis Indonesia at that time.102 This 
popular feeling needed to be directed away from hostility or condemnation of Indonesia if 
Australia's preferred policy was to be successful. 103 Despite this, the media reflected public 
concerns about the British withdrawal from the region, and of Indonesia's 'naked and 
cynical self interest' in opposing Malaysia. 104 Reporting often adopted negative language 
about Indonesian actions, and provided perspectives of the story from the British and 
Australian point of view. 105 When the time came to corrunit non-combat troops in 
April 1964, the print media was sympathetic to the diplomatic aspects of Australia's 
announcement and supportive of the corrunitrnent. 106 
POLICY ANALYSIS 
The different forces and interests present in this crisis increased the difficulty of 
creating unified Australian policy. These factors-which included Indonesian intentions 107, 
100 The two 'crises' involving Laos in 1959 and 1961 are cases in point-see Edwards (with Pemberton), 
Chapter 12. 
101 Ibid., p. 263. This opinion was shared by Woodard (Asian Alternatives, p. 91) and Dee (In Australia's 
Own Interests, p. 147). 
102 Edwards (with Pemberton), p. 263. 
103 Public support for Malaysia grew over the (election) year of 1963, ending with 62 per cent support for 
and 17 per cent against Menzies' announcement of support for Malaysia on 25 September 1963 (Edwards 
(with Pemberton), p. 276). The differi ng public views, as reflected in the major newspapers, is also 
mentioned in NAA, A1838, 3034/1/1 Pan 18, Department of External Affairs, 'British/Malaysian 
Request for the Use of Australian Forces', c. 10 December 1963, in Dee, Australia and the Formation of 
Malaysia, pp. 193-9. 
1().1 Sydney Morning Herald, 'The Proclamation of Malaysia', 16 September 1963, p. 2. 
105 Note the headlines, and how they privilege the non-Indonesian perspective. For one, the Indonesians 
were accused of threatening British aircraft in J\AP, 'We'll Shoot! ', Sun Herald (Sydney), 
15 September 1963, p. I and p. 4; and D Wilkie, 'Fighting For Malaysia', Advertiser, 
16 September 1963, p. 2 . In others, Indonesian actions are given negative connotations: AAP-Reuters, 
' U.K. Embassy Stormed by Rioters', Sydney Morning Herald, 17 September 1963, p. 1; Sydney Morning 
Herald, 'Deliberate Distortion by Dr Subandrio', 20 April 1964, p. 2; and B Grant, 'External Affairs 
Minister Due in Djakarta: Difficulties over Subversion', Age, 13 September 1963, p. I . 
106 F 
·or examples of supportive press opinion, see Sydney Morning Herald, 'Significance of New Aid to 
Malaysia ', 18 April 1964, p. 2; Advertiser, 'Australians For Borneo', 20 April 1964, p. 2; and Age, 
'Australia Honors A Commitment', 20 April 1964, p. 2. 
101 The differences in analysis about Indonesian intentions can be seen in NAA, C3736, Department of 
External Affairs Cablegram, 'Indonesia', 11 January 1963; and NAA, C3736, Department of External 
Affairs Cablegram, 'British Paper on Indonesia', 16 January 1963. Indonesia's intentions are reviewed in 
Mackie, pp. 326- 33; and with a slightly different emphasis in J Chinyong Liow, The Politics of 
Indonesia-Malaysia Relations: One kin, two nations, RoutledgeCurzon, London, 2005, pp. 103-6. 
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the US position on Indonesia and Malaysia108, and the significant defence and commercial 
interests in the region- led to two competing policy approaches in government. The first, 
championed by PMD and the military chiefs and following Britain's preferences, was to 
actively oppose the Indonesians and provide a security guarantee to Malaysia. The second 
line preferred an independent policy that protected Australia's relationship with 
Indonesia. 109 This approach, favoured by DEA and Secretary of Defence Sir Edwin Hicks, 
was concerned about the Indonesia- Australia relationship and Indonesian perceptions of an 
Australian military commitment. The result was a 'minimalist compromise' between the 
two approaches, where Australia became committed to support Malaysia under terms 
similar to the previous agreement. 110 
These differences were exacerbated by friction in some key relationships. Senior 
officials, such as Sir John Bunting of PMD, regularly criticised other departments. 
Bunting's comments concerning External Affairs Minster Barwick taking positions that did 
not follow his department' s line (instead following Cabinet' s line) would have been aimed 
at reducing the authority of DEA officers in the policy debate. Another time, Bunting's 
description of DEA as 'over sensitive' towards Indonesia and ' too hard' on Britain seemed 
intended to further undermine DEA' s position. 111 
The process of analysis within DEA provides another insight into crisis 
policymaking. Woodard describes a highly informal analytical process-which he called 
'cooperative decision-making'-within DEA during this time. 11 2 No papers would be 
tabled before the face-to-face meetings between minister and departmental officials, and 
108 For discussion, see Lee, 'The Origins', p. 72; and Pemberton, All the Way, pp. 166-91 and pp. 232- 4. 
109 Ibid., p. 168. 
110 Edwards (with Pemberton), p. 276; and Dee, In Australia's Own Interests, pp. 168-74. 
111 Edwards (with Pemberton), p. 262 and p. 267. See another example of Bunting's efforts to reduce 
External Affairs' credibility in NAA, A 1209, 1964/6040 Part I, 'Submission from Bunting to Menzies', 
19 December 1963, in Dee, Australia and the Formation of Malaysia, pp. 208-9, where he paints the 
External Affairs position on sending forces to Malaysia as overly cautious and inconsiderate of Britain's 
position. 
112 Woodard, Asian Alternatives, p. 74. 
94 
coordinated recommendations were not expected. 11 3 The discussion was described as frank, 
and the officials had the opportunity to persuade the minister.114 
Senior advisers were careful to provide advice to government that would not lead to 
open-ended conunitrnents. For example, when responding to the 20 September 1963 
enquiry about military support from Britain, the service chiefs provided options for support, 
while also noting the absence of a direct request to do a specific task. Furthermore, the 
service chiefs did not see a military need for more forces and advised against making 
commitments without a sound military basis. t 15 This line of analysis remained dominant 
until April 1964, when it was softened to allow a contribution of support troops to Borneo. 
The importance of diplomatic cables, and the contribution made by the diplomats 
who drafted them, can be seen in the flow of traffic between Canberra and the posts in 
Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. This information was supplemented by signals intelligence, 
gathered by Australian agencies and exchanged with the British under an existing 
agreement. 116 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
The differing views of Indonesia's intentions influenced the choice of policy 
instruments. These differences became apparent in early 1963 when Bunting disagreed with 
the DEA recommendation against Australia attending proposed three-party (later four-
party) talks about Indonesia. Bunting argued that Australia should attend if invited, and 
described DEA's position as flawed. He used this divergence to support his case for 
I I 3 Tange used ' morning meetings' to coordinate his senior officials and give direction to them. He was the 
first Permanent Head to do this in External Affairs, and the practice was discontinued after 
Sir James Plimsoll replaced him Apri l 1965. In Tange's meetings, 'Discussions were always frank and 
officers did not dare, as they sometimes did in later years, to hold some cards close to their chests' (ibid. , 
p. 71). 
I 
14 Ibid. , p. 74. 
11 5 See NAA, 'British/Malaysian Request for the Use of Australian Forces'; and NAA, Al 945, 245/3/6, 
'Minute from Blakers to Hicks', IO December 1963, in Dee, Australia and the Formation of Malaysia, 
pp. 199-200. Further consideration by FADC con firmed that 'military contributions at this stage would 
be ahead of need' (see NAA, A5828, Menzies Eighth Ministry Vol. I , Cabinet Decision No. 3(FAD), 
'Military Implications for Australia of the Malaysian Situation ', 19 December 1963, p. J. See also 
D Horner, Strategic Command: General Sir John Wilton and Australia's Asian Wars, Oxford University 
Press, South Melbourne, 2005, p. 2 14). 
11 6 Many of these cables have been collected in Dec, Australia and the Formation of Malaysia. On the role 
of intelligence, see Woodard, Asian /\ lrematives, pp. 84- 5. 
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forming a Cabinet sub-committee to guide government policy on security issues. 11 7 In 
another example of internal differences over instruments, DEA's suggested non-aggression 
pact was rejected by the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (FADC) (presumably also 
by PMD), as a successful pact could have compromised British, Australian and US bases in 
the region. 11 8 
Agreement could turn to disagreement at other times. For instance, the departments 
and the FADC were united behind the decision not to send troops to Borneo in late 1963. 
As a result, military advice supported the government's preference to use troops only in 
peninsula Malaya, while providing other aid and non-combat support. By April 1964, 
differences of opinion began to emerge as Barwick and DEA remained against committing 
troops while Defence and PMD, and ultimately the FADC, came to support direct military 
assistance (although still not infantry units). 119 
Information was another policy instrument available to the Australian Government. 
At this time, Radio Australia (RA) was broadcasting into Indonesia, but there was a 
significant conflict between its role as a foreign policy tool and its management's demand 
for editorial independence. This conflict led, at various times, to attempts by DEA to 
influence RA broadcasts into Indonesia so the information presented conformed to 
Australian policy. 120 The Australian Government acknowledged the value of this service, 
and the need to compete with other international broadcasters, when it decided to increase 
the power of RA's signal into the region in August 1963 and the number of hours broadcast 
in Indonesian in 1964. 121 
ANZUS proved to be another useful , but hard to direct, instrument in the crisis. At 
times, US policy in this crisis ran counter to Australian preferences, particularly over 
117 B unting used his minute proposing the FADC to describe the 'j arring tone' used by DEA in their 
correspondence about Indonesia to Washington and London (sec NAA, A4940/I, C3736, 'Minute to the 
Prime Minister from E.J. Bunting', 15 January 1963). 
118 NAA, A4943, Menzies Seventh Ministry Vol. 8, Cabinet Decision No. 976(FAD), 'Malaysia', 
12 August 1963. 
119 Edwards notes the pro-commitment stance of the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff, Sir Frederick Scherger 
and officials from PMD, such as AT Griffith, during this crisis-see Edwards (with Pemberton), p. 383. 
120 E Hodge, Radio Wars: Truth , Propaganda and the Struggle fo r Radio Australia, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 174- 5. 
121 K Najjarine and D Cottle, 'The Department of External Affairs, the ABC and Reporting of the Indonesian 
Crisis 1965- 1969 ', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 49, no. I , 2003, pp. 50- 1. 
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Indonesia. 122 On the positive side, the alliance provided Australia with a degree of 
insurance by sitting in the background during the search for diplomatic solutions. 123 
Other potential instruments were explicitly rejected. DEA thought the imposition of 
economic sanctions was 'undesirable' because it might reduce Australia's and America's 
influence in Indonesia. Similarly, Australia was against offering further aid to Indonesia, 
since this might only encourage 'brigandage'. 124 
CONSULTATION 
One notable feature of Konfrontasi was the continued and close consultation between 
Australia and a range of main and secondary international actors. Notably, Australia 
maintained diplomatic relations with Indonesia throughout, which kept open an important 
avenue for discussion. Australia also consulted closely with Britain and the United States in 
bilateral discussions, and together through 'quadpartite' discussions (including New 
Zealand). 125 The four nations worked to establish a response, and manage the implications 
of their individual commitments to avoid broader conflict with Indonesia. These 
discussions generally helped Australia to impress its views and have some influence on 
British and US thinking, without actually reconciling the two.126 
The government did little to consult with the Australian people during this crisis, 
despite the desire of some ministers to develop an informed public. 127 While the initial 
reactions to the acute crisis of September 1963 were tested at a general election soon after, 
122 For example, the attempt by Robert Kennedy, the US Attorney General, to broker a deal in early 1964 
was not welcomed by the Australian Government (see NAA, 1838, 3006/4/9 Pan 2, Cablegram from 
Beale to Menzies and Barwick, 22 January 1964, in Dee, Australia and the Formation of Malaysia, 
pp. 220-1 ; and NAA, Al838, 270/111/ Part 2, Cablegram to Washington, ' Kennedy Mission', 
23 January 1964, in Dee, Australia and the Formation of Malaysia, pp. 221-2. 
123 Dee, In Australia's Own Interests, p. 147 and pp. 187-8. Although the differences over Indonesia did not 
threaten to rupture this relationship, the inability to obtain direct support against Indonesia caused doubt 
within Australia as to the strength of the American corrunitmenl (see Pemberton, All the Way, 
p. 332). 
124 NAA, Al83, 3006/4/9 Part 3, Savingram, 'The Problem of Indonesian Hostili ty towards Malaysia', 
6 February 1964, in Dee, Australia and the Formation of Malaysia, pp. 242-3; and NAA, A 1209, 
CS 1964/6071, PMD minute covering DEA brief for Washington, 'Bilateral polky objectives in respect 
to Malaysia and Indonesia ', 5 February 1964. 
125 NAA, A4943 Vol. 7, Cabinet Decision 632, 'Indonesia - Quadripartite Talks', in Dee, Australia and the 
Formation of Malaysia, pp. 45- 6. 
126 For examples of consultation over time and its importance to policymaking, sec NAA, I 838, 
CS3034/l0/J Part 12, Submission from Tange to Barwick, 'Indonesia-Quadripartite Talks in 
Washington', 4 February 1964 in Dee, Australia and the Formation of Malaysia, pp. 37-41; and Minute 
from Bunti ng to Menzies, 'Australian Assistance to the Defence of Eastern Malaysia '. 
127 Edwards (with Pemberton), p. 380. Woodard (Asian Alternatives, pp. 83-4) argues that Barwick wanted 
to increase the Australian public's understanding of Asia and did his best to deliver informative speeches. 
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Peter Edwards noted the increasing tendency for the government to deliberate in secret and 
only announce policy after the decision had been made. 128 Pubic support was also 
demonstrated in the Australia-Malaysia Association that began meeting (with some limited 
government support) in 1964.129 
COORDINATION 
Interdepartmental coordination during this crisis was conducted mainly through the 
high-level Defence Committee (DC). This committee was chaired by the Permanent Head 
of the Department of Defence (then Sir Edward Hicks) and included the service chiefs, and 
the Permanent Heads of External Affairs, Treasury and PMD (in a change since 1954, as 
permanent members).130 The DC's role was broad (in national security terms), for it was 
charged with advising the defence minister, coordinating all inputs to the defence program, 
and joint service and interdepartmental defence matters. 131 The main advantage of this 
grouping was that the defence minister received advice that had been considered by the 
major national security departments. Another advantage came in the way defence ministers 
tended to present most, but not all, DC advice directly to Cabinet. 132 Most importantly, the 
DC aggregated mllitary judgement to support the preference for a diplomatic solution. It 
did this by not automatically accepting that military forces would make a difference in the 
early stages, thus giving more space for diplomatic initiatives to be tried. 133 
A lower-level interdepartmental committee (IDC) was also established in early 1964 
to examine the question of both military aid to Malaysia and 'practical and constructive 
128 
129 
Edwards (with Pemberton), p. 254, p. 276 and pp. 379- 80. Edwards also notes the increasing levels of 
public support for a commitment to Malaysia during 1963. 
The Australia- Malaysia Association began a private initiative. It later received some limited support 
from the Department of External Affairs (NAA, A 1838, C/S 553/1/17/1 , External Affairs Minute, 
' Australia- Malaysia Association', 14 January 1965). 
130 NAA, A4940, CS381 I , Minute by Dcrence Committee, 'No. 50/1963: Australian Association with the 
Malaysian Defence Agreement', 9 August 1963, p. 104; in Dee, Australia and the Formation of 
Malaysia, pp. 146-7. 
131 8 s NAA, A183 , T 66112 Part 2, Department of External Affairs, 'Letter from Minster for Defence, Higher 
Defence Machinery', 26 March 1957. This letter became the basis for the DC's formalised role and 
membership (see Commonwealth of Australia, Defence Committee Regulations, Statutory Rules 1960, 
No. 91 , pp. 162- 5). 
m For example, see NAA, A5827 Vol. 6, 'Submission No. 188 from Paltridgc to Cabinet ', 8 May 1964, in 
Dee, Australia and the Formation of Malaysia, pp. 286-90. 
133 This committee wi ll receive more attention in Chapter 3. 
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assistance by Australia' .134 This demonstrates the importance of looking to, but also 
beyond, military instruments in a crisis. 
While it would have been possible to note a number of peoples' contribution in that 
first year of the crisis, Woodard thinks Tange' s strong chairmanship was important to 
coordination, not just internally, but to ensuring government got the best policy advice. 135 
This included Tange's direction to the DEA to consult widely outside the department on 
forward planning, and his decision to retain an officer in the policy planning role 
throughout the crisis. The DEA also remained well connected to Defence through their 
Defence Liaison Branch. 136 Defence too remained well connected to the DEA by using the 
Joint Planning Committee and Joint Intelligence Committee (both of which contained 
External Affairs representatives) to develop military advice. 
DECISION 
When reflecting on decision-making in this period, Edwards encourages readers to 
consider the broader context of the time, rather than just the decision to go to Vietnam. He 
notes, for instance, that Indonesia was 'a subject of much greater attention' after the 1962 
annexation of West Papua and the pronouncement of Konfrontasi. On top of that, crises in 
Malaya (the 'Emergency'), Laos and Thailand during 1955-62 created a 'climate of fear' 
that 'forced the Australian Cabinet to face the issue of possible involvement in a difficult 
and probably unpopular war in Indochina, a war which could conceivably lead to the use of 
nuclear weapons' .137 So when Cabinet considered its response to the Indonesian threats in 
January 1963, this group had been considering the possibility of Asian conflict for some 
time. 
Cabinet's consideration of the Indonesian stance towards Malaysia on 
5 February 1963 noted the US desire for Australia to take more policy initiative in the 
region. While probably attractive to some, Cabinet was concerned that a proactive 
Australian course could have been perceived by Indonesia or others as adversarial. 138 The 
desire to avoid a rupture of relations with Indonesia led to the subsequent decision to 
134 Cabinet Decision No. 387(FAD), 'Review of Malaysia/Indonesia Situation and Malaysian Paper on 
Defence Planning and Finance'. 
135 w oodard, Asian A lternatives, p. 71. 
136 NAA, Al 838/361 , Department of External Affairs, Policy planning- Planning papers, 6 June 1963. 
137 Edwards (with Pemberton), pp. 379- 80. 
138 Cabinet Decision 632, 'Indonesia - Quadripartite Talks', p. 3. 
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maintain 'the greatest available degree of mutual understanding' with Indonesia.139 
Persuasion, not threats, would be the primary tool for seeking Indonesian and Filipino 
acceptance of Malaysia.140 These directions remained a strong influence on subsequent 
advice and decisions, even after the acute crisis of September 1963, until February 1965. 
Of the ministers involved early in the crisis, External Affairs Barwick seemed the 
most influential. Woodard acknowledges the considerable work done by Barwick to 
understand the issues and the rhetoric, and explains how this allowed him to secure 
personal caniage of the issue, bypassing the newly formed FADC and the prime minister' s 
traditional primacy in matters involving Britain and the United States for a time. 14 1 
The story of how and why the FADC was formed is given detailed attention in 
Chapter 3, as its formation represents the ' birth' of Australia' s modern crisis policymaking 
system. However, this committee became increasingly important to decision-making on 
1963-64 as it allowed Menzies to naITow the group of ministers involved for many 
decisions.142 FADC could act independently of officials, such as when the DC's 
recommendation to withdraw Sabre fighters from Thailand was rejected143 and when it 
rejected the DEA's proposal for a regional non-aggression pact. This shift in influence over 
the security agenda allowed Edwards to comment on the shift in power that had occurred 
towards this committee. 144 Menzies included officials in deliberations, with around half of 
the FADC meetings in 1963- 65 having one or more officials in attendance. 145 
IMPLEMENT A TI ON 
The task of implementing policy in this crisis was given, in the main, to the military 
and the diplomats. The DEA, particularly during Barwick's tenure as minster, was 
especially active in putting proposals to all sides in the conflict. This can be seen in the way 
Australia' s key emissaries in the region, Tom Critchley in Malaya and 
139 See Woodard, Asian Alternatives , p. 77; and Cabinel Decision 632, 'Indonesia - Quadripartite Talks '. 
140 Edwards (with Pemberlon), p. 259. 
141 W oodard, Asian A lternatives, pp. 74-8. This view was supponcd by Inlerview 060- 07, a former senior 
o fficial in Defence who was serving in External Affairs at Lhe time of Konfrontasi. 
142 Edwards (with Pemberlon), p. 264. 
143 Auslralia sent a squadron of Sabre fighler aircraft to Lhe Uhon Base in Thailand in mid- 1962. The DC 
advised against retaining these fighters in Thailand as Britain and New Zealand had already withdrawn 
Lheir air forces from Ubon- see ibid., p. 272; and NAA, A4943 Vol. 8, Decision No. 705(FAD), 
' Australian Mil itary Assistance to Thailand ', 28 March I 963. 
144 Edwards (with Pemberton), p. 279. 
145 Horner, Strategic Command, p. 202. The attendance notes for a number of FADC meelings show 
attendance by officials. Sec NAA, A5830, Seventh and Eighth Menzies, Holl, McEwen and First and 
Second Gorton Ministries - Cabinet Attendance Sheets. 
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KCO Shann in Indonesia, gathered information and presented their views on the conflict 
while using their personal contacts to pass messages from the Australian Government to 
key decision-makers in the region. Woodard describes the significant Jatitude given to these 
diplomats, but he also notes how they 'were implementers, not makers, of policy' .146 
However, the expert views held by the individual ambassadors allowed them to have a 
strong influence on the policy they would implement. 
On the military side, implementation began in January 1963 when two frigates were 
tasked to patrol the waters around Borneo. After this, the government was very careful 
about the signals being sent as a result of their decisions about military forces, which 
extended from announcements about equipment purchases and force expansion to the 
eventual (and progressively more combat-oriented) deployment of troops. 
Yet Cabinet did not always provide clear direction for the use of military forces. In 
one example, Cabinet directed that Australian military assistance: 
... should be in a form which can readily be identified in Malaysia as Australian, 
and that attention should be given to some items which can be made available 
relatively quickly to make an immediate impact ... the central objective should be 
to give effective and quiet assistance to Malaysia's own defence capacity rather 
than to seek dramatic or 'advertising' Australian intervention [sic].147 
Such constraints highlighted the sensitivity of this conflict, and the government's desire to 
balance a range of competing objectives without creating a wider regional war. 
EVALUATION 
There is no evidence to indicate that policy advice was formally evaluated during or 
after this crisis. However, there were a number of reviews during this crisis concerning the 
military instruments available to govemment. 148 These reviews culminated, by the end of 
1963, in decisions to purchase a range of new equipment, including the experiential TFX 
bomber (later known as the F- 111). The government also decided, based on the situation 
across the entire region, to support the re-introduction of national service. Few (if any) of 
these decisions provided the government with immediate assistance in this crisis, but they 
were probably only made politically palatable by the situation of the time.149 
146 Woodard, Asian Alternatives, pp. 7 1-2. 
147 NAA, A5828 Vo l. I, Cabinet Decision No. 39, 'Defence Assistance for Malaysia', 28 January 1964. 
148 See Dee, ln Australia's Own Interests, pp. 157- 8. 
149 For example, Cabinet decided to introduce a compulsory selective national service scheme in 1964 as 
both Konfrontasi and Vietnam were becoming more troublesome-see NAA, CRS A5828 Vol. 2, 
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Analysis against the tentative characteristics 
This crisis provides strong support for the tentative characteristics of national 
security policymaking. The prime minister's crisis role is clearly demonstrated, as is the 
leadership advantage that allows him to shape issues, bound policy choices and determine 
the structure for policymaking. The role of public opinion can also be seen, and that 
undoubtedly helped Menzies to assert his preferences over those who wanted to give more 
consideration to Indonesia. This vignette further shows that Menzies' decision to create the 
FADC was crucial to dete1mining which ministers contributed to policymaking. Menzies 
continued to use his leadership advantage by making ministerial appointments to suit his 
preferences, such as the way in which Hasluck was appointed Minister for External Affairs 
afterMenzies encouraged Barwick to move to the High Court in April 1964.150 
The Policy Analysis phase contained a mix of rational and extra-rational processes. 
Woodard's insight into DEA briefings shows how trusted experts can provide advice 
without prior coordination. This vignette also demonstrates the importance of intelligence 
to policy analysis, and the difficulties faced when a relatively unprepared bureaucracy is 
required to handle classified information. 
Aside from the increased role for foreign aid, the poJicy instruments available in this 
c1isis were similar to earlier times. However, not a]] instruments were considered useful 
under all conditions. Thus the military was introduced gradually as Indonesian provocation 
increased, while economic sanctions were rejected altogether. Other instruments, such as 
information, were double-edged swords because the government could only make them 
work in support of policy if it was prepared (and able) to provide close guidance aJl the 
time and interfere with editorial independence. 
Policymaking in this crisis was marked by a clear division in opinion between DEA 
and other national security departments, and within Defence between the civilian secretary 
and senior uniformed officers. These divergences support both the idea of competitive 
policymaking and provide some evidence of dominant frameworks. That PMD was able to 
Cabinet Decision No.596, 'Services Manpower Review', 4- 5 November I 964; and Edwards (with 
Pemberton), p. 331. 
150 Hasluck resigned from DEA when Evan was the minister in the late 1940s, and was unlikely to he 
captured by the department. He conducted his relationships with DEA officials in a very formal manner. 
While he would give due recognition to advice, Hasluck was unlikely to engage his departmental officers 
in policy debate (see G Woodard and J Beaumont, 'Paul Hasluck and the Bureaucracy: The Department 
of External Affairs', in T Stannage, K Saunders and R Nile (eds), Paul Hasluck in Australian History, 
University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, J 998, pp. 144- 37 and pp. 148-9). 
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convince the prime minster of the problems with DEA' s position shows how much the 
respect for PMD's policy skills had grown since 1945. 
The main decisions of this time generally revolved around whether or not to commit 
forces. There is no indication that Cabinet tried to influence either the British or Malaysians 
about the military strategic aspects of the conflict. Of course, Australia did try to influence 
many parties through diplomatic representations. It also followed its own policy line of 
support for Malaysia while maintaining links with Indonesia. But this did not amount to a 
strong influence over the conduct of the conflict, which shows the limits of Australia's 
ability to consult as a partner with larger powers. 
In Woodard's estimation, this period represented 'best practice in ... the then 
fashionable concept of crisis management' . 151 But the significant change in the crisis 
policymaking structure at the beginning of the crisis and the waxing and waning of 
different voices in policymaking points to the absence of an established practice. Since 
Menzies, at the prompting of his officials, clearly decided that running this crisis though the 
full Cabinet was sub-optimal, we can assume that he learned from the experience of 1954 
and was willing to change the structures and processes of crisis policymaking when needed. 
Conclusion 
Chapter 2 examined three vignettes of crisis during the mid-twentieth century. This 
approach builds on Chapter 1 's observations of policymaking from the literature by making 
further observations about Australia's experience over a period of time. The combined 
insights allow for informed generalisation to other cases by providing a longitudinal view 
of both crisis and policymaking. 
This chapter shows that the tentative characteristics of national security 
policymaking are broadly applicable to crisis, although there are enough differences to 
warrant describing 'crisis' as a distinct mode of national security policymaking. Of the 
similarities, the central roles of the national security executive in the Issue Identification, 
Policy Analysis and Decision phases are the most striking and consistent. Not surprisingly, 
the prime minister's role emerged as critical in setting parameters for action, and for 
151 Woodard, Asian Alternatives, p. 7 1. 
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deciding how crises will be handled. The prime minister also played an active role in all 
crises, particularly when he dealt with allies as the national leader. 
Other national governments also played significant roles in issue identification and 
(under limited conditions) policy analysis, while the Australian Government went to great 
lengths to consult them during each crisis. Indeed, these vignettes show that consultation 
often tends towards the 'control' end of the spectrum because the Australian Government 
has trouble influencing more powerful (and more closely involved) nations in many 
situations.152 The secrecy of policymaking is also reaffirmed in these vignettes, as was the 
importance of Cabinet conventions. The absence of evidence about evaluation is even 
starker in crisis situations than for national security policymaking in general. 
However, there are sufficient differences to distinguish crisis as a separate mode of 
national security policymaking. In some cases, extra-rational factors are more prominent in 
crises than carefully prepared analysis, even to the point where policy options are 
constrained by factors such as time and institutional preferences. Another difference can be 
seen in the way informal groups sometimes appeared more important to decision-making 
than Cabinet or its sub-committees. At times, these informal groups included ministers, 
public servants and even foreign generals. This wider membership was particularly 
remarkable at a time when it was unusual for officials to attend Cabinet at all. There was 
also less room during crises for other domestic groups, or outsiders, to influence issue 
identification and policy analysis than in national security policymaking. 
It is not worth creating a new list of characteristics of crisis policymaking at this 
stage because some important aspects of policymaking still warrant further examination. 
For one, the role of 'mass appeal' in issue identification remains uncertain, although the 
public's view is often aligned with the government. This raises questions about whether 
governing bodies seek optimal outcomes during a crisis, or whether they remain beholden 
to the most uncertain force of public opinion. 
These vignettes also contained instances where the structure for crisis policymaking 
changed during or just before an incident. The reasons for this change are not yet entirely 
clear, but two possible explanations are emerging. The first can be found in the way every 
152 Neil James expresses this point differently when he observes that 'Australia is not skilled in maximizing 
its position in coalition warfare' (N James, Reform of the Defence Management Paradigm: A Fresh View, 
Working Paper No. 59, Austral ian Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 2000, p. 9). 
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crisis involves different policy actors and instruments. This 'contingent nature of crisis' 
means that established structures, processes and perhaps norms may not be suited to 
managing the events present at any given time. Political preference may provide a second 
explanation. Political leaders have different personal styles, varying requirements of advice, 
and different 'power bases' within government. As Chapter 3 will show, they also operate 
within a constitutional structure that places only some basic constraints on the policy 
process (for example, by vesting certain powers with the Commonwealth) and relies on 
convention to bound many key parts of the system. Given these significant sources of 
variety, differences in each prime minister's requirements and approaches should be 
expected. 
Lastly, the related areas of dominant frameworks and coordination also wruTant 
further examination. There is some evidence to suggest that dominant frameworks emerged 
during the 1950s and 1960s which defined DEA, Defence and PMD as separate 
bureaucratic personalities. There is also considerable evidence to suggest this-along with 
other factors such as ' turf' and differing viewpoints-created friction between these 
departments during crises. On the other hand, there was a level of cooperation at times that 
lends credence to the collegiate view identified by Gyngell and Wesley. Also, significant 
division can be seen within Defence, which provides evidence to refute the existence of 
dominant frameworks. These continued uncertainties make it worthwhile to consider crisis 
policymaking in further detail, and across an even broader period of time. This examination 
will continue in Chapter 3, which refines the characteristics further by examining the crisis 
policymaking system from the early 1960s through to 1999. 
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EMERGENCE OF THE MODERN CRISIS 
POLICYMAKING SYSTEM, 1963-99 
3 
Australia experienced periods of tension in its security environment between 
Konfrontasi in 1963- 66 and the East Timor crisis in 1999. However, no events in this 
thirty six-year period warrant the label 'national security crisis' because Australia's 
sovereignty, international relationships or national interests were not seriously 
jeopardised by real or perceived threats from other actors. 1 Despite this, an examination 
of this period will improve the understanding of the characteristics of crisis 
policymaking in Australia because its supporting system changed considerably.2 This 
examination will also increase the level of confidence in the final group of 
characteristics of crisis policymaking because it describes experience accumulated over 
a considerable period of time. 
While Chapters 1 and 2 examined the policymaking system as a whole, 
Chapter 3 explores the structures supporting crisis policymaking in three sections. 
Section I looks at the changing structure of Australia's national security policymaking 
system during the period 1963-96. This discussion is conducted through an examination 
of change in the political, policy and administrative domains.3 Section II provides a 
detailed examination of the crisis policymaking system as it developed from 1996 
through to the East Timor crisis of 1999. The final section draws insights for the 
characteristics of crisis policymaking by identifying why the system's structure changed 
during this time. 
2 
Since the policymaking system used by the Australian Government to manage the Vietnam War from 
1962-73 was essentially the same as that for Konfrontasi, this conflict is not mentioned as a stand-
alone factor in the evolution of the crisis policymaking system. 
It is worth recalling from the Introduction and Chapter I that 'crisis' is one mode of national security 
policymaking. Thus changes to the broader system will be significant for the usua lly latent crisis 
policymaking system. 
The political domain includes Cabinet, Cabinet committees and smaller grouping of ministers and 
their personal advisers. The policy domain is based on senior officials from 'traditional ' national 
security departments such as Defence, Department o f Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C), Treasury and the intelligence community. The 
administrative domain comprises a variety of interdepartmental and intra-depanmental mechanisms. 
These domains overlap (see G Davis, A Government of Routines: Executive Coordination in an 
Australian State, Centre for Australian Public Sector Management/MacMillan, South Melbourne, 
J 995, pp. 136-40). 
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Section I: Changes in the Crisis Policymaking System from 
1963-96 
Australia experienced four major changes of government between 1963 and 
1996, and nine changes of prime minister. Each prime minister had to manage an 
evolving security environment throughout this period: earlier incumbents needed to 
adjust to the British and US withdrawal from Southeast Asia, most had to deal with the 
implications of the Cold War for Australia, and all managed an aJliance with the vastly 
more powerful United States. Yet no prime minister approached these, and other related 
challenges, in the same way. This section outlines the fo1mal roles for national security 
policymaking in Australia during this period and then traces the broad outline of how 
the system changed, providing a greater understanding of the crisis policymaking 
system used in 1999. 
The Political Domain 
FORMAL ROLES AND INFORMAL REALITIES 
The formal view of national security (and crisis) policymaking in the political 
domain is based on a constitutional division of responsibility, a hierarchical structure of 
committees that ultimately advises the prime minister and Cabinet on policy, and a 
range of supporting processes and norms. A discussion of these formal elements is 
necessary to tell the story of Australian policymaking, but it is insufficient because 
prime ministers used four methods to consult their coJleagues and make decisions. 
The authority for the Commonwealth Government to conduct the nation' s 
external affairs and to defend the states from invasion is drawn from Sections 51 and 
119 of the Constitution4 , and amplified in legislation such as the Defence Act 1903. 
From this point forward, the policymaking process develops a parallel life between the 
formal view and conventions used in practice. Tills is illustrated in the way decisions 
are made officially by the Governor-General and the Executive Council, but in practice 
Section 51 of the constitution gives the Parliament the right to make laws for the naval and military 
defence of the nation and the states, including the ability to use the nation's defence forces to 
maintain the law (vi); external affairs (xxix); and re lations with the islands of the Pacific (xxx). 
Sec tion 1 19 makes the Commonwealth Government responsible for protecting the states against 
invasion and, on the application of executive government, domestic violence (Commonwealth of 
Australia, Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act (The Constitu1ion) 1900, available 
http://www.comlaw. gov.au, accessed 4 April 2007. 
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these decisions do not vary from those made by the Cabinet-a body not mentioned in 
the Constitution.5 
Cabinet is the preeminent decision-making body in Australia. Its members, led 
by the prime minister, are ministers responsible for a department of state and the 
conduct of a specified policy area. Cabinet meets formaJly and regularly to discuss 
policy submissions and monitor implementation, which means it has an exceptionally 
large and diverse agenda. Outside this, ministers also have a significant workload 
administering their departments, attending to their duties as representatives of their 
individual constituencies and acting as senior members of a political party. They are 
supported by advisers who are employed at the discretion of these same ministers. 
While not mentioned in the Constitution, the prime minister plays a vital role in 
government as a minister in his own right, as the leader of the governing pru:ty, as the 
leader of Cabinet, and, usually, as the most influential person in all these bodies. This 
role and position is similar across governments regardless of party. As a result, the 
prime minister's preferred method of consulting his ministerial colleagues and taking 
decisions shapes the structure of crisis policymaking in the political domain. The 
following sub-sections describe the four methods used by prime ministers for decision-
making on national security issues between 1963 and 1996. The section concludes with 
a brief look at ministerial advisers. 
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY IN THE POLITICAL DOMAIN 
The actual structure for crisis policymaking in the political domain is derived 
from the broader system for national security policymaking. Significantly, the broader 
system changed between and within governments during the period 1963 and 1999 (see 
Table 3) despite the stable constitutional base. Change was most clearly shown in the 
four methods used by prime ministers to consult with ministers and take decisions on 
national security matters. 
All prime ministers consult their Cabinet frequently because collective 
responsibility is a major n01m of Cabinet government, and this method offers the most 
efficient way to establish structure and process during decision-making. As a result, 
prime ministers generally discuss major national security decisions in Cabinet, 
For a discussion of the formal role of the Constitution and Australian poli tical institutions, see 
DW Lovell et al., The Australian Political System, 2nd edn, Longman, South Melbourne, 1998, 
Chapter 2. 
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including initial troop deployments, major equipment purchases and maJor policy 
changes.6 





















Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee 
(FADC) (active from Januar 1963) 
FADC (active and met more frequently 
later in his tenure) 
Nil (his was a short tenure between Holt's 
death and Gorton' s selection) 
FADC (rarel used, became inactive) 
FADC (inactive throu hout) 
FADC (rarely used but became inactive 
after mid-1974) 
FADC (active), Intelligence and Security 
Committee (from December 1976) 
International and Defence Committee 
(inactive, disbanded 1987) 
International and National Security 
Committee (active, became known as the 
'Security Committee' ) 
Securit Committee (active) 
National Security Committee of Cabinet 
(NSCC) 
The operation of Cabinet is influenced by the prime minister's preferences, the 
frequency of meetings, the number of members and the relationship between Cabinet 
and its parliamentary party. Cabinet generally meets weekly, and always have a full 
agenda. These conditions can make it difficult to get timely decisions, meaning that 
some will be 'cleared' only in retrospect. At other times, the prime minister may take 
the decision outside a formal meeting, sometimes to the point where Cabinet becomes a 
rubber stamp for decisions by the prime minister or a committee.7 An example of this 
can be seen in Whitlam's Government, where Cabinet tended to ratify his decisions and 
6 P Weller, Cabinet Government in Australia, 1901-2006, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2007, especially 
Chapter 12, describes Cabinet practice and the development of its process. 
Ibid. , pp. 254-8. 
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overrode him infrequently.8 Menzies could also adopt a more flexible approach to the 
locus of decision, because he too was sure of his position in Cabinet, being 'dominant 
without being domineering or authoritarian'. 9 The 1954 crisis (described in Chapter 2) 
provides one example of how Menzies operated both within an outside Cabinet. 
Other prime ministers could not be certain of prevailing, which meant that 
Cabinet and party-room debate over national security issues could sometimes be 
substantial and significant to the ultimate decision. Hawke's experience in the lead up to 
the Gulf War of 1991 presented one such situation; it was essential for him to be 
sensitive to the wider parliamentary paity and not propose a divisive commitment. 10 
Cabinet's size can make decision-making during crises unwieldy and a recipe for 
indecision (the case of 1954, which was described in Chapter 2, is noteworthy here). 
Former Defence Minister Lance Barnard noted the difficulty of getting decisions 
through Whitlam's Iai·ge Cabinet, but thought this was workable.11 Since most prime 
ministers appoint a Cabinet committee for national security issues rather than use the 
full group, Barnard's confidence may have been situational or overstated.12 Indeed, 
managing national security matters through the fu]] Cabinet was the least-used method 
in this pe1iod. 
Given the obstacles to managing fast-paced and often technical matters in 
Cabinet (within its consistently crowded agenda), most prime ministers created one or 
more formal committees to manage national security issues-but not all used these 
consistently. This second method had its genesis in Menzies' Foreign Affairs ai1d 
Defence Committee (FADC), and continued through later incarnations such as Hawke's 
Security Committee. Despite the differing scope and authority of these committees, 
each generally made decisions on behalf of Cabinet when managing agreed policy or 
HS Albinski, Australian External Policy Under Uibour, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 
1977, p. 287. 
9 Weller cites Sir Paul Hasluck's opinion of Menzies in Weller, Cabinet Government, p. 118. Lee also 
describes Menzies dominance in D Lee, 'Cabinet', in S Prasser, JR Nethercote, and 
J Warhurst (eds), The Menzies Era: A Reappraisal of Government, Policy and Politics, Hale and 
Ironmonger, Sydney, 1995. 
10 D Horner, The Gulf Commitment: The Australian Defence Force's First War, Melbourne University 
Press, Carlton, I 992, p. 20 I. 
11 R Hurst and B McAvoy, 'Transcript of Interview with Lance Barnard', Australian Parliament Oral 
History Project, Canberra, 1987, p. 6:7. The Cabinet Office disagreed-see M Codd, 'Cabinet 
Operations of the Australian Government' , in B Galligan, JR Nethercote, and C Walsh (eds), 
The Cabinet and Budget Processes, Centre for Research on Federal Financial Relations, Canberra, 
1990, p. 29. 
12 Weller, Cabinet Government, pp. 123-4. 
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the prime minister wanted this. 13 The committee method was not used consistently in 
this period, and it could be bypassed if the prime minister desired. Prime ministers took 
different attitudes to attendance by officials at these meetings. While key officials 
would be invited to provide advice on relevant matters, the conunittec was strictly 
'ministers only' at other times. 14 
Menzies was advised to create the FADC early in 1963 due to the increasing 
number and scope of security issues on the horizon, including impending trouble in 
Vietnam and between Malaya and Indonesia. 15 The idea was to bring a small group of 
ministers with key portfolio responsibilities together, including the prime minister, his 
deputy, the treasurer, the defence and foreign ministers and the attorney-general at a 
minimum.16 Menzies' (and subsequently, Holt's and Fraser's) conunittee would 
consider most defence and foreign policy issues separately from Cabinet, and act as the 
body for crisis decision-making if required. 17 
Labor governments made patchy use of their committees. Whitlam started with a 
Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, with a broad membership of 
national security and economic ministers. This committee met a few times in 1973 but 





Coalilion commillees are authorised to take decisions on behalf of Cabinet; part of the prime 
minister's skill was to know when a matter needed to be referred (Interview with Malcolm Fraser). 
ALP committees do not generally have this authority, which makes Hawke and Keating's Security 
Committee an exception. 
As mentioned in Chapter 2, Menzies invited senior officials regularly. For confirmation of this in the 
FADC of the mid-1960s, sec D Horner, Strategic Command: General Sir John Wilton and 
Australia's Asian Wars, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 2005, p. 202). Whitlam did not, 
as a general rule, invite officials at all (NAA, A5925 Volume I, Second Whitlam Ministry - Cabinet 
Decision No. 1, 20 December 1972, p. 3). Fraser often invited the Secretaries of Defence and Foreign 
Affairs and the Chief o f Defence Staff to his FADC when required. These officials would leave the 
Cabinet room when minister commenced their discussions (Interview with Malcolm Fraser). 
There was a sub-text of helping the prime minister to assert his control over the Department of 
External Affai rs. See NAA, A4940/1 , C3736, Minute from AT Griffith to the Secretary, 
8 January 1963; and NAA, A4940/1, C3736, Minute to the Prime Minister from EJ Bunting, 
15 January 1963. Bunting made his recommendation even more forcefully in a subsequent minute 
(see NAA, A4940/I , C3736, Minute to the Prime Minister from EJ Bunting, 17 January 1963). The 
decision to form the rADC was taken on 22 January 1963 (NAA, A4943 Vol. 7, Cabinet Decision 
No. 609, 'Cabinet Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence Questions', 22 January 1963). 
The fi rst FADC included the Ministers for External Terri tories and Civil Aviation. FADC 
membership was hotly contended. For example, there was early pressure for pressure for service 
ministers and others, such as the Minister for Labour (W McMahon) to be included as well- see 
NAA, C3736, Minute to the Prime Minister from E.J. Bunting, 'Committees to be Appointed', 
5 February I 963, p. I. Other committees did not always include ministers with portfol io 
responsibilities; for example, Kim Beazley retained a seat in Hawke and Keating's Securi ty 
Committee, regardless of his portfolio. 
The FADC took routine and non-routine decisions under these prime ministers, and these would be 
considered Cabinet decisions. This was made possible by prior Cabinet agreement, the seniority of 
the ministers and the scope of their responsibilities (Interview with Malcolm Fraser). 
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the overwhelming focus of his Government on domestic econorruc issues. 18 He did, 
however, make an annual report to the ALP Federal Conference on behalf of the 
committee. 19 
This experience was repeated the next time the ALP won government. Hawke 
started his term with two committees: an International and Defence Committee, which 
does not seem to have been used before its disbandment in 198720, and a National and 
International Security Corrunittee (later abbreviated to the 'Security Committee'). While 
initially conceived to consider matters relating to intelligence oversight, the Security 
Committee eventually became the main body used by Hawke and Keating for all 
national security matters and was their major crisis policymaking group.21 This small 
committee reflected the initial requirement of strict secrecy, with membership extending 
only to the prime minister, deputy prime minister, foreign minister, attorney general and 
communications minister.22 Public servants frequently attended Security Committee 
meetings but, unlike the Expenditure Review Committee, there was no permanent 
official presence.23 Also unlike other committees in the Hawke Government, decisions 
of the Security Corrunittee did not normally go to Cabinet for endorsement and other 








EG Whitlam, The Whit/am Government 1972- 1975, Viking, Ringwood, 1985, p. 689; R Trood, 
'Prime Ministers and Foreign Policy', in P Weller (ed), Menzies to Keating: The Development of 
Australian Prime Ministership, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1992, p. 167; and Hurst and 
McAvoy, 'Interview with Lance Barnard', pp. 5:12- 13. Whitlam's FADC differed from coalition 
aJTangements in that his committee only made recommendations to Cabinet (Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, The Development of Cabinet Procedures in Australia, extract from the 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet Annual Report 1983- 84, Australian Government 
Publishing Service, Canberra 1984, p. 28). 
For example, see EG Whitlam, 'Presentation of report of the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee 
of the Executive to the Federal Conference', Australian Labor Party, 1975, available 
http://www.whitlam.org, accessed 8 February 2007. 
The International and Defence Conunittcc nominally inc luded ministers from the traditional national 
security portfolios, and economic ministers including those for sport, communications and industry 
and commerce (sec Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Annual Report 1985-86, 
Commonwealth of Australia, CanbeJTa, 1986, p. 46). 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, ' Development of Cabinet Procedures', pp. 25-6; and 
P Weller, 'The Cabinet', in C Jennett and RG Stewart (eds), Hawke and Australian Public Policy, 
MacMillan, South Melbourne, 1990, p. 46. Fraser also crea ted an intelligence and security committee 
in December 1976 (in accordance with the Hope Royal Conm1ission recommendations), but he 
continued to use the FADC for most defence and foreign policy issues (see Department of Prime 
Minister and Cabinet, 'The Development of Cabinet Procedures,' p. 34; and NAA, A 12909, CS 929, 
Cabinet Submission 929 - ' Royal Commission on Intelligence and Securi ty: Implementation of the 
Third Report ', 3 December 1976). 
It is interesting Lo note that Communications Minister Beazley had a scat but not Defence Minister 
Scholes (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, Annual Report 1985- 86, p. 46). 
Interviews with the Kim Beazley and General Peter Gration (Queanbeyan, 29 June 2007). Peter 
Gration was Chief of the Defence force from J 987 to l 993. 
Codd, 'Cabinet Operat ions', p. 6 ; and Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet, 'Development of 
Cabinet Procedures', p . 37. Keating appeared to continue Hawke's methods in this area. 
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informal matter at times. During the 1987 Fiji coup, for example, one attendee was 
surprised by the level of informality: 
I wasn' t sure whether it was formally constituted or whether it was an informal 
gathering ... No one was obviously taking minutes, and we were inf01mally 
sitting around talking.25 
The third method for prime-ministerial consultation and decision-making 
involved a smaller grouping of key ministers (and sometimes key officials) that took 
decisions and presented these to Cabinet or the relevant committee whenever 
convenient. This method was often employed during fast-moving events, but some 
(such as Hawke) used it as a standing method.26 This small grouping would usually 
include the ministers with national security responsibilities, especially foreign affairs 
and defence.27 There was room for individuals (other ministers or senior officials) 
considered especially knowledgeable or competent to be included in this group-Kim 
Beazley played such a role in the Hawke and Keating Governments. 
This method can emerge when the prime minister is unable to dominate either 
Cabinet or the formal committee. For example, Gorton's FADC met a few times-and 
McMahon's not at all-leading both to manage national security issues directly with the 
relevant ministers (or unilaterally). There were many reasons for this divergence from 
established practice; for one, both had a small Cabinet so committees did not 
necessarily improve the speed of decision-making. But both had strong political 
enemies m Cabinet and the F ADC: for Gorton, these included an external affairs 
minister and defence minister who did not share his view on Australia's defence 
posture28; while Gorton (now a political enemy) started as McMahon's Defence 
Minister. Furthermore, Gorton ' s political style did not lend itself to comrni ttees or 
consultations with bureaucrats; he was more presidential than previous prime ministers 






Interview with Pe ter Gration. 
On Hawke's prefere nce for operating in this way see interview with KC Beazley and Horne r, 
The Gulf Commitment, p. 174. 
Interview with Derek Woolner (Canhcrra, 13 D ecember 2006), who served on B arnard' s sta ff, 
thought Whitlam would have been likely to ma nage a crisis through the defence and foreign 
ministers rather tha n a committee. Hawke also used a very small group to handle 'operational issue s ' 
during the first Gulf War (B M ahlab, 'Da ily briefings keep PM in to uch with war', Sunday Mail, 
27 January 199 1, p. 8). 
Gorton ' s preference for a de fence of Australia posture ran counter to the 'forward defence ' view held 
by E xternal Affairs Minister Hasluck a nd Defence Minister Fairhall (see I Hancock, 'Events and 
issues that made the news in 1968 ', 1998, available http://www.naa.gov.a u, accessed 
IS July 2007). 
I Hancock, John Gorton: He did it his way, Hodder , Sydney, 2002, p. 154, quoting ABC T elevis ion's 
'Monday Conference', 22 January 1968. Gorcon's ' presidential' style was commented upon by 
S ir Alexander Downer, Six Prime Ministers, Hill o f Conte nt, M elbourne , 1982, p. 11 4; 
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successful Cabinet lends support to the view that Cabinet processes are ultimately 
important to securing the prime minister's position.30 
The last method was also used infrequently, whereby prime ministers either 
made unilateral decisions or consulted with small groups of ministers or other 
politicians about issues that fell outside these ministers' formal responsibilities. Prime 
ministers often used this mechanism to gain political advice from trusted and respected 
sources (that, on occasions, may have been restricted to themselves), rather than advice 
based on the formal division of ministerial responsibility or technical input. 31 
Prime ministers may limit consultation, and so appear to act unilaterally, for a 
number of reasons. Some prime ministers acted in this way if a proposal was likely 
create a Cabinet fight, if it was an issue of intense personal conviction, or if time was 
perceived as short. Examples of apparently unilateral decisions can be seen in Hawke's 
decision to honour the Fraser Government's commitment to supporting MX missile 
testing in 198332, and Fraser's decision concerning the boycott of South Africa. 33 As 
described earlier, Go1ton was accused by many of acting unilaterally and displaying a 
lack of trust in his Cabinet and officials and a belief in his 'right' as prime minister to 
make decisions. 
Despite the stigma of such a charge, it was rare for pnme ministers not to 
consult at all. Sometimes, they may argue they are implementing agreed policy if 
charged with acting unilaterally.34 At other times, consultation may occur through an 
informal discussion with especially trusted colleagues, advisers or officials. Such a 




G Greenwood, 'The Political Debate in Australia', in Greenwood and N Harper (ed), Australia in 
World Affairs 1966-1970, FW Cheshire, Melbourne, 1974, p. 62. Gorton himself rejected charges 
that he was 'dic tatorial' (M Pratt, ' Interview with the Rt Hon John Gorton', National Library of 
Australia - Oral History Section, Canberra, I 976, p. 3:2/130). 
Weller, Cabinet Government, p. 285. 
Trust, experience and judgement weighed heavily in the selection of these confidants (Interview with 
Malcolm Fraser). 
32 JA Camilleri, 'Nuclear Disarmament: A Emerging Issue in Australian Po litics', Working Paper no. 9, 
Australian Studies Centre, La Trobe University, May 1986, p. 8. However, some consultation may 
have occurred- another author wrote of Treasurer Paul Keating's involvement in the decision 
(Gerald Henderson, 'World order - from the old to the new', Australian Journal of International 
Affairs, vol. 57, no. 3, 2003, p. 480). 
33 Tony Ayers (interview in Canberra, 2 1 March 2007) thought Fraser did not take the maner to Cabinet 
because 'he would not have got two votes for it ', such was Cabinet's lack of desire to be involved. 
Mr Ayers was Secretary of the Department o f Defence from 1984 to 1994. He also served as a 
Deputy Secretary in DPM&C in from 1976-9. 
34 Interview with the Hon EG Whitlam, AC, QC, by telephone, 5 December 2006. 
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... There were a few ministers who met constantly, and if anything happened [the 
committees would be called together]. Most of the information was discussed 
outside in the first instance, so it meant that when committees were formally 
convened they were three-quarters of the way to a decision being made. The 
degree to which Cabinet then ;ust ratified it depended to the degree to which 
lkey] people were involved ... 3 
The inappropriate or overuse of this method was, however, bound to attract the 
opprobrium of the responsible ministers and could lead to a fractious Cabinet. 
Given the variety of methods used to make decisions, it is the prime minister 
who provides continuhy to the national security policymaking system. The prime 
minister always appears as the main decision-maker, and no evidence was found to 
suggest that he could be bypassed on national security matters. The prime minister's 
influence also extends further, as he is very influential in determining which ministers 
are assigned to portfolios, and who is selected to sit on the national security-related 
committee of Cabinet. It would be insufficient to see the political domain as only 
containing ministers, however. They are supported by staff that assist them in the day-
to-day running of their offices-and often in roles beyond that. 
MINISTERIAL ADVISERS 
The practice of employing advisers from outside the public service began in the 
late 1960s, and became common during the Whitlam Government.36 While the initial 
aim of appointing advisers was to 'strengthen the elected component of the machinery 
of government' 37, this innovation created a new and fonnidable policymaking actor by 
the 1990s whose role sometimes complemented, and sometimes conflicted with, that of 
the public service. 
While little has been written about ministerial advisers in national security areas 
during this period38, we can assume that their roles followed similar patterns to that of 
the broader group of advisers in each government.39 These ranged from supporting 




DJ Ball, The Politics of Australian Defence Decision Making: Ministerial Assistance and Defence 
Decision Making, Re ference Paper No. 14, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National 
Universi ty, Canberra, 1977, p. 7. 
DJ Ball, The Politics of Australian Defence Decision Making, Reference Paper No. 183, Strategic 
and Defence Studies Centre, AusLralian National University, Canberra, 1991, p. 33. 
A brief exception was N Ryan, 'Ministerial advisers and po licy-making', in .1 Stewart (cd), From 
Hawke to Keating - Australian Commonwealth Administration 1990- 1993, Centre for Research in 
Public Sector Management, Canberra, 1994. 
39 More has been written about the interaction between ministers, officials and ministerial staff during 
the 'Children Overboard Affair' of 2001. In this case, asylum seekers were inaccurately portrayed as 
casting their children into the sea as a way of promoting intervention by the Royal Australian Navy. 
For further analysis, see A Tiernan, Power Without Responsibility, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2007, 
Chapler 8; D Marr and M Wilkinson, Dark Victory, 2nd edn, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2002; 
and P Welter, Don't Tell the Prime Minister, Scribe, Melbourne, 2002. Anne Tiernan extended her 
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roles, such as personal assjstance (including time management), political advice and 
communication or media liaison. But advjsers also help their ministers to steer policy 
and coordinate departmental activity.40 All of these roles can be seen in the national 
security sphere: 
[Another adviser] and I would go over to Defence and talk to people 'about the 
way the minister was thinking'. There was no paper and no minutes, but you'd 
get submissions that would give you options [based on those conversations].41 
[The minister] had a view that his advisers within the office needed to be over 
in the department, talking to people, working on submissions and policy 
initiatives well before they arrived at the minister's office--Dne, so we could 
be informed and operate on the basis of no surprises, and two, so we could 
actually give the department the minister's thinking, in the broadest possible 
sense. We were always careful to make the point that [we] don't direct, or tell 
them [officials] what to do. But [we 1 ensured that the minister gets a range of 
options, and they have at least an initial inkling [about the minister's views] 
42 
. .. a key role, the absolutely fundamental one, was making sure that the prime 
. . kn h d . 43 m101ster ows w ere everyone stan s on issues ... 
While these views demonstrate some continuity between governments, differences also 
occur. For example, minjsterial advisers in one Coalition foreign minister's office did 
not provide any policy advice or recommendation on departmental briefs, unlike his 
counterparts under the previous Labor foreign minjster who were expected to use 
yellow notes to comment on each submission.44 
The relationship between advisers and officials, and their relative influence over 
ministers, has varied over time. Some observers pointed to the way ministerial advisers 
could influence some decisions without having a dominant impact on every decision.45 
General Peter Oration, for one, made the point that he never felt advisers were getting 
between he and the minister, or telling the minster anything different to what he was 
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the department or establish a conflictual relationship with senior departmental officials; 
many wanted to return to their departments after their appointment in the minister 's 
office. 
Other senior officials portrayed ministerial advisors and their roles differently. 
These advisors owed their primary loyalty, and future, to their ministers. They could be 
both protective and assertive, and so end up in conflict with officials. According to one 
description provided in a court affidavit: 
I would ask a question of the minister and get an answer from [the minister's adviser]. 
Frequently [the adviserj wou ld talk across the minister. An outside observer would have 
difficulty discerning who was the minister and who was the adviser .. . 47 
The need to balance their relationships with departmental officials (who were 
sometimes their past and future employers) could create friction between advisers and 
those operating in the policy domain.48 
The Policy Domain 
The policy domain involves interaction between senior officials, and comes into 
contact with the political domain when these senior officials engage with their 
individual ministers and ministerial offices. The main structure for crisis policymaking 
in this domain was the Defence Committee (DC) earlier in the period, but this 
committee gave way later to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and the Secretaries 
Committee on Intelligence and Security (SCIS). bnportantly, this period also saw an 
increasing tendency towards bilateral coordination, informal groupings and ad hoc 
structures after 1985. Despite these attempts, the Australian bureaucracy did not settle 
on an agreed structural solution, with stable membership and authority, to act as an 
effective body to support crisis policymaking throughout this period. 
A lower-level body, known as the Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG), 
was created in 1988 to improve coordination between the main depa1tments. This 
group, which operated in a flexible and informal manner, did much to bring the main 
national security departments together- but these strengths also contributed to its 
weakness as a policymaking body. 
47 Quoted in P Malone, 'Tough talkers steering faithful party Jines', Canberra Times, 
24 November 2007, p. 82. 
48 See Tiernan, Power Without Responsibility, pp. 220- 1 for a description of friction between advisers 
and officials. 
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THE DEFENCE COMMITTEE 
The DC was the pre-eminent interdepartmental structure for national security 
policymaking in the policy domain from 1949 to its effective demise in 1985, but it did 
not exist solely for the purpose of crisis policymaking.49 The DC met with great 
frequency in the late 1950s and 1960s (usually more often than monthly), and it played 
a significant role in developing advice about Australia's possible responses to crises 
such as Konfrontasi and the many major defence and security issues of the time. so 
Views varied on the effectiveness and perceived utility of the DC. According to 
Sir Frederick Sherger, the DC was essential to ensuring that service advice was heard by 
the defence minister.51 While time consuming, Sir Henry Bland considered the DC 'a 
very useful instrument' while he was Defence' s secretary.52 Others had less positive 
views. Sir Arthur Tange, for one, was known to be frustrated with what he regarded as 
the DC's inability to look forward and innovate.53 
While the DC was preeminent for a time, its influence began to wane in the 
1970s. The story of its decline can be told, in part, by the volume of business it 
conducted. The DC considered at least forty-one items in 1969 when Bland was its 
chair. In 1970, after Tange became Secretary of the Department of Defence, the number 
of items dropped to twenty-two in 1970, nineteen in 1971 and twelve up to July 1972.54 
This was a taste of what would happen after the change of government in 1972, when 
the service departments were amalgamated into an enlarged Department of Defence and 
budget issues were removed from the DC's charter. From then on, the DC met with 
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reorganisation), no more than six times per year m the mid-1970s, and even less 
frequently until 1980. 55 
Tange's determination to change the DC was tied to a broader agenda for 
Defence reform. This involved reducing external influences on the department, 
particularly the Treasury's control over Defence's budget and equipment acquisition 
process. His desire for internal refo1m was equally strong, extending to decreasing the 
influence of the three uniformed services over policy and strengthening Defence 
Central's role in the committee system.56 The extent of reform was, however, tempered 
by the reality of policymaking. Tange understood the need for coordination, and noted 
that the DC had 'proved particularly important in the handling of advice on international 
defence policies, not least at times of tension or danger abroad.' 57 The DC was also 
expected to play a significant role in wartime as it was the most senior committee with 
direct links to Cabinet through the Minister of Defence. 58 
The DC was somewhat revitalised in the early 1980s; it met ten times in 1980 
and four times in the first five months of 1981. Importantly, these meetings dealt more 
with the formulation of policy advice on major national issues rather than being 'mainly 
just to acquaint the non-Defence members with matters under consideration at the 
highest levels of the Department of Defence'.59 Des Ball credited a number of factors 
for this change, including new attitudes towards the committee among its (non-Defence) 
members, 'a more open disposition to the receipt of outside advice on the part of current 
secretary of the Department of Defence compared with his predecessor', prime 
ministerial interest in defence issues and the role of the DC, and an increasing number 
55 On the frequency of DC meetings, see FW Mahler, LG Poyser, and JM Moten, Report on Secretarial 
Procedures to the Higher Defence Committee, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1974, Enclosure 3; 
and DJ Ball, 'The Machinery for Making National Security Policy in the 1980s', in R O' Nei ll and 
D Horner (eds), Australian Defence Policy For the 1980s, University o f Queensland Press, St Lucia, 
1982, p. J 50. 
56 Defence Central was the main policy arm of the department. After the 1973 reorganisation, it 
remained separated from the uniformed services and under the joint control of the departmental 
Secretary and the senior mili tary officer (see Sir Arthur Tange, Australian Defence: Report on the 
Reorganisation of the Defence Croup of Departments, Australian Government Publishing Service, 
Canberra, 1973, p. 134). Similar points concerning desire to realign power within Defence were 
made in EM Andrews, The Department of Defence, Oxford University Press, South Melbourne, 
2001, p. 261; and Interviews with 060-07 and Tony Ayers. 
57 Tange, Australian Defence, p. 134. 
58 Defence Review Committee, The Higher Defence Organisation in Australia (the Utz Review), 
Australian Government Puhlishing Service, Canben-a, 1982, p. J 84. 
59 Ball, 'The Machinery ( 1982)', p. 150; and Interviews with 060-07 and Tony Ayers. 
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of relevant issues such as a more turbulent international scene and questions over the 
ANZUS alliance. 60 
But the rejuvenation was not to last. By 1984 the DC was meeting only 
annually61 , and even then it was not well accepted: 
I went along to one of the Defence Committee meetings and I had two 
problems. We were talking about whether reservists could be used to defend 
the Northwest Shelf, and I said that was a political question, and not one for the 
Defence Committee ... I felt the same way about a separate [DC] discussion 
concerning Chinese activities in Tuvalu ... 62 
The DC was eventually scuttled by Defence Minister Beazley in 1985, who wanted less 
involvement by Foreign Affairs, Treasury and the services in defence policy.63 New 
mechanisms and processes would be needed as Australia entered a more active phase in 
foreign policy and minor regional crises became more frequent. 
FILLING THE VOID 
The DC was never the only policy-domain method for developing national 
security advice. Ministers always received advice from their own departments, and 
these views were not necessarily filtered through a coordinating mechanism before 
reaching Cabinet. Under some limited circumstances, prime ministers also received 
advice directly from the policy departments as Whitlam did from DFA even after he 
relinquished the foreign minister' s role to Senator Willesee.64 An 'Officials Committee' 
to shadow the FADC was also formed in 1976, but this grouping only included the 
Permanent Heads of DPM&C, Defence and Foreign Affairs.65 
One group that may lay claim to replacing the DC was the Secretaries 
Committee on Intelligence and Security (SCIS). The SCJS dates from the early 1970s, 
and it members included the Secretaries of the Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (DPM&C), Foreign Affairs, Defence, Treasury, Attorney General's, Chief of 
the Defence Force (CDF) and the heads of Australia's intelJigence organisations~thc 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Joint Intelligence 
60 Ball, 'The Machinery ( 1982)' , p. 150. The secretary of the Department of Defence he referred to was 
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Organisation (JIO), and eventually the Office of National Assessments (ONA).66 This 
committee had a narrowly focused intelligence coordination and policy function during 
the 1970s and early 1980s, particularly after the Hope Royal Commission recommended 
significant reforms to the intelligence system. The SCIS continued into the Hawke 
Government and remained focused on intelligence issues.67 By the mid-1980s, the SCIS 
was considering a wide range of security issues including matters such as Korea, the fall 
of the Soviet Union, and the reunification of Germany.68 This role and function 
continued after the Howard Government came to office. 
Other measures were also used to promote coordination in the policy domain 
during this time. The usual practice of bilateral and multilateral consultation between 
departments continued.69 The coordinating and advisory role of DPM&C was enhanced 
during the late 1970s, which was enabled by its closeness to the prime minister, 
increases to its size, and broader changes to the conception of why this department 
. d 70 s ex1ste . tructures also changed within Defence, particularly through the 
augmentation of the COSC with additional senior Defence officials.71 This committee 
replaced some of the DC's functions, but since it only included service and Defence 
officials, it could not act as an interdepartmental committee like the DC did.72 
The body charged with improving interdepartmental links was the Strategic 
Policy Coordination Group (SPCG). This group was formed in 1988 to 'ensure effective 
consultation among departments on strategic and security policy issues in peacetime, 
and to provide a mechanism for coordinating advice to government in times of crisis' .73 
The SPCG consisted of four senior officials: a Deputy Secretary of DFA T, Defence' s 
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(VCDF), and the First Assistant Secretary International Division of DPM&C. Each 
member was accompanied by at least two subordinate officials (one of whom was a 
relevant First Assistant Secretary) who would take notes, provide detailed advice, and 
ensure the agreements were communicated within the Department.74 Again, senior 
officials from other departments (and additional officials from the member's 
departments) were co-opted as required. 
There was another subtext about the formation of the SPCG. According to Hugh 
White, who was an adviser to Prime Minister Hawke at this time, the SPCG was 'a very 
deliberate attempt by ministers and others involved in the business ... to improve the 
quality of [interdepartmental] dialogue' .75 According to Interview 054, 'I suspect the 
actual committee meetings [of the SPCG] encouraged them to get themselves together 
so they could have a say in what was going on, or at least some oversight of it'. 
According to Alan Dupont, SPCG's ability to consider broader security issues was 
reduced by the weighting given to Defence's participation.76 Regardless of these factors, 
the SPCG clearly played a role in linking the main departments at time when 
coordination was conducted bilaterally, in ad hoc interdepartmental committees, or in 
Cabinet. 
The Administrative Domain 
The administrative domain describes the lowest strata of the policymaking 
structure, where officials develop detailed proposals. The structure for crisis 
policymaking in this domain exists on two main levels. The first is the 
interdepartmental level, where two or more departments come together to provide 
policy advice (or supervise implementation) under the general direction of their 
respective departmental heads. The second level exists within departments, usually with 
designated staff areas that have a special responsibility for policy development (as 
opposed to administrative or program management matters). The following sub-section 
begins by describing the defence-based mechanism known as the Joint Planning 
Committee (JPC), which acted as the main interdepartmental planner for most of this 
period. The discussion then moves to intra-departmental mechanisms and shows how 
this level came to dominate the first by the mid- 1990s. 
74 
75 
Interview with Rear Admiral Peter Briggs, Canberra, 3 1 August 2005. Rear Admira l Briggs was 
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122 
THE JOINT PLANNING COMMITTEE 
The JPC advised the DC and COSC on military strategic issues, the operational 
aspects of defence planning, plans for combined operations and inter-service training 
until the early 1990s.77 This remit meant the JPC provided advice on politico-strategic 
matters, including advke about alliance relationships78, long-range planning (such as 
the 'Strategic Basis of Defence Planning' papers), and short-term or crisis issues. It did 
not necessarily control the entire planning agenda, for many issues could and did bypass 
JPC and go directly to the DC or Cabinet through ad hoc arrangements.79 JPC was 
usually headed by the Director of Joint Service Plans, a major general (or service 
equivalent)80, and included representatives of Defence and the armed services, as well 
as a member of the Department of External Affairs (DEA). 
The JPC usually played a role in crisis policymaking, receiving its tasks directly 
from the DC and COSC,81 such as during Operation MORRISDANCE in 1987.82 By the 
early 1990s, the JPC's functions were becoming increasingly redundant as the 
operations staff of Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQ ADF) worked more 
directly to COSC.83 This committee was formally disbanded when Strategic Command 
Division was created in the 1997 restructure of HQ ADF. 
INTRADEPARTMENTAL ARRANGEMENTS: FOREJGN AFFAIRS 
External/Foreign Affairs used three major mechanisms for national security 
policymaking in the administrative domain. The first was based on the Defence Liaison 
Branch.84 While initially a communication link between the geographically dislocated 
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aspects of that relationship except intelligence coordination.85 Thus Defence Liaison' s 
role ranged from administration to providing DEA/DFAT representatives to support 
Defence planning.86 Defence Liaison Branch did this by maintaining an oversight of 
Defence processes, preparing policy papers for the DC and JPC, and maintaining close 
relations with Defence personnel. 87 
External Affairs' second mechanism involved a centralised policy pJanning 
branch (at various times). This branch was tasked to conduct longer-range planning 
within the department, but this did not always work due to the difficulty in getting 
senior officials and the minister interested in events that may (or may not) occur three or 
fi ve years into the future. 88 The third distinguishable method used in DFA T was to 
develop policy using less formal groupings that relied on responsibilities and personal 
competence to develop advice for the minister. This method effectively flattened the 
hierarchy and bought the secretary, and often the minister, in touch with subject 
experts.89 This range of methods shows DFAT's flexibility when developing policy in 
the administrative domain. It also shows how individuals, and the nature of the problem, 
influence policymaking processes and structures. 
One foreign policy 'mini-crisis' of 1986 gives an insight into how DFAT might 
have organised itself to handle larger crises in the rnid-1980s. The 'Jenkins Crisis' 
involving Australia and Indonesia was a small-scale and short-lived affair that arose 
when the Australian journalist, David Jenkins, pubJished criticism of the Soeharto 
farmly on 10 April 1986.90 The story sparked a range of retaliatory measures by 
Indonesian officiaJs, most publicly as a planeload of Australian tourists were refused 
permission to land in Indonesia on 22 April.91 Other measures, including official 
condemnation of Australia, suspension of the Timor Gap negotiations and a ban on 
85 Inte ll igence coordination was conducted through a coord inating committee (called the Joint 
Inte lligence Committee from 1946-70 and then the National Intelligence Committee from 
1970-7). T he function of intelligence coordination was assumed by 1he Office of National 
Assessments in 1977. 
86 J King Minute to Mr Campbell. 
87 DEA attachment to ibid., and Interview with 060-07. 
88 TB Millar, 'The Making of Australian Foreign Policy', in BD Beddie (ed) Advance Australia -
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Australian journalists, continued to linger for some time after and the affair created 
significant strains in the Australia-Indonesia relationship.92 
The immediate tension was quickly diffused, but not before the Australian 
Government initiated a crisis response. The main political actor was the acting foreign 
minister, Gareth Evans, as Cabinet itself did not meet to discuss the matter. Faced with 
a situation of great uncertainty, DFAT officers briefed the acting minister, who decided 
that a crisis group should be established. This group was based on DFA T's International 
Security Division and the relevant senior officials from the department. There was some 
early consultation at the working level with other government departments, but an 
interdepartmental committee (IDC) was not established.93 
The task force did not last long. In this case, it became clear that Australia's 
preferred course was to cool the situation rather than retaliate. However, this example of 
a mini-crisis showed the role of political preference in determining structures, and the 
way a department might react to establish new structures or initiate processes in 
uncertain situations. These processes included identifying a lead department, direct 
briefing of political leaders by departmental officials, and standing arrangements for 
managing crises. 
DEFENCE 
Defence's primary task in the administrative domain during cns1s revolves 
around making plans for military operations. The main trend in military planning during 
this period was a move away from a committee-based, interdepartmental process 
represented by the JPC toward a formal, permanent staff for military planning that 
worked directly to the Chief of Defence Force and Secretary of the Defence 
Department. 94 
Prior to 1968, the central policymaking areas of Defence relied upon seconded 
officers from the service headquarters to devise military plans on behalf of the DC or 
COSC. Such officers were usually accommodated within their service headquarters, 
remaining responsible to their service chiefs, and came together as part of the JPC or its 
92 D Goldsworthy, 'Regional Relations', in Goldsworthy and P Edwards (eds), Facing north: a century 
of Australian engagement with Asia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2003, 
pp. 155-6. 
93 Interv iew with Stuart Harris. 
94 In the Australian system, the Chief of the Defence Force (a lso known previously as the C hief of 
Defence Force Staff) and Secretary o f the Department of Defence share the responsibility of advising 
the Defence Minister. They also have separate accountabilities, for command of the ADF and 
management of the department respectively. 
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sub-committees when required. The former part of this arrangement was altered in 1968 
when a joint staff was instituted. This staff, under the Director Joint Staff, was 
responsible to the Chief of Defence Force Staff (CDFS) and Secretary for functions 
including joint operational planning, equipment requirements, joint policy and logistics. 
Officers were also assigned to the Joint Staff from Defence and Foreign Affairs.95 
Despite this increasing resource at the department's centre, military plans continued to 
be developed (as described above) in the JPC.96 
Functional reorganisations and appointment changes continued. By 1976 (after 
the 1973 reorganisation), a delineation between joint operational planning (under the 
CDFS) and strategic policy (under Defence's Secretary) was fonnalised, leading to 
friction in the relationship between service personnel and civilians.97 Further changes 
were made in 1984 when Defence Central became Headquarters ADF.98 By the Gulf 
War of 1990, the committee-based system of military planning had been eclipsed by the 
centralised staff. This change was prompted, in part, by the need to make very fast 
decisions and to maintain secrecy over intentions (a condition reinforced in 1994 with 
leaks about the creation of the South Pacific Peace Keeping Force [SPPKF] during 
Operation LAGOON).99 
Despite major reorganisations of Defence during this extended period, questions 
about the organisation's ability to cope with war or periods of intense activity were 
raised in the 1970s and persisted into the 1990s. This criticism was disingenuously 
deflected by Tange's insistence that the department should not be structured for 'total 
war'. 
100 Others also thought the existing system was capable of managing the additional 
workload created by operations. Adrian D'Hage (then Director Joint Operations in HQ 
ADF) reported that the Chief of Defence Force's command centre worked well during 
the 1987 Fiji Coup, and provided an effective link to other departments. He also noted 
how the JPC provided early warning to the troops by infonning the Chiefs of Staff of 
95 FW Mahler, Defence Reorganisation in Australia 1970-79, Department of Defence, Canberra, 1980, 
pp. 20-2; and M Mcintosh, Future Directions.for the Management of Australia 's Defence: Report of 
the Defence Efficiency Review, Commonwealth of Austral ia, Canberra, 1997. 
96 See p. 129 above. 
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98 Inspector General ADF, Strategic Operations and Plans - Program Evaluation, Commonwealth of 
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100 Mahler, Defence Reorganisation, p. 183; and Department of Defence, 'The Organisation of the 
Department of Defence in Time of Defence Emergency and War', in Submission 30 to Joinr 
Committee on Foreign and Defence Sub-Committee, 1987, pp. S388- S389. 
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Land, Maritime and Air Commands of impending operations, and how the augmented 
COSC provided fast direction to the component headquarters. 10 1 The Defence Minister 
and the CDF were also happy with the performance of their command arrangements 
during the 1990-1 Gulf War. 102 
Despite this confidence, Defence's ability to manage short-notice contingencies 
attracted criticism. The Inspector General of the ADF found that Operations Division 
was stretched when preparing for the relatively minor Bougainville Peace Conference of 
1994 (supporting the SPPKF). The evaluation also asked whether delegation rules 
existed to separate strategic issues from operational ones, because the lack of clarity 
could lead to 'confusion and misunderstanding in crisis' .103 
Summary 
This section traced the development of Australia's crisis policymaking system 
over thirty-six years. Yet, aside from the experience of Konfrontasi, and to a lesser 
extent the commitment to Vietnam, no major national security crises occurred. Even so, 
the system changed a number of times during this period. 
These changes occurred in a11 three policymaking domains. Prime ministers used 
at least four different ways to gain advice on national security matters. The major 
bureaucratic committee, the DC, changed function and eventually disappeared. It was 
replaced, over time, by a committee led by DPM&C. Change was also experienced in 
the administrative domain, which moved from a Defence-based committee system with 
some external representation to a more insular staff-based system that relied upon ad 
hoc interdepartmental groups. 
Further change came when Howard's Liberal- National Coalition was elected in 
March 1996. The next section examines the changes made to the national security 
policymaking system after 1996, and describes the major components of the system that 
would eventually manage the East Timor crisis in 1999. 
10 1 D' Hage, pp. 6- 7 and 12-13. 
102 Interview with Peter Oration. Conversely, this deployment was described as 'enormously taxing ' on 
Defencc' s command arrangements by an opposition defense adviser (see Horner, The Gulf 
Commitment, p. 207). 
103 Jnspeelor General ADF, p. 4-5. 
127 
Section II: The Crisis Policymaking System under Prime 
Minister Howard 
The modern crisis policymaking system came into being when John Howard 
created the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) and associated structures 
in 1996. This change was not surprising as such a committee had been part of the 
LiberaJ's election platform since 1989. This platform criticised Labor's national security 
policy arrangements claiming defence, foreign, economic and trade policy were not 
integrated, and that the existing process for strategic planning resulted in ad hoc Cabinet 
decision-making. The subsequent election policy declared an intention to create a smal1 
Cabinet committee, supported by a 'national security unit under the Prime Minister' to 
control national security policy and coordinate departments. 104 Nor was the change 
implemented in 1996 revolutionary, as the system took pieces that Menzies and Holt 
would have recognised and kept some of the structures developed under Hawke. 
Howard came to office with views about the failings of the previous government 
to manage national security, and some suspicions about the bureaucracy: 
.. . he wanted to avoid a situation where the prime minister was running and 
determining everything. He did not think that was heaJthy. And second, the 
idea that officials should be running things and have such a strong influence, 
I think he was suspicious about that, especially because the people who had 
been working in SPCG and key areas to do with foreign and defence policy 
had been there for a while under Labor. 1 os 
I think that the prime minister, in a substantial way, felt that Treasury had 
been too dominant in closing down policy development in the government 
106 
Howard had clear ideas about policymaking in his government. He wanted 
ministers to have authority and be responsible for implementing policy in their area. He 
also he wanted to assert a high degree of political control over policymaking, without 
asserting complete personal control over everything. 107 According to another 
interviewee, Howard was not in favour of networks of committees either within the 
Cabinet or the bureaucracy in most areas of policy: 
104 Liberal Party and National Party, ' Defence Policy', 1989, copy with author, pp. 2 and 4. 
105 Interview with 05 1-06. A similar view was expressed by Hugh White (Interview, 
2 1 December 2005). 
106 Interview with 052-06 (Sydney, 27 September 2006). 052-06 is former senior government official 
with direct knowledge of NSCC, SCONS and the East Timor case). 
107 Interview with 051 -06. 
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But national security and defence he regarded somewhat differently. Because of the 
structured nature of the military and because of the way they dealt with issues we 
looked separately at the way in which coordination was handlcd. 108 
What developed over the next three years was a more formalised crisis 
policymalcing system that retained some of its previous flexibility. This section explores 
this evolved system and how it worked in the immediate lead-up to the East Timor crisis 
of 1999. This discussion is again conducted by analysing the formal structures for 
crisis-and national security-policymaking in the political, policy and administrative 
domains. The discussion also shows how the formal model needed adapting when the 
Australian Government was faced with a significant national security crisis. 
The Political Domain under Howard 
Howard created the NSCC immediately upon becoming prime minister. Like 
previous committees, NSCC was small and its formal membership was limited to six 
ministers: the prime minister and his deputy, the treasurer, the attorney general, and the 
foreign and defence ministers (see Table 4). 109 The presence of these senior ministers 
allowed the NSCC to make important decisions without reference to Cabinet. NSCC 
was therefore the 'bridge' of national security policymaking because it was the place 
where decisions were made and a link between different positions within government. 
Table 4: The National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC) - 1999 
' ... 
Secretary,,DfAT . "· ,•' . " , . . ! 
. ' DG Office of National Assessments '· Kim Jones ;- 1 
' • "' '"l::,j" 
108 Interview with 052-06. 
109 0 ther ministers were co-opted as necessary. Today, the Minister for Transport and Regional Services 
also has a permanent seat on NSCC. The Minister for Immigration (who also holds other portfolio 
responsibil ities, oft.en including Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs) and Minster for Justice and 
Customs are regular attendees, but not permanently invi ted. 
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Ministers would generally make attendance at NSCC a priority110 ; it was an 
acknowledged decision-making body about important issues, and it was 'a very good 
way of doing business' : 
. .. it enabled you as minister to put the story in the political sense, and have the 
technical back-up available at the time. So there could not be any of this stuff 
that you get in the other portfolios, of 'well that 's a great idea but let's have the 
officials look at it' - that's a great way to defer a decision and it all goes back 
to square one ... So in these circumstances decisions could be made at the 
time. 111 
Consequently, the senior officials responsible for the advice-and also generally 
the implementation- became more important to NSCC as time went on. 112 In the period 
before 1999, attendance by officials was more along the Cabinet mode] , whereby they 
would be invited for specific items and leave the room while the ministers debated 
points. 11 3 This mode was changing by 1999, by all accounts due to the influence of the 
East Timor crisis. 
By then, attendance by officials and ministerial advisers was becoming more 
frequent. With this increased and more diverse presence, NSCC meetings were 
conducted in a semi-structured way-much like a well-directed seminar. 114 The prime 
minister, who would always chair meetings unless he was overseas, would start by 
asking for an intelligence update from the Director General of the Office of National 
Assessments (DG ONA)115, and he would ask the Secretary of DFAT and CDF for their 
views. From there, discussion would turn to the formal agenda or issues of the day, and 
this would flow until (usually) the prime minister summarised the discussion and sought 
agreement or made a decision. This format was generally conducive to broad 
discussion. As one fonner attendee noted, 'it was always a very open environment for 
people to have their say'. 116 
110 Interview with the lion Tim Fischer, Canberra, 1 August 2006. Mr Fischer was Deputy Prime 
Minister from March 1996 until July 1999. He headed the Australian Parliamentary Delegation to 
East Timor in August 1999. 
111 Interview with John Moore. 
112 Interview with 051 -06. 
11 3 John Moore gave one example where discussions were 'going to becoml: political' and that a 
decision could not he made in front of the public servants (Interview, 29 November 2006). Interview 
051 -06 said that the prime minister often 'cleared everyone out', leaving the ministers and maybe his 
International Adviser in the Cabinet Room. 
114 Interview with Paul Barratt, Melbourne, 23 December 2005. Mr Barratt was Secretary of the 
Department of Defence from J 998 to August 1999. Dr Ashton Calvert described NSCC as ' business-
like ' (Interview in Canberra, 19 May 2006). Dr Calvert was Secretary of DFAT in J 999 and attended 
NSCC and SCONS. 
115 When domestic security matwrs are discussed, this briefing is g iven by the Director General of the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO). 
116 Interview with Paul Barratt. Ashton Calvert also described the atmosphere of NSCC in a sirnilar way. 
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Longer and more contiguous opportunities to attend NSCC allowed the officials 
present to get a better understanding of NSCC deliberations than could be obtained from 
minutes and debriefings by their ministers. According to one participant in the NSCC, 
'the great benefit was we all knew just what part of the jigsaw puzzle was being played 
with at the time' .117 The ability to hear the entire debate, judge the mood of the meeting 
and see the non-verbal signals helped in this regard. 
In normal circumstances, NSCC agenda items would be discussed beforehand at 
the secretaries' level, or sometimes in the lower-level SPCG. Formal, written 
submissions would also go through a 'coordinating comments' process like other 
Cabinet business. This process reflected the very strong n01m of 'no surprises', the 
desire to present agreed recommendations to NSCC, and the need to reduce complexity 
so that decisions could be made by the ministers. 
The frequent meetings of NSCC also helped to make it into an effective 
committee. Tim Fischer explained that familiarity with communication processes, good 
support from the bureaucracy, the atmosphere of the Cabinet room and 'a couple of 
drills' all helped to ensure that when NSCC was called together quickly it could 
function effectively. 118 
This description of Howard's NSCC presents a picture of a well-run, cohesive 
and focused group-and this is reasonably accurate. However, it was also clear that 
NSCC was a place of politics. Ministers kept an eye on the political importance of 
issues, and they also played out some (apparently limited) competition among 
themselves. The way NSCC operated was also clearly dependent upon personalities and 
the prime minister's authority. While Howard had created this machinery so that he did 
not have to run everything, the NSCC put him in the position where he could be the 
dominant political figure in crisis, if be so chose. 
The Policy Domain: SCONS and SPCG 
Despite the wider trend of change in the public service after Howard came to 
power in 1996, the national security policymaking structure in the policy domain 
changed little. While those responsible 'looked very closely at whether [the existing 
arrangements] were desirable', the existing secretaries-level committee (SCIS) was 
117 Interview with Admiral Chris Banie, CanbeJTa, 5 April 2005. Admiral Barrie was Chief of the 
Defence Force from 1998-2002. He was an invited offi c ial at NSCC and a member of SCONS in 
1999, and had attended SPCG when he was Vi ce Chief of the Defence Force. 
118 Interview with Tim Fischer. 
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retained in the broad shape of Keating's time and renamed as the Secretaries Committee 
on National Security (SCONS). The previous government's SPCG was also retained. 119 
The SCONS membership generally reflected the NSCC ministers, including the 
secretary of DPM&C, CDF, DG ONA and the secretaries of Defence, DFAT, Attorney 
General's and Treasury (see Table 5). 120 This grouping allowed the key senior officials 
responsible for policy development and implementation to discuss issues in a closed 
environment before taking their views to the NSCC. It was also a venue where 
agreement could be reached on some issues, thus relieving the NSCC of some of its 
workload and taking some of the heat out of interdepartmental disagreements .121 Just 
which decisions could be taken at this level was reliant upon a keen awareness of what 
their respective ministers would accept, and the relationship between the prime minister 
and secretary of DPM&C. 122 
Table 5: Secretaries Committee on National Security (SCONS) -1999 
SCONS was typically a monthly meeting in 1999, but it did meet on an ad hoc 
basis as well. Its role varied, but generally SCONS considered important, long-term 
issues with broad impacts on national security and the government. These included 
complex issues such as security for the 2000 Olympic Games, discussion about defence 
projects, and white paper considerations. 123 Thus SCONS played a major role in 
determining spending priorities and highlighting the impact of policy options across 
portfolio areas. SCONS could also become a rehearsal for NSCC, as it had the ability to 
review items going forward to the mjnisterial group. This served to 'prevent debate in 
119 Interview with 052-06. 
120 Although the Secretary of the Treasury and Secretary of Attorney General's Department did not 
usually attend NSCC. Interview 052-06 thought there were clear expectations that the departmental 
secretary, and not a deputy, would attend. In contrast, Chris Barrie d id not think there was any 
obligation to attend SC()NS all the time. 
121 Interview with 052-06. Others thought SCONS could do more. For example, Ashton Calvert 
described it as 'an energised and lively forum' that would 'break new ground '. 
122 Interviews with Paul Banatt and Chris Barrie. 
123 l nterviews with Hugh White and Ashton Calvert. 
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NSCC and [avoided] presenting an untidy picture for ministers to try and pick 
through' .124 
Despite its key position in the formal national security policymaking structure, 
SCONS would not be a main player in crisis. There were good reasons for this. For one, 
SCONS could not meet often enough to handle the workload created by a crisis because 
most of its members would be heavily committed to the NSCC, their internal 
departmental processes and essential routine departmental work. Secondly, the members 
themselves-similar to the political leaders- would not consider themselves experts on 
the details of the issues. They need briefings and submissions from their staff to make 
sense of the cable traffic and intelligence reports, and time to talk to important 
stakeholders. Thus, using SCONS during a crisis would impose a substantial workload 
on already-pressed staff and risked having senior leaders spend unnecessary time in 
· PS meetmgs. -
STRATEGIC POLICY COORDINATION GROUP 
The SPCG of 1999 continued to play its established role. It remained the only 
body-short of SCONS-where the senior officials from the major national security 
departments could come together and work through security issues. In doing so, SPCG 
often reconciled positions and built consensus before proposals were submitted to 
SCONS or NSC, which meant this group often acted like a 'policy clearing house' for 
the more senior levels. 126 
There are different views on what SPCG could do and how effective it was. For 
some, SPCG was a useful and flexible grouping of senior officials. It derived some 
strength from the ability to caJI the members together at very short notice, and for its 
ability to be an action-oriented- rather than deliberative-body. This was possible 
because its members were sufficiently senior to carry their departments once agreement 
was reached in the meeting (see Table 6). 127 Similarly, SPCG members often deputised 
for their secretaries at NSCC and SCONS, and some played important roles in other 
committees, such as Defence's Strategic Command Group (SCG). The informal nature 
124 Interviews with Paul Barratt, 052-06 and Hugh White. 
125 . c Interviews with Ashton alven and Hugh White. SCONS' limited utility in crisis was also noted by 
A Dupont, 'Taking out policy insures country against trouble' , Australian, 7 November 2000, p . 15. 
126 Interviews with Air V ice-Marshal Kerry Clarke (Canberra, 2 August 2005), Martin Brady (Canberra, 
I 6 August 2005) and 014-05 (Canberra, 5 July 2005). Air Vice-Marshal Clarke was Director General 
Joint Operations and Plans in Strategic Operations Division in 1998-9. Mr Brady was Director, 
Defence Signals Directorate in 1999, and acting Deputy Secretary Strategy in August- September. 
Interview 01 4-05 was a former senior government official with direct knowledge of SPCG. 
127 Interviews with Hugh White and 032-05 (identi ty protected , by te lephone, 29 September 2005). 
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of SPCG was considered a strength because different departments could come together 
as equals in terms of policy responsibility. This allowed the discussions to roam widely, 
without creating the angst about responsibilities that might be experienced if such a 
discussion occurred in more formal settings. It also allowed the agenda to change as the 
situation demanded. 128 
According to this view, the SPCG's ability to function was based upon strong 
relationships and trust between its principals. Indeed, one former participant described 
SPCG as 'more like a community than a committee' .129 Members were expected to 
refrain from 'silly games' when dealing with each other and state their positions clearly. 
Potentially acrimonious discussions were taken outside the meeting so that a consensus 
could be achieved wherever possibJe. 130 
This same level of familiarity, informality and norm of consensus led some to 
see SPCG quite differently. One interviewee implied that this familiarity could create 
something like groupthink, as some personalities dominated the discussion. 131 
Informality had other limits as well. It was difficult to create a working agenda and 
dealing with increased numbers in times of crisis. At times, the committee's collegiality 
could be tested by clashes due to departmental culture. 132 Some interviewees also 
thought the high degree of informality made SPCG almost meaningless: 
... il was never allowed to be anything more than where a discussion took 
place. No policy came out of it, people presented their views and that was the 
end of it. There were no minutes or records of conversation. It was just an 
h f . 133 exc ange o views ... 
The lack of a clear agenda or mandate could also make SPCG appear dysfunctional: 
128 The Australian Government carefully allocates policy responsibilities, and under normal conditions 
any attempt by one department to 'meddle ' outside their portfolio will provoke a reaction from the 
custodian. The description of the informal nature of SPCG was provided in interviews with Ashton 
Calvert and 032-05. 
129 Interview with Hugh White. 
130 Interviews with 032-05, Hugh White and Kerry Clarke. Andrews described an earlier SPCG as 'a 
joint team' that worked ' with great amicabili ty' to produce a major policy document (Andrews, 
Defence, p. 261 ). 
13 1 Interview with Major General Michael Keating, Canberra, 25 August 2005. Major General Keating 
became Head, Strategic Operations Division in Defence in May I 999. 
I 32 Interview with Michael Scrafton, Melbourne, 5 August 2005. Mr Scrafton was Assistant Secretary 
Regional Engagement, Policy and Programs at the start of 1999. He became Acting Head 
International Policy in August l 999, and attended the SPCG at times. 
133 Interview with 046-06, Canberra, 6 May 2006. Interview 046-06 is a former senior ADF officer with 
direct knowledge of the SPCG. 
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The reason why I say it was slightly dysfunctional, and did not work as well as 
it could, was that the broader grouping came to be dominated by the headline 
. f h d 134 issues o t e ay ... 
The implication of this focus on the news of the day was that SPCG could have trouble 
planning ahead and aligning departmental efforts. 
Table 6: Strategic Policy Coordination Group (SPCG) - Principal Members, 1999 
Departmental Machinery 
Individual departments had structures to support national security policymaking. 
The general focus of these included internal decision-making about the allocation of 
resources and priorities, representing views of the different components of the 
department or agency, and preparing senior leaders and ministers for their committees. 
DFA T changed little after 1996, maintaining a formal group that managed 
departmental responses to crisis (now called International Security Division).135 On the 
other hand, Defence changed its formal structure to make operational planning 
smoother. This included making Strategic Command Group more responsive and better 
focused, raising a subordinate Strategic Watch Group (SWG) to monitor potential 
crises, and establishing a Strategic Command Division to support the CDF and conduct 
interdepartmental liaison (see Figure 4). 
STRATEGIC COMMAND GROUP 
The Strategic Command Group (SCG) was an innovation introduced by CDF 
Admiral Barrie to replace the 'operational' or 'augmented' COSC. 136 The SCG included 
the CDF, VCDF, the service chiefs and the head of Strategic Command Division; and 
civilian officials including the departmental secretary, Deputy Secretary Strategy and 
Intelligence (DEP SEC S&I), Director of the Defence Intelligence Organisation 
134 Interview with Michael Scrafton. 
135 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Annual Report 2006-2007, Commonwealth of Australia, 
Canberra, 2007, pp. 111- 13. 
136 In terview with Chris Barrie. 
135 
(DDIO), and First Assistant Secretary International Policy. It was also normal for the 
senior operational commander, known as Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST), 
to participate by video link from Sydney and other officers would be invited as 
necessary.137 The membership of this group could also be expanded if needed. 
Figure 4: The National Crisis Management Machinery, Showing the Department 
of Defence's Formal Structure, 1999 
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The SCG was given a formal structure and role in 1998, which separated it from 
the more management-focused Chiefs of Service Committee and Defence Executive.138 
s, 
This role was to provide operational advice to CDF, in his capacity as commander of 
the Australian Defence Force (ADF) and in his shared role as principal adviser to the 
Minister for Defence. The SCG also helped the CDF (and the Secretary) to prepare for 
the NSCC, and for other officials such as the DEP SEC S&I and VCDF to prepare for 
the SPCG. The SCG could be called together quickly and would meet as the situation 
required. 
137 In the Australian system, COMAST is responsible for managing operations using forces assigned 
from the ADF. 
138 The Chiefs of Service Committee was a meeting of the senior uniformed officers to discuss military 
matters (usually, the departmental Secretary and a few other senior officials were invited to attend). 
The Defence Executive was an internal committee, consisting of the senior uniformed and civilian 
officers, which considered administrative and budgetary matters. 
136 
The conduct of an SCG meeting was highly dependent upon the CDF' s personal 
preferences and style. 139 These preferences extended from the selection of attendees to 
the way decisions were recorded. The SCG rarely had a formal agenda in 1999. Instead, 
the CDF would start with an intelligence brief from DDIO and then go to the major 
issues of the day or take points from attendees. 140 The minutes were generally circulated 
in the form of a brief list of decisions and not subjected to a review or acceptance 
process. 
The SCG was supported by the Strategic Watch Group (SWG). The SWG's 
purpose was to identify potential crises or issues that might be of sufficient concern to 
elevate to the SCG. This group included a range of policy and intelligence officials at 
the Colonel level who met regularly, or as needed, to consider situations that may 
become concerns. Once the SCG began to meet regularly about a crisis, the SWG 
genera11y ceased to meet on that issue, being either folded into the SCG itself or waiting 
until the signs of another crisis emerged before convening again. 
The committees mentioned here can be considered as the main bodies that 
formed the formal crisis management machinery in 1999, but they were by no means 
the only elements. For example, it was common to form interdepartmental committees 
or task forces to provide advice to the secretaries. Other committees and working 
groups, such as the Heads of Intelligence Agencies Meeting (HJAM), the Standing 
Advisory Committee-Protection Against Violence (SAC-PAV) and the Heads of 
Commonwealth Law Enforcement Agencies (HOCLEA) might also be considered as 
part of the national security and crisis policymaking machinery. However, the three 
government-level committees identified-NSCC, SCONS and SPCG-had central roles 
in the process and were the critical forums for decision-makers and advisers. 
Section III: Change, Continuity and Implications for the 
Characteristics of Crisis Policymaking 
The modern national security policymaking system, which provided the 
structural starting point for policymaking in any crisis, did not emerge through a smooth 
or linear evolution. While some key continuities were discernable over the period 
exanlined in this chapter, significant change also occurred. These changes tended to 
139 Interview with Allan Behm, Canberra, 5 May 2005. Mr Behm was Firsc Assiscant Secretary (FAS) 
International Policy in 1998 and FAS Strategic Policy in 1999- 2000. 
140 Interviews with Chris Barrie and Michael Keating. 
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rmrror the factors identified by Walcott and Hult141 , including the lower-level of 
influence for organisational factors. This final section examines the reasons behind the 
observed change and its implications for the characteristics for crisis policymaking. 
Explaining changes in the crisis policymaking system 
This period shows how the structures and processes for national security crisis 
policymaking can vary greatly at times where there is no pressing external impetus for 
change. It also shows that despite considerable experience, no single best practice for 
national security policymaking had emerged by 1999. There were two reasons for this. 
The first can be summarised in terms of the personal preferences of different 
prime ministers. The prime minister had significant discretion in choosing which of the 
four mechanisms available- full Cabinet, committee, informal grouping, or key 
ministers-would be used on any given occasion. In most cases, these choices were 
influenced by considerations such as time, the likelihood of opposition within the 
Cabinet or party, or the value prime ministers placed on the advice and support of 
others. This explains how and why prime ministers such as Gorton, McMahon and 
Whitlam routinely bypassed existing committees, and often made national security 
decisions unilaterally or with only Ii mi ted consultation. The flexibility also explains 
how a 'Cabinet-centric ' prime minister such as Fraser employed all four means at 
different times. 
In other cases party rules or Cabinet norms influenced the prime minister's 
preferred method for consulting his colleagues, but these were minor constraints as long 
as the norm of collective responsibility was observed for major decisions. While the 
utility of a Cabinet committee was accepted wherever Cabinet dynamics permitted, the 
prime minister gained significant flexibility from being able to choose between, or mix, 
the four modes of consultation and decision. While this factor may appear to overlap 
Walcott and Hult's 'presidential choice' , strategy and objectives seem to be less 
influential than the need to 'win the decision'. In other words, the changes observed in 
Australia's system during this period seemed more about ensuring the prime minister 
got a favourable political resolution, rather than met a long-term goal. 
The second reason for change is an environmental meta-factor, best identified as 
the 'contingent nature of crisis' for this purpose. Every crisis involves different policy 
interests, actors, responsibilities and instruments. This can be seen in two of the 
141 CE Walcott and KM Hult , Governing the White House, University of Kansas Press, Lawrence, 1995, 
pp. 16- 18. 
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examples cited above. For instance, the 1986 'mini crisis' was perceived as a foreign 
policy crisis that required de-escalation. The Australian Government, represented by 
acting Minister for Foreign Affairs Gareth Evans, framed this problem as a threat to the 
Australia-Indonesia relationship that would be best served by calming inflamed 
Indonesian passions. Military action was never contemplated, there were no gatherings 
of Cabinet, and the bureaucratic team developed to manage the matter came from within 
established organisations in DFA T. 
The 1990-91 Gulf War was handled differently. This event was framed as a 
military problem with significant domestic political implications-especially for 
relationships within the governing ALP. Hawke and a small circle of senior ministers 
watch the situation closely for more than three months. No additional committees were 
established, and intelligence information and advice for the leadership group was 
channelled through senior military officers. The level of Australian commitment to the 
coalition and the lack of a direct threat to national interests allowed a mini-crisis like 
this to be handled in a compact way. Indeed, the main relationship that may have been 
transformed in this instance was not between nation-states, as is the case in so many 
other crises, but in the (far from realised) potential to create division within the 
governing ALP itself. Policymaking in this instance lent itself to small and unified 
decision-making group, tightly controlled information and a low-key approach. 
The structures for policymaking at the policy and administrative domains were 
more fluid during this period, with a trend towards fragmentation by the 1980s. After 
the demise of the DC, bilateral consultation, often at the ministerial level, was the usual 
fonn of coordination. That the SCIS broadened its focus to more general national and 
international security matters after 1987, and the SPCG formed after the Fiji Coup of 
that year, shows the importance of having a policy domain forum to analyse national 
security issues. Fragmentation in the administrative domain tended to be addressed by 
ad hoc interdepartmental committees or task forces. Such groups often fonned late in 
events, as in the case of the 1994 SPPKF. These groups became practiced at operating 
together as the events of the mid- to late-1990s unfolded. 
Implications for the characteristics of crisis policymaking 
While numerous events during this period were important and received Cabinet 
attention, none after Konfrontasi and Vietnam really deserves the description 'national 
security crisis'. However, it is still possible to see how the national security executive 
remained the main arbiters of what was a crisis issue, and what was not. The 
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examination of this period also shows the dominant position of the prime minister in 
decision-making. As the first section showed, prime ministers employ a variety of 
methods to make decisions, and none decided that embarking upon a full crisis 
policymaking process was needed during this period. This makes it difficult to identify 
any implications for policy instruments, consultation, implementation or evaluation 
during this period. 
It is possible to identify some changes to the sources of policy advice as 
ministers developed personal staffs, but this does not represent a major diversion from 
the characteristic dominance of 'insiders' in this phase. There is also some evidence to 
show that a more collegial approach to national security policymaking-and by 
extension, crisis policymaking-was developing, especially after the 1980s. While the 
reasons for this change are not entirely clear, factors such as increasing role clarity 
within the bureaucracy, changes to the way senior public servants were recruited, and an 
increasing role for ministerial staff may have contributed to increased cooperation 
between key national security departments. 
So while untested during this period, the Australian Government was not 
unprepared for crisis by the late 1990s. As 1999 began, the structures and processes 
involved in national security policymaking were well understood. This understanding 
had been promoted in the previous two years where security issues had been constantly 
on the agenda and some of the mechanisms for crisis policymaking seemed to be in 
almost constant operation: 
We'd had Sandline, which got Customs and Attorney-General's Depmtment 
involved-unusually. We'd had the Soeharto succession, where we had 
positioned ourselves to evacuate up to 10 000 foreign nationals [from 
Indonesia]. We'd had the coup in Cambodia and the evacuation implemented 
there. We'd had the running problem of PNG, and the Bougainville Peace 
initiative ... So it was a pretty well-rehearsed DPM&C, DFAT and Defence 
core team that ran with the management of that stuff. The links between ADF 
Headquarters and the minister and DFAT and so on had been well 
sharpened. 142 
But wire diagrams and formal views only tell part of the story of how national 
security policy is made in a crisis, and the extent of that difference will be highlighted 
when the case of East Timor in 1999 is presented in Part II. Before thi s occurs, a short 
summary of Part I will be presented to propose characteristics for crisis policymaking. 
142 ) Interview with Peter Briggs. The Bougainville peace initiative (known as the Lincol n Agreement 
saw a regional peace monitoring group inserted into Bougainville province of Papua New Guinea 
(PNG) in 1997. Australia mounted a small evacuation operation during the Cambodian Coup of July 
1997. 
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SUMMARY OF PART I: PROPOSED CHARACTERISTICS 
FOR CRISIS POLICYMAKING 
Developing characteristics for crisis policymaking 
Part I bridges a gap in the literature about Australia's national security by 
identifying characteristics to describe crisis policymaking. The analytical process 
followed in this part was needed because many authors are content to study either 
foreign or defence policy, without recognising how the two overlap in operation. Still 
fewer have examined crisis from a policymaking perspective. Consequently, no body of 
work could be used to compare different instances of how Australian governments 
made policy during national security crises before this dissertation. 
The analytical process began by accepting the characteristics of policymaking 
developed by Bridgman and Davis. These characteristics were used without significant 
testing because the source work is considered authoritative, and because these 
characteristics only provide a start point for analysis. Further testing would be needed if 
the aim was to prove that national security is a policy field in its own right and that it 
differs from the norm described by Bridgman and Davis. 
Since this dissertation aims to examine the characteristics of crisis policymaking 
in Australia, Chapter 1 analysed the literature on foreign and defence policymaking to 
produce a tentative list of characteristics for the broader field of national security 
policymaking. The vignettes described in Chapter 2, and Chapter 3' s examination of the 
crisis policymaking system from 1963-99, developed the tentative characteristics 
further and provided an empirical grounding for understanding crisis policymaking in 
Australia. This section summarises these chapters to propose a list of characteristics of 
crisis policymaking for testing refinement in Part II. 
The proposed characteristics of crisis policymaking 
IDENTIFY ISSUES 
The characteristics of issue identification in a crisis follow those proposed for 
national security, although the central role of the national security executive- the prime 
minister, his national security ministers and their senior officials-is heightened in 
crisis situations. Indeed, the space for others such as Parliament, political parties, lobby 
groups and even the media to identify issues in c1ises is less than that for national 
security issues in general. The task here is not only to identify the problem; these actors 
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must define the problem and how to manage it. This is a critical step with important 
ramifications for analysis, structures, instruments and consultation. 
There remains space for foreign actors, particularly foreign governments, to 
identify issues and define the problem. This provides a clue to the importance of 
information and agency in a crisis. When time is critical, those who can actually have an 
impact on the government's immediate interests attract priority and attention. 
Governments need to listen to these actors' views and understand the implications of 
their activities, knowing both may influence subsequent events and national interests. 
The importance of mass appeal is more difficult to determine, however, for 
pubic opinion generally followed the government's preferred course in the examples of 
crisis examined thus far. This may support the view that the government keeps one eye 
on public opinion during a crisis and shapes public opinion to accept its view. It might 
also speak to a notion that when a crisis occurs, the public tends to support the 
government-especially since the government is likely to be providing authoritative 
information on the issues at stake. 
The proposed characteristics of the Identify Issues phase in crises are: 
• The p1ime minister, his national security ministers and their senior officials 
are the dominant domestic actors in issue identification and, by extension, 
problem definition. 
• Foreign actors (especially governments) and events have the ability to 
place issues on the crisis policy agenda when they intend to harm 
Australian interests, when the interests of Australia's allies and friends are 
threatened, and when high levels of interdependence mean that threats to 
others' interests are viewed as threats to Australia. 
• Other domestic actors have a limited ability to identify issues in a crisis. 
• Mass appeal plays a limited role in issue identification. 
These characteristics appear unlikely to change as the Australian Government, 
which is represented by the executive, is likely to maintain its dominance over issue 
identification. However, other actors may become more influential as access to new 
infonnation sources and an increasingly pervasive media increase the range of voices 
that can contest the government's view. Other external players, including non-state 
actors such as teITorist groups, can also be influential. These changes may serve to make 
mass appeal or public opinion influential , but since the Australia public has general1y 
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supported the government in national security crises, this development is unlikely to 
have a dramatic effect. 
POLICY ANALYSIS 
The Policy Analysis phase incorporates extra-rational methods during a crisis, 
particularly when timeframes are limited. One reason for this change is that political 
leaders rely heavily on trusted, expe1t bureaucratic and political advisers. This means 
political decision-makers often narrow their sources of information in crisis; they will 
generally listen more to their established insiders and intelligence agencies rather than 
find different sources of information. This narrowing of advice also changes the 
structure of policy analysis, empowering some individuals and sections of the 
bureaucracy above others. The description of 'insiders' as the policy experts should not 
be seen in a sinister light; nearly all are either elected politicians, appointed officials, or 
advisers appointed under an act of Parliament. Foreign governments, and their officials 
under some circumstances, can become quasi-insiders in a crisis as they use their access 
to information and resources to influence policy options. 
Some evidence, albeit still inconclusive, shows a role for dominant frameworks 
in policy analysis. Diplomats and defence officials have subscribed to different 'world 
views' at times; this includes differences between the uniformed and civilian elements 
of Defence. The influence of frameworks is most pronounced where there is no clear 
lead in crisis and Defence, PMD/DPM&C or External/Foreign Affairs offer different 
policy options. 
The proposed characteristics of policy analysis in a crisis are: 
• Where the ability to conduct rational comprehensive analysis is limited in 
a crisis, decision-makers tum to trusted sources of advice. This can change 
the structure of policymaking and identify which actors will be influential. 
• Policy issues are rarely analysed as individual, discrete problems, and the 
nature of competition between issues and interests, and the consequent 
influence on the issue at hand, makes analysis iterative. 
• Internal policy experts dominate. 
• Where dominant frameworks exist, they are likely to be noticeable where 
there is no clear lead for a crisis. 
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Only limited change is expected in the broad definition of these characteristics, 
but change should be expected in the specifics. Thus the degree to which rational and 
extra-rational factors may dominate changes from instance to instance, as can the 
location of the policy experts- at least in theory. The nature of the dominant framework 
is also likely to change, just as the prevailing framework may shift. 
POLICY INSTRUMENTS 
The instruments available to a government during crises follow those already 
developed as part of national security policymaking. This is logical because there is 
often little time to develop new instruments and, more importantly, develop champions 
for them. In addition, the use of policy instruments remains highly situational, to the 
point where some will be deliberately ignored to avoid sending the wrong (or right) 
signals about one's capability or intent. 
The proposed characteristics of the Policy Instruments phase are: 
• The instruments most used by the Australian Government in crises are 
diplomacy, alliances, military force, economic levers (including foreign 
aid), information, international law, and (sometimes) social levers. 
• The utility of foreign and defence policy instruments is highly situational 
ma cns1s. 
Only limited change can be expected to these characteristics, perhaps where 
additional instruments are added to existing ones. For example, health care is being 
perceived as a critical national security capability today, just as the customs and 
financial tracking agencies are seen integral instruments for counter-terrorism. 
CONSULTATION 
Government consultation is likely to be limited in crisis situations. Once again, 
the constraints of time and the sensitivity of information allow political leaders to 
provide information after decisions are made, and to limit their consultation to this 
level. The government's deliberations are generally conducted in secret. Consultation 
with foreign governments in a crisis is broader, and may extend from information 
through to partnership and delegation-where control over decisions is vested 
elsewhere. 
The proposed characteristics for consultation in a crisis are: 
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• All options are used with overseas interlocutors (who are primarily other 
governments and major international organisations) with information, 
discussion, partnership and delegation commonly occurring. 
• Consultation between the government and the public usually takes the 
form of a one-way passage of information. 
• Much consultation occurs in secret. 
Both the options for consultation, and the preferred modes, are unlikely to 
change significantly over time. However, there may be more times where delegation 
becomes the actual method of consultation in a world that is increasingly interconnected 
and national governments are limited in what they can achieve alone. The secrecy 
aspect of consultation is also likely to prevail, although better access to information may 
make secrecy harder to maintain. 
COO RD INA TION 
While the bureaucratic politics view of government activity m a cns1s is 
persuasive and influential, a strong case can be made for ascribing a greater sense of 
collegiality to coordination since the 1990s. This divergence was not always observable, 
for earlier crises (such as 1941--42) did not show signs of either approach because 
bureaucratic activity was dominated by one department (Defence). This situation 
changed in the 1950s as crises became more complex and other departments began to 
develop their own policy analysis capabilities and frameworks. 
There were instances in the case of Konfrontasi, such as the November 1963 
advice about Australian troop commitments to Borneo, where interdepartmental 
coordination was good and provided unified policy advice to Cabinet. However, there 
was divergence at other times. Importantly, PMD and DEA differed over the approach 
towards Indonesia, and a clear divergence existed between the pro-Britain line of PMD 
and the military, and DEA's independent viewpoint. These differences displayed some 
features of bureaucratic politics. 
Some instances of competition remained into the 1990s, but it is also possible to 
see more cooperation. Three factors may be responsible for this change: bureaucratic 
roles had greater clarity, there was more ministerial involvement in selecting senior 
officials, and ministers had personal staff that could provide alternatives to the 
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bureaucracy as sources of advice. There could be other factors , such as the pressure of 
events, which also promoted cooperation over competition in crisis.143 
Governments used certain structures and routines to manage crises, but these 
changed significantly over time and sometimes in the midst of a crisis. There were 
significant changes during 1941-42, while Menzies created new committees after the 
1954 crisis and made an important structural change at the start of 1963. Changes to the 
policymaking system also occurred between the 1960s and the 1990s, even though 
Australia did not face a national security crisis in this period. There were two main 
reasons for this change: political preference and the contingent nature of crises. This is 
important to understand because future changes to the policymaking structure should be 
expected. Consequently, the resulting system must cope with these influences, lest it 
become inflexible and unable to adapt to the political and organisational conditions of 
the day. 
The proposed characteristics of coordination in crisis policymaking are: 
• Governments describe structures and routines that suit their particular 
preferences and best thinking for the time, the task at hand, and external 
factors. 
• Coordination is basically competitive, but it shows increasing propensity 
for collegiality. 
While the first charactetistic is likely to remain consistent, the second may vary because 
individual preferences remain important to this fundamentally human form of 
interaction. 
DECISION 
While Cabinets influence national security policymaking and will be consulted 
about major issues, it is the prime minister who emerges as the dominant decision-
maker in crises. Furthermore, the prime minister decides his sources of advice and the 
circumstances under which he shares that advice. This characteristic may see prime 
ministers go beyond formally appointed committees and defined ministerial 
I~ h A point emphas ised by current Secretary DPM&C, Dr P Shergold, 'Keynote Address', at t e 
Governing Through Collaboration Conference, Hyatt Hote l, Canberra, 28-29 June 2007. This broad 
position has been challenged by R Gerodimos, 'The UK BSE Crisis as a Failure of Government', 
Public Administration, vol. 82, no. 4, 2004, pp. 920- 1; and A McConnell and A Stark, 'Foot-and-
Mouth 2001: The Politics o f Crisis Management', Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 55, no. 4, 2002, 
pp. 667- 9. 
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responsibilities. It may see officials closely involved in decision-making, although 
officials are never credited with taking decisions that rightly belong to elected 
politicians. It was still normal for officials to leave the Cabinet or committee room when 
decisions were Laken during the period examined, except in the very unusual situation of 
the Prime Minister' s War Conference in 1942. 
Despite the prime minister's dominance and strong influence over the decision-
making processes, normal Cabinet conventions of collective responsibility, secrecy and 
recorded decisions are usually followed in a crisis. However, adherence to some, 
especially collective responsibility, may not be honoured in a strict way. This is 
especially the case where the prime minister is the dominant figure. 
Both the prime minister's dominance and the basic conventions of this phase are 
likely to continue, although fundamental changes to the national security structure may 
change the influence of other players. For example, the appointment of a national 
security adviser in a future government may qualify the foreign or defence minister's 
existing influence. The role of officials in Cabinet has already changed over time, so 
further change should be expected. Given this, the proposed characterises for the 
Decision phase of a crisis are: 
• The prime minister is dominant. 
• Cabinet conventions are based on collective responsibility, secrecy and 
recorded decisions. 
• Officials, when invited, answer questions of a technical nature and leave 
the Cabinet room (or committee room) before decisions are taken. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
Implementation in a crisis follows the characteristics described for policymaking 
in general and national security policymaking in particular. It is usual for <lecision-
makers and those analysing policy to think about the instruments they may use in 
implementation very early in the crisis. Implementation issues may even set the timing 
for the policy process at Limes, as it does with most military deployments because not 
all instruments are ready to use all the time. Implementation also continues throughout 
the process as leaders and diplomats test messages and reactions with protagonists, 
allies and other parties. These features of impJementalion are unlikely to change. 
The complexity experienced when two or more agencies are involved m 
implementation is also shown in crisis . The example of Konfrontasi, and the efforts to 
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create a unified approach to dealing with communism in Asia in the mid- to 
late-1950s144, shows how implementation can become more complex when agencies 
representing instruments disagree on a course of action, and how much easier 
implementation can be when they agree. Again, this characteristic is likely to be 
enduring. 
The proposed characteristics of implementation in a crisis are: 
• Implementation is considered throughout the policy cycle. 
• The more agencies involved, the more difficult implementation becomes. 
EVALUATION 
The final phase, Evaluation, shows significant continuity with other 
policymaking fields in that it is rare during or after a crisis in Australia. While two 
Royal Commissions were held into major aspects of the First World War, no similar 
enquiries were held after any of the other crises examined. Parliamentary enquiries, only 
a feature of Australian politics since 1970, had never examined policymaking in a crisis 
until 1999. No situations can be found where Cabinet ordered a review of policymaking 
processes in a crisis before 1999. 
These characteristics are unlikely to change since evaluation can expose the 
government, or individual ministers, to significant political risks. Given this, 
governments are unlikely to allow evaluation of their own perfo1mance in a crisis, and 
are likely to resist caJls for any type of enquiry by the Parliament or other body. Future 
governments may find resistance difficult, especially if judicial means are used for 
evaluation. 
The proposed characteristics of the evaluation phase in a crisis are: 
• Policy advice is not systemically evaluated. 
• If conducted at all, evaluation typically occurs after the policy has been 
implemented in full. 
Part II tests these characteristics through the seminal case of the East Timor 
crisis of 1999. This study adds depth and a degree of currency to the characteristics, and 
provides further reassurance that the characteristics identified can be applied to other 
instances where an Australian Government reacts to a national security crisis. 
144 See C Waters, 'A failure of imagination: R.G. Casey and Australian Plans for counter-subversion in 
Asia, 1954- 1956', Ausrralian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 3, l 999. 
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PART II 
TESTING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CRISIS 
POLICYMAKING IN AUSTRALIA: THE CASE OF EAST 
TIMOR, 1999 
Part II tests the proposed characteristics of crisis policymaking through the 
seminal case of East Timor in 1999. The part begins with a narrative of the case from 
the perspective of Australian Government policymakers in Canberra. Three 
subsequent chapters examine the proposed characteristics in greater detail. The first 
of these, Chapter 5, describes the early stages of the policy cycle involving issue 
identification, policy analysis and policy instruments. Chapter 6 looks at bringing 
policy together through consultation outside the Australian Government and 
coordination within it. The final chapter examines decision and the phases beyond-
implementation and evaluation-which complete the policy cycle. 
The examination of each policy phase uses the characteristics developed in 
Part I to provide the framework for discussion. Evidence will be assembled to support 
or refute each characteristic, and the conclusions will be used to modify these. The 
aim remains to develop a robust set of characteristics that can be used to help 
policymakers understand the nature of crisis policymaking in Australia. 
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A BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE EAST TIMOR 
CRISIS-THE VIEW FROM CANBERRA 
4 
'This is big' 
There have been a number of books pubJished about East Timor' s history 
during the period 1945-991, and this dissertation will not repeat those efforts. Instead, 
the main focus fall s on the seat of Australia's Government, Canberra, during the 
period after December 1998 when Prime Minister John Howard wrote to Indonesia's 
President BJ Habibie concerning the status of East Timor.2 This event represents the 
case's beginning as more Australian government agencies become increasingly 
involved in developing, and then managing, new policies concerning East Timor's 
future. The case study period concludes in late-October 1999, as this marked the 
transition from crisis policymaking to a 'steady state' of operations in Canberra. This 
steady state began when most ad hoc groups-established to manage or coordinate 
policy with regard to East Timor-were disbanded or incorporated into fom1al 
departmental and agency structures. 
Although December 1998 has been chosen to start this case study, it is 
important to recognise that the East Timor issue had taken an important place in the 
Australian policy agenda before this time, especially after Indonesia's President 
Soeharto was replaced by Habibie on 20 May 1998. 3 In one of his first major policy 
statements after assuming the presidency, Habibie announced that his government 
2 
For example, sec JG Taylor, Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timar, Pluto 
Press, Leichhardt, l 991. 
It should be noted that Howard made his first public appeal to Habibie on 26 May 1998. See 
R Rose, 'Howard Urges Habibic To Act On East Timor', West Australian, 26 May 1998, p. 4. 
While the fate of East Timor had been on Australia's political agenda since 1974, it did not have a 
impact upon Australian politics until 1997 with the start of the debate within the Australian Labor 
Party about East Timor policy that began in November-December 1997 (see A Burke, 'Labor 
Could Be Set For A Backflip on East Timor', Canberra Times, 22 December 1997). However, this 
change did not appear to have a significant effect upon policy until May 1998. Tt is also important 
to note that Australia was also engaged in East Timor on the official side before 1998, primarily 
through the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID), which had been involved 
in humanitarian and development projects in East Timor. 
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would consider granting 'special autonomy' to East Timor.4 Australian policymakers 
saw an opportunity to achieve three interwoven outcomes in these new conditions. 
The first and most important outcome desired by Australian policymakers in 
1998 was a better relationship with Indonesia. Perhaps more than any other single 
issue in recent times, Indonesia's conduct in East Timor had been viewed negatively 
by many in Australia and this had implications for the entire Australia-Indonesia 
relationship. From the Australian perspective, healing this 'running sore' was one way 
to correct this problem.5 
The second desired outcome was to see Indonesia's economy recover from the 
1997 economic crisis, while maintaining a degree of stability during its transition 
from dictatorship to democracy.6 At the time, Australia was concerned that instability 
in Indonesia would have a negative effect on Australia' s own prosperity, and saw 
assistance as a way of showing Australia's value as a friend in the region.7 Support for 
democratic change was less pronounced, perhaps because it implied criticism of the 
6 
7 
Habibie vaci llated over this poinL for a few days. Compare his posiLion as cited in D Greenlees, 
'Habibie rules ouL Timor referendum', Australian, 4 June 1998, Lo Lhc announcement reported by 
J Solomon, 'Habibie Offers East Timor Special Status', The Wall Street Journal Europe, 
IO June 1998. 
The difficulty caused to the bilaLeral Australia- Indonesia relationship by the ongoing conflict 
within Indonesia's East Timorese province is described in DeparLment of Defence, Australia's 
Strategic Policy, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1997, p. 22. ConLemporary analysis of 
the East Timor issue also stressed the irriLanL issue as a motive for Australian action in 1999 (see 
C Thayer, 'Australia-Indonesia Relations: The Case of EasL Timor', paper presenLed at the 
International Conference on Australia and East Asian Security into the 2 lst Century, Department 
of Diplomacy, NaLional Cheng Chi University Taipei, Taiwan, 8 October 1999, p. 4. The logic of 
'solving the running sore' is strongly critic ised by W Maley, 'Australia and the East Timor Ctisis: 
Some Critical Comments', Australian Journal of International Affairs, vol. 54, no. 2, 2000, 
p. 153 and p. 155, who finds the notion of brekaing the re lationship to fix it absurd; and J Cotton, 
East Timar, Australia and Regional Order: intervention and its aftermath in Southeast Asia, 
Routledge, London, 2004, p. 2 13. 
This point is made by Foreign Minister Downer, 'CEDA Luncheon Address', 20 July 2000, 
available http://www.dfat.gov.au, accessed 12 Apri l 2006. It was also mentioned as being 
' interwoven' with the issue of Australia's medium-term relationship with Indonesia in an interview 
with Dr Ashton Calvert, who was Secretary of Dr AT in 1999. 
Speeches such as A Downer, ' Indonesia's Challenges: How Australia Can Help', (paper presented 
at the International Conference on Indonesian Economic Stabilisation and Recovery, Australian 
National U niversity, Canberra, 23 November 1998, available http://www.foreignministc r.gov.au, 
accessed 12 Apri l 2006) and A Downer, 'Australia-Stability in !he Asia Pacific' (speech to the 
Harvard Club, New York, 8 June 1998, available http://www.fore ignminister.gov.au, accessed 
27 July 2007), which emphasise the economic imperatives of Australia's interests at this time. 
Downer used another speech in July 1998 to suggest changes that could be made to East Timor's 
relationship wi th Indonesia, which show how the Australian Government saw room to discuss 
Timor wi thout being accused of interference in Indonesia. See A Downer, ' A Long Term 
Commitment: Australia And East Asia', (speech to Lhe Indonesian Council on World Affairs and 
the Indonesia-Australia Business Council , Borobodur Hotel, Jakarta, 9 July 1998, available 
http://www.dfat.gov.au, accessed 12 April 2006). 
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former Indonesian president.8 The third outcome-and arguably lowest priority-was 
the desire to improve the humanitarian situation in East Timor, which was still a 
significantly underdeveloped province. Senior officials thought that a different 
political arrangement offered some chance of ending the guerilla conflict, and perhaps 
the opportunity to develop the economy and obtain more international aid.9 
While the most visible discussions about East Timor' s future were being 
conducted through the United Nations (UN)-Portugal-Indonesia 'Tripartite Talks,1°, 
Australian diplomats soon began consulting a number of influential Timorese about 
acceptable political arrangements. 11 Australia's internal policymaking process also 
increased in tempo. Foreign Minister Alexander Downer began taking weekly 
briefings on East Timor from June 199812 and a small, informal meeting of senior 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Department of Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (DPM&C) and Defence officials convened to discuss Australian policy 
options. 13 
Significant events occurred on other fronts. East Timor expe1ienced further 
violence in October and November 1998, which increased international attention on 
the situation. At the same time, the Tripartite Talks appeared to falter as Indonesian 
claims about troop withdrawals were discredited in the media14 and the parties found 







Downer, 'A Long Term Commitment'. 
Interview with Ashton Calvert and D Goldsworthy, 'East Timor,' in Goldsworthy and P Edwards 
(eds), Facing north: a century of Australian engagement with Asia, Melbourne University Press, 
Carlton, 2003, p. 225. 
These talks recommenced in June 1997. See A Alatas, The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic 
Struggle for East Timor, Aksara Karunia, Jakarta, 2006, Chapter 9, for an account of their progress 
to mid-1 998. 
The major efforts included those by Nick Warner, then First Assistant Secretary (FAS) Southeast 
Asia Division in DFAT to consul t identified East Timorese leaders, and by the Australian 
Ambassador to Indonesia, John McCarthy, who consulted the noted East Timorese resistance 
leader and future President, Xanana Gusmao (Department of roreign Affairs and Trade, East 
Timor in Transition 1998- 2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, Commonwealth o f Australia, 
Canberra, 200 I, pp. 26--7). 
Interview with Ashton Calvert. See also D Greenlees and R Garran, Deliverance: The Inside Story 
of East Timor's Fight for Freedom, Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2002, p. 80. 
Interview with Hugh White, who was Deputy Secretary Strategy in Defence in 1999. 
The 'shuffl ing' of Indonesian combat troops in East T imor was widely reported. See D Greenlees, 
'Leak shows no E Timor troop cuts', Australian, 30 October 1998, p. l ; and AusLralian Associated 
Press, 'Downer denies Aust intelligence wanting', AAP Information Services Pty Ltd, 
I November 1998. 
While Alatas argues that the talks were proceeding 'at an encouraging pace', they were suspended 
for a short time in November 1998 before an agreement was reached to recommence in January 
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Australia as new evidence about the killings of journalists at Balibo in 1975 was 
uncovered in October 1998.16 Finally, it became known to officials that the Australian 
Government wanted to develop an initiative to start their new term. Interview 052-06 
recalled how '... the government recognised that, to some extent, Indonesia was 
falling into a dangerous vacuum and Australia needed to express some views which 
would help, from our point of view, to crystallize the situation', although there was no 
agreed way forward among the major national security departments. 17 These 
conditions presented an opportunity for a policy initiative.18 
The exact form of the initiative came to be known as the 'Howard Letter' .19 It 
is almost certain, based on interviews with Hugh White, 051-06 and 032-05 (the latter 
being a senior officer in a key department in 1999) that the letter was developed by 
the Prime Minister's international adviser, Michael Thawley; Peter Varghese, then 
First Assistant Secretary in DPM&C; and Deputy Secretary of DFAT, John Dauth. 
The draft of the letter was discussed with the Secretary of DFA T Dr Ashton Calvert, a 
senior analyst from the Office of National Assessments (ONA), and the Ambassador 
in Jakarta, John McCarthy. The letter was then cleared through Prime Minister 
Howard and Foreign Minister Downer. 
Further knowledge of the letter probably extended only as far as the Secretary 
of DPM&C, Max Moore-Wilton and DFAT's Nick Warner.20 Some claim that the 
1999 (Alatas, pp. 145- 6). These difficulties are noted in the text of the Howard Letter and the 
analys is contained in Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition, p. 29 
and 3 I. See also NJ Wheeler an<l T Dunne, 'East Timor and the New Humanitarian Intervention', 
International Affairs, vol. 77, no. 4, 2001 , p. 8 12. 
16 s ee J Holmes, 'East Timor - Balibo: A Special Report', Foreign Correspondent, ABC Television 
17 
(Australia), 20 October 1998, available http://www.abc.net.au, accessed 21 January 2006). This 
report led to a re-opening of the Sherman Enquiry into the Balibo killings of 16 October 1975. 
This a trocity involved the murder of five Australian-based newsmen by Indonesian forces and 
some Timoresc militia. 
Hugh White recalls a discussion in June 1998 where the prospect of changing Australian policy to 
calling for an act of self-determination was discussed, bul 'no clear conclusion was reached ... in 
that discussion ' and the proposal was not raised again with Defence (H White, 'The Road to 
INTERFET: East Timor - 1999', unpublished paper, copy in author's possession, 2007, p . 2). 
18 Greenlees and Garran, pp. 84-5. The idea of 'opportunity' was expressed in interviews with 
Ashton Calvert and 064-07, a former ministerial staffer and government offic ial. 
19 The full text of the Howard Letter is reproduced in Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East 
Timor in Transition, pp. 181-2. 
20 Goldsworthy claims this letter was instigated by DFAT, through a ministerial submission on 
30 November 1999 (NAA, A9737, 921051 651 part 17, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 
'Ministerial Submission', 30 November I 999, c ited in Goldsworthy, 'East Timor', p. 227). It is 
more likely the text was drafted as stated above and presented formally to the foreign minister 
through this submission, so he could present it ' below the line' to NSCC on I December. 
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letter was discussed at the 1 December 1998 meeting of National Security Committee 
of Cabinet (NSCC)21 ; indeed, Howard is said to have grabbed Alexander Downer by 
the arm after the meeting and said 'This is big, this is very big.' 22 However, key 
officials within Defence and the Defence minister's office said they knew nothing 
about it.23 Given the limited circle of senior politicians and officials involved, it is not 
surprising that this initiative caught sections of the Australian national security policy 
community by surprise. 
The letter stressed Australia's respect for Indonesia's territorial integrity and 
continued sovereignty over East Timor, but it encouraged President Habibie to see 
East Timor as a political-that is, domestic-problem rather than as a foreign policy 
issue. This letter also recommended building a review mechanism into the autonomy 
package, similar to the 1988 Matignon Accords in New Caledonia, thus delaying a 
Timorese vote for independence by ten years at least.24 The Australian Government 
intended to deliver the letter directly and quietly to Habibie, so giving the Indonesian 
President the time and space to consider its proposals without external pressure.25 In 
total, this letter revised important elements of Australia' s position on East Timor's 







Interview wi th 052-06, a former senior government official with direct knowledge of the East 
Timor crisis. See also Greenlees and Garran, pp. 85- 6; Goldsworthy, 'East Timor', p. 221; and 
J Cotton, 'East Timor and Australia - Twenty- five years of the policy debate', in Cotton (ed), East 
Timar and Australia, Australian Defence Studies Centre/Australian Institute of International 
Affairs, Canberra, 2000, p. 13. 
Greenlees and Gar-ran, p. 86. 
Interviews with John Moore (Defence Minister in 1999), Paul Barratt (Secretary of the Department 
of Defence unti l August 1999) and Chris Barrie (Chief of the Defence Force in 1999), and Hugh 
White. Other well-placed interviewees who also claimed that the le tter caught Defence by surprise 
included Aldo Borgu (an adviser LO Defence Minister John Moore in 1999) and Allan Behm 
(Canberra, 5 May 2005). Behm was FAS International Policy in 1998 and FAS Strategic Policy 
and Plans in 1999- 2000. 
The 1988 Matignon Accords between France and the people of New Caledonia included 
provisions on legal status of citizens, customary law, land, devolution of powers, economic 
development and political representation. Most importantly, these accords allowed for a poll to 
determine whether the people of New Caledonia would convert 'citizenry into nationality' in 1998 
(Embassy of France in Australia, 'The Noumea Accord', no date, available 
http://www.ambafrance-au.org, accessed 28 December 2006). 
Interview with 051-06, who is a former senior government official with direct knowledge of the 
East Time r case. 
A DFAT submission described the policy suggestions contained in the letter as a 'major shift' (see 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and AusAID, Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade References Committee Inquiry into East Timor, Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade References Committee, Additional Information, vol. 5, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 1999, p. 046). Alatas agreed with that assessment, describing the leuer as an 
'unmistakable shift in I Australian I policy' (Alatas, p. 144). 
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However, that plan went awry almost inunediately as the letter's contents, 
particularly the reference it contained to the Matignon Accords (so comparing East 
Timor with a colonial situation), angered Habibie.27 Ultimately, however, this letter 
changed Habibie's thinking on East Timor in a substantive way about its future 
status.28 
The situation became difficult to control once the existence of the letter was 
leaked sometime in late-December 199829, even before the story of Howard's letter 
broke in the Australian press on 12 January 1999. This news story was followed 
quickly by an official statement that confirmed Australia's preference for ' an act of 
self-determination at some future time, following a substantial period of autonomy' .30 
On 27 January, Habibie consulted his Cabinet and decided to offer East Timor 
'regional autonomy plus' in a referendum. If that offer was rejected, his government 
would recommend that the Indonesian Parliament 'release East Timor from 
Indonesia' .31 
A developing situation 
The events and decisions of January 1999 sent the Australian national secmity 
policy conununity into overdrive. The meeting of the Strategic Policy Coordination 
Group (SPCG) on 15 January highlighted Defence's disappointment with the lack of 
internal consultation, and provided a negative prognosis for what might happen next. 




This reaction was reported by Australia's Ambassador, John McCarthy (Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, East Timar in Transition , p. 32) and recounted in Goldsworthy, 'East Timor', 
pp. 228- 9. See also K Polgaze, 'PM's Timor letter "angered Habibie"', The Canberra Times, 
3 November 1999, who quotes an interview with Alatas; a view repeated in Alatas, pp. 148-51. 
This is a lso how Tim Fischer, then Australia's deputy prime minister and a member of the NSCC, 
understood Habibie's reaction. 
Greenlees and Garran, pp. 89-95; and Alatas, p . 144. Goldsworthy notes other forces on Habibie's 
decision-making at the time, including pressure from the European Union, US Congress and 
influential Indonesians (Goldsworthy, 'East Timor', p. 230). 
Interview with 051 -06. Another interviewee (identity protected) confirmed the period of the leak, 
recalling that a journalist called to ask for background on the letter. Goldsworthy implies 
Indonesian officials were responsible for the leak (Goldsworthy, 'East Timor', p. 229). 
30 The story was reported in D Greenlees, ' Howard reverse on Timor' , Australian, 
12 January 1999; and A Downer, ' Australian Government Historic Policy Shift On East Timar', 
Media Release, 12 January 1999, available http://www.dfat.gov.au, accessed 12 January 2006. 
31 J Head, 'Rast Timor Breakthrough', BBC News (United Kingdom), 28 January 1999, available 
http://news.bbc.co.uk, accessed 20 January 2006, quoting Information Minister Yunus Yosfiah's 
announcement on 27 January. 
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Hugh White was very forthright, and questioned the DFAT representatives 
on the process and intentions of the letter. Hugh said something like 'Do 
you know what the f ... is going to happen?' They were taken aback at 
Hugh' s language and expression: 'Habibie is going to accept the offer, 
there will be a process of self-determination which the Indonesian military 
will resist, and the local militias will be the tool they will resist it with, and 
we will end up with the ADF [Australian Defence Force] on the ground 
between the Indonesians and the East Timorese. We could well end up 
with body bags coming back to Australia.' It was an extremely strong 
event.32 
Other agencies m Canberra were also working to prepare information on 
Australia's options by late January. Defence intelligence was providing analysis of the 
situation in East Timor and Indonesia, including reports that pointed to Indonesian 
military support for militia violence.33 Defence's Strategic Operations Division 
produced a paper that explained what forces might be needed to conduct different 
types of missions, ranging from small observer missions to larger, combat-capable 
forces.34 Other work was undertaken within Defence to examine the state of ADF 
readiness and the costs involved in preparing air and naval assets and another brigade 
group (of around 3500 people) for possible contingencies. While the potential for 
strife in East Timor was a factor, this planning seemed especially prudent given the 
ongoing problems of instability and unrest across the northern archipelago, including 
in Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and Bougainville, and sporadic violence in 
Indonesia in 1997 and 1998.35 The proposal for increased readiness was made at the 
February 1999 meeting of the NSCC, and subsequently announced on 11 March.36 
DFAT was also busy. Aside from increased consultation with both Indonesian 







Interview with Rear Admiral Pe te r Briggs, who was Head, Strategic Operations Division in 
Defence from early 1997 to May 1999. 
DJ Ball, 'Silent Witness: Australian Intelligence and East Timor', in Ball, J Dunn, G van Klinken, 
D Bourehier, D Kammen and R Tanter (eds), Masters of Terror: Indonesia's Military and the 
Violence in East Timor in 1999, Canberra Paper 145, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 
Canherra,2002,pp. 246- 7. 
Interviews with John Moore, Allan Behm and 035-05 (Canberra, 14 October 2005, identity 
protected). 
Interview with Chris Barrie. 
Interviews with John Moore, Chris Barrie, 051-06 and Aldo Borgu. It interesting to note that the 
increased readiness wa attributed to savings from the Defence Reform Program- see Defence 
Public Affairs, 'The Hon J Moore, Progress on the Implementation of the Defence Reform 
Program', Media Release 067/99, Canberra, 11 March 1999. 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and AusAID, Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade References Committee inquiry into East Timor, p. 047. 
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other countries included specific discussions about East Timor. In one example, 
Ashton Calvert visited Washington to consult the US Assistant Secretary of State, 
Stanley Roth. DFAT also established its own policy unit, headed by Nick Warner and 
managed by Chris Moraitis, to coordinate the diplomatic aspects of national policy. 
DPM&C also began to look more closely at the issue. Having taken a leading 
role in drafting the Howard Letter, it left most of lhe subsequent policy development 
work to 'implementation departments' like DFAT and Defence. Its focus remained on 
keeping the prime minister informed of developments and ensuring that agency 
activity was coordinated.38 
There was, however, a significant divergence of opinion between DFAT and 
Defence about what Australia should be doing. DFAT argued that the Indonesians 
were responsible for security; they were keen to avoid the perception that Australia 
was making military preparations to intervene in East Timor.39 To this way of 
thinking, such a perception could create tension with Indonesia, or allow others to 
assume that Australia would take the lead and 'bankroll' the process.40 A perception 
such as this may also discourage the Indonesians and Timorese from coming to their 
own compromises about the process.41 Others saw a danger in being proactive, 
thinking overt pressure on the Indonesians or clearly visible defence preparations may 
force Habibie to renege on the consultation plan.42 
On the other hand, Defence visualised multiple scenarios that could occur in 
the region, and East Timor in particular, ranging from a monitoring mission up to the 
need to conduct an evacuation protected by ADF troops.43 As mentioned earlier, the 
NSCC identified a need to increase force readiness to ensure that the ADF would be 
38 Interview with 052-06. 
39 This position was expressed in the leaked cable from Calvert to Roth, and was supported by 
interviews with Hugh White and 012-05 (Canberra, 30 June 2005), who is an official with direct 
knowledge of the East Timor ballot. Maley also makes note of DFAT's adherence to this position, 
sec Maley, 'Australia and the East Timor Crisis', pp. 155-8. 
40 According to Carl Thayer, this view was expressed by Peter Varghese, FAS International Division 
in DPM&C. Thayer docs not state his source or the remarks' context. See Thayer, 'Australia-




This reason was attributed to a DPM&C official, and is criticised by William Maley ('Australia 
and the East Timor Crisis', p. 157). It is not inconceivable to think that a 'Machiavellian' East 
Timorese element may see advantage in acting so to inflame tensions and encourage foreign 
intervention. 
Interview with Tim Fischer. 
Interview with Air Vice-Marshal Bob Treloar, by telephone, 4 November 2005. Air Vice-Marshal 
Treloar was appointed Commander Austral ian Theatre in May 1999. 
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m a position to respond to a maJor cns1s, while being prepared for a separate, 
additional contingency should one occur. These preparations required the overt 
movement of troops and equipment, increased training and increased spending on 
logistic support- activities that are difficult to hide and would be difficult to attribute 
to anything other than preparations for East Timor in the prevailing climate. There 
would also be a need to engage potential coalition contributors and the United States 
to ensure that Australia had international support and appropriate capabilities to 
conduct an operation offshore.44 The Defence minister decided (after consultation 
with the prime minister) to ignore DFAT's concern and agree to Admiral Chris 
Barrie's (Australian Chief of the Defence Force- CDF), recommendation to go ahead 
with readiness planning and consultation with US Pacific Command (USPACOM). 
This was fortunate because it took nearly five months to prepare a second brigade 
group for peacekeeping operations.45 
Defence also took the step of appointing Brigadier Mike Smith to manage part 
of its input to the East Timor policy process. Given the title 'Director General East 
Timor' (DGET), he reported directly to the CDF through the Deputy Secretary 
Strategy and Intelligence (Hugh White). While the initial thinking was for DGET to 
focus on the relationship with Indonesia, it was eventually decided to use Smith to 
develop an understanding of the United Nations and its processes. Brigadier Smith 
would also be made available to command a UN peacekeeping force if one was 
required in East Tirnor, even though the idea of an intervention force (what became 
INTERFET) was still not being contemplated.46 This proved to be a worthwhile 
foresight when the time came to work with the United Nations on the eventual 
peacekeeping operation.47 
44 Interview with 052-06. 
45 Interview with John Moore and Allan Behm. The second brigade group was declared ready by the 
end of June (see R Carran, 'The military masses for its biggest march in 30 years', Australian, 
3 July 1999, p. 7). 
46 Interview 007-05, Canberra 17 June 2005. Interview 007-05 is a former senior ADF offi cer who 
was closely involved with Defence planning for East Timor, including knowledge of liaison 
activities with the United Nations. 
47 After the post-ballot violence, Smith was promoted to Major General and deployed lO New York 
(for four months) where he and his smal l team assisted the Military Planning Staff in DPKO in 
preparing for the transition from INTERFET to a UN peacekeeping force (PKF). This team 
subsequently deployed to Dili in late 1999 as the advance party for the PKF, and Smith was 
appoimed as the Deputy Force Corrunander of the PKF in December. 
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Brigadier Smith established himself in a key position linking, in part, 
Defence, DFAT and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at the United 
Nations. This 'small office' approach was selected by Defence because there was an 
imperative to protect information about Australia's intentions. There was also a need 
to avoid agitating the Indonesians, and probably DFAT, by creating a new, large 
policy and planning organisation. The small office also allowed Brigadier Smith to 
move nimbly between different organisations and ensure a single ADF view was 
presented to key stakeholders.48 
Other agencies were involved m planning. In addition to its mission of 
organising aid, AusAID (the Australian Agency for International Development) was 
tasked by the foreign minister to conduct an assessment of the humanitarian situation 
in East Timor and investigate claims that Indonesian officials were preventing food 
from moving around the province. 49 The Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) was 
asked to provide advice on electoral methods, draft an election manual and directions, 
and advise on whether Australia could provide further support to the popular 
consultation process. 50 
Activities by the United Nations also involved the Australian Government. In 
late March, a UN assessment mission visited Jakarta, East Timor and Canberra to 
scope the requirements for the proposed referendum. The Australian Government saw 
this visit as an opportunity to influence the UN team's thinking on East Timor.51 This 
meeting was soon followed by a delegation to UN Headquarters in New York, led by 






Interviews with Chris Barrie, Kerry Clarke (Canberra, 2 August 2005); 007-05 and Mr Matthew 
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Operations in Strategic Operations Division in 1998-9. Mr Skoien was Director Indonesia Section 
in International Policy Division in Defence from December 1998 to September 1999. 
Interview with Steve Darvill (Canberra, 5 July 2005) who said the April 1999 assessment 
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party. Darvill was involved in operational planning as part of AusAID's Humanitarian 
Emergencies section in 1999. For the text of the fact-finding mjssion's report, see AusAJD, Report 
of the AusAID Fact-Finding Mission to East Timar, 10- 20 March 1999, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 1999. 
Interview with 012-05 and Australian Electoral Commission, Submission to the Senate Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee: Australian Electoral Commission Support for 
the East Timar Consultation Ballot, Canberra, 1999, pp. 2-3. 
Interviews with Hugh White and 012-05. 
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Other diplomatic initiatives were underway. Closer to home, Prime Minister 
Howard requested a summit with President Habibie to discuss the security situation 
after violence occurred in Liqui9a on 6 April and Dili on 17 April. 53 At this meeting, 
Howard sought- gently and unsuccessfully-to obtain Indonesian acquiescence for 
an international peacekeeping force. He had to settle for an increase in the number of 
police advisors within what was to become the United Nations Mission in East Timor 
(UNAMET), and for permission to open an Australian consulate in Dili.54 
A new committee was added to the interdepartmental policymaking structure 
in mid-April 1999. Led by Bill Paterson, an assistant secretary in DPM&C, this semi-
formal grouping met fortnightly from 16 April to discuss issues of day-to-day 
importance between the departments and discuss 'options and implications' .55 This 
meeting included relatively senior representatives (assistant secretary-level) from 
DFAT, Defence, AusAID, the Australian Federal Police (AFP), AEC, and the ONA. 
The main agenda items at each meeting included updates on the situation in East 
Timor and overseas, and briefings on each agency' s activities. Representatives also 
had the opportunity to discuss issues such as funding, Australian capabilities and 
interaction with the United Nations. The topics broadened later, as these meetings 
began to focus on Australian support for the popular consultation. The group never 
considered issues concerning military operations, such as the evacuation. 56 
Much of the Paterson committee's work was, therefore, process oriented: it 
provided a chance for representatives to identify issues that would be discussed at 
forthcoming meetings by more senior committees such as SPCG and NSCC, and 
coordinate the timing and content of submissions. Interestingly, the early meetings 





Interview 052-06 described the re la1ionship between the Australian Government and President 
Habibie as 'quite testy' during this time, which meant !he timing of the meeting was up to Habibie. 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition, pp. 78- 81. By the time of the 
summit, Australian policymakers had already come to the conclusion that Habibie could not agree 
to peacekeepers (interviews with Ashton Calvert and Hugh White). Therefore, Prime Minister 
Howard is not likely to have pushed too hard for peacekeepers in his 90-minute private meeting 
with President Habibic. Further, Interview 052-06 did not think Habibie's ability to carry 
agreements with the Army and his rninisters was assured either. Interview 051-06 also expressed 
the concern that the military might throw Habibie out if he gave way on military peacekeepers in 
April. See also Alatas, p. 173. 
Interviews with 052-05, Matt Skoien and 0 12-05. 
Interviews with 01 2-05, Kerry Clarke, 020-05 (by telephone, 11 August 2005) and 035-05. 
Interview 020-05 is a former senior member o f DPM&C with direct knowledge of the East Timor 
case. 
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little part in the detailed planning thus far.57 It also provided another channel-in 
addition to contacts between departments and the existing working groups- to 
improve coordination at lower levels. 58 
By the end of April, in terms of establishing the mechanisms for handling the 
emerging crisis in East Timor, Australian policymakers had moved from being 
concerned observers to active participants. For one, Australia had undertaken a range 
of significant meetings with United States, United Nations, Indonesia, Portugal and 
representatives from East Timor either to shape those groups or seek their support. 
Next, a range of government agencies-including the ADF, the intelligence 
community59, the AEC and AusAID- began preparations to provide services or 
options to government. DFAT had also been in contact with the Indonesian 
Government to, among other things, lobby for pennission to open a consulate in 
Dili.60 Thirdly, interdepartmental interaction became more formalised at lower levels, 
with Paterson's committee being established to improve information sharing between 
different agencies. Interaction was also facilitated by standing invitations to meetings 
(such as Defence's East Timor Working Group), joint delegations and individual 
consultations between officials. 
However, there was also 'a sense [among policymakers] that events were 
getting out of control' .61 The Indonesian army (in Indonesian, Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia, or TNI) was being blamed for supporting militia violence in East Timor by 
the media and witnesses who had been in East Timor.62 Given the TNI's importance 
to securing the next phase of the crisis, this development was disconcerting for many 
of those watching the unfolding events. 
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planned to deliver A$6 million in aid in Financial Year 1998-99-see Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade Committee, Consideration of Additional Estimates (Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade), 11 February 1999, p. 240; and Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References 
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Organising for the consultation 
The period of the UNAMET mission, starting with the May 5 Agreement and 
ending with the declaration of the consultation results on 4 September, marked the 
next phase of the crisis. 
Once the May 5 Agreement was announced, more agencies, notably the AFP, 
became involved in the Australian response. AusAID began to fund Australian 
agencies to prepare for, and then participate in, UNAMET activities. Australia also 
agreed to provide A$20 million in cash and ' in kind' support so the operation could 
commence quickly.63 
Events started to move at pace once the UN Security Council approved 
Resolution 1246 to establish UNAMET on 11 June 1999.64 Just prior to the 
63 Testimony by Mr John Dauth of DFAT in Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References 
Committee, Economic, social and political conditions in East Timor, 13 August 1999, p. 220. 
64 This resolution provided a mandate to 'organize and conduct a popular consultation to determine 
whether the people of East Timor accepted or rejected the Indonesian proposal to grant special 
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resolution, the first group of UNAMET staff and a small number of AFP officers 
arrived in Dili. Within a week the Australian contingent to UNAMET had grown to 
nearly 50 police and six military liaison officers, and voter registration started within 
four weeks. However, this process was maffed by violence and intimidation within 
East Timor, to the point where some already doubted this would be a 'free and fair 
election' .65 
Activity at the AFP was intense during this period, with the main activities-
outside the normal anti-crime operations66-revolving around monitoring the 
operation and preparing the next rotation: 
There were a range of other issues-whether the security situation was getting 
better, and secondly, our capacity to actually rotate people through. The three 
month deployment meant we were advertising for the next group while we 
were still training a group to go ... We had to move to bringing state and 
territory police in then as AFP secondees to build our capacity.67 
The AFP was also involved in frequent meetings with other departments, and 
regularly attended DFAT meetings (and eventually, the task force formed to manage 
consular matters) to provide advice on operational matters during the deployment. 
Defence managed one particularly sensitive diplomatic issue in this period, 
when the Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF) Air Marshal Doug Riding and 
First Assistant Secretary Strategic Policy Ailan Behm were dispatched to Jakarta on 
21 June. This delegation was instigated by a Cabinet decision,68 and a tightly-worded 
script was developed by the ONA and DFAT that was written to protect the sources 
used. Riding's task was to inform senior TNI officers-including Generals Sugiono 
65 
autonomy Lo the territory, or fail ing that, 'separation from the stale of Indonesia' (United Nations, 
'UNTAMET Fact Sheet', 1999, available http://www.un.org, accessed 24 November 2007). 
See C Scheiner, ' Grassroots in the Field-Observing the East Timor Consultation ' , in R Tanter, 
M Selden and S Shalom (eds), Bitter Flowers, Sweet Flowers: East Timar, Indonesia and the 
World Community, Rowman and Littlefie ld, Lanham, 2001 , pp. 11 5- 18. 
66 Interviews with Assistant Commission Adrien Whiddett (Canberra, 29 June 2005) and Assistant 
Commissioner Andrew Hughes (Suva, 9 September 2005) both noted their involvement in a range 
of normal policing issues, which meant the East Timor operation was a major additional task for 
them. Assistant Commissioner Whiddett was responsible for Australian Federal Police Operations 
in 1999, and Assistant Commissioner Hughes was Director International and Operations for the 
67 
68 
AFP in 1999. 
Interview with Federal AgcnL Tim Dahlstrom, CanbeITa, 16 August 2005. Federal Agent 
Dahlstrom was member o f the UN and Other Overseas Commitments Coordination team for AFP 
in 1999. As part o f this team, he was responsible for the deta iled planning of AFP's involvement 
(especially contingent preparation) in East Timor. 
Goldsworthy, 'East Timor', p. 241 . 
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and Yudhoyono-that Australia had detected evidence of the Indonesian Army's 
involvement in equipping and directing a number of existing civil defence units and 
newly-formed militias to intimidate the East Timorese people.69 It was a blunt, but 
diplomatically-conducted conversation between 'close military partner[s]' ,70 although 
not one that had much influence.71 The Indonesian view of the security situation was 
far different, and General Yudhoyono represented strongly for TNI's neutrality.72 
Further meetings were conducted with the Indonesian Government and with key East 
Timorese to convince them to maintain their promises about security before and after 
the ballot.73 
By August, activity levels in other parts of Canberra appeared to decline from 
the levels of March and April. With UNAMET now in its implementation phase, 
some of the policy attention began to turn to encouraging Southeast Asian nations to 
be more active in the process, and to maintaining a close liaison with the United 
States.74 Defence also attempted to solve a number of important logistic issues and 
prepared contingencies for an evacuation. 
This focus on Canberra is not intended to neglect the very real bravery and 
skill of UNAMET and the East Timorese people themselves. UNAMET's overall 
success in fulfilling its mandate is a testimony to the qualities of those involved. That 
the consultation delivered a fair reflection of the East Timorese peoples' will served to 
reinforce the shock felt by many- but expected by others-when serious violence 
erupted in Dili and other parts of East Timor on 4 September. 
69 Interviews with Allan Behm, Kerry Clarke and 046-06, a senior ADF officer with direct 
knowledge of the East Timor case. See also J Lyons, 'The Secret East Timor Dossier', Bulletin, 
12 October 1999, p. 25 ; P Daley, 'Gunning for the General ', Bulletin, 30 June 2004; and Ball , 
'Silent Witness'. Greenlees and Ganan reproduced some of Riding's script in their book (see 
pp. 167-8). Interview 046-06 is a former senior ADF officer with direct knowledge o f the East 
Timor case. General Sugiono was TNl's Chie f of Staff for General Affairs and General 
Yudhoyono was Chief of Staff for Territorial Affairs in 1999. 
70 Greenlees and Garran, p. 167 and p. 168. 
7 1 Interview 046-06. 
72 Interview with Allan Behm, and Greenlees and Garran, p. 168. 
73 See Goldsworthy, 'East Timor' , p. 242- 3; and M Riley, 'UN Backs Downer Plan to Beef Up 
Timor Force ', Sydney Morning Herald, 6 August 1999, p. l . 
74 Matt Skoien and Interview 062-07 (Canberra, 29 June 2007) described a number of meetings with 
US military offic ials from USP ACOM. Interview 062-07 is an ADF officer with knowledge of the 
East Timor case, including knowledge of planning for UNAMET, INTERFET and UNTAET. 
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Acute crisis and response 
Once the extent and severity of violence became known, the plan to evacuate 
UNAMET personnel from East Timor (Operation SPITFIRE) commenced75, 
contingency planning for a peace operation began, and intense lobbying was 
conducted to muster support for an international coalition. It was also clear that UN 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan did not believe that the Indonesian military could 
maintain control of the situation. This concern resulted in a phone call to Howard on 
6 September, and a query as to whether Australia would be prepared to lead a force 
into East Timor if invited to do so by the Indonesians and the UN Security Council. 
According to accounts, the prime minister readily agreed.76 
These events led to activities at many levels within the Australian 
Government. Crucially, the prime minister and foreign minister were lobbying their 
counterpai1s in the region for support-a task helped by having many regional leaders 
75 I 500 UN and other personnel were evacuated in the period 3-14 September 1999 (Defence Public 
Affairs, 'Hon. John Moore - East Timor Update', MIN 271/99, 14 September 1999, available 
http://www.minister.defence.gov.au, accessed 12 December 2007). 
76 Ashton Calvert said that Australia made a 'realistic assumption' about who was both best placed 
and willing to lead a collation. See also Department of Fore ign Affairs and Tracie, East Timor in 
Transition, p. 133; Greenlees and Garran, p. 238; and Goldsworthy, 'East Timor', p. 248. 
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meeting together at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting m Auckland 
during 9-12 September.77 Howard was also dealing directly with Annan on a frequent 
basis.78 At the diplomatic level, DFAT-often with direct assistance from Defence-
worked to gather support for the mandate at the United Nations and among Southeast 
Asian states. Getting the appropriate mandate for the mission was an essential task, as 
the Australian Government wanted to conduct this operation under Chapter VII of the 
UN Charter so it would not be a 'helpless bystander when violence broke out between 
factions on the ground' .79 
Yet getting authorisation for the intervention was not complete, as Indonesia 
still needed to acquiesce before the UN would even consider a mandate. Once again, 
pressure was applied to President Habibie and other Indonesian leaders from a variety 
of sources, including Kofi Annan, ambassadors representing the UN Security Council, 
US President Clinton and, indirectly, from the World Bank.80 Despite this effort, 
Habibie did not change his mind until 12 September. 
At this stage, international military preparations became overt but the size, 
leadership and role of such a force was still to be finalised. It was, however, certain 
that the United Nations would be unable to raise and deploy a force quickly-it would 
need at least five months to do so.81 Australia confirmed its willingness to lead the 
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Significant planning for operations m East Timor had been conducted by 
USPACOM in 1999, but this assumed US leadership of the peacekeeping force.82 
This assumption was out of step with the Washington-based political and military 
leadership, and so of limited utility when the crisis broke. The ADF had also 
conducted its own planning, but this was for a protected evacuation (Operation 
SPITFIRE). The evacuation task was quantitatively different in terms of size, logistic 
needs and the potential duration of the operation from that required for a large-scale 
intervention. This meant rapid planning was needed to design, prepare and deploy 
INTERFET. 83 
Any one of the three main tasks presented to Defence and the ADF in early 
September-the evacuation, deploying Australian troops overseas, and developing a 
coalition- would have been demanding on its own. When the three came together 
under conditions of tight poJitical and media scrutiny, Defence soon found its nonnal 
working structures to be both overwhelmed and insufficient to manage the crisis.84 
Defence responded to the increased demands for policy advice and 
coordination in three ways. The first was to make the Strategic Command Grnup 
(SCG) more responsive to the CDF's needs by increasing the frequency of its 
meetings and expanding its membership. This meant the SCG began meeting daily 
(and sometimes twice daily) in September, at a time that allowed the CDF Admiral 
Chris Barrie and Acting Secretary Hugh White to brief the Defence minister before 




Interviews with Lieutenant General Earl Hails ton, USMC (by telephone, 28 March 2006), and 
Lieutenant General John Castellaw, USMC (by te lephone, 14 February 2006). General Hailston 
was the lead planner (J5) for USPACOM until 31 May 99. He moved to Command Ill Marine 
Expeditionary Force in June and became responsible for deploying II1 Marine Expeditionary 
Brigade to East Timor in September 1999. General Castellaw was the commander of llI Marine 
Expeditionary Brigade in 1999 and deployed to East Timor. In his interview, General Hailston 
recalled being directed to prepare a contingency for East Timor by the Commander USPACOM, 
Admiral Denis Blair, in June 1999. The resulting plan included options for a US-only task force, 
and a coalition task force. This recollectio n of US planning is consistent with another well-placed 
interviewee and some press reporting of the time: sec P Daley, 'Timor: We Snub Offer To Send In 
The Marines', Sunday Age, l August 1999, p. l. However, this planning has been downp layed by 
some interviewees and described as the normal activities of military forces. 
Couon also draws this conclusion from his evidence (East Timar, Australia and Regional Order, 
p. 11 6). 
The actual conduct of Operation SPITflRE (the evacuation) and Operation STABILISE (the 
deployment of INTERFET) are described in B Breen, Mission Accomplished-East Timar, 
Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2000); and A Ryan, Primary responsibilities and primmy risks: 
Australian Defence Force participation in the International Force East Timar, Land Warfare 
Studies Centre, Duntroon, 2000, pp. 68- 76. 
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The expanded membership was also important to making the SCG more 
effective. By September, the Canberra-based group was joined by the Commander 
Australia Theatre, Air Vice-Marshal Bob Treloar, and his four component 
commanders by video-link from Sydney. This link allowed the most senior 
operational commanders to hear what the strategic leadership was saying about events 
and intentions. In addition, representatives from the Defence minister's office and 
DFA T were sometimes present. This went some of the way to ensure that information 
could be passed first-hand, and that different views were available at the meeting. 
Such representation was also important, according to ministerial adviser Aldo Borgu: 
... so they could get a sense of what the minister was thinking on different 
issues, and I could report back to the minister in terms of the particular things 
and the logic behind the things they were looking at.85 
Defence's second response was to create two new policy groups to deal with 
the crisis. The first, known as the 'East Timor Policy Unit' (ETPU) was created to 
85 Interview wi th Aldo Borgu . 
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focus Defence's policy work into a dedicated organisation. Under the circumstances, 
it made sense to pool expertise to deal with the increased volume of work. 
Centralisation near the senior decision-makers would also cut down on the time taken 
to deliver that advice and make the group more responsive: 
Basically, we needed our own mini-SPCG. We needed someone to pull all of 
this disparate stuff together, to ask some hard questions about things that had 
not been thought of, and provide a bit of focus. Asking desk people to do that 
on top of the day-to-day [is a little much]. So there comes a time when you 
have to say, 'hang on, this is not going to do it and I need someone full time 
on this'.86 
Others pointed the need to create a stronger basis for coordinating policy 
advice than could be achieved through the normal structure.87 Not coincidentally, 
ETPU also provided a way of reducing the number of people in Defence who needed 
to know about the operation, and so helped to control leaks. 88 
It was also clear that such a group would need to sustain a high work tempo 
for a considerable period of time. In anticipation of this, Mike Scrafton was appointed 
to lead ETPU and Peter Jennings was appointed as his deputy on 7 September. Both 
were promoted to First Assistant Secretary so the unit could operate on a twenty-four 
hour-a-day basis. Having an official of this rank available also meant there would be 
'someone senior enough to be there to talk to senior people around the place at any 
point in time, and to make the right judgement calls . . . '.89 At its height, ETPU was a 
group of about twelve policy officers from various parts of the department, including 
the Defence Intelligence Organisation, International Policy, Strategic Policy, Defence 
Public Affairs and the uniformed services. ETPU's role was cloudy at first, but it soon 
began to provide a new link between senior Defence management, other departments 
and the ministers' offices. Its role became clearer as the intervention approached and 
86 Interview wi th Chris Barrie. 
87 Interviews with Martin Brady (Canberra, 16 August 2005), 009-05 (Canberra, 20 June 2005) and 
Michael Scrafton (Melbourne, 5 August 2005). Mr Brady was Director, Defence Signals 
Directorate in 1999, and was acting Deputy Secretary Strategy in August-September 1999. 
Interview 009-05 is a former ministerial adviser and senior Defence official. Mr Scrafton was 
Assistant Secre tary Regional Engagement, Policy and Programs al the start of 1999. He became 
Acting Head International Policy in August 1999, and was appointed to head ETPU in September 
I 999. He was also Defence's representati ve on the Taylor Committee. 
88 Interview with Chris Barrie. 
89 Interview with Michael Scrafton. 
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other whole-of-government mechanisms were established to manage the crisis, such 
as the 'Taylor Committee' (described below).90 
The task of assembling a multinational military coalition was complex, 
sensitive and-given the pressing operational tasks that needed to be monitored-
beyond the capacity of Defence's Strategic Command Division (SCD) to manage:91 
The big thing that got our attention was having to form a coalition. We hadn't 
put anything into that and ... [we} did not have the brain space to be able to do 
that ... it was probably one of the biggest learning curves we had ... 92 
As a result of this new need, the CDF created a second organisation within 
Strategic Command Division called INTERFET Branch to act as a 'strategic coalition 
manager' .93 Once again, the main task of INTERFET Branch was not immediately 
clear, nor was there established doctrine for how to manage this delicate process-but 
these shortfalls were quickly addressed in discussions between Defence and DFA T. 
The process to get a contribution actually deployed in East Timor was 
sometimes lengthy. At the start, INTERFET Branch provided advice about the forces 
needed so that DFAT and the ETPU could canvass possible contributors. Once 
interest was signaled by a government (or their embassy), TNTERFET Branch 
provided operational information to military attaches through daily briefings.94 If the 
relationship progressed to an in-principle agreement to contribute, the next step 
involved the branch and DFAT negotiating the role, size and deployment timings for 
the contingent. INTERFET Branch also conducted extensive liaison on behalf of 
contributing nations with other Strategic Command Division planners on logistic 
issues like personnel and health policy. Once a commitment was made, INTERFET 
Branch assumed management responsibility for the contribution from DFAT, and 
maintained a link with the representatives of troop contributing nations in Australia 
throughout the operation. This also included working with Headquarters Australian 
90 Interviews with Michael Scrafton and Matthew Skoien. 
91 The normal staff o f Strategic Command Division was about 30-35 ADF officers (Interview with 
Major General Michael Keating, who became Head of Strategic Operations Division in Defence in 
May 1999. 
92 Interview with Kerry Clarke. 
93 Interviews with Brigadier Steve Ayling (Canberra, 14 April 2005) and Kerry Clarke. Brigadier 
Ayling was Director General INTERFET Branch in 1999. This branch was responsible for 
managing contributions to the INTERFET coalition. 
94 A Ryan, p. 60-1. 
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Theatre to manage contingents during their pre-deployment training in Australia prior 
to their actual deployment to East Timor. 
Defence's third response involved obtaining support for INTERFET through 
direct and indirect representations to regional govemments.95 One aspect of this effort 
involved sending the VCDF, Air Marshal Riding, on a rapid tour of the region to 
solicit troop contributions for INTERFET. Building upon the discussions between 
Howard and regional leaders at the Auckland APEC meeting, Riding and a team of 
three staff officers set out to conduct detailed discussions in Malaysia, Singapore, 
Thailand, the Philippines and Brunei. The visit started poorly when the Malaysian 
Government changed its mind about contributing to INTERFET and Singapore 
offered a much smaller group than anticipated.96 The mission was not looking 
promising at that stage: one interviewee recalled: 'We were batting 0 from 2, and we 
did not think the Thais were going to make a big contribution' .97 However, an early 
promise from the Philippines Government and a positive decision by the Thais 
demonstrated regional support for INTERFET, and secured important military 
capabilities.98 
Another aspect of supporting INTERFET involved the very practical issue of 
financial management. UN operations are often characterised by their torturous 
financial process, arguments over funding responsibilities and long waits for 
reimbursement.99 Australia sought to short-circuit similar problems by agreeing to 






Interview 046-06 was also keen to point out DFAT's important contribution, especially that by 
Australia 's regional ambassadors and their staff. 
Having just promised to increase the number of pol ice and observers for UNAMET, the Malaysian 
Defense Minister Ahang Abu Bakar Mustapha was quoted as saying that Malaysia was ready to 
contribute forces to a peacekeeping force in East Timor (see Associated Press newswires, 'Report: 
Malaysia ready to send peacekeeping troops to Hast 'J'imor', 6 September 1999). Some in Riding's 
party thought that Malays ia might make a sizable contribution (perhaps an infantry battalion and a 
command clement) and were surprised when the decision to make only a token contribution was 
relayed to them by Malaysian officials-Interviews with 046-06 and Matthew Skoien (who 
accompanied Riding on the tour); and Ryan, p. 47. 
Interview with Matthew Skoien. 
Interviews with 046-06 and Mauhew Skoien. The team cancelled the visit to Brunei because the 
Bruneian Government sent word of their decision not to commit troops beforehand. The Chief of 
AJmy, Lieutenant General Frank Hickling, also used a conference of Pacific Army commanders in 
Singapore on 5-8 September to develop a better understanding of regional perceptions of the issue 
and present Australia's views on East Timor. 
For a summary of the main financial issues concerning UN peace operations, see J Daudelin and 
LJM Seymour. 'Peace Operat ions Fi nance and the Political Economy of a Way Out', International 
Peacekeeping, vol. 9, no. 2, 2002, pp. 100---1 . 
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and underwrote death and disability compensation for some contingents. The use of 
Australian funds, and the capacity to absorb some costs in the short term, played an 
important role in reducing the risk to a few contributing nations and increasing their 
willingness to participate. 100 
The rapid increase in workload experienced at Defence was mirrored at the 
national level. The NSCC began meeting almost every day, with a sole focus on the 
cdsis and emerging response. The effect of the frequency and high-level composition 
of these meetings will be discussed later in this dissertation. 
Despite the increased interaction with officials, the prime minister-probably 
on the recommendation of Max Moore-Wilton or Michael Thawley-directed Allan 
Taylor (a former deputy secretary in DPM&C and then Director General of the 
Australian Secret Intelligence Service, ASIS) to form a new body to help coordinate 
national policy and report on policy development to the NSCC. This ad hoc body 
consisted of two components. The first comprised a small secretariat of middle-
ranking (Executive Level l and 2 or their military equivalent) officials seconded from 
DFAT, Defence, Immigration, AusAID and DPM&C. 101 The second group contained 
more senior officials representing their departments and agencies at daily committee 
meetings. 102 
The decision to establish the Taylor Committee reflected the prime minister's 
desire to streamline policy advice and a level of concern about interdepartmental 
coordination. However, when interviewees were asked for explanations for the new 
committee, they offered a variety of responses. Some thought the NSCC wanted to 
ensure that neither Defence nor DFAT became the lead agency, fearing this would 
skew Australia' s responses towards these department's favoured instruments. Others 
thought a new body was needed because DFAT lacked the authority to coordinate the 
other departments, and Defence lacked the capability to do so. Another thought the 
100 Brigadier S Ayling and S Guise, 'UNTAC and CNTERFET - A Comparative Analysis ', Australian 
Defence Force Journal, no. 150, 2001 , p. 5 1; and A Ryan, pp. 43-5. The issue o f fina nce will be 
discussed in more detail during the 'Policy Instruments' phase. 
101 
102 
The secretariat was also referred to as a 'task group ', so the Taylor Committee was also known as 
the 'East Timor Task Group' by some. 
Attendees at the inter-departmental meetings were generally at the FAS or Deputy Secretary level. 
This varied according to the department's role, size, a nd the level of interest shown by 
departments- Interviews with Michael Scrafton, 028-05 (Canbe1Ta, I September 2005) and 033-05 
(Canberra, 29 September 2005-identity protected). Interview 028-05 is a DFAT official with 
direct knowledge of the East Timor case. 
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Taylor Committee was a way to refocus the government on the Indonesia relationship, 
and improve coordination between the Australian Government and the range of UN 
agencies now involved in East Timor. Others saw bureaucratic motives, and thought 
that Moore-Wilton recommended the new structure as a way of asserting DPM&C' s 
leadership. 103 
The Taylor Committee's secretariat assembled on 21 September, the day after 
INTERFET began to deploy, and the full committee met for the first time on 
27 Septernber. 104 The committee had three important functions: reporting, policy 
analysis and coordination. In the first function, Taylor would attend NSCC meetings 
and provide reports about issues his committee had been working through. In the 
second function, members of the committee secretariat drafted answers or policy 
submissions from a 'whole-of-government' perspective based on the questions and 
issues raised by the NSCC. While some of these briefs related to national security, 
many concerned Australia' s views on the basic structures and modes of East Timor's 
future government and institutions. Taylor was firmly of the view that the work 
produced by the group was his responsibility (that is, the recommendations were not 
necessarily a consensus view from the broader committee), and this gave the 
secretariat an ability to produce work that did not have to reflect departmental 
positions. 105 Lastly, the coordination function involved deconflicting, prioritising, 
monitoring and convincing departments to take the lead on specific issues. This 
function was perfonned in daily meetings where the departmental representatives 
would discuss the issues of the day and any papers being drafted by the secretariat. 
The first four to six weeks after its establishment were hectic for the Taylor 
Committee-an experience reflected in the DFAT Crisis Centre106, INTERFET 
Branch, ETPU and among the wide range of officials involved from other 
departments and agencies. By late October, some of these people went back to their 
103 This range of opinions was discussed during interviews with Chris Barrie, Hugh White, Ashton 
Calvert, Allan Behm, 014-05 (Canberra , 5 July 2005), Kerry Clarke, 020-05, Michael Keating, 
028-05, 051 -06 and 052-06. Interview 014-05 is a former senior government official with first-
hand knowledge of the Taylor Committee. 
104 The creation of the Taylor Committee was flamboyantly announced by T Wright and P Daley, 
'PM sets up secret unit on Timor', Age, 22 October 1999, pp. AJ - 2. 
105 Interviews with 014-05. 028-05 and 033-05 (Canberra, 29 September 2005, identify protected). 
106 As the DFAT Crisis Centre was responsible for consular issues, it has not been examined in this 
case study. 
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normal work, while others migrated to become the 'East Timor Desk' within their 
respective departments and agencies. These changes returned the government to a 
steady state for policymaking, and so represented the end of the crisis for Australia. 
This chapter outlined the events of 1998-9 and described how the 
policymaking system changed during this crisis. The next three chapters use the 
Australian Policy Cycle to structure an in-depth examination of how the system 
worked in 1999, and the degree to which this activity reflect the proposed 
characteristics of crisis policymaking. 
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5 
DEVELOPING POLICY ADVICE IN A CRISIS 
Previous chapters identified proposed characteristics of crisis policymaking, 
and provided a brief outline of the East Timor crisis from the perspective of 
Australian policymakers. This chapter examines policymaking during this crisis 
through the first three phases of the policy cycle, where policy is initiated. Each 
section examines one phase-starting with issue identification, then moving to policy 
analysis and policy instruments. The subsequent discussion is organised according to 
the characteristics of crisis policymaking identified in Part I. Each section includes a 
short summary identifying the degree and location of continuity and change between 
this case and the proposed principles. These judgments will be presented after the 
discussion of each phase, in place of an overall conclusion for the chapter. 
Identify Issues 
The Identify Issues phase represents the nominal start of the Australian Policy 
Cycle. In this phase, 'issues are selected for attention from the myriad of matters 
pressed on government'' and the problem is defined for the later stages. Four 
characteristics were proposed for this phase at the end of Part I: 
• The prime minister, his national security ministers and their semor 
officials are the dominant domestic actors in issue identification and, by 
extension, problem definition. 
• Foreign actors (especially governments) and events have the ability to 
place issues on the crisis policy agenda when they intend to harm 
Australian interests, when the interests of Australia's allies and friends 
are threatened, and when high levels of interdependence mean that 
threats to others' interests are viewed as threats to Australia. 
• Other domestic actors have a limited ability to identify issues in a crisis. 
P Bridgman and G Davis, The Australian Policy Handbook, 3rd edn, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 
2004, p. 34. 
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• Mass appeal plays a limited role in issue identification. 
This phase is therefore about determining which issues the government pays 
attention to, and how those issues are framed as they enter the latter phases of the 
policymaking process. 
Dominant core 
The core of the Australian Government, represented by the prime minister, his 
national security ministers and their senior officials, were the dominant domestic 
actors involved in issue identification in this crisis. In most cases, this group-more 
so than other domestic actors such as Parliament, interest groups or the media-
categorised events and determined their significance for the national interest. In one 
important instance, the action taken by part of this group to develop the Howard 
Letter provided a catalyst for the eventual acute crisis in September 1999. This letter 
also (unintentionally) shaped the problem into one of rapid political change, and 
ultimately into a situation with significant potential for instability and violence. 
East Timor was not, however, a new issue in 1998- 99 and its history led this 
dominant core to consider East Timar through the prism of the Australia-Indonesia 
relationship. After noting the fundamental importance of this relationship, the 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade's (DFA T) white paper of mid-1997 included 
this statement: 
Developments in East Timor will remain important in shaping Australian 
public attitudes towards Indonesia and Indonesia's standing internationally ... 
While the overall administration of the Province is primarily a matter for the 
Indonesian Government to determine, the Australian Government considers 
that an improved human rights situation and a greater role in the administration 
of the Province for indigenous East Timorese would contribute to an overall 
resolution of the issue.2 
As a primary policy document, this statement was a high-level call by Australia for 
the Indonesian Government to do something-for the good of the bilateral 
relationship-about the situation in East Timor. It is therefore unsurprising that the 
Australian Government would be very interested in developments that might lead to a 
resolution of this ' running sore'. In this sense, Soeharto's fall in May 1998 was both 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, In the National Interest - Australia's Foreign and 
Trade Policy White Paper, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1997, p. 62. 
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an opportunity and a risk for Australia. Consequently, the National Security 
Corrunittee of Cabinet's (NSCC) interest increased during 1998, and Foreign Minister 
Downer took regular briefings from his senior officials and made several visits to 
Indonesia throughout 1998 and 1999.3 
Ministerial engagement was also important to promoting agenda issues. 
Downer's statements and actions in the period after June 1998, which included a visit 
to Jakarta to promote dialogue with East Tirnorese leaders, were important to shaping 
policy actions in the early period.4 Not all of this activity was driven by external 
events. Indeed, the engagement with Indonesia over East Timor may have reflected 
institutional preferences within DFAT5, but these preferences may not have surfaced 
without the newly re-elected Coalition government (as of October 1998) wanting to 
start their second term with a positive initiative.6 
Some government agencies had been involved in East Timor for a long time, 
although not as intensely as later in 1999. On the practical side, the Australian 
Electoral Commission (AEC) had been preparing for involvement in East Timor as 
part of the support for the 1999 Indonesian elections, while AusAID had provided 
support to Red Cross activities in the province for some time. The Indonesia Section 
of AusAID was also busy gathering information about development indicators in East 
Timor throughout 1999, which put the agency in a strong position to respond later.7 In 
contrast, Defence and the Australian Federal Police (AFP) had not given much 
consideration to East Timor in terms of potential operations. Indeed, the East Timor 
6 
The prime minister also called the secretary of DFAT on a number of occasions to receive 
briefings on the situation in Indonesia (Interview with Ashton Calvert); and D Greenlees and 
R Garran, Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor 's Fight for Freedom, Allen and Unwin, 
Crows Nest, 2002, p. 83. 
Interview with Ashton Calvert; and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in 
Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, Commonweal th of Australia, Canberra, 
2001, pp. 44-5 1. Cotton describes Downer's involvement as 'activism'; see J Cotton, 'East 
Timor and Australia - Twenty-five years or the policy debate', in J Cotton (ed) , East Timor and 
Australia, Australian Defence Studies Centre/ Australian Institute o f International Affairs, 
Canberra 2000, p. 12. 
Hugh White recalled in an interview that DFAT was 'interested in pursuing the East Timor 
issue' in late 1998, which may indicate that the Department was 'in tune' with its minister. 
Greenlees and Garran, pp. 84- 5. Others, such as Interview 064-07, saw greater continuity in 
government policy throughout J 998 and suggest that opportunity, rather than the election, was 
the impetus behind the Howard Lener. 
Interviews with Steve Darvill and Scott Dawson, Canberra, 4 April 2006. Dawson was Assistant 
Director General East Asia Branch in AusAID from June 1999, with responsibility for East 
Timor. In the post-ballot period, he headed the AusAID Task Force that dealt with the 
immediate emergency response and then worked on the longer-term program for East T imor. 
178 
issue did not become prominent for the AFP until the Bali summit of 27 April 1999 
and the actual May 5 Agreement. 8 
New issues were often identified to the administrative level by policy 
statements and ministerial announcements, the actions of other departments, and the 
media. Policy statements are usually crafted within departments, either at the behest 
of the minister or as a departmental initiative concerning a policy-in-progress. When 
issues are raised in this way, departments are better able to manage the issues as they 
have the initiative and frequently have time to prepare. But when issues are raised 
unexpectedly, such as when media stories gain political significance, departments will 
be reactive. It will take time for them to work through the implications and align their 
policy messages. 
The Howard Letter was the most dramatic example of how challenging 
reactive policymaking can be. While starting as an initiative, Australia clearly lacked 
a fully-developed policy on how it would approach East Timor in mid-January 1999. 
As a result, departments such as Defence did not have any understanding of what the 
government might want from it when the surprise announcement about the letter was 
made. This gap gave other actors-such as the media and lobby groups-time to 
provide advice to government and launch criticism in an effort to shape the agenda.9 
The problems with this reactive posture continued to mar the government's 
preparations well into March 1999, which was shown in the way Defence's need for 
planning lead-time continued to run at cross purposes to DFAT's view of how to 
manage the relationship with Indonesia. 10 
Intelligence agencies also played a role in identifying issues, particularly when 
they provided information not available in the public domain. In thi s case, Australian 
intelligence agencies correctly identified Indonesian military support for pro-
integration militias and provided 'detailed, accurate, relevant and timely reporting to 
9 
10 
Interview with Adrien Whidden. The Bali Summit was a meeting between Prime Minister 
Howard and President Habibie that discussed the situation in East Timor (see Chapter 6). 
For example, see J Dunn. ' Righting our Past Wrongs', Sydney Morning Herald, 
13 January 1999, p. I l; P Cleary, 'A policy that's a bit light on detail ', Sydney Morning Herald, 
I 3 January I 999, p. 7; and Australian Associated Press, 'East Timor committee asks Howard to 
take stronger stance', 26 January 1999. 
The later section on policy instruments re1urns to this issue. 
179 
policymakers.' 11 The influence of such reporting is demonstrated in the way 
intelligence about military activities and sponsorship of the pro-integration militia led 
directly to the government's decision to send the Riding/Behm delegation to Jakarta 
in June 1999 .12 But the possession of intelligence does compel the government to act. 
Indeed, this case shows a clear example where the government knew about the 
emergence of a disturbing factor, namely the increasing involvement of sections of the 
Indonesian Army (TNJ) with militias after January 1999, but judged that overtly 
confronting this fact would place the entire consultation process in jeopardy, risked a 
direct confrontation with Indonesia's foreign minister, and risked compromising 
sensitive intelligence assets. 13 
Official domestic agents can identify issues in indirect ways when they 
release, or 'leak', sensitive information without authorisation to agents such as the 
media. A number of leaks were recorded throughout 1999, including disclosures about 
US military intentions and TNI involvement in violence by pro-integration militia. 14 
Some of the leaks involved classified reports from the Defence Intelligence 
Organisation and DFAT cables, which were subsequently circulated in media and 





This opinion was expressed by a critic of the overall use of intelligence in policymaking. See 
DJ Ball, 'Si lent Witness: Australian Intelligence and East Timor', in Masters of Terror: 
Indonesia's Military and the Violence in Easr Timor in 1999, Canberra Paper 145, Strategic and 
Defence Studies Centre, Canberra, 2002, p. 179. Interviews with the Hon Daryl Williams, 
Canbe1Ta, 17 March 2007; and 048-06, Canberra, 5 June 2006, also mentioned the importance 
ministers placed upon intelligence. Williams was Attorney-General (a ministerial position in 
Australia) and a member for NSCC from 1996-2003. Interview 048-06 is a former mjnisterial 
adviser. 
Interviews with 046-06 and Allan Behm. Sec also Ball, 'Silent Witness', p. 252. 
Ball, 'Silent Witness', pp. 246-9 cites three Defence Intelligence Organisation reports 
identifying TNI involvement with mili tias from January 1999 and predicting the consequences 
for securi ty in East Timor. DFAT says Australia was concerned about the deteriorating security 
situation after late- 1998, and it 'applied consistent pressure on Indonesia' (Department of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor, pp. 6 1-2). According to Allan Behm, the Office of 
National Assessments (ONA) was against a direct approach to the TNI because it could 
compromise intelligrnce sources and methods (Behm interview). 
Jason Brown, Assistanl Secretary Security for the Department of Defence, advised Senate 
Estimates that 28 cases o f unauthorised disclosure of information about the East Timor operation 
were heing investigated as at I 0 February 2000. Sec Senaie Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade 
Committee, Consideration of Additional Estimates (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade), 
9 February 2000, p. 165. 
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number of critical press reports about Australian policy throughout 1999 and into the 
next year. 15 
While the motivations of 'leakers' vary16, the release of info1mation had 
important effects on policymaking. For one, leaked information that contradicts 
government policy might embarrass the government, and so change or undermine a 
bargaining position or allow critics to djrect the agenda. The unauthorised disclosure 
of classified information may compromise intelligence capabilities and sources, which 
could allow targets of collection to take steps to protect their information. Leaks also 
have a corrosive effect on relationships by causing investigations (with their attendant 
additional work) and reducing trust between different agencies: 
There were the times when we had huge debates about [an intelligence agency] 
passing us infonnation that they got from the Americans - [it became a 
question of] whether we could be trusted or not. 17 
This view is critical to the effective operation of intelligence agencies, for it shows 
how leaks can have broader implications for cooperation and ultimately 
policymaking. 
While this section has shown the important role of the core, an examination of 
other domestic actors is needed before the claim for dominance is suppo11ed. This 
point will be reviewed after the important role of external actors is considered. 
Essential external actors 
The available evidence points to the prominence of external actors and 
influences in both creating and then promoting East Timor as an issue for Australian 
policymakers in 1998-99. Some of these were macro-forces such as the Asian 




A few examples include P Daley, 'Armed with information, now what?', Age, 29 May 1999, p.4; 
J Lyons, 'The Secret East T imor Dossier', Bulletin, 12 October 1999; J Lyons, 'The Timor Truth 
Gap', Bulletin, 30 November 1999, pp. 24- 32; and L Brereton, MP, 'East Timor: Revelations on 
Four Corners', News Release, 15 February 2000. 
On the motivations of ' leakers' or ' truth tellers', see L Collins and W Reed, Plunging Point: 
intelligence Failures, Cover-ups and Consequences, 4th Estate/Harper Collins, Sydney, 2005, 
Chapter JO; G Terrill, Secrecy and Openness, Melbourne University Press, South Carhon, 2000, 
pp. 222-227; and BW Marcus, T here's a leak in my firm', The Marcus Letter, (no date) 
available http://www.marcusletter.com, accessed 11 May 2006. 
Interview with Mr Frank Lewincamp (Canberra, 4 July 2005). Mr Lewincamp was Director of 
the Defence Intelligence Organisation from 1998-2005. 
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international relations. Other influences, such as the notion that Australia was now 
living within an 'arc of instability' and thoughts that the United States wanted its 
allies to do more in the wake of the Kosovo war, added to the broad range of 
reinforcing external drivers. 18 However, it remains difficult to identify the exact 
influence or importance of influences such as these for identifying issues for 
Australian policymaking, except in so far as they establish the context for events of 
the time. 
It is much easier to establish the importance of proximate external actors and 
influences such as the attitudes and actions of the Indonesian Government, and the 
location of East Timor and its long history as an issue in Australia and internationally. 
One change had an unmistakable impact on what was to occur-the resignation of 
President Soeharto in May 1998 and the subsequent statements by President-designate 
Habibie about his willingness to reconsider East Timor's status within lndonesia.19 
While Howard began to shift ground on Australian support for Soeharto during the 
lead-up to the latter's resignation on 20 May, the prime rninister had not made any 
public statements calling for a reconsideration of the East Timor issue to that point; 
indeed, calls by others to do so were explicitly rejected by government Jeaders.20 It 
was not until 24 May that Downer broached the issue of change in East Timor, and 
Howard repeated that call a day later. 21 Further, it was not until after President 





On US attitudes towards alliances post-Kosovo, see LD Kozaryn, 'US, NATO Allies Plan New, 
Improved Alliance', American Forces Information Service, 2 1 September 1999; R Haas, 
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Australian Government took active measures to support the policy change, including 
offering DF AT to facilitate intra-Timorese dialogue and survey East Timorese 
opinion about their future status.22 
The main stumbling point to a better understanding was the Indonesian 
Government's identification of East Timor as a diplomatic issue. This perspective 
meant the Indonesian Government was more concerned about dealing with their 
problems through international negotiations, rather than focusing on the domestic 
aspects of the problem such as discontent among the East Timorese. Indonesia's 
acknowledgement of this point led to their acceptance of Australia's offer to canvass 
East Timorese opinion on the situation, although the differing perspective continued 
well into early 1999.23 As such, the external factors based around the political changes 
in Jakarta were instrumental to bringing this issue from 'watching brief' status to the 
fore of the Australian Government' s agenda. 
Australia was, however, still a long way from committing to a military 
operation. But once again, issues generated overseas-and particularly in East 
Timer- influenced the policy agenda throughout late 1998 and 1999. For example, 
the violence in Alas (a town in East Timor) and Jakarta in November 1998, and 
stalling of the Tripartite talks, were almost certainly on the government's mind as the 
Howard Letter was sent. Continuing violence early in 1999, especially in Liqui9a and 
Dili was central to the Australian request for the Bali Summit in April. Even the 
May S Agreement itself, which had such a dramatic influence on Australian policy 
and action for the following few months, was only indirectly influenced by Australia. 
This influence was exercised by visits to the United Nations by the combined DFAT 
and Defence delegation, and by impressing the importance of issues such as security 
to UN interlocutors.24 
The pattern whereby external actors were important for agenda setting 




See Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timar, pp. 24-6. 
A problem recognised by DFAT in an un-refcrenced cable mentioned in D Goldsworthy, 'East 
Timor,' in Goldsworthy and P Edwards (eds), Facing north: a century of Australian engagement 
with Asia, Melbourne Uni versity Press, Carlton, 2003, p. 225 and p. 232. 
Interviews with 007-05 a nd Hugh White; and Department of Foreign Affa irs and Trade, East 
Timor, p. 72- 5. 
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(INTERFET). While domestic actors exerted some pressure25, the Australian 
Government was more concerned about the Indonesian Government's views because 
their permission was needed before action could be taken in East Timor (without 
potentially serious consequences and with international support). This permission was 
essential because the Australian Government wanted to avoid provoking conflict with 
Indonesia, and for pragmatic reasons such as an inability to forcibly enter East Timor 
without undue risk. The Australian Government also identified the need to influence 
other UN members to support action, and was very mindful of US attitudes. However, 
once the external conditions were set by Indonesia's acquiescence, the UN mandate 
and US support for the mission, the Australian Government was able to harness the 
considerable domestic support for intervention. 
Marginal domestic actors 
Australian interest in East Timor's future was clearly driven by a number of 
sources, and competitive agitation from domestic sources featured among them. 
However, these sources were not the most important in this case-while the East 
Timor issue could create political costs, those costs were manageable and not 
electorally significant. 26 
Indeed, the issue had been given energy once again after agitation by the 
Australian Labor Pa1ty' s (ALP) spokesperson, Laurie Brereton, in late 1997. This led 
to a consequent shift in ALP policy toward recognising the right of self-determination 
for the East Timorese in early 1998.27 The impact of the ALP intervention on 




For examples of this pressure, see A Dupont and A Bergin, 'UN Force Critical to Peace in East 
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'Labor Could Be Set For A Backflip on East Timor', Canberra Times, 22 December 1997. 
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government ministers would acknowledge this agitation as a factor in their ultimate 
actions.28 
A number of groups in Australia were vociferous in their support for East 
Timorese independence throughout 1998 and 1999, including the Catholic Church, 
academics and non-government organisations (NG0).29 The attempts to raise East 
Timor as a human rights policy issue took many forms. There were some protests 
involving low levels of violence against the Australian prime :minister and foreign 
:minister during the period February-May 1998, and strident calls from East Timorese 
emissary Jose Ramos Horta for greater Australian attention and aid.30 Local interest in 
East Timer increased after Habibie's June announcement on special autonomy, and 
again after the 'Balibo Five' issue re-surfaced in October 1998 (leading the 
government to re-open the Sherman Inquiry in November that year).31 In addition, the 
Senate ran a public enquiry throughout 1998 and 1999 in an attempt to examine the 
social and political conditions in East Timor. As the crisis developed, this 
conunittee-along with meetings conducted as part of the Senate Estimates process-
often quizzed officials about events and positions and heard testimony from a variety 
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While these groups had some influence on political leaders and public opinion 
about Indonesia, this agitation did not have a major impact on the Australian 
Government's position. This lack of impact was displayed in the government's high 
priority on showing positive support for Soeharto and the crisis-affected Indonesian 
economy in early 1998. This record of political and practical support made it difficult 
for the Australian Government to accede to any demand for a rethink on East Timor-
untiJ the situation changed dramatically in May of that year. 
It may be possible, however, to identify how an emerging consensus made it 
easier for the government to act on East Timor when the acute crisis occurred in 
September 1999. Richard Woolcott made an interesting point that a range of different 
groups-including the Labor left, Catholic groups and the One Nation party-who 
generally opposed the government's foreign policy were supportive of the new 
populist-nationalist line on East Timor.33 When this support was added to mainstream 
(and sometimes nationalistic) opinion that favoured action, a strongly supportive 
media and bipartisan parliamentary support, competitive agitation disappeared as a 
factor in issue identification. As a result, the government found itself with fewer 
constraints and some room for manoeuvre when it came to East Timor policy. 
Mass appeal 
Just as most domestic actors had only a marginal influence on issue 
identification, the mass appeal of the Timor issue in both the domestic and 
international spheres was patchy until September 1999. But when the public came to 
be fully behind intervention, mass appeal supported and enabled the Australian 
Government's policy preferences. 
While Indonesia's actions m East Tirnor after 1975 had been debated and 
condemned by some sections of the Australian community, East Timer's status 
remained an obscure issue for the Australian public until the Santa Cruz massacre of 
33 R Woolcott, 'The consequences of the crisis over East Timor', in B Brown (ed), East Timor -
The Consequences, New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, Wellington, 2000, p. 28. 
Woolcott was a former Secretary of DFAT and Ambassador to Indonesia. Interviewee 048-06 
described this convergence of opinion as ' incredibly iro nic' given the usual 'le ft wing' 
opposition to the use of military force. 
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November 1991. 34 One explanation for its lack of prominence was that successive 
Australian Governments tried to separate East Timor from the broader Indonesia 
relationship.35 While violence and other acute events resuscitated the issue from time 
to time, the ensuing protest or discussion occurred without East Timor becoming a 
mainstream political issue in Australia.36 
Pressure mounted on the Australian Government throughout 1999, and there 
were times when it had to act, despite its preferences. For example, the decision to 
break military ties with the TNI, largely because of suspected KOPASSUS37 
involvement with the militias, was not supported by the Department of Defence: 
... but it was literally a government-directed edict. l can remember . . . others 
[in Defence] trying to argue that we should not go down that path, but Moore's 
office, the Prime Minister's Office and to an extent [Foreign Minister] Downer 
realised that we had to go along with it because the wider Australian public just 
would not stand for maintaining that relationship-and there was also a need to 
send a message to the Indonesians as weII.38 
While other caJls were made to intervene, the government resisted these until 







It appeared as if Indonesia was becoming unacceptable to the Australian people 
as a governing force in East Timor, so I think politically the pressure was on 
the government to ensure that the government was registering its concerns with 
the Indonesians, showing that it had a plan to deal with the issue, and I think 
It is difficult to register the place of East T imor in Australian public consciousness. Moreen Dee, 
for instance, thinks the East Timor issue was ·generally unregarded' until 1991 and the Santa 
Cruz (or Dili) massacre, where the TNI killed at least 250 people. Further, it is di fficult to judge 
whether this incident had a lasting impact on popular consciousness - see M Dee, "'Coali tions 
of the Willing" and Humanitarian Intervention: Australia's Involvement with INTERFET', 
international Peacekeeping, vol. 8, no. 3, 2001, p. 3. One indicator may be the way perceptions 
of the 'Indonesian threat' among Australians changed after major events in East T imor. As 
McAll ister showed, the perception of Indonesia as a threat rose after its 1975 invasion of East 
T imor and again after Sama Cruz (to around three in ten). In both instances, the threat had been 
relatively low for the period before the events. See I McAllister, Altitude Matters: Public 
opinion in Australia towards defence and security, Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 
Canberra, 2004, J:iigure 5, p. 20. 
N Viviani , 'Australia Indonesia Relations - Past, Present and Future', Senate Foreign Affairs, 
Defence and Trade References Committee, Additional Information, vol. 2, Commonwealth of 
Australia, Canberra, 1999, p. 3. 
McAllister, p. I 0. 
KOPASSUS - Komando Pasukan Khusus (Indonesian Special Forces Command). 
Interview with Aldo Borgu. See also AAP, 'Moore defends joint military ors with Indonesia ', 
28 March 1999. 
For a sample of the pressure from international NGO, see S Jones, 'East Timor: Stop the 
Violence', Human Rights News, 6 Jul y 1999. 
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that when one sees violence on the streets then that has a negative impact on 
40 the government ... 
In this case, the public's 'sense of collective morality, justice or responsibility' 41 saw a 
great number of people take interest in the issue after the September violence, and 
around 90 per cent of Australians eventually either supported or strongly supported 
the intervention.42 This high level of support meant that the government was not 
constrained in its action, and was able to point to significant public backing to justify 
its actions. This was important later, when the government floated its preferred way of 
raising extra money to pay for the intervention force.43 
It is difficult to attribute the government's action solely to public opinion. As 
one interviewee remarked: 
Sure public opinion was significant in that made it a big political issue, but that 
was not what was driving them [the Cabinetj ... they all thought, this is an 
outrage, particularly since Australia had invested the amount of money and 
diplomatic capital and personnel in this process. To see these thugs go in there, 
and to see the military stand aside and let it happen, I think people [in the 
Cabinet] were genuinely really disgusted ... [so] how do you separate public 
opinion from the outrage of people in Cabinet?44 
While domestic public opinion might be important, there is also a case to be 
made for the effect of international opinion and its influence on events and 
government options. When asked about this, Ashton Calvert thought that the ' lack of 
an appetite' for earlier action among the international community was another 






And why was it possible to have INTERFET after the vote and after the 
violence and why it wasn't possible to have it before? ... Simply because 
international opinion was so appalled at the spectacle of what was unfolding 
after there had been a vote ... The mood in Australia would not have been 
sufficient by itself. It was the broader international focus, the media and in the 
lnLerview with 052-06. 
One Roy Morgan poll described the East Timor situation as the 'dominant issue' of September 
J 999 (Roy Morgan Research, L-NP Draws Closer On Primary Vote As ALP Support Eases, 
Finding No 3228, 28 SepLember 1999, available http://www.roymorgan.com, accessed 
26 August 2006). See also A Gyngell and M Wesley, Making Austrafian Foreign Policy, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, p. 193. 
This daLa was taken from a poll of 1164 people in 2000 (see McAllister, Table 6, p. 24). 
AusLralians earning over A$50 000 would pay an additional 0.5% 'Timor Levy' to help fund the 
intervention. See ReuLers News, 'Howard would consider one-off tax for Timor Lroops', 
28 October 1999; and Agence France-Presse, 'Affluent Aussies to fund peacekeeping in East 
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Interview with 064-07. Ashton Calverl also noted public pressure in September 1999, but said 
the Australian GovernmenL remained focused on getting policy 'on a better basis'. 
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bigger countries like the United Sates and the bigger countries of Europe, 
demanding that something had to be done.45 
Regardless of the actual effect or where the weight of opinion is generated, at 
least one political leader acknowledged that informed public opinion is difficult to 
ignore in a crisis: 
Nowadays there can be mass sentiment about human rights abuses anywhere in 
the world because of information technology. And you know the communities 
of the world demand that action be taken against cruelty, against human abuse. 
And governments have to work out ways of doing that and my point is that in 
the case of East Timor we did find a way of doing so.46 
So while political leaders might promote an issue when popular support is ambivalent 
or divided, or bury an issue when it runs against their prefeITed course of action, it is 
difficult to ignore mass appeal if it arises. That the mass appeal of the East Timor 
issue suited the government's preferred course of action was undoubtedly a factor that 
gave the government significant room to move in September 1999. 
Observations about Identifying Issues 
This examination of the Identifying Issues phase in the East Timor crisis 
shows a strong degree of continuity with the proposed characteristics. In terms of 
actors, the prime minister and a very small group of ministers and senior officials 
were the most important, particular1y for the way they defined the problem. There is 
little evidence to support the prospect of significant change in the future, given the 
high likelihood of the central role of these players continuing. 
The lack of general public interest in defence and security-much less human 
rights or violence in East Timor-as issues in Australia's 1998 general election could 
explain why domestic actors and public opinion were not decisively influential in the 
Identifying Issues phase of the policy cycle.47 While mass appeal developed later in 
the crisis, it is likely that the government would have acted in much the same way 
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'Timor Tax'). The government's probable course can be inferred from the planning 
and discussions underway with the United Nations and United States since February 
(and especially March) 1999, and from the range of official statements about East 
Timor that year. 
External actors were more important than domestic actors for identifying 
issues in this case. Whether foreign governments, international institutions or the 
nebulous international opinion, these actors enabled and constrained action. In one 
sense, international actors have some similarities with domestic lobby groups: they 
can change their minds quickly, get caught in their own internal politics and influence 
some people. Unlike domestic lobby groups, external actors may have significantly 
more military, diplomatic and financial resources available to them. Some of them 
also have the potential to deploy these resources quickly to protect or advance their 
interests. This highlights national security policy as a multi-actor international game, 
where the actions of one have consequent effects on others. 
Policy Analysis 
The second phase of the policy cycle involves analysis of the policy issue, 
which is defined by Bridgman and Davis as using research and logic to develop 
options for decision-makers.48 The four proposed characteristics identified in Part I 
were: 
48 
• Where the ability to conduct rational comprehensive analysis is limited 
in a crisis, decision-makers turn to trusted sources of advice. This can 
change the structure of policymaking and identify which actors will be 
influential. 
• Policy issues are rarely analysed as individual, discrete problems, and the 
nature of competition between issues and interests, and the consequent 
influence on the issue at hand, makes analysis iterative. 
• Policy insiders dominate. 
• Where dominant frameworks exist, they are likely to be noticeable where 
there is no clear lead for a crisis. 
Bridgman and Davis, p. 47. 
190 
This phase is about the way policymakers define, evaluate and then present alternative 
courses of action to the decision-makers in Cabinet. 
Anything but a rational comprehensive method 
The earlier discussion on national security policymaking identified how 
departments are structured to conduct rational-comprehensive methods of policy 
analysis in Australia, while the discussion of crises showed this ideal was rarely 
achieved. Indeed, even Bridgman and Davis argue that such a process is rare in 
general policymaking because it is difficult to achieve agreement on the aims and a 
clear understanding of the means available.49 The East Timar case confinns the 
tenuous position of the rational-comprehensive method, and clearly shows how 
analysis is influenced by a range of extra-rational means when policymakers are 
dealing with a crisis and are hampered by shifting national objectives. 
Most of the major policy analysis in the East Timor case was conducted by 
small groups of very senior officials and a few working groups or task forces that 
formed just for this crisis. The influence of small groups of senior officials was clearly 
seen in the production of the Howard Letter. In this instance, only about ten people 
had any real knowledge of the letter or input to its contents.50 While this act of policy 
was developed and then implemented with speed and secrecy, the full range of 
possible consequences was not anticipated before the letter was sent. As a result, the 
implications for the full range of policy instruments-particularly for the Australian 
Defence Force (ADF)- were not canvassed beforehand.51 
Other small groups of more junior officials had important roles in managing 
the crisis (as outlined in Chapters 3 and 4), and most of these were formed and 
structured to promote rational-comprehensive consideration. Thus Defence's East 
Timor Working Group and the Depmtment of Prime Minister and Cabinet's 
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See Chapter 4. It is important Lo note that the overall policy direction toward East Timor was 
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directly consulted on the actual detail of the subsequent letter to President Habibic (Interview 
with Hugh White), and Defonce was not permitted Lo produce papers on East Timor around this 
time without the express permission of its minister (Interview with Paul Barratt). 
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information could be pooled from all the major stakeholders, and work could be 
conducted under the auspices of different authorities. For example, Defence's 
working group met frequently up until the election (noticeably, with shorter meeting 
durations as time went on), and these helped to work through different opinions 
among agencies.52 However, these meetings were also mainly information exchanges 
and tasking opportunities rather than policy discussions.53 
Despite these structural attempts to unify analysis, policymaking could 
scarcely be described as comprehensive or rational in that it followed known or 
repeatable processes toward agreed objectives: 
I think you would have to say that it was not a rational process that started with 
a clear set of objectives and then took an orderly set of steps towards achieving 
those objectives. It was a process that aimed to manage the consequences of 
events as they broke over us, with a very broad sense of a few long-term 
preferences ... so I don't think it was a structured or formal policy process, nor 
was it a tightly documented process either. There is no doubt about that.54 






My sense was the decision-making and reaction to the announcement was 
made between individuals at high levels, and that a lot of us in policy 
development and planning were pretty much playing catch-up. We were pretty 
much in the dark. In the first few weeks after the [Howard] Letter, we provided 
advice on some of the planning issues and implications, but the actual policy 
decisions that lay behind were made hurriedly, in corridors and by telephone 
calls among key people.55 
... but I got this sense throughout, certainly over at DFA T, that we were never 
working to a grand strategic plan or meeting grand strategic objectives, other 
than general stability in the region-which is an overriding objective-and 
facilitating the process with least cost to Australia ... 56 
Interview 035-05. 
Interview with Andrew Hughes, who had direct involvement in AFP planning for UNAMET. 
Hughes described how some operational issues were discussed openly and forcefull y in 
interdepartmental meetings around September 1999. 
Interview with Hugh White. 
Interview with Matt Skoien. 
Interview with 062-07. 
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A maJor mam reason why policy analysis unfolded in this way was the 
continued change in Australia's strategic objectives throughout the crisis. As Table 7 
shows, Australia's strategic objectives around this crisis went through numerous 
iterations in 1998 and 1999, to the point where none of the four main objectives from 
December 1998 and March 1999 had been achieved by September 1999. While most 
interviewees referred to the relationship with Indonesia, including Australia's 
overriding interest in avoiding conflict and ensuring Indonesia's stability and 
transition to a democracy as priority objectives throughout the year, other objectives 
changed throughout.57 Those changes were not peripheral. They included, for one, a 
change in the desired future status of East Timor from autonomy within Indonesia 
(held until at least June 1999) to 'painless divorce' by September. They also changed 
from not wanting to involve the ADF in operations in Indonesian territory, to 
leadership of an international coalition. In other words, the objectives for policy 
analysis-the bedrock of the rational-comprehensive approach-kept shifting. 
Policymakers were also under significant time pressure at different points 
during the crisis. For example, issues would sometimes be raised in NSCC for 
decision that day. There was simply no time to go through formal processes or to seek 
other opinions. The NSCC, which comprised the political decision-makers and their 
senior official advisers, needed to apply what they knew of their objectives in a 
largely intuitive way to the new situation to produce a decision.58 
In some instances, the range of inputs for policy analysis might have been 
deliberately restricted for tactical reasons. Hugh White noted, in an interview, that 
warning of the Howard Letter might have jeopardised the process, either by giving 
Indonesia time to refuse the initiative or by giving critics enough time to rally 
potential opposition. Maley and Taudevin also point to this issue, but they ascribe it to 




This view of Australia's interests was supported in interviews with Hugh White, 024-05, 
Aldo Borgu and 032-05 (by telephone, 29 September 2005, identity protected). Another who 
supported this view was Woolcott, p. 29. A number of other interests were also mentioned 
during interviews, including the desire to avoid refugee flows from East Timor and Indonesia, 
and the importance of perceptions of Australian leadership credentials in the region. 
Interviews with Hugh White and Paul Barratt. 
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The desire to maintain secrecy by using a compartmentalised planning process also 
restricts the number of people involved in policy analysis. This control became more 
pronounced after policy and intelligence information was leaked in mid-1999. 
The concept of judgement, or having a sense of the issues, was mentioned by a 
number of interviewees: 
. . . in these situations you just have to make a judgement about what the 
. . 60 
appropnate way 1s ... 
There was a sense in which to some people, 1 think Habibie himself and some 
of his advisers, they were sort of weary of East Timor ... 61 
The first is that very early on, they had a sense this was getting out of control.62 
While these quotes are given in different contexts about different aspects of 
the case, they demonstrate the importance of coup d'oeil- the 'inward eye' or 
intuition63-that senior leaders reputedly use to come to quick judgments about 
complex situations: 
It [analysis] was much less formalised that the equivalent military deliberate 
planning process, where someone writes down the aim, situation and the 
constraints and the rest of it. There is a bit of a cultural point there. That' s not 
the way a civilian policy culture tends to work.64 
While decision-making will be discussed in Chapter 7, these examples show the 
importance of the extra-rational factors of experience, intuition and individual critical 
skills in policy analysis. 
While forgoing a rational-comprehensive analytical process may have 
advantages in terms of speed and security, less-thorough analytical processes can have 
less than satisfactory consequences. For instance, the process for developing the 
Howard Letter shows how implications can be overlooked; while the ability to 
influence the May 5 Agreement was criticised as a missed opportunity to shape policy 
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We also failed to recognise-which we would have if we had run through a 
more formal policy process-that the critical pressure point . . . [was] the 
negotiations in New York that led to the Tripartite Agreement. The fact that we 
failed to make any significant attempt to make an impact on those negotiations 
beyond the conversations we had with Vendrell when he was here in March 
meant that the opportunity to press for a full-scale military peacekeeping 
operation in the pre-popular consultation was lost, and it was lost by the Jack of 
an appreciation that such a force was strongly in Australia' s interests. That was 
a position we ended up pushing, but we failed to recognise that soon enough or 
recognise what to do to bring it about soon enough .. . 5 
An iterative process 
National security policymaking in this crisis tended to fo1low an iterative 
process. In this case, the main issues for iteration included the government's position 
on the future status of East Timor and the ADF's prospective roles in the event of a 
military commitment. 
As Table 7 showed (above), the government's preferred position on the future 
status of East Timor started as 'an act of self-determination in a manner which avoids 
an early and final decision on the future status of the province' in December 1998.66 
By March 1999 this preferred status had been modified to 'support for an act of self-
determination ... preferably following a long period of autonomy, while accepting the 
possibility of independence' .67 By late September 1999, the preferred outcome had 
become a highly pragmatic 'painless divorce' .68 
The changes in national objectives had a significant impact on Defence and 
the ADF. Jn January, when the mission was still unclear, the ADF produced a 
discussion paper covering a broad range of military options to explain the types of 
forces that could be assembled, their broad military capabilities (from peace 
monitoring to combat operations), and the indicative cost of each option. Political 
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form of a services-assisted evacuation-a mission of short duration that involves only 
a minimum level of offensive combat capability. With this tasking, Defence increased 
the readiness of 1st Brigade for peace operations and leased a fast catamaran (named 
the HMAS Jervis Bay once in service).69 However, after the violence of early 
September and firming of the US position against taking a leadership role, the 
assumed commitment of providing 2000 troops to an international mission or even 
fewer to an evacuation grew to over 5000 troops, and included the new and 
unexpected role of leading that coalition.70 
These two instances show that the ability of strategic objectives to change and 
the importance of external factors in national security policymaking make an iterative 
process almost mandatory. Events that create surprise, such as Habibie's offer of a 
referendum, introduce new dimensions that force previous decisions to be reviewed. 
On the military side, the continuing deterioration of the security situation and the 
changing nature of the task meant Defence had to create new planning organisations, 
and the ADF had to bring additional units to operational readiness. The broader 
international interest in events (especially in September 1999) meant DFAT and 
Defence had to conduct more careful consultation with potential coalition partners in 
a very short period. 
Policy insiders dominate ... period 
This case supports the general proposi6on that national security and cns1s 
policymaking are dominated by internal policy experts-with expertise being largely 
defined by official roles. As the preceding section noted, only a small number of 
people were closely involved in policymaking: namely ministers and their advisers, 
appointed career officials drawn from the main national security policy departments, 
senior officials of agencies with immediate involvement as policy instruments (such 
as the AFP and AEC), and the intelligence community. Although external parties 
attempted to have an influence (as noted in the section on issue identification), these 
had minimal impact. One such example was noted by William Maley, who lamented 
69 
70 
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Green less and Garran, p. 239. The figure of 2000 troops was given by Defence Minister John 
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his failed attempt to convince DFAT officials about the need for preparations for the 
'worst case'.71 Another example was an attempt by the Centre for Democratic 
Institutions to identify the main issues concerning the forthcoming ballot. This 
workshop had official involvement, but little emphasis was placed on getting 
information from it.72 These examples show how domestic groups or individuals 
outside government have difficulty when trying to influence the Policy Analysis phase 
in crises. 
However, not every department or agency gets to play equally in the policy 
analysis phase for national security issues. It is possible to identify four groups in this 
case, although there is some flexibility in this taxonomy. The first was the policy-
driving group consisting of DFAT and Defence, where the former was first among 
equals. These departments used key committees such as NSCC and Strategic Policy 
Coordination Group (SPCG), and their authority over policy submissions, to control 
the major bureaucratic initiatives in 1999. 
The second group consisted of advice agencies such as AFP, AEC and 
AusAID. Each group was widely consulted on the details of its involvement, but 
generally the advice agencies would only provide information on their specialist area 
or comments on submissions drafted by the lead agency.73 One response was typical 
of those from advice agencies: 
I wasn't expected to advise much on issues of national policy. Mine was more 
a technical role ... I'd also give updates on how we were tracking, training our 
people, and the logistics of that.74 
Advice agencies might also do analysis of their own, but this was often in 
response to a request by others. For example, AusAID conducted an assessment of the 
humanitarian situation in East Timor in March 1999 at the request of the foreign 
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doctrinal separation between policy and intelligence. As a result, one may expect to 
find that the Australian intelligence agencies played no role in policy analysis- but 
that would underestimate the individuals who represented their agencies and their 
ability to present information in a way that shaped policy discussion. 
DPM&C falls into its own category. This department played a central role in 
setting the broad direction of policy, and also a coordinating role. Thus DPM&C was 
a key player on the main committees, and individuals within it could be-and 
reportedly were-influential in discussions. The department could also exercise an 
informal veto over policy proposals.76 But the small size of DPM&C and vast range of 
issues to be covered in 1999 meant its officers tended to play a background role, 
speaking up where they needed to, but leaving the main analytical work to the other 
departments. 
Lastly, some groups could have played a role in this crisis but did not. 
Foremost among these were the Treasury and the Department of Finance and 
Administration (DOFA). In the Australian system, the Treasury provides economic 
policy advice to government and DOFA manages the Commonwealth's budget 
(among other responsibilities). Aside from DOFA's routine advice on budgets, neither 
department appeared to play a significant role.77 The implications of their absence will 
be discussed in the next section on policy instruments. 
Dominant frameworks 
Discussions of 'dominant frameworks' or 'paradigms' in policymaking are 
often loaded and vitriolic-loaded in the sense that dominant paradigms are 
considered inherently bad and a limit on creative thought, and vitriolic in that 
policymakers who follow the dominant framework are often accused of being narrow-
minded and inflexible.78 The discussion of frameworks also touches on the 
structure/agency debate, for it implies people are unable to think or act beyond the 
structurally mandated assumptions of their organisation. This discussion tries to avoid 
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assumptions about what Australia should be preparing for in 1999, and arguing that 
these different assumptions took on the character of dominant frameworks. 
Based on the evidence gathered during the interviews, DF AT' s actions 
concerning East Timor in 1999 could be characterised as adopting 'best case' 
position. This view contributed to a policy preference of pressuring the Indonesian 
Government to keep its word and maintain security which, in tum, made it essential to 
minimise activity that might betray that position. 
The reasons for taking such a position may not be related to a dominant 
framework. A voiding situations that would antagonise Indonesia, and perhaps lead to 
a disruption of ties before the popular consultation, made policy sense to many. 
Viewed another way, this focus on the best case may have also been necessary 
because DFAT has relatively few resources to assign to problems. DFAT probably 
only had around fifteen to twenty policy officers assigned to the East Timor issue 
before mid-September 1999.79 Such paucity of resources usually leads to planning that 
is focused on limited, most likely options. 
However, a number of interviewees (notably from outside DFAT) felt this 
tendency to plan for the best case represented DFAT's preferred way of thinking: 
DFAT is inclined to think optimistically (so their) focus was therefore on 
"d" fl" 80 avo1 mg con 1ct ... 
DFAT has a kind of 'beautiful idealism' that is its main operational paradigm. 
That is, you can negotiate your way out of everything and that diplomacy will 
always solve the problem.81 
... it was you [Defence] take a dim view, we' ll [DFAT] take the rose-tinted 
view and never the twain shall meet ... 82 
While empirical work by Gyngell and Wesley would dispute the presence of 
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because it revolved around planning for a broad range of contingencies before 
focusing on the worst case, which is often defined in terms of levels of violence or 
resources.84 But even Defence was not planning for the worst case before September 
1999, because-as mentioned earlier- it has been directed to prepare for a services-
assisted evacuation only. 
Defence's own difficulty with seeing problems through its dominant 
framework of operations was demonstrated by the way little planning was conducted 
for the nation-building aspects of the intervention. According to one interviewee: 
My area ... started to see some of the operational planning coming out of 
Defence, and we saw what we thought were some gaps in that- in terms of aid 
to the civil power when there was no civil power. And we started asking 
questions about how the 'civilian' side was going to be managed. Who was 
going to be doing the electricity supply, water and administrative tasks? We 
had a strong sense that Defence' s planning up to that stage had not considered 
those questions. Very good [operational] planning to get troops on the ground 
and to get control and establish order, but the next step did not seem to us to 
have been well-considered.85 
This view of events was supported by other interviewees, who acknowledged 
little had been done to prepare for the post-intervention phase of the crisis.86 Then-
CDF Cluis Barrie acknowledged that the intervention was always going to involve 
more than just stabilizing the situation, but stressed that Defence's priority was to 
restore law and order: 
Our mandate was to provide security. The actual nation-building and stuff 
belonged to the UN, but blind Freddie could have seen that was going to come 
out of Australia. It had to. And the sooner we can hand the whole thing off to 
the UN the better. 87 
The curious issue here is that Australia led INTERFET because the United 
Nations could not have organised its own force in time to prevent more destruction in 
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nation-building operation any faster? A related issue concerned the idea that 
operations and nation building would occur sequentialJy-that is, the force would 
restore order, then others would come in to restore services and ultimately develop 
national institutions. As the experience of Timor and elsewhere shows, this is faulty 
thinking because people will become impatient while the follow-on organisations 
prepare themselves-some will try to seize political power themselves, while others 
may resort to new forms of violence to assert thefr position. This type of thinking 
shows the difficulties of working within dominant paradigms and provides some 
evidence for the benefits of adopting a more integrated, 'national security' approach 
to policymaking. 
Despite this, there were a number of instances where the dominant paradigm 
was overthrown, while others think it does not matter anyway. Examples of where the 
dominant paradigm was sidelined included the way DFAT allocated some diplomatic 
tasks to Defence officials, and the way officials cooperated in a range of committees. 
This shows a significant pragmatic (and often cooperative) streak in national security 
policymaking, and also shows that dominant frameworks may be shaped or resisted 
by individuals. One interviewee also argued that, at the very top level, the NSCC 
proved successful at bringing convergence in thinking which made dominant 
frameworks unimportant.89 This convergence was assisted by the presence of a very 
influential prime minister and strong ministers, and also the situation itself. The 
presence of ministerial advisers in the analysis phase adds another element that can 
break the dominant framework down. 
Observations about policy analysis 
The East Timor case study provides evidence to support the proposed 
characteristics of policy analysis in crisis. This evidence also shows a large degree of 
durability within these characteristics. Some continuity, particularly the limitation on 
rational comprehensive analysis and its iterative nature, is caused by the time pressure 
and ambiguity normally associated with crisis. However, this continuity may also 
indicate a bias against long-term thinking, and greater comfort with managing issues 
89 
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individually within departmental confines. The role of national security policy 
insiders is also likely to endure, even in crisis, given the importance of information 
and proximity to decision-makers. One aspect that may change, over a long period of 
time, is that of the dominant framework. There is clearly some flexibility in this 
characteristic, which will be explored further in Chapter 6. 
This discussion of the policy analysis phase highlights a number of other key 
issues, with the first being the importance to analysis of extra-rational factors, such as 
judgement. The way key policy advice appears to have been generated-in this 
case- by the top layer of officials, and the limited attention paid to formal analysis of 
the options through methods such as cost benefit analysis, military appreciations or 
the like, supports observations by other observers of policymaking. For example, Dror 
argued that the limited knowledge of policymakers, and indeed the changing nature of 
goals, limits the ability to conduct rational processes. He went on to argue that 
rational processes must be replaced by something else, such as judgement, intuition or 
heuristics.90 This phenomenon has been observed in the East T imor case, as key 
decisions such as the Howard Letter were taken without a strict reliance on a rational-
comprehensive analytical method. Experience, judgement and understanding of 
somewhat intangible national objectives seem to have played the dominant role in this 
instance. 
There is also an argument that process is not important in policymaking, only 
results. 91 After all, it is possible for an individual to conduct this phase alone and come 
up with a suitable answer. However, reliance on the 'heroic individual' has limits and 
represents a significant gamble. In this case, the flaws were shown in missed 
opportunities to influence the Tripartite Talks, and unforeseen implications of policy 
action such as the Howard Letter. These shortcomings echo Janis and Haney, who 
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would therefore seem that it is best to design and use a good analytical process, and 
then adapt it to fit the situation. This must include ensuring that the process can be 
adapted to the requirements of crisis situations. 
It is also difficult to overlook the central role played by ministers in analysis 
during a crisis. While decision-making will be discussed later in Chapter 7, it is 
possible to see ministers act as analysts at times. In this case, there were occasions 
where the prime minister brought newly-emerging issues straight to NSCC, and the 
ministers themselves became analysts as they discussed the latest occurrences. They 
did so based on their general knowledge of the situation and their detailed knowledge 
of the most recent events. This involvement should not be seen as an aberration: 
It's the PM [prime minister] who has been onto the phone to Kofi Annan 
overnight, and while someone would have written up a record it won't have 
been widely distributed. So the people down lower won't know about what the 
PM said to Kofi Annan, and they certainly won't know what ministers said to 
each other ... 93 
Ministerial advisers are another important group of insiders in policy analysis. 
At times, ministers are briefed by their advisers on important proposals, which allow 
them to identify the political and policy implications and merits of each. The 
proximity of advisers also gives them an opp01tunity to influence the minister' s 
thinking, often at critical times. How advisers use their position is often up to the 
minister's preferences, their own personality and the confidence between departments 
and the advisers.94 
The earlier discussion of bodies such as Defence's East Timor Policy Unit and 
the Taylor Committee, and the discussion of iterative and fast-paced nature of 
policymaking in this section also show that structures and systems designed to 
conduct policy analysis in routine situations are not necessarily suited to coping with 
crises. Instead, organisations may prefer to establish smalJ groups to focus on the 
issue and provide analysis directly to senior leaders. 
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The third phase of the policy cycle involves considering the means, called 
policy instruments, to achieve the government's ends. Two proposed characteristics of 
this phase were identified in Part I: 
• The instruments most used by the Australian Government in crises are 
diplomacy, alliances, military force, economic levers (including foreign 
aid), information, international law, and (sometimes) social levers. 
• The utility of policy instruments is highly situational in a crisis. 
The range of policy instruments identified in Part I captured most of those 
used in the past by Australian policymakers. Of these, it should be no surprise that 
diplomatic and military instruments remained the most visible and important. 
However, this case also shows how the Australian Government used instruments that 
are not usually considered in the context of national security, such as the electoral 
conunission. This case study also confirms that policy instruments are highly 
situational, not least for their potential to precipitate detrimental consequences if used. 
More worryingly, some parts of the military instrument were not ready or sustainable 
for offshore operations had they been needed. 
Australian policy instruments 
Diplomacy was again an essential policy instrument, and the Australian 
Government used both DFAT and Defence extensively for diplomatic purposes 
during this crisis. As on other occasions, DFAT used its embassies, delegations and 
informal contacts with a number of agencies to advocate Australia's position. DFAT 
was also the most prominent Australian organisation used in consultations with East 
Timorese, Indonesian and UN leaders in the early period. These consultations 
included the work by DFAT officials in June 1998 and the visits to Jakarta, New York 
and Washington by Foreign Minister Downer and his senior officials.95 DFAT also 
95 These were some of the 120 representations made to the Indonesian Government over East 
Timor during 1998- 99, according to Mr John Dauth in his testimony to Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade References Committee, Economic, social and political conditions in East Timor, 
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facilitated a range of other forums, such as intra-Timorese reconciliation meetings and 
later a 'Group of Friends' on East Timor.96 
While DFAT played the major role in planning and executing the diplomatic 
effort, Defence' s part was important in te1ms of engaging the Indonesians and 
regional neighbours in 1999. These activities included indirect advocacy during a 
joint Australia- Indonesia forum from 9-11 March97, and direct approaches by Air 
Marshal Riding and Allan Behm to senior TNI leaders in June. Defence's diplomacy 
also extended to practical areas, such as the efforts made in September 1999 by acting 
Deputy Secretary Strategy and Intelligence (DEP SEC S&I) Martin Brady to establish 
cooperative modes between the TNI and ADF, and VCDF Riding's regional tour to 
build support for INTERFET. In addition, Defence' s attaches in Indonesia, Brigadier 
Jim Molan and Colonel Ken Brownrigg, played key roles in putting Australia's 
position to the TNI and establishing a relationship with TNI forces in East Timor so 
that INTERFET could operate there without coming into conflict with Indonesian 
units.98 
Other instruments make direct contributions to diplomatic efforts-and they 
can detract from diplomacy as well. For example, cash donations to UNTAET and 
financial support for intra-East Timorese dialogue supported the broad diplomatic 
messages of reconciliation, while demonstrations of ADF units and equipment 
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departmental controversy over increasing ADF preparedness in February and March 
1999 showed, actions deemed necessary by one organisation may not suit others. It is 
also important to note the role of political leaders in diplomacy. Aside from Downer's 
efforts, the prime minister was involved in some direct diplomacy through the 
December 1998 letter to President Habibie, the Bali Summit of April 1999, the APEC 
meeting of September that same year, and the negotiations to establish INTERFET. 
Australia's alliance with the United States was another important policy 
instrument. While there no evidence of consultation between the Australian and US 
Governments about the Howard Letter, developing a shared policy line was clearly 
important to Australia by February 1999. This imperative was reflected in the visit by 
DFA T secretary Ashton Calvert to Washington for talks with his US counterparts in 
the State Department. Ausu·alian political leaders and officials also continued to 
promote the need for US engagement, most notably with USPACOM and through 
counterparts in the US Government. 100 The US Government also used its weight to 
gain Indonesian acceptance for the intervention at a critical time. Once the decision to 
commit forces was made, the United States provided important support to the mission, 
most visibly the strategic lift and Marine force positioned off Timor. 
While its role in diplomacy was clearly valuable, the ADF' s main contribution 
in this crisis came through its ability to deploy and sustain combat forces offshore as 
part of an international coalition. The added responsibility of leading the force and 
providing significant logistic and intelligence support allowed the Australian 
Government to act quickly and decisively. But Defence and the ADF do not act alone, 
and the potential cost of preparing a force can interfere with other efforts. The 
preparation of 1st Brigade had the potential to convey messages that ran counter to 
other efforts; in this case, to DFA T's prefeITed policy line that Indonesia would be 
trusted to manage security and the East Timorese would be encouraged to 
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compromise. 101 That Defence went ahead with preparing 1st Brigade for deployment 
was a risk, but one that proved worthwhile given the events of September 1999. 
While Australia chose not to employ all of its economic instruments in this 
cdsis (a discussion that will be taken up later in this section), development aid and 
financial assistance were prominent. As mentioned earlier, AusATD directed funds to 
meeting short- and longer-term humanitarian problems, as well as funding immediate 
initiatives to support policy. These initiatives extended to providing financial and 
technical assistance to NGOs working in East Timor. AusAID also provided technical 
assistance to policymaking by dispatching assessment teams when requested and 
organising direct humanitarian assistance on occasions. 102 
The willingness to accept some financial risk to fund the mission was another 
significant element of Australia's policy response in September. Under normal 
circumstances, the United Nations establishes elaborate measures to determine 
funding arrangements for contributions to peacekeeping forces. But these mechanisms 
take time to build and some nations were reluctant to commit without confirmed 
funding arrangements. In this case, the Australian Government accepted the risk and 
paid the deployment costs of some participants, and underwrote a range of other costs 
until the UN Trust Fund was fully operational. This move was instrumental in keeping 
negotiations going with a number of countries during INTERFET's early days, and 
helped to ensure that the force included a broad range of nationalities. 103 
Australia' s willingness to bear additional costs also helped to allay concerns 
and avoid potential ill-feeling with contributing nations. The value of this approach 
was shown when some contributing nations delivered their forces to Australia without 
essential military equipment. 104 The necessary equipment was duly loaned by the 
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came to reconcile the loans, these stores were given as a gift to avoid creating 
animosity between Australia and the contributing nations. 105 
The list of possible policy instruments developed in Part I is not complete, 
however. This crisis shows how a number of departments and agencies contribute 
different abilities to create additional policy instruments. For example, the AEC 
helped the United Nations to establish the legal and procedural framework for the 
electoral process, established systems for voter registration, developed and procured 
ballot materials, developed training courses and briefing packages, and facilitated 
voting for East Timorese expatriates in Australia. 106 According to Corina Perelli, these 
services made a significant contribution to the ballot's outcome.107 The AFP was 
important to providing UNAMET with an ability to diffuse problems through the 
moral authority of international poljce.108 
Other instruments that the government might want to call upon are owned and 
operated by the private and community sectors. For example, Australia's main 
telecommunications company, Telstra, assisted the ADF and fledgling authority in 
East Timor by providing on-the-ground communications support in DiJi. 109 Other 
examples included the use of commercial shipping to support the INTERFET 
deployment and the use of a commercial provider for aeromedical evacuation during 
UNT AET. 11° Further examples are found in the way commercial and non-government 
organisations helped AusAID to implement its humanitarian program as suppliers and 
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some policy instruments had clearly moved from government hands by 1999, but the 
government could-at a price-harness more instruments for policy than it actually 
owned. 
Limitations on instruments 
Some Australian policy instruments were not used in this cns1s. In some 
instances they were not perceived as useful, or their use would have created 
significant negative repercussions. On some occasions, the instruments were not 
suited to the specific task, perhaps because they have limitations or lack the ability to 
deal with conditions as they exist. Taken together, these reasons show why the utility 
of policy instruments will always be highly situational in a crisis. 
Jn the first instance, the government did not view information as a vital 
element of national power or think deeply about how to employ this instrument 
systematically. 112 While there were some specific instances where information was 
applied to achieve national objectives, such as the Riding/Behm visit to TNI leaders, 
the government missed others. According to Defence, an opportunity to shape the 
opinion of regional audiences about the intervention was missed, and many people 
were left to develop a negative perception of Australia's actions. 11 3 These perceptions 
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magazine article that appeared on 24 September 1999 where Howard did not dispute a 
journalist's assertion that Australia was the US' ' deputy sheriff' in the region.115 This 
story (and image) was roundly criticised in the regional media and created credibility 
problems for Australia. 116 
There were also differing perceptions about the efficacy of applying broader 
econormc instruments to force the Indonesian Government to accept peacekeepers 
before or after the ballot. While Foreign Minister Downer and Defence Minister 
Moore made mention of the international community's involvement in the Indonesian 
economy in media interviews117, sanctions were not seen as a viable instrument by 
Australian policymakers at any time in 1999. This attracted significant criticism from 
academics who argued that economically vulnerable Indonesia was in no condition to 
resist international pressure, and gave credit to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
and World Bank for eventually convincing Indonesia to accept INTERFET. 11 8 Maley 
takes this further by arguing that economic pressure might have convinced the 
Indonesian Government to accept a neutral military force in East Timor before the 









We tested the waters as much as we could, and what economic levers did we 
have? We wanted to bring the Indonesians along, we didn't want to get their 
120 backs up and have problems ... 
These points were made by people who had never met President Habibie. We 
didn't have levers on him. Sanctions are traditionally pretty ineffective and we 
didn' t have available to us more refined 'smart sanctions'. Habibie's mind was 
not going to be changed by such measures, in any case, or by Australia. 121 
... Indonesia was on its knees as a result of the Asian Economic Crisis at the 
time, they were reacting badly to the IMF intervention ... but at the time we 
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were getting ready to deploy INTERFET, people were actually dyin~ in large 
numbers on the ground. How long do economic levers take to work? 12 
I would be skeptical about the economic levers argument, as I am not sure what 
levers we had. Economic levers tend to work [only] in the long-term, and they 
work on everybody- not just the government-when you apply them. It would 
have been very hard to change short-term Indonesian policies with economic 
means ... Indonesians have always been happy to take the hit and wait it out.123 
When asked whether Australia had considered asking the Ilv1F to pressure 
Indonesia into allowing a peacekeeping force before the consultation, or whether this 
option was even discussed, one we11-placed interviewee responded: 
Not that I am aware of ... in the Asian meltdown we had sought to ameliorate 
the worst excesses of the IMF. Downer went into bat on behalf of Indonesia, 
and I think that was the right way to play it. 124 
This exchange shows that Australian policymakers clearly thought that 
bringing economic pressure on Indonesia was either impossible or potentially 
detrimental, or both. What is interesting is that the potential experts on economic 
power, the Treasury or DOFA, were not engaged in policymaking about East Timor. 
When asked about their participation, no interviewee described even a minor role for 
either department, except for their role in managing funding. This example, in 
particular, shows that governments make judgments about when and where to apply 
their instruments. It also shows that just because a government has certain 
instruments, these instruments are not necessarily available to further policy 
objectives. Nor will instruments-in this case, using diplomacy alone to convince the 
Indonesians to accept peacekeepers- always achieve the intended results. 
Defence did not use its entire range of military options during INTERFET. 
Some weapons, such as tanks, were not justified by the level of threat and were 
potentially damaging to East Timor's underdeveloped road network. Others, such as 
Australia's F-111 strategic bombers, were used only as a subtle threat. According to 
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Force base Tindal, near Katherine in northern Australia. 125 While this move was not 
announced, it is an example of how not using an instrument can still have an effect if 
the adversary detects the signal. 
Policy instruments can also be limited by political decisions. Although the 
evidence to identify exactly why is not yet publicly available, there are strong 
indications that the Australian Government chose not to use economic sanctions 
because it did not want to stat1 a war or a lasting conflict with Indonesia over East 
Timor, or jeopardise Indonesia's move towards democracy. It is also possible that the 
Australian Government may have shied away from overt pressure in order to preserve 
the bilateral trade relationship. While Indonesia was only Australia's tenth-largest 
trading partner in 1999, any break in the economic relationship might have caused 
econorruc discomfort in Australia as well as Indonesia. These types of political, 
economic and electoral factors weigh heavily upon political decision-makers, 
potentially more than the risk of violence in a foreign jurisdiction. 126 
Foreign governments might also restrict the use of some policy instruments. 
For example, the Australian Government's ability to sponsor NGO activities in East 
Timor before September 1999 was constrained by the Indonesian Government: 
... there were fairly strict controls about who could work in East Timor which 
were run out of the foreign ministry and state security apparatus in Jakarta, and 
that kind of limited the sorts of partnerships that we could make with 
Australian non-government organisations. None of that [control] existed post-
ballot, and ... we were able to make more use of the linkages between church-
based NGOs in Australia and church-based NGOs in East Timor. 127 
This type of constraint is a usual limitation imposed by the dictates of sovereignty-
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and, once there, what those people do. Accepting these conditions is sometimes the 
price of operating in such situations. 
Policy instruments also have physical limits such as reach, sustainabmty, 
survivability and readiness. The ability to use a given instrument at the place or time 
where it will achieve the desired effect-described as 'reach'- is especially relevant 
to this case. While Australia has police, military forces, election officials and aid 
workers, these capabilities must move outside their normal operating areas and be 
able to work in the appropriate location if they are to contribute as a policy 
instrument. For example, it was soon apparent that the AFP' s communications, air 
transport and logistics were very limited-although these shortcomings were 
ameliorated by other agencies or commercial contracts. Other AFP limitations 
included difficulties with preparing and training large groups of police for 
peacekeeping duties; however, these shortcomings were overcome through 
cooperation with other agencies.128 The ability to protect instruments while deployed 
may be another limitation, which was seen in the way the AEC was unwilling to send 
staff into East Timor due to safety concerns.129 
Deficiencies in logistics, lift, combat equipment and communications were 
also identified within Defence. 130 Significant concerns were raised about the amount 
of body armour and night vision equipment available to the deploying forces 131 , and 
about the ability to rotate infantry units.132 However, other possible deficiencies did 
not become obvious because the operation' s scale and intensity prevented 
' survivability' from coming to attention. It should also be noted that the ADF did not 
deploy its full range of military capabilities to East Timor. Tank units, medium 
artillery and strike bombers all remained outside the territory and its airspace. These 
units were not deployed for a range of reasons, including the absence of a real military 
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be some consensus that the ADF was lucky it did not have to face a more heavily 
armed or determined enemy. 133 
'Readiness' also relates to the physical limits of capability. However, it is a 
separate issue because some instruments may have appropriate physical 
characteristics, but not be employable immediately. This limitation is especially 
apparent with military forces. While the ADF showed itself to be a flexible 
instrument, different elements within the force required a considerable lead-time to 
prepare for missions. This need complicated the relationship between DFA T and 
Defence in early 1999 because military preparations ran against the preferred policy 
position that Indonesia was trusted to maintain security. 134 
Readiness limitations are also apparent with aid instruments. For example, 
AusAID did not fund NGOs to maintain capabilities in 1999-they only provided 
funding in return for service when the crisis broke. As a result, it often took valuable 
time to bring NGO relief capabilities to a state where they could be deployed, while it 
also took time to negotiate the terms of AusA ID support. 135 
Observations about policy instruments 
This discussion of the Policy Instruments phase shows a significant degree of 
continuity with the examples presented in Part I, and the proposed characteristics of 
crisis policymaking. Two factors may explain this continuity. The first is the way 
many national security crises are perceived in terms of military threats. As a result, 
there is a strong and consistent role for DF AT and Defence. This view could change 
as more concerns are considered first-order national security issues-such as 
protection from non-physical threats and recovery from terrorist attacks 
('consequence management')-and a closer link is created between governance and 
security. The second factor, which was discussed in relation to changing structures in 
Chapter 3, is the contingent nature of crisis. Again, while every crisis has the common 
feature of marking a potential transformation in a relationship, the points of friction 
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As no two crises will be exactly the same, the Australian Government 
maintains a range of instruments to achieve national security goals. Indeed, the use of 
many different departments and agencies, and the attempt to coordinate their 
activities, makes East Timor an example of a modern, whole-of-government approach 
to crisis. 136 In this case, the front-line instruments went beyond the traditional 
diplomatic and economic means to include the technical expertise of the AEC (and 
later Customs), and the authority of the AFP. It was also notable that one of the main 
instruments, the ADF, only provided background intelligence, logistic support, and a 
role in the diplomatic effort until the crisis became acute. Another interesting factor 
was the way commercial assets were integrated into the response, albeit in a limited 
way and only after significant policy effort. This adds another dimension to the 
understanding of the means available to pursue national objectives. 
Of course, just because a government has a viable instrument does not mean 
that instrument should be used. For example, economic sanctions might have forced 
the Indonesian Government to accept a peacekeeping force before the ba11ot. 
However, there was real potential for sanctions to create negative economic and 
political consequences for Australia. Officials need to identify the chances of negative 
consequences when they develop options to recommend to government. 
In other cases, governments may need to accept limitations imposed by other 
sovereign governments to maintain the ability to work on issues. In this case, 
Indonesia's limitations on which NGOs could or could not work in East Timor may 
have been objectionable, but acceptance was the price of providing other forms of 
Australian assistance. Jn situations such as this, governments might need to use other 
instruments as levers to remove or reduce those restrictions. 
The practical limitations on instruments also mean that policymakers must 
consult closely with operators and specialist advisers when options are being 
developed. This is especially important where there is a difference between what an 
instrument can do in theory, and what it can do when factors such as survivability, 
readiness, sustainability and reach are considered. A case should be made for 
13() The Bougainville operation of 1997 pre-dates Timex and provides some portent of the way 
policy instruments could be used together, although it was on a smaller scale and few 
instruments were marshalled. 
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including Treasury on key committees, such as the SPCG, and of including the 
Secretary of Treasury on NSCC. Such representation would ensure that important 
policy instruments are included in national planning at the earliest possible time. 
This chapter reviewed the first three phases of the policy cycle, and found 
significant continuity with the proposed characteristics of crisis policymaking. The 
next chapter examines how the Consultation and Coordination phases bring advice 
together to ensure that policy is comprehensive and acceptable. 
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6 
BRINGING POLICY ADVICE TOGETHER 
Whjle advice may be well-developed by this stage of the cycle, policymakers 
generally see advantage in exposjng that advice to others before seeking decisions. 
Chapter 6 examines how international and domestic audiences are brought into the 
policy cycle through consultation, and other internal government actors through 
coordination. This chapter follows the format used in Chapter 5, and tests the 
characteristics developed in Part I against the case of East Timor. Once again, each 
section is drawn together by a short observation covering the main points about that 
phase in lieu of a conclusion for the chapter. 
Consultation 
The Consultation phase involves testing policy with audiences outside the 
originating policymaking department. For Bridgman and Davis, consultation responds 
to democratic pressure because people 'want a say between elections' .1 Consultation 
is expected to increase public involvement and, in turn, increase policy legitimacy. 
Crises, including East Timor, are somewhat different because there are few 
instances of discussions between the government and domestic parties. This is 
because the information needed for consultation, such as Cabinet submissions and 
decisions, committee minutes and agendum papers, Department of Foreign Affairs 
and Trade (DFA T) cables and defence planning documents are carefully guarded 
secrets and only released after a considerable period of time has elapsed. This often 
makes any genuine consultation (beyond information) very difficult because the 
public do not have sufficient data to develop informed positions. In the East Timor 
case, discussions between Australian politicians and officials and the US Government 
and armed forces, leaders and departments of the United Nations, neighbours such as 
New Zealand and the Southeast Asian states, and even Timorese leaders, were 
numerous and influential in the policymaking process. 
P Bridgman and G Davis, The Australian Policy Handbook, 3rd edn, Allen and U nwin, 
Sydney,2004, p.78. 
218 
However, it is still possible to identify a number of consultative measures that 
the Australian Government takes in crises. The characteristics of this consultation 
were proposed in Part I as: 
• All options are used with overseas interlocutors (who are primarily other 
governments and major international organisations) with information, 
discussion, partnership and delegation commonly occurring. 
• Consultation between the government and the public usually takes the 
form of a one-way passage of information. 
• Much consultation occurs in secret. 
This section outlines the details of Australian Government consultation during the 
East Timor crisis, and places each effort alongside a modified version of the 
Bridgman and Davis consultation continuum (see Figure 3 in Chapter 1). This 
continuum shows both the intent of consultation and the degree of freedom that each 
party has afterwards. This has especially important implications in crisis 
policymaking, as the increasing depth of consultation with external actors tends to 
constrain the options available to government. In this sense, governments can actually 
forego flexibility in decision-making as they increase their interaction with external 
parties. 
Consultation with international actors 
The Australian Government consulted a range of parties in 1998-99, with 
different entities being important at different stages. Early in the crisis, most 
consultation was conducted with the Indonesian Government, East Timoresc leaders 
and Portugal. In all three cases, the Australian Government was operating at the 
'discussion' point along the Bridgman and Davis continuum-there was an attempt to 
identify the positions of the various parties and convince them to change their policy 
preferences. Australia adopted a similar position with other major actors early in 
1999, particularly those who might provide support to the popular consultation and 
future nation-building operation in East Timor. This position moved further to the 
right on the continuum as the crisis became acute, before reaching 'delegation' and 
'control' as the international community decided on action to restore stability. This 
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section explores how the modes of Australian consultation changed during 1999, 
before moving to consultation during the period of acute crisis. 
Prior to September 1999, Australia's consultation with Indonesia was aimed 
at firstly determining the attitudes of the key Indonesian actors-such as the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the military and the new president-and then towards convincing 
the Indonesians to uphold their agreement to maintain security during the popular 
consultation. These discussions were conducted by Australia's embassy in Jakarta, 
and included a number of visits by Foreign Minister Downer and meetings with 
Indonesian leaders. Other ministers, including Defence Minister John Moore and 
Deputy Prime Minister Tim Fischer, also engaged Indonesian leaders and sought to 
exchange opinions on the situation.2 The main thrust of these discussions went 
towards convincing the Indonesian Government to undertake a more meaningful 
dialogue with East Timorese leaders. 3 
After the Howard Letter was leaked and the Indonesian Cabinet decided to 
conduct the ballot, Australian consultation was mainly about security in East Timor. 
This ran on two tracks. The first concerned convincing the Indonesian Government to 
accept their responsibility for security in East Timor, while the second involved 
occasional attempts to get the Indonesians to agree to accept a peacekeeping presence 
for the ballot. This second track culminated with the 'Bali Summit' between Prime 
Minister Howard and President Habibie on 27 April 1999. This meeting, which 
occurred during the period where the Indonesian Government was considering the 
final tripartite agreement, marked the last time Australia pressed for peacekeepers 
before the consultation.4 After this, the main theme of Australia's formal and informal 
representations switched to reminding the Indonesians of their commitment to 
maintain security.5 
2 Interviews with Tim Fischer and John Moore. These exchanges included a round of formal 
ministerial discussion on 24- 25 February 1999. 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timar in Transition 1998- 2000: An Australian 
Policy Challenge, Commonwealth o f Australia, Canberra, 2001 , p. 25-6. 
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D Goldsworthy, 'East T imor,' in Goldsworthy and P Edwards (eds), Facing north: a century 
of Australian engagement with Asia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2003, p. 232- 3; 
and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timar in Transition, pp. 98-99 and 
pp. 109- 1 11. 
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While DFA T's efforts to consult with Indonesia were covered in the Policy 
Instruments phase (see Chapter 5), there were also informal and 'off-line' 
consultations throughout the crisis. These contacts provided an advantage in this 
sensitive situation, largely because they could be explained as second-tier or 
unofficial.6 The Australian Federal Police (AFP) had good relations with Indonesia's 
police, and they were able to use these links effectively in 1999 and in later 
situations.7 Significant discussion at the military-to-military level also occurred. These 
included a formal seminar about civil-military relations in March 1999, which 
allowed the apolitical Australian military to discuss the role of military organisations 
in democracies with their Indonesian counterparts. Informal contacts were also 
important. One interviewee recalled one such exchange with high-ranking Indonesian 
officers in 1998: 
There was always that issue of Australia' s apparent support for the freedom of 
East Timor and agitation was going on in Australia at the time. We talked 
about it, typically off line. They were concerned that we had a predilection for 
. . 8 
supportmg various groups ... 
These military-to-military discussions became sharp at one point, when a senior 
military leader and Defence official were dispatched to Jakarta to provide their 
counterparts with evidence of Indonesian military complicity with the East Timorese 
militias.9 Consultation like this provided ways to pass diplomatic messages, and to 
effect important coordination. 
DFAT also met with East Timorese leaders from mid-1998. These included 
visits by Ambassador John McCarthy to the province during 12- 16 June, infom1al 
consultations about the future of East Timor from June 1998 and financial support to 
intra-Timorese reconciliation. 10 Other contacts between senior Australians and 
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Bello in Melbourne in February 1999. 11 These discussions were, on one level, simply 
attempts to gauge the opinion of potentially influential people. However, the manner 
in which the consultation occurred, and the central proposition expressed to Xanana 
Gusmao during this time12, indicated that Australian consultation was designed to 
shape East Timorese opinion toward a more moderate and unified position that would 
(unsurprisingly) accord with Australia's preferred policy position-acceptance of 
Indonesia's autonomy offer before undertaking a long transition to independence. 
Portuguese leaders were also consulted in an attempt to persuade them towards 
Australia's views. As the former colonial power, Portugal was a member of the UN-
sponsored Tripartite Talks, and a defacto representative of East Timorese opinion. On 
one occasion in early 1998, Downer rebuffed the demand for an immediate 
recognition of East Timorese independence by Portuguese Foreign Minister Jamie 
Gama. Instead, Downer argued for a staged process, citing the examples of other 
peace processes in the region. 13 Further meetings were held between the foreign 
ministers, with the aim being to coordinate the two nation's positions on East Timor. 
During a meeting on 27 February 1999, Downer stressed the need to convince the 
East Timorese to support the process, clearly hoping the Portuguese would use their 
influence toward this end. 14 
The Australian Government also consulted intensively with the United 
Nations, especially with those officials responsible for organising the popular 
consultation. These consultations included the March 1999 discussions with Francese 
Vendrell' s UN assessment team. While this meeting was an exchange of views at one 
level, the Australian delegation took it as an opportunity to influence the United 





Bishop Carlos Bello, a Nobel Laureate, was the Catholic Bishop for Dili in 1998- 99. 
Interview with 064-07 recalls that Bishop Bello accurately predicted the result or the popular 
consultation at that early stage. 
In 1998, Xanana Gusmao was an imprisoned but influential East Timorese resistance leader. 
He later became independent East Timor 's first President. Australia's ambassador to Jakarta 
had 'regular contact' with Gusmao in 1998, and this helped the Austral ian Government to 
obtain a clearer picture of Gusmiio's views (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East 
Timar in Transition, p. 27). 
G Hunt, 'Timor peace plan more palatable after dinner', Australian, 14 January 1999, 
p. 1. 
Department o f Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition, p. 46-7. See also 
Goldsworthy, 'East Timor', p. 233 who cites NAA, A9737, 92/05165 I, Cablegram 
O.PA6346, Paris to Canberra, 2 March J 999 for detail o f th is discussion. 
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continued throughout 1999, with frequent visits to UN Headquarters by a DFAT-
Defence team and a series of policy 'non-papers'. These 'non-papers' were provided 
to the United Nations for use in their own processes: 
... non-papers ... did not have a heading or footer, and no title. They were 
pages of information, advice and policy options that were consistent with 
Australia's interests that he [Brigadier Smithj would send off to New York. 
They would often come back as a UN document . . . That was one way we 
were able to walk that line of not being formally involved but still influencing 
h ·1 15 eav1 y .. . 
These were all common techniques within the UN system to help talks progress 
without implying commitment16, and were clearly useful in a situation where 
considerable sensitivity was required during consultation. 
Contact between Australia and the UN Department of Peace Keeping 
Operations (DPKO) and Department of Political Affairs (DPA) had very subtle and 
sensitive aims. Significant work was done to convince these departments to use 
Darwin (rather than Denpassar in Bali) as the key logistic base for UNAMET (the 
United Nations Mission in East Timor)-a decision that proved beneficial when the 
peacekeeping force was subsequently required.17 It was clear to Australian 
policymakers that the DPKO did not have the staff to conduct detailed appreciations 
of the situation or design the necessary force for an operation. In addition, the DPKO 
was operating in an uncertain environment where pre-emptive contingency planning 
for a peacekeeping force, in the absence of an assured mandate, created diplomatic 
challenges with no assurances of troop commitments. In order to reduce this problem, 
Australia sent a group of defence planners to assist the understrength Military 
Planning Staff at DPKO in September 1999 to design a potential structure for a 
follow-on peacekeeping force, so they could gauge potential troop contributions from 
member states. This cooperation was not only about consultation; it was also done to 






Interview with Matthew Skoien. 
A Alatas, The Pebble in the Shoe: The Diplomatic Struggle f or East Timar, Aksara Karunia, 
Jakarta, 2006, p. 113. 
Interview 007-05. 
Interviews with 007-05 and 062-07. 
223 
AusAID also tried to engage the DPA (and the US State Department) to 
discuss post-ballot structures for governance around mid-1999, possible international 
contributions, and Australia' s role in that contribution. However, the discussions 
lacked the specificity of detailed planning and were constrained by the inability to 
prejudge the outcome. As a result, AusAID 'spent a fair bit of time around those sort 
of issues-not all of which were very productive at the end of the day' .19 These 
discussions with the United Nations were more than attempts to convince; they began 
to take on characteristics of partnership as UNAMET was launched and the popular 
consultation drew closer. 
Australia also conducted discussions with other potential partners. In the case 
of New Zealand, the main aim was to maintain their interest in supporting Australia 
with forces at a 1ater date. The purpose of these discussions was to create a sense of 
partnership, because the New Zealanders were considered valuable coalition partners 
due to their willingness to engage in offensive miUtary operations under a 
UN mandate.20 
The most important line of consultation, from both the Australian Government 
and Australian Defence Force (ADF) point of view, was occmTing with the United 
States. Fonnal consultation started early in 1999 with an exchange of views between 
DFAT's Secretary, Dr Ashton Calvert, and Stanley Roth of the US State Department. 
This meeting, the contents of which were leaked in 1999, provides an insight into the 
aims of Australian consultation at this time, and the differences in American and 
Australian views about the likelihood of the need to conduct a peacekeeping mission 
and the utility of different options to influence the situation.21 The similarities in 
policy positions were still strong, however, especially on key points such as alerting 
the Indonesians to their security responsibilities and their assessment of Habibie's 
'unreal' deadline.22 Occurring early in the crisis, this conversation shows how the 





Interview with Scot! Dawson. 
Interview with Allan Behm. 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Calvert Roth Meeting, February 1999', copy in 
author 's possession, paragraphs 10- 12. The divergence is somewhat ambiguous in this 
account of the conversation as Dr Calvert and Mr Roth were discussing the same hypothetical 
situa tion in different timcframes. 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 'Calvert Roth Meeting', paragraphs 7-9. 
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Bridgman and Davis continuum as it sought to influence the US Government to 
develop a position that was complementary to AustraHa's view. 
Consultation between Australian ministers and officials and their 
US counterparts continued throughout the year. This consultation was complicated 
because different parts of the US Government held different views on the how the 
United States would act if the situation in East Timor required intervention. One 
interviewee provided an insight into how Washington-meaning the US Departments 
of State and Defense-were thinking at the time: 
I had the opportunity to host John Hamre, who was the Deputy Secretary [of 
Defense] and he gave an insight into how [the United States viewed the East 
Timor situation]. I would say that we viewed this very reluctantly. If you look 
at that period there we are talking about, 1999, we had come out of Desert 
Storm and we were still doing no-fly zones in Iraq. We'd done Bosnia-
Herzegovina and Kosovo ... So Hamre said, quite frankly, we were tired by 
this time in the decade and the Clinton Administration was f tiredl too. It 
became apparent to me, as we were getting pressure to reduce the numbers 
involved that the policymakers and senior leadership were very reluctant to get 
involved in the effort.23 
Despite this indicator, the key US military arm m the Pacific, USPACOM, 
continued to conduct contingency planning for a large involvement in East Timor.24 
For some in Australia, this gave the impression of there being two US positions-one 
of wholehearted support in Hawaii, and the other of significant reluctance in 
Washington. This difference was noted by senior ministers and it became the subject 
of media speculation after mid-year leaks.25 However, others took USPACOM's 




It was pretended, in terms of some of the media commentary, they [the United 
StatesJ were ready to do peacekeeping ... and with just a bit of extra urging 
lnterview with John Castellaw. This view was consistent with that expressed by Earl Hai lston 
and a number of Australians including Chris Barrie and Bob Treloar. See also Goldswonhy, 
'East Timor', p. 234- 5. 
Interviews with Earl Hai lston, John Castellaw, Bob Treloar and Ashton Calvert. The 
contingencies considered at this time by USPACOM ranged from low-level evacuations up to 
a multinational peacekeeping inLcrvcntion-the figure of 15 000 US troops was mentioned in 
the Australian Parliament (Mr S Martin, MP, House of Representatives, Votes and 
Proceedings, vol. 55, I I August J 999, p. 8419). 
lntcrview with John Moore. For examples o f how the media portrayed this difference, see 
P Daley, 'Timor: We Snub Offer To Send In The Marines' , Sunday Age, I August 1999, p. l; 
and P Daley, 'Rift Denied With US Over Timor', Age, 3 August 1999, p. 3. D Greenlees and 
R Garran, Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor's Fight for Freedom, Allen and 
Unwin, Crows Nest, 2002, pp. 240-8, describe the reluctance of influential leaders in 
Congress to commit troops. 
225 
[the Australian Government] would have gotten them there. My understanding 
was this was not the case. They [USPACOM] certainly had no authority from 
Washington for peacekeeping. What they were doin~ was doing military 
contingency planning for one or both of those scenarios. 6 
Consultation can be politically dangerous when confidential information is 
leaked. In this case, the revelations contained in the Australian press were politically 
embarrassing because they created the perception of difference between the US 
Government' s position and USPACOM.27 Leaks also made future consultation harder, 
as governments tend to reduce the number of people who know about the policy and 
launch internal investigations to find culprits. Senior officials generally try to 
pre-empt compromises by 'compartmentalising' planning so that very few people 
know the complete details of a planned policy or operation. However, this only serves 
to create further problems: 
But [the leaks about USPACOM planning] caused some grief and severe 
compartmentalisation of our planning processes. Compartmentalisation is a n 
anathema to good planning and preparedness of the troops. It undermines 
confidence ... and morale ... 28 
The discussions between Australian and USPACOM staff were conducted 
though liaison officers, videoconferences and visits. These exchanges had a number of 
aims including comparing each party's understanding of the situation, reviewing the 
type of contingencies that might arise, and outlining possible military options. The 
power of this consultation at the operational level was built on very strong bonds 
between senior USP ACOM officers and their ADF counterparts, and resulted in a 
close and shared understanding between the two organisations by the middle of 





We understood completely how the Australian Army operated, and they 
understood how we operated. We trained together, planned together, played 
together ... We were friends and we enjoyed working with each other. We had 
a shared view of how planning and operations were conducted. I think you are 
Interview with AshLon Calvert. 
Recall the article cited early by Daley, 'Timar: We Snub Offer', which broke this story. This 
report drew a denial from Foreign Minister Downer (S Aylmer, 'Timar: Downer Says There's 
No Rift With US', Australian Financial Review, 2 August I 999, p. 7). Give the absence of 
access to US planning documents, it is difficult to determine whether an actual difference 
between Washington and PACOM existed. 
Interview Bob Treloar. 
Interviews with Bob Treloar, Allan Behm and John Castellaw. 
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looking at one of the very, very few s ituations where US forces were willing 
to subordinate themselves to another country' s military leadership.30 
However, consultation across the political and military levels was not always 
so easy to manage despite the alliance and a high degree of familiarity among many of 
the key leaders. The size and complexity of the US Government seemed to be one 
contributing factor. For one interviewee, this crisis exposed a lack of understanding of 
among Australian officials of the US political system. While the relationships were 
strong, particularly with US PACOM and the US intelligence community, there was a 
lack of understanding about how Washington worked-particularly the US 
Department of Defense.31 
Other factors complicated Australia- US consultation too. Wilkinson reports 
the difference of opinion about the Indonesian rnilitary's capacity to maintain security 
throughout the ballot, and Australia's reluctance to provide the United States with 
intelligence due to a need to protect 'sensitive Australian intelligence sources' .32 So 
while there was clearly some level of misunderstanding between the Australians and 
their US counterparts, the work done throughout 1999 still resulted in a high degree of 
cooperation between Defence and USPACOM in particular. This work was to prove 
beneficial once the crisis became acute in September 1999. 
As the situation in East Timor grew into a violent crisis, Australia's 
consultation-often led by Prime Minister Howard-aimed to secure international 
support for an intervention force with an appropriate mandate. 33 The trend for 
consultation was clearly now towards 'partnership', although it could be argued that 
Australian consultation had become 'delegation' as the UN Security Council' s 






Interview with John Castellaw. He was referring to Major General Peter Cosgrove, then 
Commander of the I st Australian Division and future commander INTERFET, and Colonel 
Mark Kelly, Cosgrove's Chief of Staff. 
Interview with 051-06. 
M Wilkinson, 'Why we kept Timor secrets from the US', Sydney Morning Herald, 
13 August 1999, p. l. The view of separation between Australia and the United States was 
taken up in Parliament by opposition member Mr L Brereton and challenged by Foreign 
Minister Downer (Sydney Morning Herald, 'Whal force in East T imor', 11 August 1999, 
p. 14). 
J Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: intervention and its aftermath in 
Southeast Asia, Routledge, London, 2004, p. 12 1. 
Figure 3, 'The Consultation Continuum' (p. 47) defines these forms of consultation. 
227 
The Australian Government continued to make use of its good relations with 
key UN bodies as the c1isis developed. John Howard was in direct contact with Kofi 
Annan, which was crucial because the aim of Australian diplomacy at the time was to 
create support for a robust Chapter VII mandate. It is easy to forget that such a 
mandate was not assured, even after significant international opinion came to favor 
intervention. One interviewee talked about the importance of continuing to consult 
with UN members, such as the Russians, who may have vetoed any UN operation.35 
At this point, Australia's consultation almost became 'delegation' as the government 
refused to be part of a peacekeeping force without a UN mandate, clear US support 
and Indonesian permission.36 
Given these conditions, and the rising public support for intervention 
described in Chapter 5, it is possible to see a situation where the desire for 
consultation could have unhinged Australia's preferred policy line during the acute 
crisis. For instance, if a pennanent member exercised their veto against the 
Chapter VII mandate, Australia (and others in the international community) would 
have needed another mechanism to legitimise any operation into East Timor. Of 
course, that did not happen and, given the support of all pennanent members, this 
scenario was most unlikely. 
The form of US support was only assured after a series of meetings between 
Australian and US officials from 6-9 September. These meetings included at least two 
video conferences which discussed the detailed concept for the operation and the 
likely US contribution.37 While there was clear political support for ending the 
violence (the president and a number of senior officials made direct approaches to 





Interview with Michael Scrafton. In the end, the Russian Federation indicated a willingness to 
'expeditiously consider additional measures to resolve the si tuation in East Timor.' 
(Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition, p. 252). 
These conditions (or close variations) were described in numerous public statements, 
including Defence Public Affairs, 'Transcript, Hon. John Moore, MP & Hon. Alexander 
Downer', Commonwealth Offices, Melbourne, 6 September 1999, available 
http://www.minister.dcfence.gov.au, accessed 12 December 2007; Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, East Timar, p. 133; and Interview with Chris Barrie. 
Goldsworthy, 'East Timor', p. 248-9. 
These approaches are outl ined in Greenlees and Garran, pp. 240--8, and included calls by 
Secretary of State Madeline /\!bright, Secretary of Defense William Cohen, Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs and General Henry Shelton. Commander USPACOM Admiral Denis Blair also 
made a short and reputedly pointed visit lo General Wiranto on 8 September. President 
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conunit combat troops to the mission unless the situation turned dramatically worse.39 
This surprised ministers who thought they knew US leaders well and thought they 
understood the Australia, New Zealand and United States Security Treaty (ANZUS): 
... I spoke to Bill Cohen, who I knew before ... The answer from Cohen was 
'it is your baby' . I said that you need to help-it's part of ANZUS. But he said 
it is all yours. I asked what he would do, and he said he' ll have to think about 
it. He said they would give us intelligence, and he would get back to us. But 
h .d . I , , 40 e sai precise y, no troops ... 
This sparked further consultative efforts on multiple fronts: 
When I spoke to Howard about the fact that we were getting absolutely 
nowhere with Cohen on the matter, I said I was astonished. He said that APEC 
[the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting] is on in Auckland, and I'll 
speak to Clinton. Downer went off to New York, and he was going to chase 
around there. Nothing came of that. When Howard spoke to Clinton, Clinton 
said he would have to do something for us. So I rang Cohen again and Cohen 
rang back. He said he'd come out to Australia to meet me in Cairns ... 41 
The importance of obtaining support for JNTERFET from Southeast Asian 
nations was quickly understood, and Australia used a range of methods to ensure such 
consultation occurred quickly. The 9-12 September APEC meeting in Auckland was 
critical to this effort, as it brought many key regional leaders together. But as the 
earlier discussion of Air Marshal Riding's regional tour in September shows, not all 
consultation was successful to the extent initially envisaged. In Malaysia's case, early 
discussions with Australian diplomats indicated that a significant leadership role and a 
sizable troop contribution would be forthcoming.42 Malaysia's ultimate decision not to 





Clinton made a number of approaches to President Habibie, including the direct call for 
Indonesia to accept a peacekeeping force on l 0 September (Associated Press, 'U.S. Suspends 
Military Relations with Indonesia', The Augusta Chronicle, I 0 September 1999, p. A09). 
Interview with John Castellaw. John Moore recalled how he asked Cohen for an assurance 
that US troops would provide additional support if the situation became ' murky', which the 
US Defense secretary agreed to do. Goldsworthy claims the US decision not to deploy combat 
troops on the ground with INTERFET was made clear to the Australians on 9 September 
('East Timor', p. 249). 
Interview with John Moore. 
Interview with .John Moore. 
Some have also pointed to the importance placed in not 'offending' Indonesia and to the 
Association of Southeast Asian state's (ASEAN) doctrine of 'non-interference ' (Interview 
with Ashton Calvert, and A Ryan, Primary responsibilities and primary risks: Australian 
Defence Force panicipation in the International Force East Timor, Land Warfare Studies 
Centre, Duntroon, 2000, p. 4 I). 
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international relationships intrude on consultation.43 Other ASEAN nations also 
needed to balance competing concerns. Singapore's decision calculus included local 
sensitivities about sending conscripts overseas, and a desire to avoid offending 
Indonesia or Australia.44 The Philippines Government were concerned for the danger 
to their Catholic neighbours, but also wanted to maintain a good relationship with 
Indonesia. This led to the dispatch of a 'humanitarian task force' from the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines to East Timor, and a medical team to West Timor.45 That 
twenty-two nations eventually joined the coalition speaks for a significant success of 
this consultation, even if it did not achieve exactly what might have been hoped for. 
Consultation continued with Indonesia, with the aim of establishing the 
modalities for deconflicting INTERFET and TNI operation in Dili: 
We wanted to de-conflict their operations, so we had three days of talks [at the 
United Nations in New York] to manage the matter in great detail. It also gave 
them a sense of pa11nership, and might have even helped in the long run. We 
never talked about it publicly, and it never came up.46 
On the aid front, consultation moved quickly once the humanitarian task 
became clear and the need to create a new government from scratch was known. In 
this case, AusAID was able to provide immediate assistance and create an interim 
development strategy. Their work before the popular consultation provided a 
springboard for this. Established links with the United Nations and United States also 
helped, even though new players from these organisations entered the scene.47 
Domestic consultation 
Consultation on national security policy is not unknown in Australia. As 
Chapter 1 explained, the government conducted consultation during the process for 
developing the 2000 Defence White Paper. More recently, a reference group was 






Jt is hard to separate this outcome from other factors, such as the poisonous relationship 
between then-Prime Minister Mahathir and Australia and concern over command and funding 
arrangements (Interviews with 051-06 and 046-06. See also A Ryan, pp. 40-2 and 
Goldsworthy, 'East Timor', p. 251 ) 
Interviews with 051-06 and 046-06; and Goldsworthy, 'East Timor', pp. 251-2. 
Goldsworthy, 'East Timor', p. 252. 
Interview with Martin Brady. Interview 007-05 also reco unted the importance of these talks, 
and of the important work done by Australia's mission to the UN during the c risis. 
Interview with Scott Dawson. 
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Trusted Information Sharing Network provides a useful link between government and 
business in the field of information infrastructure security. However, no comparable 
forums existed in 1999 where the government could consult with the community 
about the East Timor crisis. 
At best, there were two indirect methods of consultation. The first, which has 
been mentioned earlier and will be taken up again in Chapter 7, was Parliament's 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee enquiry into East Timor.48 
This committee heard testimony from many individuals, community groups and 
officials during its hearings, and these provided a broad picture of what the Australian 
community thought about the situation in East Timor. Furthermore, the government 
had access to polling data about the crisis at frequent intervals.49 However, because 
neither constitutes a solicitation of opinion by the executive, or discussions before 
decisions are taken, they cannot be considered consultation in the sense proposed by 
Bridgman and Davis. 
While falling well short of the consultation efforts made in 1941-42 
(see Chapter 2), the government still provided information directly to the opposition 
about their policy on East Timor. This contact followed convention where the 
government seeks to create a bipartisan view of policy by discussing major 
commitments, such as the deployment of troops, with the opposition. This may also 
extend to allowing opposition leaders to read intelligence reports and receive briefings 
from officials. However, these briefings took the form of one-way discussions 
according to then-opposition leader, Kim Beazley: 
48 
49 
The opposition is not consulted on national security. The opposition is often 
quite intensively briefed, but we are not seen as part of the decision-making 
process. On some occasions, such as when it is necessary for us to facil itate a 
piece of legislation [through Parliament] you get engaged, but that's up to the 
prime minister ... [with regard to East Timor specificallyJ ... l was briefed 
occasionally [as opposition leader], but our defence and foreign affairs 
Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, Final Report into the Inquiry into 
East Timor, 2000. 
Newspoll conducted a survey on 12 September that asked voters directly about the 
government's handling of the crisis (http://www.ncwspoll.eom.au, accessed 26 August 2006). 
Roy Morgan Research also asked voters about their perceptions of the government and the 
opposition three times during September- October 1999, and made comment on voter' s 
positive views of how the prime minister was handling the crisis ('Labor Stretches Two-Party 
Preferred Lead As Troops Go In To East Timar', Finding No. 3240, 12 October 1999, 
availahle http://www.roymorgan.com, accessed 26 August 2006). 
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spokesmen were briefed aJJ the time. Very regularly. It was much more 
intense than now ... 50 
Despite this, the opposition was given advance notice of the major deployments, such 
as the corrunitment of UNT AET and lNTERFET, but not other major initiatives, such 
as the Howard Letter. Beazley's final remark shows that this convention may not be 
applied consistently, or at least applied as consistently as the alternative government 
might like. 
Secrecy and consultation 
The principle of strict secrecy was applied in this crisis, although, as the 
comments above about leaks showed, it was not always maintained. Despite these 
breaches, four main reasons for maintaining secrecy can be identified in this case. The 
first involves protecting a policy position while it is being developed. The Howard 
Letter was a good example of how well secrecy could be applied, and how secrecy 
can prevent an initiative from being pre-empted by other parties or derailed by 
opponents. A second, related reason is to allow one side to make preparations for an 
activity without alerting possible opponents or the public. This helps to maintain the 
element of surprise; it may also allow the government to act without scrutiny during 
sensitive activities. A third reason for secrecy involves protecting confidences; this is 
why the Calvert- Roth cable was classified, and why its leaking embarrassed the 
government. Lastly, secrecy helps protect intelligence sources and methods.51 This 
need explains why Air Marshal Riding's mission to Jakarta in June 1999 was very 
risky, for it involved an admission that Australian intelligence had access to sensitive 
Indonesian information. 52 
These advantages allow governments to feel justified about maintaining 
secrecy in crises. However, it may be more difficult to maintain secrecy in the future. 
While measures can be taken to avoid leaks, these are not foolproof and come at a 




Jnterview with Kim Beazley. 
For instances where information ahout intelligence activities came in to the public domain, see 
P Daley, 'Spy effort stepped up in Timor', Age, 20 March 1999, p. 5; P Daley, 'Armed with 
information, now what?', Age, 29 May 1999, p.4; and 1 Hunter, 'Elite forces scouted island 
from April ', Sydney Morning Herald, J 1Octoher1999, p. 11. 
Greenlees and Garran, pp. 166-8. 
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access to information, analysis and opinion is likely to place pressure on the 
government's narrative in a future crisis. While some activists and the media tried to 
produce a different story to promote immediate intervention during the acute crisis, 
the Australian Government was not forced to act and the public remained 
overwhelmingly satisfied with the government's actions in September 1999.53 
Observations about consultation 
This examination of the Consultation phase presents strong evidence to 
support the proposed characteristics of crisis policymaking and shows continuity with 
the past. However, some characteristics may change in the future as the public gains 
access to more information and provides instant feedback though polls. 
In this case, consultation efforts did not involve the government engaging the 
public in any real way. Instead, the main consultation was between the Australian 
Government and foreign entities, especially the governments of the United States, 
Indonesia, Portugal and New Zealand; and non-government agencies including the 
United Nations and East Timorese leaders. Most of this consultation took place in the 
space between infonnation and partnership on the Bridgman and Davis continuum. 
The Australian Government used this space to obtain views about policy options 
(generally in terms of others' aims and positions), convince others of the merits of the 
Australian case and develop aligned positions with important actors. 
Interaction with specific entities later in the crisis showed consultation in the 
form of delegation, verging on control. In this case, the Australian Government was 
only willing to act decisively to stabilise East Timor if their desired conditions for 
intervention were met by Indonesia, the United Nations and others. This movement 
along the consultation continuum showed the real limits of the Australian 
Government's agency in this crisis, and demonstrated the importance of creating 
space for future activity th.rough constant attention to relationship building. Space was 
53 For examples of media encouragement, see P Kelly, 'From the Lips of Prime Ministers: 
Diplomacy al the Crossroads', Australian, 15 September 1999, p. 13; and A Rolt, 'Don't 
Expect Praise', Herald Sun (Melbourne), 16 September I 999, p. 18. Of course, critics also 
assai led the government for its handling of the crisis (for example, see G Sheridan, 'The 
Burden is Here to Stay', Australian, 17 September J 999, p. I 5). For the public's reaction, as 
judged in Newspoll's 12 September 1999 questions shows opinions evenly split between 
support for the government's actions and opinion that the government was not doing enough 
(see hup://www.newspoll.com.au, accessed 26 September 2006). 
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needed because the Australian Government was unwilling to create a deeper conflict 
with Indonesia by pressing ahead unilaterally. It therefore had to rely on bringing 
others to a similar way of thinking about the problem, which meant providing support 
for an intervention while satisfying a domestic public that was calling for action to 
stop the violence. While there was a clear and timely coincidence of agreement in the 
international community about what needed to be done in East Timor, developing the 
intervention force still required significant consultation and persuasion. The 
Australian Government's ability to do both was assisted by the violence and the 
pattern of diplomatic contact that had been developed over the previous year-and 
indeed, in previous years. 
Bridgman and Davis consider consultation as intrinsically good for policy 
development because it increases policy legitimacy and acceptance, and this case 
provides examples where consultation was beneficial to Australia. It is clear, for 
instance, that consultation reduces friction in policymaking because it allows the 
government to understand the policy positions of others and provide opportunities to 
devise strategies to overcome possible friction. For example, the limited consultation 
between the government and the opposition served to build sufficient consensus for 
the government's action without letting the opposition share the credit for the 
decisions. While this consultation may only come late in the crisis or appear 
perfunctory, it remains an important step for winning bipartisan support, especially for 
military action, in a crisis. The value of consulting with international leaders was also 
shown in this crisis. Even though the consultation undertaken at APEC in Auckland 
imposed a short delay in the process, it was clearly worth using this opportunity to 
gain international support for intervention. 
The Howard Letter shows the risk when consultation is not undertaken. After 
the government's new policy position became known, wider and more focused 
consultation began with a broader range of actors. Since some actors held opinions 
that differed from Australia's, the government found that it needed to do significant 
work to close the gaps in views (notably with the United States over the likely 
outcomes and the applicability of the ANZUS Treaty) as the pressure to act increased 
throughout the year. 
Regardless of the potential for gains and cost avoidance, consultation is not 
automatically beneficial in crises because it can actually decrease the chances of 
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success. Firstly, consultation increases the time it takes to make a decision by 
increasing the number of actors involved, potentially allowing other parties to take the 
initiative or resulting in missed opportunities. Consultation also gives opponents time 
to take pre-emptive action or marshal opinion against a policy. This desire to limit the 
potential for damaging criticism or debate was one reason why knowledge of the 
Howard Letter was confined to a very small group and not shared with allies. Lastly, 
consultation also increases the chances of allowing other parties to know one's 
intentions. Thus the compromise of policy intentions during consultation can 
jeopardise surprise and reduce trust among potential partners. These reasons provide 
support for anticipating a continued role for the characteristic of secrecy in crisis 
policymaking. 
Does this mean the public is more likely to be consulted beyond the current 
level of information in a crisis? While formal consultation remains unlikely, the 
proliferation of opinion polls through the Internet, television and conventional polling 
methods means that governments will be made constantly aware of the public 's mood 
in any future crisis and may need to respond. 
Coordination 
The Coordination phase aims to achieve 'tolerable compatibility' across 
government activities in an attempt to minimise harmful inconsistencies. This phase is 
characterised by the way coordination is institutionalised through structures and 
routine processes.54 However, there is more to coordination than this, and it is possible 
that other influences- often described as bureaucratic politics-can also interfere. 
54 
Two characteristics for the Coordination phase were identified in Part I: 
• Governments will describe structures and routines that suit their 
particular preferences and best thinking for the time, the task at hand, 
and external factors. 
• Coordination is basically competitive, but it shows increasing propensity 
for collegiality. 
Bridgman and Davis, pp. 93- 7. 
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This section examines how the structures and routines described in Chapter 4 
actually worked in this crisis, while pointing to the importance of informal practices 
that bind this system together. The thorny question of bureaucratic politics is then 
broached, for this case provides evidence to support a collegiate view of modern 
policymaking. 
Structures and routines for coordination 
Structure is often used to promote coordination where tasks are complex and 
require different types of specialised knowledge, or where conflicts of interest can 
occur.55 In this case structural changes were made to clarify roles, to improve dialogue 
between departments and to meet the tangible challenges of this crisis. However, 
opinions about the role of central agencies- which Bridgman and Davis see as 
essential to coordination-and the effectiveness of those changes were varied. The 
role of political leadership in coordination is also underplayed and deserves separate 
consideration. 
Early interdepartmental dialogue became fonnali sed in a number of different 
ways by April 1999. Further to existing committees and forming new ones (such as 
Bill Paterson's group), departments extended standing invitations to others to attend 
internal planning meetings (such as Defence's East Timor Working Group and 
Strategic Command Group-SCG), and joint delegations travelled to places such as 
the United Nations and Washington. DF AT helped to tie these structural changes 
together by exercising a leading role in the period before INTERFET's deployment. 
This involved being the focal point for Cabinet submissions, leadership of a variety of 
interdepartmental delegations, raising a consular crisis centre with ad hoc staffing that 
provided information to a range of agencies, and retaining the chair of the Strategic 
Policy Coordination Group (SPCG). 
The nature of the acute crisis in September tested these existing coordination 
structures and created the need for new ones. One of the main changes to 
interdepartmental coordination came as the National Security Committee of Cabinet 
(NSCC) began to operate on a daily basis, and the main coordinating role of the 
55 A Downs, Inside Bureaucracy, RAND/Little, Brown and Company, Boston, 1968, pp. 50- 3. 
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SPCG passed to the Taylor Committee. 56 While it could be argued that such 
arrangements could have been put in place before the crisis, some interviewees 
remarked that it was either difficult to foresee some aspects of what happened (such 
as leading the international force), or that the need to create new bodies would not 
have arisen if the violence had not triggered a rapid international intervention.57 
Opinions varied on the effectiveness of the new arrangements, particularly the 
Taylor Committee. While the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet' s (DPM&C) 
role in coordination was widely acknowledged, many also recognised that existing 
coordination mechanisms were not delivering as well as they should. But some close 
to the committee (but outside it) were sceptical about its role and effectiveness. Some 
commented that the Taylor Committee became too bureaucratic and inflexible, or that 
it existed on the fringe of the action.58 Others did not consider ad hoc solutions 
suitable in any case: 
... and it seemed to me that the establishment of this new mechanism under 
PM&C, to replace other mechanisms that I think were working satisfactorily, 
was a mistaken move and a move that was made more about bureaucratic 
I. . h d d . 59 po 1t1cs t an goo a vice to government. 
I'm not so sure about the 'wrong output from the SPCG' line [as justifying the 
need for the Taylor Committee]: if you don't like the oulfcut, tell the SPCG to 
create the right output, rather than create another body . .. 0 
Other interviewees, often those closely involved in the committee, were more 







The whole suppo1t to government stepped up eight or ten notches as a 
consequence of Allan's committee. A lot of it was due to having the function, 
and a lot was Allan's ability to manage it.61 
The fTaylor] Committee ... kept the discipline if you like ... It wasn' t a high-
powered policymaking body, it was there to coordinate. To smooth the 
wheels.62 
Interview 051 -06 observed that the informal processes o f SPCG made it unsuited to managing 
a crisis and noted broader concerns about the need to coordinate better at the official level. For 
background, see the section in Chapter 4 titled 'Acute crisis and response'. 
Interviews with Chris Barrie, 024-05 and 028-05. 
Interviews with Aldo Borgu, 009-05, Michael Scrafton and 032-05. 
Interview with Hugh White. 
Interview with Michael Keating. 
Interview with Michael Scrafton. 
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... to some degree the creation of another committee was amusing at the time. 
But with hindsight, what we didn't realise at the time, was that we were 
learning. So when we found something wasn't working, we formed the Taylor 
Committee. It wasn't the case that we just stuck with something. We moved 
onto a different model ... 63 
The Taylor Committee came after a very hectic year and an acute crisis. It was 
time to find a way to step back, draw a breath and find a way to develop some 
medium- and long-term policy options for the relationship with Indonesia.64 
The adoption of new methods to coordinate policy shows, as Aldo Borgu 
noted, that the government as a whole was learning as it went. The key officials 
learned quickly about the potential disconnects that could occur in the existing 
structures and the weaknesses in those mechanisms, so they made changes. In one 
interpretation, this shows that a highly adaptive mindset is necessary to keep the 
activities of a large number of agencies coordinated in a national security crisis. It also 
shows that practicing ministers and senior officials in crisis simulations may help 
them to learn before an event, and so reduce the chance of mid-crisis change. In 
another interpretation, decisions to form new bodies in the midst of a crisis can be 
simply part of an ongoing conflict where agencies jockey for power. 
One prescription for avoiding conflict over responsibilities (or turf) is role 
clarity. A lack of role clarity, should it exist, can have consequences including 
conflict, nugatory work at lower levels, and work at 'cross purposes with people 
running different agendas'.65 While some activities needed active de-confliction and 
demarcation, Australian government agencies seem to have possessed a reasonable 
idea about what they were required to do during this crisis. For example, the 
coordination role played by DPM&C was understood and not disputed, as was 
DFA T's leading role in the pre-crisis meetings with external actors and Cabinet 
submissions. This is not to claim that the division ofresponsibilities was always clear, 
and Alan Ryan thought 'the issue of how departmental responsibilities were divided 
was never fully resolved'.66 However, some instances of where people are uncertain 






Interview with 01 4-05. 
Interview wi th Aldo Borgu. 
Interview wi th Ashton Calvert. 
Interview Bob Treloar. 
A Ryan, p. 39. 
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Having a way to settle these disputes quickly, authoritatively and with 
minimal work is therefore essential to successful coordination. The method used in 
this crisis can best be likened to a series of courts. Small problems between 
departments, generally technical ones linked to different interpretations of policy or 
legislation, may get resolved at lower-level committees such as Bill Paterson's or in 
discussions between officials. If not solved here, problems would be elevated to more 
senior committees including the SPCG, the Taylor Committee and the Secretaries 
Committee on National Security (SCONS). The final court was the NSCC, but the 
ministers would be displeased if a matter reached them that could have been resolved 
at lower levels.67 
Agencies were very aware of their responsibilities, but still willing to cede 
some at different times. One example involved Defence conducting important 
diplomatic tasks instead of DFAT (as discussed in Chapter 5). Understanding what 
counterpart organisations actually do is another way of ameliorating conflict.68 The 
less-formal interactions between DFAT and Strategic Operations staff mentioned by 
Michael Keating were attempts to promote this understanding. 
Providing a forum to reconcile issues is another way of inducing role clarity 
and reducing the problem of turf battles. According to Interview 052-06, the SCONS 
played an important role as it allowed a 'fairly robust discussion' between the 
departmental secretruies. Issues that could not be resolved here would be referred to 
the ministers. All were aware that such a move would provide additional, unwelcome 
work for the minister that could be viewed as a failure on their part. 
The role of the central agencies of DPM&C and Treasury is interesting 
because this case provides an important distinction between the view of coordination 
presented by Bridgman and Davis, and this particular instance of crisis policymaking. 
According to B1idgman and Davis, the central agencies 'work to resist fragmentation 
67 
68 
In his interview, Tim Fischer recounted the prime minister's intolerance to wards 'protecting 
fie fdoms ' and airing interdepartmental conflicts in NSCC. 
Interview with Adrien Whiddett. 
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by providing consistent rules and processes' .69 Their view receives wide support in 
other literature, including work that ascribes a key role to the British Treasury.70 
This case provides partial support for the usual interpretation of the roles 
played by central agencies. On balance, DPM&C played its normal role throughout.71 
It was involved in developing the broad direction for policy (such as its involvement 
in drafting the Howard Letter), while performing its usual tasks of advising the prime 
minister and guiding Cabinet business. DPM&C's main new intervention in the 
process-forming Bill Paterson's group-was also a fairly normal task. While no 
doubt useful, this committee played a relatively small part in coordination compared 
to others such as the SPCG (which included DPM&C representation), DFAT's East 
Timor Task Force and Defence' s East Timor Working Group.72 This meant that 
DPM&C did not assume a leading position until the acute crisis. On the other hand, 
the other major central agency, the Treasury, was only a minor player. It limited its 
involvement mainly to matters of expenditure, although it would have played a key 
role in the question of the 'Timor Tax'. 
Political leadership through the NSCC was another structural element of 
coordination with a deeper relevance. The view of NSCC as the bridge for national 
security policy was mentioned in Chapter 3, as this is the place where authoritative 
commands were issued and, sometimes, where coordination linked different 
departments. When asked about how coordination looked from the political level, 
Interview 048-06 commented that it was 'better than normal' because the daily NSCC 
meetings imposed discipline on the bureaucracy; there was less room for conflict 
because answers were needed the next day. But routine was not the only factor. The 
strong solidarity of the NSCC was important for preventing gaps opening between 






Bridgman and Davis, p. 97. 
These works include H Heclo and A Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money: 
Community and Policy inside British Politics, MacMillan, London, 1974; and MJ Smith, 
The Core Executive in Britain, MacMillan Press, Basingstoke, 1999. 
Interview 052-06 noted how DPM&C handled their role 'as normal' though International 
Division and, later, the Taylor Committee. 
Both DFAT's and Defence's coordinating committees met far more frequently than Paterson's 
group, and often included representatives from the same organisations. 
While John Moore thought the relationships between key ministers were very good 
(lnterview, 29 November 2006), other interviewees thought competition between the prime 
minister and Treasurer Peter Costello could be observed. 
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departments among the senior ministers and indeed senior leaders. As Tim Fischer 
noted, anything more than 'a touch of light banter' would have resulted in a censure 
from the prime minister and secretary of DPM&C.74 This type of attitude had a 
distinctive flow-on effect that will be discussed later in this section. 
Ministerial staffs were also involved in coordination through their role in 
keeping their minister aligned with the prime minjster and other ministers. This role 
extended to keeping ministers aware of departmental activities, whether by reading 
submissions, calling senior departmental officers, or attending departmental meetings 
in some cases. Advisers would also help to coordinate activity by describing ' the 
minister's thinkjng' on various issues. Of these advisers, the prime minister's 
international adviser played a crucial part as a conduit of information to, and from, the 
prime rrunister.75 
Routines also help to coordinate activities by makjng actions consistent and 
predictable.76 Thus the DPM&C's Cabinet Handbook outlines a number of routines 
that ensure coordination occurs before submissions are presented to Cabinet.77 These 
processes are supported- in theory at least- by strong links between the norm of 
coordination, the concept of collective responsibility of Cabinet, and the strong desire 
to prevent surprises from emerging at the Cabinet table or in discussion between 
senior officials.78 
While formal Cabinet submissions seem to have been used infrequently in this 
case, it was usual for other documents and draft cables to be circulated to relevant 
stakeholders before final submission. The small size of the policy community 
undoubtedly helped to make this process relatively smooth.79 Of the major instruments 







Interview 051 -06 also said that the prime minister would not tolerate poor cooperation. 
Interview with Aldo Borgu. 
G Davis, A Government of Routines: Executive Coordination in an Australian State, Centre 
for Australian Public Sector Management/MacMillan, South Melbourne, 1995, pp. 24-6. 
BG Peters, 'Managing horizontal government: The politics of co-ordination, Public 
Administration, vol. 76, no. 2, 1998, p. 4 1. 
Interview with 052-06. 
Interviews with 028-05 and 032-05. 
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and-although a relatively recent innovation at the time--email that helped make the 
processes work at the speed required. 80 
Despite this, and noting that uncertainty still exists over what was discussed at 
the 1 December 1999 NSCC meeting, the East Timor crisis appears to have begun 
with an instance of poor coordination: 
I said to Max [Moore-Wilton] that I had just heard about the Jetter to Habibie 
and that we weren't consulted on that letter. I said that we had consultative 
processes coming out our ears, and they are rigorously enforced, insisted 
h . 81 upon, except w en 1t matters. 
The effect of this lack of coordination was felt deeply within Defence. On top 
of the frustration expressed by Hugh White at the 15 January 1999 SPCG meeting (as 
discussed in Chapter 4), Defence planners were forced into a situation where a range 
of practical options needed to be devised quickly. The ADF itself needed to conduct a 
crash program of resource redistribution and training to bring sufficient forces to 
readiness for deployment. 
Other problems-many of which were discussed earlier in Chapters 4 and 5-
continued to flow from the initial decision not to consult or coordinate. In particular, it 
was clear that DFAT's prefen-ed policy line of early 1999, which aimed to prevent a 
major rupture in Australian- Indonesian relations, could have been compromised by 
Defence's need to prepare forces for operations. The problem was further embodied in 
the different ways both departments viewed the possible course of the crisis, and their 
different concepts of 'worst case' .82 
While a number of instances have been discussed already, communication 
between departments posed additional problems. On one hand, it can be difficult to 
find the person who could make a decision in a large place like Defence, and work-




Most interviewees spoke of the importance of direct communicatio n to coordination. For 
example, Adrien Whiddett spoke of regular liaison meetings and te lephone calls, 
Andrew Hughes spoke of the need for a central crisis room and Allan Behm spoke of the way 
email could be used effectively when people asked themselves who really needed to know the 
information. 
Interview with Paul Barratt. 
Interviews with Allan Behm, Peter Briggs and 035-05. 
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with specific people.83 There were also times where people found themselves talking 
in different languages: another interviewee thought a 'Babel Fish' was needed to 
interpret between the government and the ADF on some occasions.84 But even if such 
a device existed, there would still be a range of other problems confronting 
coordination, such as secrecy, compartmentalisation, policy ambiguity and the turf 
battles associated with bureaucratic politics. 
Collegiality trumps turf 
Structures and processes are clearly important to coordination, but they may 
not be sufficient. As the discussion about bureaucratic politics in Chapter 1 showed, 
there is a deep-seated view that government agencies act in their own self-interests 
and this creates conflictual relationships. While it is possible to observe instances of 
conflict and competition between departments in this case, these instances were 
relatively minor and immaterial to the outcome. Instead, this case provides support for 
the view that relationships between government departments in a crisis are more 
collegial and reliant upon informal aspects of coordination such as relationships and 
trust. 
Strong personal relationships, a willingness to approach the work with a 
collegial attitude, and the small size of the group involved in the case and their 







I think [relationships are] critical ... especially at the SES [Senior Executive 
Service] level in the Commonwealth, and even the states.86 
That our senior ministers, senior bureaucrats and senior military have worked 
with each other in the past means they can talk with each other on the phone 
and fix problems. That was a great advantage in J 999.87 
Interviews with 0 14-05, 028-05, Andrew Hughes and Major General John Hartley (Canberra, 
27 September 2005). Hartley was Land Commander Australia in 1999. As such, he was 
responsible for preparing Australian land forces for deployment and providing advice to the 
Chief of AJmy and CO MAST. 
Interview 009-05. A 'Babel J-"ish' is a mythical animal that instantly translates any language 
into another. 
Interview 020-05, 051 -06 and 032-05 commented on the way the small group involved in 
national security policy was a particular advantage for Canberra. 
Interview with Adrien Whidden. 
Interview with 029-05. 
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[Relationships] were very important. Did I go about building them? No, I 
didn ' t. They came about through a process that I don't think exists any more. I 
went though a series of jobs that put me into professional contact with military 
officers who were coming up through the system ... 88 
I knew most of the people. One of the points I would make is that coordination 
in Australia is easier in the security area than in any other major country that I 
am aware of because .. . [for examplel all of the other heads of the intelligence 
agencies had been contempora1ies, or near contemporaries in DF AT in the 60s 
and 70s. So we knew one another. We could j ust pick up the phone. We were 
around the lake. It was not difficult to coordinate at aII.89 
Trust also allowed action to occur faster, and the familiarity gained during 
ordinary times often bred confidence between people.90 While relationships usually 
worked better where they had been established, newcomers were not excluded. It was 
normal for people recently appointed to CanbeITa to need to develop relationships 
quickly; although on some occasions, newly aITived senior officials would delegate 
(for a short period) the function of working with other stakeholders to a close 
subordinate who had been in Canbeffa longer. When the time came to build one's 
own network, officials generally did so through the formal structure of meetings and 
committees. Beyond that, people grew their relationships through telephone calls, 
emails and informal discussions. 91 
In other situations, people with wide-ranging ties could be used as 







I think one role that I played was that I was seen to be a reasonably sensible 
player from both the bureaucratic and political side of the house, which was 
kind of to lend a bit of confidence in both areas that their concerns were being 
taken care of.92 
The key [to understanding the positions of other ministers] was the Defence 
and Foreign Affairs Adviser to the Prime Minister, Michael Thawley ... he 
Interview with Michael Scrafton. 
Interview with 014-05. 
Interview with 02 1-05 (Canberra, I 2 August 2005). Interview 021 -05 was a former senior 
Defence intelligence official. 




understood defence, he understood foreign affairs ... and he was an enormous 
93 
support to me when I started at Defence ... 
Thus trust was clearly important to coordination in this case, and it seems to 
have been more widespread-to different degrees, but widespread nonetheless-at the 
more senior levels in the government. Thus relationships within Cabinet, and between 
officials and ministers in NSCC, were important to maintaining cooperation 
throughout.94 At other times, strong relationships and trust had not been formed at 
lower levels and this could be a problem: 
... that level of relationship didn't necessarily exist further down the chain-
that it was more compartmentalised both within and between organisations.95 
It was not all plain sailing though, and a few interviewees reported minor 
instances of disagreement and even conflict between individuals.96 One went as far as 
to speak of animosity between Defence and DFA T at some levels, especially at first. 
However, the same interviewee also said that: 
When people realised what needed to happen, they just got on and worked 
together ... and made things happen despite other issues and problems. So 
when the group was brought together and given some imprimatur to do 
something, I think, that even if the government structures and formalities 
weren't there, individually we all got on and worked well together.97 
This experience was echoed by Interview 033-06, who said that working 
together in a crisis soon overcame attitudes whereby people were departmental 
representatives first, and team members second.98 This view of good working 
relationships was also seen in instances where parts of different organisations worked 







Interview with John Moore. 
John Moore described his strong trust in one of his senior officials, and how this influenced 
his way of working. Daryl Williams identi fied the need to trust people because he, as a 
minister, did not have all the information. Hugh White observed the long way many o fficials 
had to come in l 996 to overcome the new government 's mistrust of their relationship with the 
previous government. 
Interview with Andrew Hughes. 
Interviews with Paul Barratt, 01 2-05, Michael Keating and Andrew Hughes all cited instances 
where disagreement or conflict occurred. However, none recalled this as a major impediment 
to policymaking. 
Interview with Matthew Skoien. Interview 062-07 thought that some DFAT officials had a 
poor understanding of ADF officers and tended to underestimate their knowledge. 
Interview 062-07 also noted the importance of establishing himself as part of the team when 
sent to work in another department. 
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I don't recall any animosity. Strategic Command had been working 
extensively with relevant DFAT teams-joint briefings on what we did and 
why, and at social gatherings including dinners and drinks-before and after I 
arrived .. . All this was to our favour after the crisis statted.99 
This kind of divergence in opinions about working relationships shows how 
perceptions of conflict can vary according to where you sit, and can be strongly 
influenced by personalities. In other words, conflict may occur as a result of 
institutional pressures, but conflict also occurs because individuals simply allow it to. 
Observations about coordination 
This case provides support for the importance of structures and routines to 
coordination. However, since the evidence of this case adds weight to the collegial 
interpretation of relationships, the proposed characteristic of policymaking as 
'basically competitive with a propensity of increasing collegiality' will be 
reformulated to read 'coordination is basically collegial, but the potential for conflict 
should not be ignored' . Since this represents both a discontinuity with previous 
Australian experiences and a characteristic with a caveat, there is prospect for change 
in the future. 
This case shows the importance being flexible enough to change structures and 
routines when the situation warrants. Such flexibility was shown in the way different 
committees were formed to cope with both the increased policy workload and the 
imperative of keeping activity aligned. Flexibility was also shown in the way 
departments invited others to meetings, and were generally willing to present a united 
front to external agencies. 
The East Timor crisis also points to a range of other factors that were 
important to coordination. For one, this case shows that big is not necessarily better; 
the relatively small size of the Canben-a bureaucracy could help to make policy 
quickly when needed. Even more importantly, this case highlights the importance of 
relationships and trust to coordination. The importance of the informal aspects of 
coordination was reasonably well-understood by practitioners and often mentioned in 
interviews, but they are not mentioned by Bridgman and Davis. 
?9 lntervie w with Kerry Clarke. 
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Others have identified the importance of informal mechanisms. Donald 
Chisholm argues informal bargaining, norms or networks based on friendship or 
technical expertise are powerful devices under some conditions. 100 However, these 
informal mechanisms are not given enough attention, often because they are 
considered as illegal, unhealthy or designed to achieve personal- rather than 
organisational-goals. Chisholm promotes a contrary view to the orthodoxy and 
instead describes informal networks as flexible, adaptive, coherent and problem-
oriented.101 This case supports the need to encourage informal coordination methods, 
while noting the importance of formal structures that provide these with an 
overarching legitimacy. 
This case also shows some weaknesses with the interpretation of bureaucratic 
politics as the driving factor in coordination. Indeed, most of the comments about 
coordination in the interviews conducted for this study describe a far more collegial 
approach to policymaking than the theory of bureaucratic politics would allow. 
Differences-which do certainly exist-occur at the margins and these should be 
expected. However, a number of factors may have worked to lessen conflict, such as 
the small size of the bureaucracy, the urgent nature of the crisis, the relatively clear 
division of responsibilities, political leadership and the significant interpersonal 
relationships that existed between key players. 
It is entirely possible that collegiality is a transitory phenomenon. Chapter 1 
identified a school of thought that saw bureaucratic politics played a role in national 
security policymaking (see pp. 50-1), and there is evidence to show its presence in 
earlier crises (for example, during the United Action Crisis-see p. 85). In this case 
however, a collegial atti tude can be seen in the way officials emphasised the 
importance of respecting other's roles, getting on and knowing people. These norms 
were backed by a strong political will to get the job done. However, it is possible that 
a future government may not be as cohesive as the NSCC of 1999, or as able to exe1t 
their will over interdepartmental rivalries. Future collegiality should not be assumed, 
and governments will need to take active steps to promote trust and cooperation, and 
reduce the rewards for destructively competitive behaviour. 
100 
101 
D Chisholm, Coordination without Hierarchy: informal structures in. multiorganisation.al 
systems, University of California Press, Berkley, 1989, pp. 11- 12 and p. 39. 
Ibid., p. 12 and pp. 27- 8. 
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Ministers have been involved in policymaking at various stages of the cycle; 
they have been important to identifying issues, have participated in analysis and even 
conducted consultation. Their influence has also been felt in coordination. The next 
chapter examines the point where ministers become central to policymaking, namely 
decision. But that point is not the end of the story because decisions must be 
implemented and, in theory at least, evaluated. The task of examining these last three 
phases of the policy cycle is taken up in Chapter 7. 
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7 
DECISION AND BEYOND 
This chapter completes the examination of Australian crisis policymaking in 
1999 by testing the last three phases of the policy cycle: Decision, Implementation 
and Evaluation. This chapter follows the format of the previous two. 
Decision 
The Decision phase is the pivotal point of the cycle where the analysts' work 
is judged by the authoritative actors in the cycle-in this case, the prime minister and 
the NSCC. The characteristics proposed in Part I for this phase were: 
• The prime minister is dominant. 
• Officials, when invited, answer questions of a technical nature and leave 
the Cabinet room before decisions are taken. 
• Cabinet conventions are based on collective responsibility, secrecy and 
recorded decisions. 
While this phase is pivotal, it is also opaque. On top of the Thirty Year Rule 
that withholds Cabinet documents from the public, the rules and norms of the Cabinet 
process make it difficult for an outsider to develop an understanding of how decisions 
were made in this case (and others as well). As one interviewee remarked: 
Getting inside the minister-to-minister relationship is a hard veil for anyone to 
penetrate . . . they seem to keep their own counsel if they are content enough 
with how it is coming out. 1 
As a result, this section offers insights about the factors that led to specific 
decisions in the East Timor crisis. Further evidence, such as the Cabinet notebooks 
and Cabinet submissions, will be needed to reconstruct the discussions between 
Australia's senior leaders. Meanwhile, the interviews collected for this di ssertation 
provide some evidence to begin understanding the Decision phase's characteristics. 
Interview with Paul Barratt. 
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Dominant prime minister and involved committee 
While Cabinet remained the final authority for decisions, it is more useful to 
focus on the dominant role of the prime minister and the main Cabinet committee, the 
National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC). As Chapter 3 noted, the 
membership and processes of the NSCC are different to Cabinet and other committees 
in that officials are invited to sit with politicians. NSCC also has considerable formal 
power because its decisions are recorded as Cabinet decisions (although that power is 
not absolute as NSCC refers some matters to the full Cabinet). In this case, only those 
concerning the final or in-principle decisions regarding the deployment of police or 
military forces to East Timor seem to have been referred to Cabinet.2 This freedom to 
commit the government and direct activity allowed the prime minister and NSCC to 
be the dominant decision-makers in this case. 
There are three other reasons for this dominance. The first relates to Prime 
Minister Howard's personal authority. Electoral success clearly played a role in 
generating this authority, while being at the centre of the government means most key 
decisions are brokered through his office. These factors are enhanced by the prime 
minister's personality and his colleagues' trust. For Howard, this was activated 
through his meticulous attention to process and inclusive pattern of consultation; he 
learned the value of carrying his colleagues with him from observing other prime 
ministers.3 But the prime minister was also his own man: 
2 
3 
Anyone who takes the prime minister to be a patsy for anyone else is seriously 
mistaken. He would make his own decisions, and he often went against other 
ministers or officials ... No committee that Howard chairs runs by consensus. It 
runs by trying to get agreement-and that doesn't mean that Howard has made 
up his mind (beforehand)-but when he has made up his mind there is no 
doubt that he gets what he wants ... 4 
John Moore also described the autonomy generally received in defence and national security 
matters from Cahinet, and neither he nor Tim Fischer could not recall a situation where 
Cabinet overturned an NSCC decision. 
Interviews with John M oore and 05 I -06. Interview 052-06 noted how the prime minister used 
NSCC as a tool to keep his key ministers involved. Other commentators noted Howard 's 
dominant and personalised role. For examples, see J Birmingham, 'A Time For War: The 
Re-birth of Australia's Military Culture', Quarlerly Essay, no. 20, 2006, pp. 42- 3; and 
G Sheridan, 'All the World 's a Stage', in N Cater (ed), The Howard Factor: A Decade that 
Changed the Nation, The University of Melbourne Press, Carlton, 2006, p. 159. 
Interview with Chris Barrie. 
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These factors of delegation, process and personality helped Howard to lead 
authoritatively during crisis, but another factor was also important. The second reason 
was that the grouping of Howard, Treasurer Costello, Foreign Minister Downer and 
Deputy Prime Minister (and National Party leader) John Anderson meant that the 
NSCC contained Cabinet's key leaders.5 When Defence Minister John Moore-who 
had a reputation as an internal powerbroker- was added, it is not surprising that the 
NSCC was able to dominate national security decision-making at that time. 
This group relied on precedent to operate as it did. Interview 049-06 likened 
this to the authority given to the Expenditure Review Committee in the budget 
process, but there was also an intangible factor: 
I think there was a feeling of comfort [in Cabinet] that if NSCC had looked at it 
in detail then it did not need to be unpicked ... 
This confidence was born partly from the status of the individual members, and partly 
from success in managing other major issues, such as the Asian Economic Crisis.6 
When coupled with their access to information and close contact with senior officials, 
the NSCC had the means and authority to act within Cabinet's very broad guidelines 
and a degree of latitude to make new policy if needed. 
Procedural factors were the third additional reason to explain NSCC's 
dominance. One important contributor was NSCC's ability to meet daily (and 
frequently twice daily) during the crisis' acute stage.7 This meant NSCC ministers 
were kept apprised of breaking issues and agencies raised matters for decision in a 
timely fashion.8 Other factors that helped promote NSCC's role included access to 
briefings, the ability to question senior officials in depth and together (noting 
ministers would not usually be able to quiz the senior officials from departments other 
than their own), and the ability to conduct consultative and coordination tasks 
themselves. Taken together, these procedural factors gave the national security 




Anderson replaced Tim Fischer in July l 999. 
Interviews with Chris Barrie and Aldo Borgu. The Asian Economic Crisis refers to the series 
of interconnected financial meltdowns that afflicted some Asian countries, including 
Indonesia, in 1997-98. 
It is hard to determine the actual frequency of full Cahinet meetings during the acute phase of 




them to move NSCC from being a decision-making body alone towards being a body 
for decision and management. 
Dominance has pitfalls though. It is also possible that a dorrtinant group can 
suffer from a cognitive defect, such as bias or groupthink. While the methodology 
used in this dissertation was not suited to identify these types of problems, it is 
possible to see how the NSCC could get sidetracked on important, but nonetheless 
second-order issues: 
Minister Downer made his 'coalition of the willing' remark on [the weekendl. 
NSCC met on Monday and did not discuss it- they focused on the safety of 
consular officials in Dili instead. They got to the coalition statement on 
Tuesday, [the same day] Habibie was in press saying it would not happen.9 
These remarks were widely reported10, and the notion was quickly and explicitly 
rejected by President Habibie. 11 Yet this apparent diplomatic disagreement did not 
ultimately have a major effect on support for Australia's leadership role. In Hugh 
White's opinion, that was a close call. While consular official safety is important, the 
focus on this issue to the exclusion of major matters such as international 
relationships and national credibility prevented the NSCC from developing a unified 
view on coalition development at this delicate moment. It also prevented NSCC from 
considering how best to clarify what might have been interpreted as a call to arms 
against Indonesia. ' It was lucky that we had the initiative,' said White.12 
Prime Minister Howard used other mechanisms for decision-making in this 
crisis. Of these, unilateral decisions were the least used and seem limited only to times 
where he was discussing fast-moving events with international leaders. 13 More 
commonly, Howard would discuss important emerging issues with Downer and 







Interview with Hugh White, who was referring Downer's doorstop interview on 
4 September 1999 (see G Barker, 'Australian foreign minister on possible peacekeeping 
force ', Radio Australia, 4 September 1999). 
P Daley, 'Troops Could Go Within Days', Sunday Age, 5 September 1999. 
S Anthony, 'Jakarta blocks Canberra's call for armed intervention', West Australian, 
6 September 1999. 
Interview with Hugh White. 
Hugh White recounts the interaction between Howard and Kofi Anan as one instance, 
although Howard was probably working within the NSCC's agreed course at the time. 
Defence Minister Moore acknowledged that a 'sub group' of Ministers - not the full NSCC 
would be meeting on the night of 6 September 1999 to discuss the Timor Crisis (see Defence 
Public Affairs, 'Transcript, Hon John Moore, MP & Hon Alexander Downer', Commonwealth 
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between ministerial advisers and the pnme minister' s office. Interview 051-06 
characterised such discussions as a normal way of doing business, especially in a 
system where ministers have substantial authority to act in their own right and direct 
control over some of the principal instruments. Since these discussions tended to 
foreshadow subsequent NSCC discussions and decisions, the committee's central role 
was preserved. 15 
Closely involved officials 
The emergent role for NSCC was also influenced by the growing trust 
between the polHical leaders and their senior officials during l 999. In 1998, it was 
common for officials to attend NSCC, but not always stay for the entire meeting; at 
times, they would be asked to leave when matters got 'political'. There would also be 
occasions where officials were not invited at all. 16 
This situation changed in 1999, where senior officials, the prime minister's 
international adviser and (frequently) less-senior officials and ministerial staff 
attended most, if not all meetings and stayed throughout. 17 According to one 
interviewee, this was indicative of the government learning that the bureaucracy was 
not full of 'old Laborites', but of seasoned public servants who were experienced in 
national security matters. 18 At other times, it was a reflection of fast-moving events. 
The privilege of attending the complete NSCC meeting provided those senior 
officials with a better understanding of the reasons for decisions, and an opportunity 
to comment as the discussion progressed toward decision. It did not, however, mean 
that the officials participated in the decision, for 'you always knew they were the 
decision-makers and we were the advisers' . 19 The close involvement was reflected by 






Offices, Melbourne, 6 September 1999, available http://www.minister.defence.gov.au, 
accessed 12 December 2007). 
Interview wi th John Moore. Interviews with T im Fischer, 051-06, 048-06 and 064-07 also 
described the important role of informal contac t between ministers and the facilitating role of 
their advisory staff. 
Interview with John Moore. 
Interviews with Hugh W hite and Paul Barratt. 
Interview with Chris Barrie. This point was supported in interviews with Daryl Williams, 
T im Fisher and John M oore. 
Interview with Paul Barratt. 
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even 'collegiality' .20 These descriptions speak of a high degree of trust-in the 
main- between the NSCC ministers and their senior officials when dealing with a 
crisis. 
A conventional Cabinet? 
While Cabinet's conventions were observed, some were bent to fit the 
requirements of crisis in 1999. Of these, secrecy and collective responsibility 
remained intact, although the latter was modified in that the Committee- rather than 
the full Cabinet- took most major operational decisions. 
Compromises were made in other areas as well. For one, the NSCC took many 
briefs verbally, which bypassed the normal process of written submissions and 
coordinating comments. This weakness was ameliorated by the Taylor Committee's 
work, as it consulted across government relatively quickly when preparing their 
submissions. Another factor that reduced potential consternation over the Jack of 
formal process was that the ministers and officials understood the nature of crisis 
decision-making, and were willing to accept the occasional surprise: 'No one was too 
precious about having uncleared matters, especially once the tempo of events 
increased' .21 
The close involvement of ministers and senior officials in the details of the 
crisis was another factor that modified normal processes and promoted faster 
decision-making: 
One of the ways that people get crisis management machinery wrong is that 
they assume that, in a crisis, ministers still have limited time and limited 
attention because they are getting around a whole lot of other things. That's not 
what happens ... In a crisis, the only people who understand the situation are 
the ministers. And the people lower down know less and less about what is 
. 22 gomg on. 
This highly abbreviated and closed form of decision-making meant that normal 
processes-involving formal consultation, briefing papers and preliminary committee 




Interviews with Hugh White, Chris Barrie and Paul BaJTatt. Daryl Williams also described 
how the prime minis ter invited his international adviser to make policy contributions in the 
NSCC (Interview, 17 March 2007). 
Interview with Chris BaJTie. 
Interview with Hugh White. 
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was the way ministers and officials effectively stopped work on most other tasks. 
They read cables (reports from overseas missions), intelligence briefings and other 
submissions more carefully and more often-and developed a deeper understanding 
of the situation. In this sense, every NSCC member became both the 'desk officer' 
and the decision-maker.23 
It is one thing to make decisions; it is another to communicate decisions so 
people charged with implementation can do so faithfully. With the limited 
information contained in formal minutes, a short space of time between meetings and 
the hyper-busy schedules generated by crisis, officials rely upon understanding the 
decision-makers' intent.24 The guidance provided by the NSCC was considered 
satisfactory by a number of interviewees-and importantly, none complained about 
an inability to understand NSCC' s intent:25 
[A Cabinet decision was] a pretty clear statement ... after the ministers agreed 
it. So in that sense we had a clear statement of intent ... I don't recall too much 
difficulty that he [our minister] had with anything that we sent to him, and 
[cabinet and ministerial submissions l were written in a way designed to give us 
a mandate to go ahead and do things.26 
However, many senior leaders had only a general understanding of their minister's 
detailed requirements and relied upon their understanding of the context of events to 







We had some very clear understandings of what a number of key objectives 
had to be ... I think in these broad terms we had an understanding of the key 
challenges and particularly what to avoid.27 
... You might get word from the minister that this [issue] was being 
canvassed. You would also look for the Cabinet document to find things for 
[us). You certainly had a hankering of what it was about before [NSCC 
decisions] came and you would know what was coming ... 28 
Interview with Hugh White. 
Intent describes the outcomes desired by political leaders. Intent may be more encompassing 
in practice, for politicians may also choose to stipulate how the outcome is to be achieved, and 
not just what should be achieved. An understanding of intent enables subordi nates to adjust 
their plans to the emerging situation, or to take action where guidance is incomplete or 
ambiguous. 
Chris Barrie, Hugh White and Michael Scrafton made particular mention of the importance of 
intent in their interviews. 
Interview with Scott Dawson. 
Interview with 009-05. 
Interview with Adrien Whiddett. 
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Other ministers, notably Downer, would have regular meetings with task force 
officials to hear their views directly: 
... every two weeks we would brief Downer on how the ETIF fDFAT' s East 
Timar Task Force] was tracking. This was an informal, fireside chat ... there 
was no agenda, it was very much a 'so what have you got for me' ... Downer 
would say what he had to say, [and] offer guidance or not ... 29 
These few comments show that while intent is transmitted m a number of 
ways, the most important factors for understanding intent was a knowledge of the 
minister's or senior official's long-term goals and preferences, an understanding of 
where others stood on an issue, some ability to extrapolate once new information 
came to hand, and a willingness to ask follow-up questions.30 But a clearly stated 
intent was not always easy to obtain: 
The minister was under no illusions that he necessarily knew what he wanted, 
so he was fairly reliant upon the department for advice on issues. He would 
give broad parameters, but given Moore's style he was not the sort of person 
who communicated by reams of paper. His style was to talk to people and talk 
through issues, and he would have someone from the office involved. He 
would say 'you tell me what' .31 
Consequently, subordinates still needed to work hard to identify the intent of a 
decision before they passed instructions to others. However, this management 
approach may be a blessing-after all, it would be a poor minister who provided a 
misleading intent to their officials. 
Observations about decision 
While making definitive observations about the substance of decisions during 
the East Timor crisis remains difficult, it is possible to discuss the way the Decision 
phase worked. For one, the prime minister's dominance is clear. Howard's 
chairmanship of NSCC gave him the final say in decisions, but his style was not 
unilateral: he preferred to operate with and through his key conunittee. As a result, the 
existence of a strong leader, and indeed a strong leadership core, meant most 




Interview wi th 062-07. 
Interview 05 1-06 described the value the prime minister and other ministers placed on 
knowing the opinions and preferenc.;es of other main actors before decisions were made. 
Interview with Aldo Borgu. 
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to Cabinet. When the focus of ministers is added, the NSCC acted as a highly 
responsive committee that managed the crisis-particularly the acute stage-
effectively. 
NSCC's effectiveness was shown by the way their intent was grasped by 
offidals responsible for implementing policy. For example, NSCC's position on a 
number of critical issues was well understood, such as the conditions for Australian 
involvement and the desire not to go to war with Indonesia. In addition, the close 
interaction between senior officials and political leaders ensured that if the NSCC did 
not provide all of the necessary direction, the officials could follow their intent. This 
need for officials to interpret guidance, understand the broader context of issues, and 
make changes as the situation demands is clearly an essential aspect of crisis 
policymaking. 
That the nation' s political leaders overcame the real (or perceived) suspicion 
of their senior public servants, and trusted their officials to remain throughout NSCC 
meetings, circumvented one important Cabinet convention. Trust also allowed 
shortcuts in a number of important processes, and allowed the prime minister to bend 
Cabinet conventions to make decision-making fast and responsive. This shows a 
highly pragmatic streak at play, which leads to questions about whether this type of 
Decision phase would be repeatable under other conditions and leaders. 
Implementation 
Implementation 1s the penultimate phase of the policy cycle, where ' the 
machinery of government smoothly implements the Cabinet's wish-in theory' .32 The 
two main characteristics of implementation identified in Part I were: 
• Implementation is considered throughout the policy cycle; and 
• The more agencies involved, the more difficult implementation becomes. 
Since this dissertation takes a Canberra-centric view of national security 
policymaking, there is no intention to discuss here the activities of the diplomats, 
election officials, police, military personnel or aid workers who actually served in 
32 P Bridgman and G Davis, The Australian Policy Handbook, 3rd edn, Allen and Unwin, 
Sydney, 2004, p. 11 9. 
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East Timor or elsewhere.33 However, issues such as the way forces were assigned to 
INTERFET, how aid was organised from Canberra, and how the media was managed 
from Canberra are germane to this discussion. 
Considered throughout the policy cycle 
Implementation occuffed throughout 1999, often in parallel with earlier parts 
of the policy cycle. One particularly good example of this was the Australian 
preparation for dealing with an independent East Timor, which included establishing a 
direct connection between humanitarian aid and East Timor, and by establishing a 
consulate in Dili.34 A second instance displaying simultaneity between consultation 
and implementation can be seen in the way Australia prepared forces for peace 
operations-widely interpreted as peace operations in East Timor-while the 
Australian Government insisted that Indonesia remained responsible for security. 
These examples show how considerable amounts of policy may need to be developed 
after implementation begins. 
In another respect, those implementing policy may be writing aspects of that 
policy at the same time. This situation was evident during the pe1iod when the 
INTERFET coalition was formed. Officials exercised a significant deal of discretion 
at this time, offering carrots and some small sticks in order to entice decisions from 
potential contributors. On one occasion, INTERFET Branch made it known that 
attaches from non-contributing nations accredited to Canberra would be excluded 
from the classified operational briefs. As one foreign government, in particular, was 
horrified at the thought of being excluded from the inner circle, INTERFET Branch 
33 
34 
A number of other authors have undertaken this task, including B Breen, Mission 
Accomplished-East Timor, Allen & Unwin, Crows Nest, 2000, for an ADF perspective; 
N Sugget, See the Road Well: Shaping East Timor's Frontier, Pandanus Books, Canberra, 
2005, for the perspective of Customs officials after early 2000; L Taudevin, East Timor: Too 
Little Too Late, Duffy and Snellgrove, Sydney, 1999, for an aid worker's perspective; and 
R Tanter, M Selden and SR Shalom (eds), Bitter flowers, sweet flowers: East Timor, 
Indonesia, and the world communiry, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Boulder, 2001 , for a 
number of papers about UNAMET's activities. 
For example, DFAT listed a range of implementation acti vities and aid programs in relation to 
East Timor in their March 1999 submission (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and 
AusAID, Submission to the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee 
Inquiry into East Timor, Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee, 
Additional Informatio n, Volume 5: Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 1999, pp. 047-048 
and pp. 056-062). 
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and their attache kept the conversation open and this eventually led to a contribution 
of forces to INTERFET.35 
Structures and processes need to be in place to support implementation. One 
example is the need for appropriate financial arrangements to support novel solutions 
to po1icy problems. As AusAID found in this case, issues such as budgets and annual 
allocations can actually work against implementation by delaying activity, by 
precluding certain options, or by forcing agencies into 'creative accounting' as they 
juggled rules with realities. In some instances, agencies used trust funds or moved 
funds between appropriations to ensure that the desired policy was implemented.36 
These points highlight the importance of legitimate and understood financial 
processes that are flexible enough to make funds available when they are needed to 
support implementation. 
One interesting aspect of implementation in this case was the way the strong 
political imperative behind INTERFET allowed, or perhaps forced, officials to take 
risks that might have been unacceptable under other circumstances. This was 
especially noticeable in the way officials accepted a large degree of financial risk in 
order to facilitate (or entice) non-Anglo-Saxon contributors to lNTERFET.37 In some 
instances, Australian officials showed significant initiative by agreeing to pay for 
capital equipment items, and underwrite compensation benefits for a number of 
contributors as a way of getting a rapid agreement to contribute.38 
Implementation was also essential to supporting the political message in other 
ways. Early in the UNAMET deployment, DFAT and AusATD recognised the 
importance of getting UN humanitarian agencies involved, and showing the people of 






Inte rview with Steve Ayling. 
Steve Darvi ll described how one agency wrote a contract for helicopters to support UNT AET 
from June to Aug ust (Interview, 5 July 2005). While sufficient funds were available for the 
full contract, this money would be ' lost' at the end of the financial year- and they were not 
permitted to commit the Commonwealth unless they had an approved budget. At this stage, 
AusAID created a new ' trust fund ' so that the money could be he ld beyond the formal 
financial year. 
Interview with Steve Ayling. 
This example financial risk was discussed in the earlier discussion of policy instruments in 
C hapter 5. 
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Again, it was that kind of practical stuff [that was needed] ... I was phoning 
around trying to get rice. And Ralph [an AusAID official] essentially went to 
Woolies and emptied their warehouse of rice, so that day there was stuff to 
drop. Back here l was phoning rice growers, and working out how to get it 
there. So I was on the bus on the way home, negotiating for a 747. It was 
expensive, but we had to make things happen. There was a political message 
that we had to get out there ... 39 
Desperate times often call for creative thinking and unusual measures. 
The use of the media during crisis is another aspect of implementation, and 
one that attracted criticism from a number of interviewees. One important use was the 
way Australian leaders employed the media to make sense of the crisis for the 
Australian public. 40 During September 1999 alone, Howard gave fifty-three separate 
media interviews and speeches that helped him to explain the situation to domestic 
(and sometimes international) audiences. He used these opportunities to explain the 
events in East Timor, outline the reasons for Australia's commitment, stress 
Australia's role as being both in line with the international community and in line 
with Australia's responsibilities, and to reduce growing domestk animosity against 
Indonesia. He did not, however, miss the opportunity to highlight the government's 
political achievements and how these contributed to the operation's succcss.41 Other 
ministers also provided press biiefings or spoke to other audiences (the Defence 
minister made twenty-three announcements about the East Timor operation and the 
Foreign minister made at least thirty-one announcements-the majority of these in the 
period 6-10 September).42 The Australian commander in East Timar, Major General 
Peter Cosgrove, also played an important part in developing the narrative and 






Inte rview with Steve Darvill. The risk o f this hurried activity was shown when a food airdrop 
injured a small boy (see Birmingham Post, 'Refugee boy crushed by East Timor airdrop', 
30 September I 999, p. 9). 
An important role noted by P 't Hart, K Tindall and C Brown, 'Success and failure in crisis 
leadership: Advisory capacity and presidential performance in the 9/11 and Katrina crises', 
unpublished paper, 2007, pp. 7-8. 
For example, Howard linked the government's economic management to the operation in East 
Timor (.J Howard, 'Address to the ACT Division of the Liberal Party', 29 Septemher 1999, 
avai lable http://www.pm.gov.au, accessed 10 April 2006). 
This workload compelled the defonce minister to assign a second adviser to the media liaison 
role to keep track of the requests and allow the primary media adviser to maintain close 
contac t wi th the prime minister's office (Interview with 048-06). 
Interview with Chris Barrie. 
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it was the prime minister who carried the bulk of the message to the Australian people 
and presented the government's preferred view of this crisis. 
Getting this message out is not simple, and there are significant limitations in 
usmg the media as a tool to support policy implementation. For one, having an 
independent media reflect the government's preferred view is no easy task. This 
difficulty is magnified when the target of influence is a foreign population, and their 
domestic media is the only viable way of reaching them. One interviewee, who was 
involved in Defence's public affairs organisation in 1999, recounted the analysis done 
to identify how to get messages to the Indonesian people in particular, and the 
Southeast Asian pubic more generally. He cited the real challenge with getting 
balancing messages through media outlets that were either controlled by foreign 
governments, or highly sympathetic to their government's position.44 He also noted 
the absence of Radio Australia and decline of Australia Television during this period, 
but added the audience for this type of media was relatively small. He thought 
suggestions that foreign media could be manipulated were fanciful, but recounted the 
way positive messages were sent to specific audience in Japan to encourage their 
support.45 
The second difficulty relates to the tools available to an organisation such as 
Defence public affairs. The formal tools-press releases and media alerts-often 
provide the news ' filling' for the daily newspapers. However, they have limited utility 
if the media wants other stories or is simply unwilling to accept the view presented. 
Also, public statements need to be carefully managed to ensure all remain 'on 
message'. Transcripts of media interviews and speeches by Prime Minister Howard, 
Foreign Minister Downer and Defence Minister Moore all show high degrees of 
consistency in their messages about the international mandate, relationship with 
Indonesia, and will of the East Timorese people when discussing the intervention. 
Keeping these messages coordinated was a major task that required real ingenuity 
given the technology of 1999. In one case, the system of synchronising near 
44 
45 
A problem noted in J Cotto n, East Timar, Australia and Regional Order: intervention and its 
aftermath in Southeast Asia, Routledge, London, 2004, pp. 121-2; and Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An Australian Policy Challenge, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 200 I, p. 145. 
Interview with 066-07, who has a knowledge o f Defence public affairs planning in 1999. 
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simultaneous briefings in Dili, Darwin and Canberra involved taping conferences and 
then playing them down the satellite phone line to the next conference location.46 
Thirdly, it was also difficult to be 'proactive' due to political sensitivities (as 
disused earlier) and the complexity of engaging with a skeptical media. Interview 
066-07 recounted one attempt where Defence arranged for a very senior ADF officer 
to speak to an influential Indonesian journalist about a range of topics, with the aim of 
showing Australia's benign intentions and friendly attitude towards Indonesia. By his 
recollection, this attempt was only marginal1y successful and risked back-firing as the 
journalist interpreted a casual remark in a negative way. On other occasions, the 
desire to get fresh news footage from East Timor to the international media could 
have resulted in negative images of the Australian intervention being sent into the 
public domain. This led to some photographs being confiscated to protect operational 
security and Australia' s image. Engaging with the media to implement policy is 
clearly important, but complex, aspect of implementation. 
Other interviewees criticised the Australian Government for being less than 
effective in using the media to further their interests. The attempts to influence 
regional perceptions about Australia, as mentioned in Chapter 5, are one example. 
However, the broader problem concerned the difficulty with using information as a 
policy instrument. For example: 
46 
47 
My view was that you should use the international media, among other things, 
to present your position and the operational character of your deployment in 
the best possible light, and the opposition's in the worst possible light. But we 
did none of that. We didn ' t engage anybody to work over the New Straits 
Times or the Jaka11a newspapers, we didn' t seed stories about the Indonesian 
generals-and we could have run terrible smear campaigns because we knew 
all about them and how corrupt they were. We could have had that stuff flashed 
all round the world, and undermined the credibility of the Indonesian military 
and Kopassus. I think this was a great lacuna in respect out of our IW 
[Information Warfare] policy toward East Timor . . . 47 
Interview 066-07. 
Interview with Allan Behm. Michael Scrafton also described the difficulties of implementing 
an ' information operatio ns campaign' at the strategic level (Interview, 5 August 2005). There 
was more success at the operational level: see K Beasley, Information Operations during 
Operation Stabilise in East Timar, Working Paper 120, Land W arfare Studies Centre, 
Duntroon, 2002; and J Blaxland, Information-era Manouevre: The Australian-led Mission to 
East Timar, Working Paper I 18, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon, 2002. 
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Others also pointed to tactical reasons for not using the media to explain 
Australia's position: 
If only the media knew that in fact we were doing more than anyone else in the 
world to prepare and be ready to guide consideration in the UN and US; but we 
wouldn't, couldn't speak out about it ... [if] it had looked that we were 
preparing an Australian peacekeeping force before the ballot or anything like 
that, we feared that Indonesia would say they would only go ahead with this if 
Australia took no part. That would have been our worst outcome ... 48 
These conflicting views of whether or how to use the media highlights a profoundly 
difficult choice faced by policymakers. In these situations, they must confront the 
need to gather support for initiatives and remain accountable, while balancing the 
need to restrict information for the purposes of achieving policy objectives. 
Cooks and broth? 
It is not surprising to find that implementation becomes more complex and 
complicated as the number of participants increase. For example, the relatively 
straightforward task of organising helicopters for UNAMET using a commercial 
provider was soon complicated as other departments became involved: 
And: 
When we hired the helicopters, there was a period where they couldn't go ... 
from our point of view it was being treated a logistical thing- get them on 
contract, painted the right colour ... But having done that, [attention] shifted to 
the political arena and DFAT went to Jakarta and took this up in the UN with 
Indonesia.49 
The ADF had duty of care for their people, if they fell ill on deployments. They 
would normally have their hospital go with them, but the Indonesians were not 
going to have a bar of that, and it fell back onto us to hire a medevac [medical 
evacuation] facility to sit on the tarmac in Darwin-at great expense-just in 
case there was a need. I don' t know whether it got used much. But that became 
a kind of political issue with Defence, and DFA T had to play the political 
dialogue f with Indonesia] to make this happen.50 
However, the limited capacity of some organisations actually increases the 
need to involve more players. This was especially seen in the difficulties experienced 




Interview with Matthew Skoien. 
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police officers, as the AFP also needed support for communication, transport and 
logistics.51 It is also important to recognise that civilian firms and charities become 
critical to implementation when the government either lacks their own capabilities, or 
needs help to surge for a crisis.52 
Implementation also influences the way people think about coordination. On 
the one hand, the act of executing a policy decision can have a unifying effect within 
large organisations. Some interviewees commented on how people got behind each 
other, while another commented on how single-minded Canberra became once forces 
were deployed.53 On the other hand, some had the impression that once the decision 
was made, politicians would just leave the departments and agencies to get on with 
the job: 
On one occasion, [Defence Minister] Moore called General Cosgrove and 
directed him to call a fresh press conference to announce that JNTERFET 
would conduct operations across the Indonesian border if needed [the 'hot 
pursuit' issue54]. Moore then called back five minutes later to check to see that 
55 the arrangements had been made. 
I think there was still quite a strong entrenched feeling within the military 
element of the structure-to Dili and beyond quite frankly-that it wasn't 
appropriate for civilian advisers to be urging them to provide information 
quickly, and a view that some of this stuff needs to be sat on so that the 
minister doesn' t bugger up 'our operation'.56 
The complexity involved in implementation was also shown through issues 








The need for state police was especially acute as AFP prepared for the second rotation of 
UNAMET. 
Some of the specific shortfalls for INTERFET were discussed in A Ryan, Primary 
responsibilities and primary risks: Australian Defence Force participation in the 
international Force East Timor, Land Warfare Studies Centre, Duntroon, 2000, p. 39. 
Interview with Kerry Clarke. Interviews with Adrien Whidclett and Matthew Skoien also 
expressed similar views. 
For descriptions of this incident, see E Kniekmeyer, 'Australia: peacekeepers allowed to cross 
border in hot pursuit', Associated Press Newswires, 30 September J 999; and D Shannahan, 
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wider range of players and heightened political sensitivity added another layer to 
considerations that may not have been grasped immediately. As one interviewee 
noted: 
For me, that [problem] will always crystallise around the shooting incident that 
happened at Motaain on the border, which we found out about through CNN ... 
You know, we had the minister screaming down the phone trying to find out 
what had gone on ... I tried COM AST [Commander Australian Theatre, in 
Sydney] and then I actually rang Dili to find out what was going on. I got some 
Captain who was quite aghast, and probably rightly so in a sense that here was 
this wally from headquarters trying to get some information. But what the 
doctrine manuals said was a fairly trivial tactical incident had the potential to 
be a serious strategic impediment in the government's policy. It could have 
brought us frankly to a shooting war with Indonesia. I don't think the Defence 
system, then or now, has really engaged its mind on how to deal with that 
. 58 issue. 
These difficulties also extended to a range of other problems that had a lesser impact 
on the overall mission. However, it is important to note that the implementation of 
INTERFET went well, to the point where it was described as successful and a 
significant achievement by Australia's leaders and by some foreign observers.59 
Observations about implementation 
Asked whether Australia achieved its policy objectives, Hugh White started 
his answer by listing what he thought were the key four at the start of 1999: East 
Timor would remain a part of Indonesia, there would be no disruption to 
Australian-Indonesian relations as a result of East Timor, East Timor would not 
disrupt TNI-ADF relations, and Australia would not have large parts of the ADF 
deployed in East Timor. 'We got none from four', he said.60 
However, the effective implementation of INTERFET in the period of acute 
crisis did ultimately save the 'strategic bacon'. For one, it was the beginning of the 
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INTERFET' s deployment kept global attention focused on the East Timar problem, 
which gave legitimacy to the cause and additional exposure to encourage more 
support. Thirdly, INTERFET initially operated amid TNI forces, and then maintained 
a separation between themselves and the Indonesians across a difficult border. 
Fourthly, INTERFET provided enough stability for the UN transitional administration 
to begin work to create an independent East Timar. Thus, successful implementation 
led to an objective desired by many- although not enjoyed by everyone that should 
have shared in it. The successful mission also allowed the Australian Government to 
weather significant media and political criticism over their handling of the crisis. 
Although the critics were fast to point out shortcomings and the lives lost in the crisis, 
the Australian Government was able to respond by acknowledging some faults while 
pointing to the world's newest free nation. It was the Australian Government' s 
position that resonated most with Australian voters. 
The difficulty with describing implementation shows a real shortcoming of 
the policy cycle. Policy in a crisis is unlikely to be a single decision followed by a 
single action. Instead, a range of decisions are made and implemented over time, with 
later decisions being influenced by the impact of measures implemented earlier. Not 
all of these actions were the result of fo1mal Cabinet or NSCC decisions; even routine 
cables from DF AT posts elicited some form of action in Canberra that contributed to 
policy implementation. 
The importance of structures and processes, intent, creative thinking and risk 
all came though in this case. Structures and processes are generally considered 
essential to spending money; public servants in Australia cannot, in layman's terms, 
commit public funds without an approved budget and the authority to spend that 
money. However, some impediments can be overcome (legally) if political support is 
present and if the officials have a clear understanding of what is needed to meet the 
intent of the decision-makers. Armed with some confidence, officials can then devise 
alternatives and even accept risk in areas ranging from funding to media engagement. 
Given the wide range of problems that arise in crisis, a variety of players must 
be involved in implementation and they need to be consulted early. This case showed 
how the agencies traditionally responsible for national security policy in Australia-
DFA T, Defence and DPM&C-needed important support from those normally 
associated with domestic aspects of security, particularly the AFP. It also identifies 
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that some agencies, such as AusAID and the AEC, were only partial1y aware of their 
role in national security issues at all. This crisis also reinforces the need to consult 
operational agencies at the start of planning, and to practice responses before crises 
occur. 
Evaluation 
The Evaluation phase provides the nominal end of the policy cycle, where the 
utility of policy must be questioned and a new cycle of analysis begins. Two 
characteristics of evaluation are: 
• If conducted at all, evaluation typically occurs after the policy has been 
implemented in full. 
• Policy advice is not systemically evaluated.61 
There were four identifiable avenues to evaluate policymaking about the East 
Timer crisis. These included formal reports by external agencies on limited aspects of 
performance; classified, internal evaluations of Defence's performance; implied 
individual evaluations that will be described here as 'self-critique'; and special or 
periodic inquiries by Parliament. A call for a commission of inquiry was also made by 
the opposition spokesperson on foreign affairs, Laurie Brereton.62 These final two are 
mentioned not because they were actually used, but because they could help to 
evaluate policy if given a mandate. 
An examination of these sources finds that the characteristics of policymaking 
described in Part I generally hold true for this crisis, although there are some small 
differences. This examination also shows that if evaluation is difficult, then a spirit of 
self-criticism is essential. 
Evaluation only after implementation is complete 
Of the clearly identifiable evaluation efforts that took place around the East 
Timer crisis, most occurred after the crisis had ended. Of these, two formal 
evaluations were conducted after the event, but these only covered limited aspects of 
61 
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performance. The first, an Australian National Audit Office (ANAO) report about the 
ADF's deployment into East Timor, was unusual.63 While a broad range of Defence 
activities have been subjected to ANAO scrutiny over time (around sixty-four 
Defence-specific reports were delivered in the period 1996 to 2007), the vast majority 
focused on procurement or other management functions. In this case, the ANAO 
chose to look at an operational activity and made recommendations on issues that 
included training standards, public affairs planning and preparedness issues. AusAID 
also participated in a formal UN evaluation of the humanitarian response, and regular 
assessments of transitional administration programs. These evaluations were 
conducted on a six-monthly basis and provided to donor countries before major 
meetings.64 
Defence conducted internal evaluations of its policy processes during the 
crisis. Allan Behm's report into Defence command arrangements is still classified, but 
he recounted some aspects of the report in an interview for this dissertation. His report 
was developed after interviews with key members of Defence, some outsiders, and his 
own observations of Defence during the crisis. Interestingly, he developed two 
versions of the report: a 'vanilla' draft for external (government) readers and a more 
candid version for an internal audience. The internal version was reputedly a very 
blunt assessment of Defence's organisational deficiencies, and it included 
recommendations to change the structure of Defence headquarters. However, even 
supposedly objective assessments can be controversial and may not lead to any action: 
according to Behm, no recommendations to improve coordination were implemented 
as of early 2005 (although the results of others, such as a separate review of ADF 
command and control in 2003, did result in some change).65 According to another 
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at the time and resulted in a mismatch between feedback at the time and criticism 
Iater.66 
On top of Behm's formal evaluation, Defence's Strategic Command Group 
conducted an informal, yet frank evaluation of its own performance. In this, the 
service chiefs reportedly expressed their concern about the way command and control 
was effected, especially the limited role given to Commander Australian Theatre and 
his headquarters.67 Other interviewees from within and outside Defence spoke of 
learning lessons from previous events and operations and how these were applied 
during the East Timer crisis. This shows, at least, a willingness among officials to test 
current or likely events against experience.68 
The remaining three modes of evaluation were certainly ongoing throughout 
the crisis, but it is difficult to pinpoint their influence on policymaking. The first, and 
most important, was the way politicians and officials evaluate events themselves. 
While evidence to prove self-criticism is very scarce (aside from personal accounts), 
some hints of criticism and reflection may be found in the way structures were 
changed mid-crisis. While other reasons may have been influential, the decision to 
create new organisations within DPM&C and Defence to manage different aspects of 
the crisis can be interpreted as learning, and perhaps contemporary criticism of the 
policymaking process. 69 
One group that did not have a formal review of their perfo1mance was the 
NSCC. One interviewee noted that ministers are 'constantly reassessing as things 
move on', but: 
There's not that much time available to sit down and do an academic review of 
what's gone on before. But in the moving forward exercise, you are reassessing 
70 
as you go. 
This response seems to echo the l 943 slogan concerning the lack of time for review 
when things are busy. This seems unlikely to change because ministers will always be 
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would require a willingness on the part of ministers to initiate reviews of their own 
performance voluntarily- a willingness that was not been seen in this case or before. 
But while internal review and 'lessons learnt' processes can be difficult to conduct 
when time is short, they offer at least one way of learning from experience. 
Parliamentary committees can play a role in evaluation-but none had an 
effect on policymaking in 1999. Of the two parliamentary bodies operating in 1999 
the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee (FADTRC), was the 
most focused on this crisis through its hearings on the social, political and economic 
conditions in East Timor. This committee often probed officials with questions about 
government policy, the history of the case, the facts of the emerging crisis, and details 
of Australia's assistance to East Timor. However, the committee's interim report, 
which was tabled soon after INTERFET deployed, only contained recommendations 
concerning the future of Radio Australia and a request for a Committee visit to the 
territory.7 1 The committee's final recommendations were similarly slim. Aside from 
another request to visit Indonesia, the only policy-relevant recommendation 
concerned East Timorese access to oil from the Timor Gap.72 None of these 
recommendations acted as evaluation, or had a significant impact on policy. 
The Senate Estimates process is another forum where evaluation can occur. 
The purpose of this process is to examine the operations of government by 
considering 'estimates of government expenditure referred to Senate legislation 
committees as part of the annual budget cycle' .73 This mechanism provided an 
opportunity for senators to ask detailed questions of public servants and, in so doing, 
scrutinise the government and its perfo1mance. In 1999-2000, most of the issues 
raised in this committee related to the costs of the Timor campaign, the effects of the 
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and equiprnent.74 There were some questions about readiness, as well as Indonesian 
activities and the TNI-ADF relationship. 
That neither committee appeared to contribute to evaluation highlights the 
difficulties that even Parliament has. While committees can get good access to 
departmental officers and ask questions of them, the depth of questioning generally 
depends upon the expertise of the individual senator and their staff. This fonnat also 
creates a competitive atmosphere where officials aim to provide complete answers, 
while ensuring their answers provide only enough information to answer the specific 
question. Nor can officials discuss classified information in this forum. These 
shortcomings make parliamentary committees unsuitable for the type of reflection or 
self-criticism that aids evaluation. 
Policy advice not systematically evaluated 
Despite the different types of evaluation discussed above, there was no 
evidence of a systematic evaluation of policymaking during or after the East Timor 
crisis. Of the identified evaluation efforts, Behm's report on defence command 
arrangements provides one instance of systemic evaluation, albeit one focused within 
a single department. The other major evaluation by the ANAO crossed departmental 
lines to a small extent, but it was focused on the management of the deployment.75 
While both are examples of evaluation, they fall well short of a government-wide 
process that would be useful for evaluating policymaking processes and structures. 
This should not be surprising. Michael Di Francesco noted that Australian 
policy departments of the 1990s 'commonly protested that evaluating policy advising 
activities was impractical since it presented what they saw as insurmountable 
problems of definition . . . and fuelled concerns that, if pressed, assessment would 
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reduce evaluation to a highly political activity in a sphere where policy advice was 
traditionally held to be non-political. 
Indeed, the reticence to be open to any external evaluation-particularly 
in the highly partisan Senate- is well illustrated in this exchange between the 
FADTRC Chairman, Senator John Hogg of Queensland, and DFAT's John 
Dauth. According to Hansard, Senator Hogg said: 
Throughout this inquiry, there have been more brickbats than bouquets for 
DFAT. If you have read the Hansard that will show itself to be fairly true. 
There has been a claim- and these are my words trying to paraphrase a number 
of people who have put evidence to us-that DFAT has failed in its advice to 
the government, in its advice to the Parliament. .. there have also been claims 
by some people appearing before us-rightly or wrongly; I am not siding with 
anyone on the evidence- that there should be an inquiry into DFAT and its 
shortcomings over a long period of time, whether it be 25 years ago or even 
today. Do you have a response to that?' 
Dauth's response was short: 'No. Senator, I do not' .77 
There is anecdotal evidence to suggest that the lessons of East Timor informed 
planning for the next major national security issue, which involved the Sydney 
Olympics in 2000, and for national security policymaking in general.78 This type of 
evaluation is, however, inherently personal and reliant upon a continuing role for key 
participants in future relevant activities. 
Observations about evaluation 
The two main characteristics of evaluation developed in Part I are very closely 
matched to the experience of this case. While the main evaluation efforts occurred 
after the crisis, none were systematic, cross-government evaluations of policymaking. 
However, this is not to say that evaluation did not occur at all- it can be inferred from 
structural change, such as the Paterson and Taylor committees. The decision to 
increase force readiness in February 1999 could also be offered as one example of 
early evaluation and anticipation. These changes show that evaluation can occur 
during the policy cycle. 
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Evaluation seems more likely to occur after failure, particularly when there is 
a strong public demand.79 In this case, voices for change to policymaking structures 
would likely have been hampered by the overall perception that INTERFET was a 
successful mission-indeed, about 99 per cent of Australians interviewed in one 
survey thought the ADF had perfo1med well in East Timor.80 Speaking against a 
strongly held conventional wisdom and demanding a review can be difficult. These 
difficulties can continue even where well-researched and considered 
recommendations are provided as evaluation. As this case shows, not all 
recommendations are acted upon, no matter how prescient or logical they may be. 
This chapter completes the examination of the East Timor case and its 
comparison against the proposed characteristics of crisis policymaking in Australia. 
This examination has shown a strong degree of continuity between the proposed 
characteristics and the East Timor case, particularly in the role of the prime minister 
and his executive, in the importance of external actors, and in the complexity of 
coordination and implementation. But some change was also identified, particularly in 
the officials' role in decision-making and in a noticeable increase in collegiality 
between departments. Change was also observed in the policymaking structures 
during the crisis. The final tasks for this dissertation involve refining the 
characteristics of crisis policymaking that have been presented in this and preceding 
chapters, and identifying the implications of this research for the future Australian 
crisis policymaking system. These tasks are undertaken in the concluding chapter. 
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CONCLUSION: 
REFINING THE CHARACTERISTICS OF CRISIS 
POLICYMAKING 
Two maJOr conclusions are drawn from the research presented in this 
dissertation. The first is that enduring characteristics of Australian crisis policymaking 
can be identified. The second is that while the broader national security policymaking 
system is an important influence, the contingent nature of crisis and political 
preferences are generally responsible for variation in the system during crises. The 
dissertation has also developed a number of insights into the understanding of crisis 
policymaking and the East Timor case that add to the store of knowledge about each. 
This concluding chapter contains two sections. In the first, the characteristics 
identified in earlier chapters are drawn together and then reduced to a manageable, 
essential group. The section then explores the two major causes of variation within the 
crisis policymaking system. The second and final section identifies implications for 
Australia's future crisis policymaking system, and concludes by describing this 
dissertation's substantive and methodological contributions to the understanding of 
crisis policymaking in Australia in general and of Australia's role in the East Timor 
crisis in particular. 
The characteristics of crisis policymaking in Australia 
Part I developed characteristics of national security policymaking (Chapter 1 ), 
and proposed characteristics of its subordinate crisis mode by examining historical 
vignettes for evidence of change and continuity in the system over time (Chapters 2 and 
3). These proposed characteristics were tested in Part II using the East Timor crisis of 
1999. This work provides a sound basis on which to identify the characteristics of crisis 
policymaking, and to identify why the system changes. These characteristics are 
aggregated in Table 8. 
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Table 8: The Characteristics of Crisis Policymaking in Australia 
Phase Characteristic of Crisis Policymaking Variable or 
consistent? 
The prime minister, his national security ministers and their senior officials are the dominant domestic actors Consistent c: in issue identification and, by extension, problem definition. 0 
-m Foreign actors and events (especially governments) have the ability to place issues on the crisis policy (,) 
~ agenda when they intend to harm Australian interests, when the interests of Australia's allies and friends are Consistent 
-c: threatened, and when high levels of interdependence mean that threats to others' interests are viewed as Cl) 
"O threats to Australia. 
Cl) 
Other domestic actors have a limited ability to identify issues in a crisis. :::J Consistent en 
(/) 
Mass appeal plays a limited role in issue identification. Consistent 
CJ) Where the ability to conduct rational comprehensive analysis is limited in a crisis, decision-makers turn to Consistent 
(/) trusted sources of advice. This can change the structure of policymaking and which actors will be influential. 
> 
m Policy issues are rarely analysed as individual, discrete problems, and the nature of competition between Consistent c: ~ issues and interests, and the consequent influence on the issue at hand, makes analysis iterative. 
> 
<.J Policy insiders dominate. Consistent 0 
a.. Where dominant frameworks exist, they are likely to be noticeable where there is no clear lead for a crisis. Variable 
en The instruments most used by the Australian Government in crises are diplomacy, alliances, military force, 




CJ) The utility of foreign and defence policy instruments is highly situational in a crisis. Consistent c: 
-
c: All options are used with overseas interlocutors (who are primarily other governments and major Consistent 0 
·.;::; international organisations); with information, discussion, partnership and delegation commonly occurring. m 
-:::J 
(/) 
Consultation between the government and the public usually takes the form of a one-way passage of c: Consistent 0 
() information. 
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Much consultation occurs in secret. Consistent 
c: Governments describe structures and routines that suit their particular preferences and best thinking for the Consistent 0 
-




0 Variable 0 Coordination is basically collegial, but the potential for conflict should not be ignored. (..) 




Cabinet conventions are based on collective responsibility, secrecy, and recorded decisions. 0 Consistent 
Q) 
c Officials, when invited, answer questions of a technical nature and leave the Cabinet room before decisions Variable 
are taken. 
0 Consistent :;:; Implementation is considered throughout the policy cycle. m 
-c: 
Q) c: E Consistent Q) The more agencies involved, the more difficult implementation becomes. 0. 
E 
-




- Consistent m Policy advice is not systemically evaluated. > w 
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This table shows remarkable consistency among the characteristics. The stable 
constitutional basis and accepted conventions of government help explain this. For 
instance, the executive's role has been developed in a largely informal way and has 
resulted in a very strong role for the prime minster. Few immediate political 
constraints are placed on executive action, mainly because the Australian public and 
Parliament do not pay constant attention to national security issues-and because the 
process is generally closed and secretive. This provides the executive with significant 
latitude to identify the issues and develop policy in their preferred way. The external 
orientation of crises also provides a consistent and enduring role for foreign actors. 
Another noteworthy consist~ncy can be found in the absence of frequent, structured 
evaluation. The lack of a formal method for evaluating policymaking performance in 
crises means the Australian Government misses real opportunities to learn from 
experience and improve. 
There is always potential for varia6on in coordination strnctures and routines, 
dominant frameworks in policy analysis, and cooperation during a crisis. Other 
examples of variation can be seen in conventions, such as the role of officials in 
Cabinet meetings. The choice of policy instruments is an excellent example of how 
the external environment creates variation, particularly in the way the situational 
utility of instruments changes from crisis-to-crisis. The main sources of variation will 
be described further in the next sec6on. 
While the twenty-two characteristics presented in Table 8 are thorough and 
suitable for lengthy analysis, this list is not easily used to discuss crisis policymaking 
under other conditions. These characteristics also overlap in a number of places, and 
some are more important than others. Refining these twenty-two to a smaller group 
provides a shorthand way to discuss crisis policymaking without compromising the 
substance of this dissertation. This essential group is described in more detail below. 
Dominant executive 
The national security executive's dominance of crisis policymaking is evident 
from its role in issue identification, policy analysis, coordination, consultation and 
decision. The executive's dominance also impedes evaluation. 
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Of those forming this executive, the prime minister stands above the others in 
crisis policymaking. 1 He maintains his position by using his superior institutional and 
political resources to provide leadership to the Cabinet, and usually the nation, when 
crisis occurs. Of his political resources, his support in the party room and Parliament's 
lower house are significant assets. But his institutional resources are more important 
in crisis. He has his own sources of advice, and he also chooses the method of 
decision-making-although he must take care to ensure Cabinet supports him on 
major decisions. Another critical advantage is his role as an information hub. In the 
tight timeframes of a crisis, where communication channels narrow and discussions 
with overseas interlocutors are of great import, the prime minister has an exclusive 
view. The prime minister is also the leader who defines the problem to the public and 
generally acts as the personification of national interests. These advantages and 
responsibilities mean he must receive the best possible level of support in a crisis. 
The key national security ministers are also important. But while their sources 
of infonnation, advice and resources are significant, they rarely secure authority over 
other departments. For example, the Defence minister may be highly influential when 
the defence force is employed, but the National Security Committee of Cabinet 
(NSCC) is unlikely to approve supporting diplomatic or economic activities without 
the foreign minister's concurrence or a prime-ministerial directive. At times, the 
foreign minister may be able to act as the lead in a crisis, as Barwick did in the early 
stages of Konfrontasi. However, this position is easily lost if the prime minister takes 
a direct interest. 
Senior officials and ministerial advisers are the executive's last mam 
component. Australian leaders rely on advice from these two groups, despite the 
occasional instances of unilateral decision-making. Under most conditions, senior 
officials and advisers are highly influential in issue identification, policy analysis, 
consultation, coordination and implementation. Some play a discreet part in decision 
as well. Trust is an essential part of this relationship-as the East Timor case showed, 
This finding provides strong support to a range of other work on Australian foreign policy. For 
other work that also makes this link, see P Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The Making 
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'Prime Ministers and Foreign Po licy', in P Weller (ed), Menzies to Keating: The Development of 
Australian Prime Ministership, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1992; and A Gyngell and 
M Wesley, Making Australian Foreign Policy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003, 
pp. 97- 102. 
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increasing trust between ministers and their officials changed the operating mode of 
the NSCC. A number of senior officials involved in this case also refen-ed to their 
close contacts with others, and the positive effect of these relationships on the smooth 
functioning of the crisis policymaking system. The characteristic of executive 
dominance is unlikely to change, although political preferences are likely to change 
the location of, and the structures employed to make, decisions. 
Collegial approach 
This dissertation showed that the Australian crisis policymaking system tends 
towards a collegial approach, which supports the analysis of foreign policymaking by 
Gyngell and Wesley.2 Although interagency conflict does occur, it rarely reaches the 
worst excesses of bureaucratic politics.3 This is because role clarity, political 
direction, agreed processes, personal relationships and trust serve to mitigate or 
resolve conflicting points of view-most of the time. 
This collegiate approach has other effects on policymaking. It, together with 
the pressures of time and secrecy, makes rational-comprehensive approaches to 
policymaking less valued in the process. Instead, ministers and senior officials tend to 
use their experience and intuition to make sense of emerging situations where normal 
policy processes cannot or do not deliver within their perceived time limitations. This 
informal analytical process generally produced satisfactory outcomes in the East 
Timor case, but it also meant Australia did not fully recognise the importance of some 
issues or events until it was too late to have influence. The continued maintenance of 
an ineffective formal system only serves as a source of unnecessary risk in crisis. 
Secretive and closed system 
Crisis policymaking is likely to remain secretive and closed due to the 
system's competitive nature, time pressures, and the privileged sources of information 
used. The same pressures also impose restrictions about who within government has 
information about future plans, while the use of sensitive intelligence usually prevents 
2 Ibid. , p. 32. 
The disagreement between the Department of External Affairs (DEA) and the Prime Minister's 
Department (PMD) at the start of Konfrontasi provides an example o f how different opinions lead 
to the creation of a struc tural mechanism (the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee - FADC) to 
ameliorate interdepartmental conflict 
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national leaders from releasing some kinds of information during a crisis and for some 
time after the event. While the lack of transparency gives some people cause for 
concern4, even critics concede that secrecy in national security matters is usually in 
the public interest.5 However, some change may be necessary because future 
governments will have to contend with increased public expectations, competing 
sources of information, interconnected problems, and a broader range of actors 
involved in national secudty.6 
Central role for external actors 
While most domestic actors play peripheral roles in crises, foreign 
governments and other external actors are usually at the centre. At the start (in many 
cases), an external actor frames the issue at hand by challenging an existing interest. 
External actors may also help the government meet a challenge by employing their 
significant resources, such as military forces or economic assets. Close consultation 
with allies will be necessary in most crises. 
Since this characteristic is unlikely to change, the future crisis policymaking 
system must create effective linkages with allies or potential partners while denying 
information to adversaries. The system must also provide information on the 
capability and intentions of these actors in a timely and relevant way so decision-
makers and policy analysts understand overt and subtle indicators of change. 
Complicated and complex implementation 
The significant range of issues involved in any crisis makes policymaking 
complicated. Identifying the issues at stake is critical, because this directly bears upon 
the instruments used and the range of actors involved. This increases the importance 
of having multidisciplinary planning teams and sound written procedures, and of 
6 
C Oalley, Australia's National Security Framework: A Look to the Future, Australian Defence 
Studies Centre, University of New South Wales, Canberra, 2000, p. 18; and B Robert and 
C Lajtha, 'A New Approach to Crisis Management', Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, vol. I 0, no. 4, 2002, pp. 181-3. 
W Funnell , Government by Fiat: The Retreat from Responsibility, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2001, 
p. 190. 
This future environment and its range of challenges is discussed in D Beveridge, 'Australia 's 
Future Threat Space: Strategic Risks and Vulnerabilities', Security Challenges, vol. 2, no. 2, 2006, 
pp. 45- 52; and D Connery, National Security Community 2020: Six Practical Recommendations 
for the Australian Government, The Kokoda Foundation, Canberra, 2007, pp. 6--15. 
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providing opportunities to practice together before a crisis occurs. Such measures will 
improve participants' ability to understand the implications of possible events, or 
anticipate how their policies may be challenged in crises. 
The growing number of actors and actions, and reactions among them; the 
apparent compression of time and space; and the interconnectedness of future national 
security crises will make implementation increasingly complex.7 Yet the characteristic 
of complexity is one that Australian governments have found difficult to manage at 
times. For example, the failed attempt to create a coordinated counter-subversion plan 
for Asia in the 1950s shows how difficult it can be to implement effective plans and 
align departmental efforts.8 
This essential group of characteristics provides a basis for thinking about the 
future of Australia's crisis policymaking system. While others have suggested 
methods such as 'first principles' 9 or adapting a foreign system for Australian 
purposes 10, these characteristics have the significant advantage of being rooted in the 
system 's history and inherent nature. While examining other systems and borrowing a 
good idea is worthwhile, being conscious of the system's characteristics decreases the 
likelihood of developing a system that is alien to its nature. While there is a strong 
degree of continuity in these characteristics, change has occurred in the structures, 
processes and norms of crisis policymaking. Understanding how and why these 
characteristics have and may change is therefore an important part of understanding 
the system. 
Accounting for variation 
Two factors account for variation in Australia' s crisis policymaking system. 
The first, political preference, stems from the prime minister's ability to adopt 
different methods of decision-making and to restructure the crisis policymaking 
10 
M Evans, 'Towards and Australian National Security Strategy: A Conceptual Analysis', Security 
Challenges, vol. 3, no. 4, 2007, p. I I 7. 
C Waters, 'A failure of imagination: R.G. Casey and Australian plans for counter-subversion in 
Asia, 1954- 1956', Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 45, no. 3, 1999, pp. 360-3. 
I Wing, 'Reapplying First Principles', paper presented at the Safeguarding Australia Summit 2007, 
Canberra, 2007. 
A Dupont, 'Taking out policy insures country against trouble', Australian, 7 November 2000, 
p. I 5; and G Keating, 'The Machinery of Australian National Security Policy: Changes, 
Continuing Problems and Possibil ities', Australian Defence Force Journal, no. 166, 2005, 
pp. 24- 5. 
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system. Sometimes, the prime minister will be able to make decisions unilaterally; at 
other times, Cabinet will be involved. The prime minister can seek advice from 
different sources, or stick to his established sources. He can also direct others to 
establish new committees, and bypass existing ones if he needs to. This power to 
revise the system is a major source of change. 
The important role played by informal relationships between individuals is 
relevant here. 11 Trust and personal contacts reduce the costs of interaction and reduce 
disruptive competition. Trust also provides actors with the confidence to bend 
established rules or processes to increase the speed of policymaking. This helps to 
explain, in part, why the NSCC was an effective body during the East Timor crisis. It 
also helps to understand why departmental leaders were confident of their 
understanding of what ministers wanted to achieve. 
Despite this infonnality and ability to vary structures and processes, the crisis 
policymaking system is not anarchical. 12 The prime minister must operate within a 
system where institutions, such as Cabinet and the House of Representatives (at least), 
must explicitly or implicitly support his decisions at critical times. The four distinct 
modes for prime ministerial decision-making, the limited structural options for 
advisory systems, and the consistent influence of external actors also serve as system 
boundaries. Similarly, informal relationships must be legitimised by formal structures 
or personal responsibility. Thus, national security institutions- departments, 
intelligence agencies, Cabinet, and nominated committees--create a closed structure 
that bars entry to new actors, unless an existing one takes responsibility for their 
actions. 
The contingent nature of crises is the second main cause of variation. Every 
crisis involves different interests, actors and responsibilities because instruments have 
greater or lesser utility (described as 'situational utility' earlier) in each situation. For 
II 
12 
This supports Donald Chisholm's view lhal informal coordination helps lo eorrecl the failures o f 
formal syslems. He goes on to argue that informal coordination is based on 'good behaviour and 
relationships'. See D Chisholm, Coordination without Hierarchy: informal structures in 
multiorganisational systems, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989, pp. 16, 66, 114- 20 
and I 30-4. Other authors have also noted how the informal system replaces the formal in crises. 
For example, see U Rosenthal, P 't Hart, and MT Charles, 'The World of Crises and Crisis 
Management', in Rosenthal, 't Hart, and Charles (eds), Coping With Crises: The Management of 
Disasters, Riots and Terrorism, Charles C Thomas, Springfield, 1989, p. 18. 
Gyngell and Wesley, p. 22. 
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example, the Jenkins mini-crisis of 1986 was a case where the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade (DFAT) minimised input from others and de-escalated tension. 
Keeping the military out of calculations in 1954's United Action crisis, and keeping 
Australian combat forces out of Borneo until late in Konfrontasi, are other good 
examples. Similarly, while diplomacy was unable to prevent Japan from advancing 
towards Australia in 1942, it was important to securing the new relationship (and 
eventual alliance) with the United States. While Australia is not usually known for 
financial muscle, it was able to apply its relative wealth to help build and sustain an 
effective coalition for the intervention in East Timor. This source of variation contains 
the impetus of future change as broader challenges are categorised as national security 
issues, and different instruments are used to achieve national objectives. Any future 
c1isis policymaking system should remain flexible enough to account for these 
variables. 
Insights from the empirical findings 
The research presented in this dissertation presents important insights into the 
roles played by different actors in crisis and the relationships between them. This has 
important implications for the structure, processes and development of Australia' s 
future crisis policymaking system. 
Implications for structure 
This dissertation has identified the propensity for ad hoc change in Australia's 
crisis policymaking system. This insight tells us that any future Australian system 
should not be overly reliant upon rigid structures and processes. Instead, a future 
system should capitalise on Australia' s collegiality, small size, and the direct 
involvement of political leaders to ensure responsiveness and coordinated action. 
These requirements make the structure of NSCC broadly suitable for future 
challenges, particularly as this committee brings the political and policy domains 
together. 
Despite this general predisposition towards flexibility, there is a need to 
develop a more effective way of planning responses to national security crises that 
ensures all the instruments of national power are brought together early, in a coherent, 
comprehensive and effective way. This need was demonstrated in three areas during 
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the East Timar crisis. First, planning for the intervention tended to focus on individual 
policy instruments, meaning important work for the nation-building aspect of the task 
was not conducted together with the initial security response. There is a need to 
ensure that all aspects of a situation receive attention at the same time. Second, the 
inability of a rational-comprehensive planning system to provide decision-makers 
with advice on the full range of options contributed (in the eyes of some participants) 
to Australia missing some opportunities to influence events that were important to the 
national interest. While there may have been a high level of satisfaction with the 
informal process that was used in 1999, the willingness to accept an ineffective formal 
system creates a risk factor in crisis that could be reduced by prior attention to this 
challenge. Third, the imperative to coordinate policy and operations from a whole-of-
government perspective, which was demonstrated by the creation of the ad hoc Taylor 
committee in 1999, could be met by increasing the capacity within the Australian 
Government to develop national security policy, supervise its implementation, 
rehearse scenarios and evaluate outcomes of real and rehearsed crises. 
The need for a more integrated, 'national security' approach to planning is 
only likely to increase in the future as the increasing complexity of challenges 
heighten the need to incorporate advice from a range of sources-some of which 
currently sit outside the security-cleared system boundaries. There are a range of 
existing proposals to achieve this13, with the best focusing on the appointment of a 
national security adviser to the prime minister and developing additional capacity 
within the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (DPM&C) to plan ahead, 
coordinate activity, supervise implementation, evaluate performance and develop 
capacity within the system. 
13 Such as R Babbage, Preparing Australia's Defence fo r 2020: Transformation or Reform?, The 
Kokoda Papers No. 1, The Kokoda Foundation, Canberra, 2005, p. 43; B Pacey, National Effects-
Based Approach - A Policy Discussion Paper, Working Paper 381 , Strategic and Defence Studies 
Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, 2004; A Bergin and D Woolner, 'Securi ty needs 
power of dedicated leader', Australian Financial Review, 28 May 2003, p. 63; and A Dupont, 
'A National Security Policy for Australia ', unpublished, copy in author 's possession, 1998. 
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Implications for processes 
The evidence presented here agrees with the depiction of the national security 
executive as the central domestic actors. 14 Within this group, it is the prime minister 
who emerges as dominant in crisis policymaking. Consequently, the future policy 
making system should account for the prime minister's role, and ensure he or she is 
provided with the best possible sources of information and advice. This advice should 
provide strategic options that unify the executive's preferences, while allowing the 
prime minister to provide early political input to planning. While the prime minster 
should not control implementation, the advisory system needs to provide a source of 
unfettered feedback on the crisis situation. 
A national security adviser, as mentioned above, would provide such support. 
Appointing a 'minister assisting the prime minster for national secwity', rather than a 
bureaucrat or another ministerial adviser, is the best way of injecting early and 
ongoing political input to the policymaking process. Such an appointment would lend 
authority to the position, as a minister assisting would clearly have the status and 
access to deal with the other national security ministers as an equal. It would also 
create an effective way of maintaining accountability because a minister assisting can 
be asked questions about policy and process in Parliament. 
The closed and secretive nature of crisis policymaking should be 
acknowledged in the future system, while ensuring that the process maintains its 
legitimacy and effectiveness. Ministerial control over national security policy is the 
main way of promoting legitimacy, although measures such as freedom of 
info1mation (to the extent these laws apply to national security), Parliamentary 
committees and archival rules also provide post-facto assistance. 
The infonnal nature of the existing crisis policymaking system tends to a rapid 
recourse to a small group of trusted insiders- a pattern that arguably heightens the 
risk of cognitive biases such as groupthink}5 There are a few ways of reducing this 
risk, and enhancing effectiveness, without disrupting the system. These include 
14 Such as Gyngell and Wesley, Chapter 5. 
15 IL Janis, Groupthink: psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes, 2nd edn, Houghton 
Miffl in, Boston, 1982. See also P 't Hart, Groupthink in government: a study of small groups and 
policy fa ilure, Swets & Zeitlinger, Amsterdam, 1990, for other cognitive biases that may afflict 
small groups in crisis. 
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structural and process changes that increase the internal contestability of advice, 
which may include placing an arbiter between competing advisors or creating a new 
competitor in a decentralised policymaking system. This change would enable the use 
of a more comprehensive planning system, as advocated above, and could be achieved 
by expanding DPM&C's ability to make and supervise national security policy. As 
this group could also make a contribution to evaluation-albeit one done by those 
who, in part, conducted the activity. 
The effectiveness of the future system will be strongly influenced by the 
ability to expand the group of insiders quickly and securely in the face of more 
complicated challenges. This expanded group of insiders may include new players 
from government policy instruments such as education, health, economic analysis and 
disaster management capability; and even key commercial providers and owners of 
critical infrastructure under some circumstances. Having the ability to expand quickly 
requires attention to mundane aspects of administration, such as information 
technology and security clearances. Exercises, simulations, tailored education and 
personnel exchanges would also contribute to this- and provide a way to ameliorate 
the negative aspects of competition- by helping all parts of the system to understand 
their roles, build trust, and ensure that policy skills are highly valued. An effective 
evaluation system would also help to promote accountability and learning. 
Implications for system development 
The spectrum of friction between bureaucratic politics and collegiality 
received much attention in this dissertation. Indeed, the balance between the two 
changed as the research moved from the literature on national security policy and past 
instances of crisis into the modern crisis policymaking system and East Timor. This 
indicates significant variation in this characteristic over time, and shows that future 
governments cannot assume the policymaking system will remain collegial. Nor 
should collegiality be accepted as a universal good, for the ability to air competing 
positions strengthens policy analysis. The suggestions made above for structural 
changes and greater ministerial involvement will help to promote collegiality, as long 
as other factors such as role clarity, training and education receive attention as well. 
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This research has identified a strong role for ministerial advisers in 
policymaking. This group has not been a feature of writing on national security until 
recently, and then really only during instances of controversy rather than in national 
security crises.16 Yet the prime minster's international adviser and advisers in the 
other ministerial offices (to a lesser extent) played key roles in bringing people and 
their positions together- and sometimes, on the actual content of policy. A future 
crisis policymaking system would be made stronger by recognising this influence, for 
example, by formally incorporating advisors into national security exercises. '7 
Measures to improve the advisors' accountability are also likely to improve the trust 
between them and the non-partisan actors in the system. 18 
Contribution 
While this dissertation aims to identify the consistent and variable 
characteristics of crisis policymaking in Australia, it also contributes to the body of 
knowledge of crisis policymaking in general and the understanding of Australian 
policymaking in the East Timor crisis. This dissertation also makes a contribution to 
the methodology of studying policymaking. 
The in-depth examination of crisis policymaking rn Australia is the maJor 
contribution of this dissertation. This examination was built on the first systematic 
study of national security as a policy field. The longitudinal comparison of four crises 
and the emergence of the modem crisis policymaking system allowed the system's 
consistent and variable characteristics to be developed, tested and eventually refined. 
This method for producing the characteristics should provide a high degree of 
confidence for those who apply these findings to other case studies, or for those who 
use them for practical problems such as designing a future crisis policymaking system 
for Australian conditions. 
16 Such as the 'Children O verboard Affair' of 200 I, as descrihed in A Tiernan, Power Without 
Responsibility, UNSW Press, Sydney, 2007; D Marr and M Wilkinson, Dark Victory, 2nd edn, 
Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, 2002; and P Weller, Don't Tell the Prime Minister, Scribe, 
Melbourne, 2002. An exception is Gyngell and Wesley, pp. I 09- 111. 
17 The author was told by one mjnisterial adviser that he played a role in the 2005 Multi-
jurisdictional counter-terrorism exercise. 
18 This view adds to the normative perspective on the need for accountabil ity that is advocated hy 
Tiernan, Power Without Responsibili1y, pp. 236-7. 
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Secondly, this dissertation makes a substantial contribution to the 
understanding of how Australian policymaking was conducted during the East Timor 
crisis. While the interpretation of events differs only in details from the broader 
accounts by Goldsworthy, Greenlees and Garran, White, and the Department of 
Foreign Affairs 19, this dissertation is unique in that it looks at the policymakers' 
perspective of crisis. It shows how the formal, accepted structures and processes 
needed important modifications when the system was placed under pressure. The 
examination also provides insights into the changing conception of some policy 
instruments, and how the relationships between actors varied once in crisis. This 
research fills part of the gap in the understanding of this crisis that Cotton identified in 
2004.20 It also provides a window into a usually closed world, in a similar manner to 
Edwards' study of Australian social policy21 and Heclo and Wildavsky's 
groundbreaking examination of the British Treasury.22 
Lastly, the combination of the Australian Policy Cycle with interviews, 
official sources and other primary and secondary accounts makes a methodological 
contribution to the study of policymaking. This dissertation shows how the policy 
cycle can be gainfully employed as a heuristic framework for case studies. This usage 
supports both the proponents of the policy cycle and its critics (such as Howard and 
Everett23) by not claiming too much for the cycle and recognising its limitations as an 
explanatory tool. 
The interviews conducted for this dissertation will prove a valuable resource 
for the future, especially as the official record is likely to be incomplete when it is 
released to the public. In addition, these interviews have told a story about the 
19 D Goldsworthy, 'East Timor,' in Goldsworthy and P Edwards (eds), Facing north: a century of 
Australian engagement with Asia, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 2003; D Greenlees, and 
R Ga1Tan, Deliverance: The Inside Story of Hast Timor's Fight for Freedom, Allen and Un win, 
Crows Nest, 2002; H White, 'The Road to INTERFET: East T imor - 1999', unpublished paper, 
2007; and Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, East Timor in Transition 1998-2000: An 
Australian Policy Challenge, Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, 2001. 
20 
.T Cotton, East Timor, Australia and Regional Order: intervention and its aftermath in Southeast 




M Edwards, Social Policy, Public Policy: From Problem to Practice, Allen and Unwin, Crows 
Nest, 2001. 
H Heclo and A Wildavsky, The Private Government of Public Money: Community and Policy 
inside British Politics, MacMillan, London, 1974. 
S Everett, 'The Policy Cycle: Democratic Process or Rational Paradigm Revisited?', Australian 
Journal of Public Administration, vol. 62, no. 2, 2003; and C Howard, 'The Policy Cycle: 
A Model of Post Machiavellian Policy Making?', Australian Journal of Public Administration, 
vol. 63, no. 3, 2005. 
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structure and processes-and sometimes the emotion-of policymaking that are 
difficult to assemble using documents alone. 
The analysis of the political, policy and administrative domains adds another 
layer of richness to the understanding of policymaking. This depth is often missed by 
the usual focus on political leaders, just as the detail of the structures and processes of 
policymaking are overlooked unless those working at lower-levels in the system are 
illuminated through a suitable research method. 
This dissertation, in effect, tells a story of how Australia developed its crisis 
policymaking system from one suitable for a dependent nation, to one that helps a 
nation protect and advance it own interests. It has also shown how the nation's 
bureaucracy has gone from little interaction, through a period of significant 
competition, to one marked by collegiality. This dissertation also shows how 
Australia has moved from being dependent upon others for policy inputs to one that 
develops its own, in cooperation with allies and others. Yet this does not describe the 
end of a journey. Australia's future crisis policymaking system must continue to 
change in ways that accord with its nature, while retaining an ability to respond to 
new challenges. Such change will be essential because Australia will face more 
complex crises in the future, and these crises will involve high stakes for its 
relationships, sovereignty, public safety and the economy. How the Australian 
Government organises its policymaking system beforehand will be critical to 
managing the transformative potential of those events. Making the most of pre-crisis 
opportunities to improve organisation, training and ultimately culture will improve the 
ability of future policymakers to respond effectively to crisis. This is a critical matter 
for governments to address, and to review periodically to ensure the continued 
relevance and robustness of Australia's crisis policymaking system. 
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INTERVIEW GUIDE 
The interviews were designed to gain insights into policymaking during the 
crisis in East Timor (1998-99). The interview was tailored to the individuals 
experience and interest, so each was different in some way. The questions below are 
representative of those asked and were used as a basis for discussion. 
1. I understand that you (appointmenUposition) from (date) to (date). How do 
you recall the events that Jed to the intervention up to that point? 
2. What happened during the acute crisis in September? 
3. I am interested in your views of policymaking within (your organisation), 
and between (your organisation) and other agencies. 
a. How were issues identified? 
b. What type of analytical processes were used? 
c. What steps did you take to coordinate effort within (your 
organisation)? 
1. Please describe the mechanisms. What helped? What hindered? 
IL How effective was coordination within (your organisation)? 
d. What was policymaking like within (your organisation)? 
J. What factors or events made ad hoc measures necessary? 
u. How effective was policymaking? 
4. If you had your time over again, what would you change to improve 
policymaking (that you learned as a result of this crisis, and perhaps as a 
result of your broader experience)? 
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